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ABSTRACT

The hope and history debate in twentieth century Catholic theology concerned to
what extent the object(s) of eschatological hope could be realised within history. Its
context was the ‘secularisation of Christian eschatology’. On the one hand, Joseph
Ratzinger, who was indebted to the philosophical work of Josef Pieper, considered
hope’s object to belong to the realm of gift. He was sceptical of the extent to which
hope could be manufactured by human means within history. On the other, Edward
Schillebeeckx, Johann Baptist Metz and Gustavo Gutiérrez presented theologies of
futurity, including political theology and liberation theology, in which the realisation
of eschatological goals in the historical future became an important object of hope.
The protagonists’ positions depended upon the decisions they took in fundamental
theology. They are aligned in broad terms to the Communio and Concilium ‘schools’
of post-conciliar Catholic theology. These ‘schools’ embody importantly different
presentations of fundamental theology still at large today. The different areas of
fundamental theology engaged by the hope-history debate include metaphysics and
the philosophy of history, Christology, the nature-grace debate and soteriology. The
Communio perspective on fundamental theology, represented by Ratzinger, adopts an
analogical metaphysics and a theology of history aware of the limits of any
philosophy of history and its claims to exhaustive knowledge of history’s progress. It
privileges the place of Christ, understood in Chalcedonian terms, in the
understanding of hope and salvation history, his novelty in relation to nature and his
centrality to the redemption. The Concilium interpretation, represented by
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez, incorporate elements of Hegelian-Marxist
philosophy, view Christ through politico-historical lens and adopt a Rahnerian
theology of grace, in which Christ’s novelty and centrality to nature, grace and the
redemption are downplayed, and the redemption is understood as involving the
integration of historical and eschatological reality.
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INTRODUCTION
A creature's power is not as great as its desire.1

Deus, qui cónspicis, quia ex nulla nostra actione confídimus…2

If the hope we have learned to repose in Christ belongs to this world only, then we
are unhappy beyond all other men. (1 Cor 19, Knox translation).3

Preface: Hope and History at the Foundations of Theology Today

Reflection on hope, and the meaning and goal of history became pressing in the
twentieth century as a result of what Joseph Ratzinger described in 1977 as “the
emerging crisis of European civilisation”.4 The “crisis… in [the] particular historical
configuration” of twentieth century Europe involved the despair and annihilation
generated by total war, nuclear proliferation and genocide, the transmogrification of
Christian hope into “this-worldly hope”, the “naïve faith in progress” embodied in
liberalism, and the optimism and utopianism inherent in revolutionary Marxist
systems of thought and praxis.5 Present in twentieth century Catholic thought were

1

Josemaría Escrivá, “The Eucharist, Mystery of Faith and Love,” in Josemaría Escrivá, Christ is
Passing By: Homilies (New York: Scepter Publishers, 1973), 195 (83).
2
Collect of Sexagesima Sunday (MR 1962 (London: Baronius Press Ltd, 2005)).
3
The Holy Bible, translated from the Latin Vulgate by Monsignor Ronald Knox (London: Baronius
Press, 2012).
4
Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, second English edition, trans. M Waldstein
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 3.
5
Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology,
trans. Sr Mary Frances McCarthy SND (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 153ff, Joseph
Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology: Approaches to Understanding Its Role in the Light of
Present Controversy, trans. A Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 101. Joseph Ratzinger,
The Yes of Jesus Christ: Spiritual Exercises in Faith, Hope and Love, trans. R Nowell (New York:
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1991), 43, Joseph Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe? The
Church in the Modern World: Assessment and Forecast, second edition, trans. B McNeil (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), 27-28. Pierre Manent, “Human Unity Real and Imagined”, First
Things 226 (October 2012): 47. C.f. e.g. Christopher Dawson, “Christian Culture as a Culture of

1

various responses to civilisational crisis and the possibility, and nature, of hope in the
face of it, which in essence concerns the relationship between hope and history. The
hope-history debate raises questions therefore regarding: the nature of hope and its
object(s); the distinction and relationship between eschatological hope and worldly
hope; whether the object(s) of hope are largely inner- or extra- (or supra-) historical;
and therefore what are the meaning of history and the relationship between history
and the eschaton.6 It focuses on “the search for an appropriate ‘praxis of hope’ in
contemporary society” and represents the continuing need to form a genuine
Christian hope.7

The thesis asks the question how various protagonists of the hope-history debate
dealt with the issue of whether hope, in its most fundamental sense, has an inner- or
extra-historical object. This question is significant because one’s answer to it will
determine whether or not hope is secularised and directed to inner-historical goals,
projects and strategies. In Catholic twentieth century thought, varying answers were
given. The received wisdom that hope concerned the individual and the traditional

Hope” in Christianity and European Culture: Selections from the Work of Christopher Dawson, ed.
GJ Russello (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 48-49.
6
Apart from the authors under examination in this study, who are principal protagonists in the hopehistory debate (see below), hope has been of philosophical and theological interest in contemporary
thought. From among the literature see for example philosophers: Bernard Schumacher, Philosophy of
Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope, trans. DC Schindler (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2003); Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope in three volumes, trans. N
Plaice, S Plaice and P Knight, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1995); and theologians: Romanus
Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), ch. 2;
Servais Pinckaers, La vertu d’espérance de Pierre Lombard à St Thomas d’Aquin, STD Thesis,
Angelicum, 1958 cited in John Berkman, “Introduction,” in Servais Pinckaers OP, The Pinckaers
Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), xiv; Dominic Doyle, “Changing Hopes:
Theological Virtue of Hope in Thomas Aquinas, John of the Cross, and Karl Rahner,” Irish
Theological Quarterly, 77(1) (2012): 18-36, esp 18, “Post-traumatic Ecclesiology and the Restoration
of Hope,” Theological Studies, 72(2) (2011): 275-295, “Spe Salvi on Eschatological and Secular
Hope: A Thomistic Critique of an Augustinian Encyclical,” Theological Studies, 71(2) (2011): 350379 and The Promise of Christian Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope, (New York: Crossroad
Publishing Company, 2011); Reinhard Hütter, “‘In hope he believed against hope’ (Rom 4:18); Faith
and Hope, Two Pauline Motifs as Interpreted by Aquinas: A Re-lecture of Pope Benedict XVI’s
Encyclical Letter Spe Salvi,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 7(4) (2009): 839-867 and “‘In Hope He
Believed Against Hope’ – The Unity of Faith and Hope in Paul, Thomas, and Benedict XVI” in his
Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids, Michigan
and Cambridge, UK: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 283-312; and Constance
Fitzgerald, “From Impasse to Prophetic Hope: Crisis of Memory”, CTSA Proceedings, 64 (2009): 2142.
7
Aidan Nichols OP, The Thought of Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph
Ratzinger, second edition, (London and New York: Burns and Oates, 2005), see ch. 8, “The
Eschatology Theme”, 155-187, especially 156-157. James G McEvoy, “Hope, Modernity, and the
Church: A Response to Richard Lennan and Dominic Doyle,” Theological Studies 72 (2011): 296.

2

themes of eschatology (the four ‘last things’ of death, judgment, heaven or hell) was
replaced by some with a theology of hope. An exclusive focus was given to
eschatology as a motivator to seek, at least partially, the realisation of eschatological
realities within history, often conceived in terms redolent of contemporary concerns
with justice and peace. A contrary perspective continued to see hope as relating to
eschatology’s traditional concerns with the individual’s fate after death, although not
in individualistic terms or ignorant of hope’s communal and inner-historical
implications. It linked hope to an existential desire for fulfilment in eternal life. It
resisted the revolutionary implications that a theology of hope augured for the whole
of theology and the fabric of Christian belief.8

The contours of the hope-history debate both reveal and are revealed by fundamental
theology. The principal objective of this thesis is to make out the contention that the
foundational orientations of a theologian will determine the position he takes in the
hope-history debate, especially regarding the inner- or extra-historical character of
hope’s object(s). Focusing on the nature of hope and history itself while essential
does not give the full picture. To answer the question of whether hope can be realised
in history, partially or completely, requires reference to a theological framework that
itself answers questions regarding the destiny of creation and the human person. This
is not to criticise a singular focus on hope, which is necessary to explore the nature of
hope. It is to suggest, rather, that a singular focus is incomplete. 9 The study thus
unearths some of the theological assumptions of authors’ contributions to the debate
and connects those contributions to what happens elsewhere in theology.
A theologian’s views on the hope-history relationship reveal the fundamental
presuppositions of his theology, even if those underpinnings reman unstated or
unclear. Positioning in the hope-history debate is akin to a litmus test for the whole
of theology and, to a degree, one’s attitude to modernity in general. In its way, it is a
building block of fundamental theology because it implicates foundational questions
in theology. Analysis of the hope-history debate is, therefore, a case study of the
consequences and importance of positions taken in fundamental theology. The thesis

8

See for example, Ratzinger on the immortality of the soul, Eschatology, 266-268.
For example, Schumacher’s indispensable study (Philosophy of Hope) of Josef Pieper’s philosophy
of hope is primarily philosophical.
9
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aims to explore in depth the nature and reasons for contrasting orientations evident in
the hope-history debate. Through investigation of the theological and philosophical
sources of the dispute, it examines the theological roots of the contending positions
in the debate and the significance of baseline decisions in fundamental theology
today.

The issues in fundamental theology revealed in an exploration of the theological
roots of the hope-history debate concern the nature-grace-history relationship and
questions of metaphysics. The hope-history debate especially touches on the
questions foundational to theology because the position one takes on nature-grace –
and with that Christology – is often determinative for related areas of theology,
including hope-history, soteriology and eschatology. It is also relevant to
fundamental theology because it explores the human capacity for the divine and how
the object of revelation – the Word made manifest in Christ – fulfils that capacity,
which is essential to answering the question of where hope and its energy is to be
oriented.10 In a sense, it asks the fundamental question of all theology concerning
why God became man and what effect, therefore, his Incarnation has had on human
history: is the Kingdom of God to be built on earth by human hands and/or is its
realisation to come?11 The positions taken on nature and grace and Christ’s relation
to human nature, and metaphysics, govern one’s views of the possibilities of history
10

Various definitions are given of fundamental theology. Aidan Nichols OP describes it as covering
the area formerly discussed in apologetics: The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to its
Sources, Principles, and History (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press: 1991), 24.
Apologetics partly concerned the possibility of divine revelation and the reasonableness of what
Christian faith claims to be divine revelation: see, for example, Ronald Knox, The Belief of Catholics
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000; first published 1927). Fundamental theology is taken here to be
that area of theology touching on the foundational questions of the theological enterprise identified by
Tracey Rowland, Catholic Theology (London and New York: Bloomsbury T & T Clark: 2017), 205.
Answers to these situate a theologian, especially concerning the relationship between nature-grace and
history-ontology. At the heart of these questions is how humanity’s transcendent destiny and therefore
being is mediated in history, and the role of Christ in that mediation; that is, how the grace of the
Incarnate Word is communicated to humanity. C.f. PJ Cahill’s description of “Fundamental Theology,”
in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., vol. 6, (Detroit, MI: Gale, 2003), 26-27 from Gale Virtual Reference Library,
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3407704353/GVRL?u=note_dame&sid=GVRL&xid=f50b1ca
8, accessed 17 Dec 2018. Cahill notes that fundamental theology’s traditional interest was with respect
to God’s revelation of himself in Christ, and his establishment of the Church as the bearer of that
revelation. He notes that Karl Rahner and others sought to develop fundamental theology by orienting
it to a study of “man’s openness to all being”, in which the analogy of being and the human person’s
obediential potency are important. The questions of this thesis touch on fundamental theology
understood in this sense of an “analysis of [the] capability [of “hearing the word of God”], both in the
abstract and as it is fulfilled in the concrete”, especially with respect to differing answers given to how
the human person’s capacity for grace is fulfilled in the Person of Christ.
11
C.f. James McAuley’s Captain Quiros of 1964, discussed in Dan Hitchens, “McAuley Beyond
Despair,” First Things 280 (February 2018): 36.
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and, even more fundamentally, how soteriology (who saves us and how) and
eschatology (what is the nature of God’s final redemption and when it is realised) is
understood.

If the supernatural and soteriology are conceived immanently, and the distinction
between history and the eschaton blurred, hope will be immanently framed. If
sanctifying grace is imparted through unique means from ‘above’, on the contrary, a
reserve will be applied to the eschatological significance of profane activity, and
hope will primarily be directed to an eternal future. Determinative is one’s
Christology. How Christ is conceived informs one’s soteriology and who is the
primary agent in saving us. If Christ is conceived ‘from below’ in his historicity, the
soteriological import of history will increase and hope will be turned to the social,
historical and political. If ‘from above’, emphasising the unity of Christ’s humanity
to his divinity, history will be relativised and hope directed in a personalistic manner
‘above’ to the Incarnate Word. Metaphysics is also important. If the relation between
God and humanity is conceptualised univocally, the creature and history (and the
secular) have an ontology untethered from God. If analogically, the creature is seen
intrinsically to participate in God’s being and is oriented to the fullness of it. How
hope is understood thus depends on fundamental theology.

The hope-history debate and the underlying theological principles informing it are
pertinent to the state of the Church today. To an extent, what one thinks the Church’s
response to the contemporary philosophical, social and historical matrix ought to be
will turn on what one thinks is the object(s) of hope. Particularly, the answer given to
the question of whether hope’s object(s) is primarily inner- or extra-historical and the
related issue of who has agency in bringing hope’s object(s) about, will determine
what credence is given to the idea that history develops progressively and
immanently, an often unspecified but nonetheless subsisting assumption today. As
one’s view of the historicity or not of hope depends on fundamental theology, one’s
positions on metaphysics, and the relationship between nature and grace will inform
one’s soteriology and eschatology. In turn, one’s soteriology and eschatology shapes
the response give to Hegel’s question of whether or not history develops according to
its own immanent logic towards a telos within history.

5

Whether one finds thus a Hegelian-Marxist view of history palatable or not coincides
with or, more strongly, is determined by how one: understands Christology;
conceives the natural in relation to the supernatural and consequently relates Christ
to nature; and conceives metaphysics. Much effort in Catholic thought in modernity
has been directed to responding to Kant’s epistemological challenge. As well as
Kant’s anti-realist transcendentalism, the crisis in the Church today concerns the
reception given to the historicisation of ontology latent in Hegelian-Marxist dialectic
and how secularisation and the ‘world’ are viewed.12 The future health of Catholic
theology requires a rejoinder to a dialectical view of history. One’s response to Hegel
and Marx in the hope-history debate depends ultimately upon higher order
theological and philosophical principles. The merit of those principles will shape the
quality of that response.

Careful attention must therefore be given to the choices one makes in fundamental
theology. Even if the differences between the choices might appear subtle, on these
decisions turn the attitudes, dispositions and arguments revealed in the hope and
history debate but also those present in the broader ecclesial environment.
Fundamental theology is not confined to the academy but plays itself out in the
rhetoric of bishops, priests, religious, agency leaders and parishioners. The manner in
which the human person is conceived as being capable of receiving supernatural
revelation and how grace is imparted to him, and the objective bindingness of that
revelation shape understandings of what salvific significance human activity has,
sacramental discipline and practice, the adaptability or otherwise of dogma and the
purpose of the Church’s activities in the world. It will determine attitudes to the
‘world’, the worth of secular activities and how much guidance the Church should
take from the secular realm.

To examine the implications of the hope-history debate in fundamental theology and
the place of Hegel and Marx in contemporary Catholic thought, this thesis compares
therefore two different sets of authors. The first consists of Edward Schillebeeckx,
Johann Baptist Metz (who developed a political theology) and Gustavo Gutiérrez
(who developed a liberation theology). Together they will be taken as representative
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C.f. Rowland, Catholic Theology, 205.
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of the Concilium perspective on hope and history, named for the theological journal
(see further below).13 As representative of the Communio perspective, contrasted
against them is Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI, especially understood as
influenced by the philosophical work of Josef Pieper.14 Each set typifies contrasting
positions on the question of hope and history and can be examined as a set. In his
own right, each author was a chief participant in the hope-history debate. The study
excavates the underlying, higher-order theological principles animating each author’s
contribution to the debate in relation to the general perspective they embody. It
relates their views on hope and history to their orientations in fundamental theology
concerning the Person of Christ and his significance for history and eschatology, the
human person’s creaturely capacity for grace and the way in which he receives it,
and the nature of the soteriological role of Christ in mediating that grace.

Moreover, in examining these questions, the proper relationship between history and
the eschaton, and metaphysics will be touched upon. If Christ is conceived in
Chalcedonian terms (3) as the divine and novel intervention in the order of creation,

13

For a good overview of Schillebeeckx’s bibliography and life, see Olav Hovdelien’s entry on
“Edward Schillebeeckx” in Key Theological Thinkers: From Modern to Postmodern, ed. Staale
Johannes Kristiansen and Svein Rise (Taylor & Francis Group, 2016). ProQuest Ebook Central
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unda/detail.action?docID=4513660, accessed 7 March 2018. For
an overview of Metz, see J Matthew Ashley’s “Introduction” to Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History
and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, trans. J Matthew Ashley (New York:
Crossroad Publishing Company, 2007), 1-20. Gerhard Cardinal Müller provides theological context
for Gutiérrez’s liberation theology: Gerhard Ludwig Müller, “Liberation Theology in Context,” in
Gustavo Gutiérrez and Cardinal Gerhard Ludwig Müller, On the Side of the Poor: The Theology of
Liberation, trans. Robert A Krieg and James Benedict Nickoloff (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books,
2015), 54-82.
In order to outline the positions of Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez on hope and history in
fundamental theology, some representative texts will be utilised. For Schillebeeckx, this will include
the second volume of his Christological trilogy, Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern
World: Gerechtigheid end liefde: Genade en bevrijding, 1977, published in English in London by
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1980. Metz’s Faith in History and Society will be taken as
illustrative of his political theology. Translator J Matthew Ashley describes this book as “the most
important single text for understanding [Metz’s] approach”: see his “Introduction” to Metz, Faith in
History and Society, 1. The principal text of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s liberation theology is his A Theology
of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, trans. and ed. Sr Caridad Inda and John Eagleson
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998).
For further discussion of the Communio-Concilium split in Catholic theology and examples
of Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez being published in the Concilium journal see section 4 of this
Chapter.
14
See n88 below for texts of Pieper and Ratzinger on hope and history. The thesis will use Ratzinger
in references to his writings to his election as Pope, and Benedict for those published thereafter. As
Aidan Nichols OP notes, although Ratzinger’s roles as private theologian and member of the
magisterium are distinct, they possess a unity such that ‘Ratzinger’ and ‘Benedict’ can be used
“indifferently”: The Conversation of Faith and Reason: Modern Catholic Thought from Hermes to
Benedict XVI (Chicago and Mundelein, Illinois: Hillenbrand Books, 2009).
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and history is conceived as a creature, then history cannot be seen as containing the
entirety of being, but as containing it in a provisional, creaturely way (see further
below).15 Creation – nature and the temporal order – are to be taken out of
themselves to partake in eternity. Necessarily, any inner-historical claims for hope
are relativised against the recognition that creation and the human person long for a
(personal) transformation, which elevates them into an entirely different order of
being.

To provide context to how this thesis will explore the competing perspectives on the
hope-history relationship, this Introduction will essay the impact of conceptions of
the history-ontology relationship on the current ecclesial and theological context, the
nature-grace relationship and Christology, the utility of the Incarnationalist/Eschatological
distinction sometimes drawn in the literature, and the Concilium/Communio split in
contemporary Catholic theology. Finally, it will provide an outline of the argument
pursued in the thesis.

1. Contemporary Ecclesial and Theological Context: The History-Ontology
Relationship

The volatile contemporary ecclesial atmosphere reveals the stakes in the hopehistory debate. A theologian is not immune from the travails in the Church around
him and will ask what the philosophical and theological sources are of those travails.
Virulent disputation characterises public discourse in the contemporary ecclesial
climate. The relative calm of the St John Paul II and Benedict XVI pontificates –
which was only ever apparent – has been upended. On display in the current ecclesial
environment is, on the one hand, a latent if inchoate cocktail of Joachimite, Hegelian
and Marxist ingredients, which sees history, dogma and tradition and even the papal
office in essentially dialectical terms. The ‘new’ is urged to replace the ‘old’, in the
expectation that an essentially different and definitive historical epoch awaits. The
drive to the future is joined to a repudiation of the past and an imperative to change
existing, “sinful structures”.16 Allied to this progressive dialecticism is a treatment of
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References to numerals in parenthesis throughout this thesis are references to Chapters of the thesis.
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, trans.
Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 115 describing liberation theology. The rhetoric
16
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the ‘world’ as a principal locus theologicus. Theology takes its cues from secular
reality outside the Church. In this way, human effort is to be focused upon praxis and
the working towards of economic and social emancipation, effort receiving its
content from secular-inflected dialectics. Received doctrine is apt for revision in light
of changing of historical circumstances. The Church must be on the ‘right side of
history’. Generally speaking, such an attitude aligns with more immanentist
understandings of hope(s)’s object.17

On the other hand, there are defenders of the authority of a living, apostolic tradition,
which continues to bind today. The Christian religion is not an “open narrative”,
which incorporates into the faith what is held in “contemporary critical
consciousness” – it respects rather an ontologically-grounded ‘timelessness of
truth’.18 A defence of timeless, transcendent ontology is thus a response to the
spectre of a “dictatorship of relativism” generated by an immanentist emphasis on
praxis, which struggles to breathe in transcendent air.19 One of the chief proponents
of ‘timeless truth’ is Ratzinger, whose theological concerns regarding political and
liberation theology – which often manifest the attitude described above – are
of ‘new phase’ and ‘paradigm shift’ has fairly or not been applied to Pope Francis’s papacy, which
reveals the presence of an underlying Joachimitism of some in the Church. Fr Thomas Rosica has
stated that Pope Francis represents a “new phase” in the history of the Church because he “breaks
Catholic traditions whenever he wants”. The Church “is openly ruled by an individual rather than by
the authority of Scripture alone or even its own dictates of tradition [sic] plus Scripture”: Michael
Brendan Dougherty, “The Case against Pope Francis,” National Review, 11 October 2018,
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/29/case-against-pope-francis-catholic-church/;
accessed 19 October 2018. Matthew Schmitz “Parallel popes,” Catholic Herald 6899 (25 January,
2019): 21 summarises the attitude well: “Francis is the cool pope, a mascot for those who believe that
Christ came 2,000 years before the fullness of time, which will only arrive when we live up to the
latest set of liberal platitudes.”: Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, in his intervention regarding the sex
abuse scandal, notes the fruitlessness of trying to build a “new Church”, arguing that such has been
tried and found wanting. The ‘better Church’ is diabolical and cannot ground hope: “The Church and the Scandal
of Sexual Abuse,” Catholic News Agency, 10 April, 2019: https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/fulltext-of-benedict-xvi-the-church-and-the-scandal-of-sexual-abuse-59639, accessed 15 April 2019. On
the fragility of the so-called ‘conservative’ order in the Church see Ross Douthat, “A Crisis of
Conservative Catholicism,” First Things, 259 (January 2016): 21-28.
17
The description in this and the next paragraph is necessarily general, painted in broad strokes that
inevitably gloss over the subtleties of the positions.
18
Tracey Rowland, “Ratzinger on the Timelessness of Truth,” Communio 44 (Summer 2017): 263.
19
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Homily for Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice,” 18 April 2005,
http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_20050418_en.html,
last
accessed 28 February 2019. C.f. Pope Benedict XVI, “The Listening Heart: Reflections on
the Foundations of Law,” Address to Bundestag, 22 September 2011 :
http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20110922_reichstag-berlin.html last accessed 3 August 2020. Reproduced in Benedict
XVI/Joseph Ratzinger, Faith and Politics: Selected Writings, trans. Michael J Miller and others (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2018) as “Affirming the Right to Combat Injustice: The Speech in the
Bundestag (September 22, 2011),” 159-167, see 165.
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grounded in the fear that an emphasis on praxis can result in relativism.20 Ratzinger
and those of like-mind see history as turning definitively on the Incarnation and
Paschal Mystery of Christ. They are cautious regarding the possibility of innerhistorical fulfilment and sceptical of claims that history develops according to its
own immanent logic. History already contains instead the seeds of its own yet to be
realised supra-historical fulfilment in the Resurrection of Christ. It does not need
human action to construct a ‘better future’ and ‘new humanity’. Christ in the Church
alone can redeem the world. He is the ‘better future’ and ‘new humanity’. Most
important for them is not inner-historical human activity seeking to ‘build a better
world’ but a patient orientation to Christ, built on charitable union with him and our
neighbour, and fostered in the liturgy and sacraments. On this view, hope’s object is
eternal hope in Christ.

Implicit in the contrasting contemporary ecclesial viewpoints are competing
metaphysics. Tracey Rowland has often pointed out Ratzinger’s observation that in
the wake of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), the “fundamental crisis of
our age” is conceptualising how being is mediated in history.21 Several issues are at
play in seeking to understand the relationship between ontology and history. Perhaps
most crucial is the question of how truth is mediated in history, including regarding
the truth of the human person and his nature. Also relevant are questions of how
history is reconciled to the present and what significance the past has for the present,
issues catalysed by the historical crisis of the twentieth century.22 Underlying such
questions is the more fundamental metaphysical issue of whether truth and its object,
Being, transcend particular, historical circumstances or are historically contingent,
partially or entirely. Another way of looking at the issue is to ask Hegel’s question
20

Ratzinger notes that relativism, including with respect the various world religions, followed in the
wake of the subsidence of liberation theology in the 1990s and points out the connections between
orthopraxy and relativism, including with respect to P Knitter, who sought to “[link] pluralist theology
of religions with the liberation theologies”: Truth and Tolerance, 123-126.
21
Rowland, Catholic Theology, 205, c.f. Rowland, “Timelessness of Truth,” 243 quoting Ratzinger,
Principles of Catholic Theology, 160. See also Tracey Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the
Perplexed (London: Continuum Books, 2010), 1-2, Tracey Rowland, “Foreword” to Christopher S.
Collins SJ, The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI
(Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2013), in Collins, vii.
22
As Rowland points out, in response to these issues Ratzinger notes the question of whether there is
a human nature as such is raised, Rowland, “Timelessness of Truth,” 242-243, quoting Ratzinger,
Principles of Catholic Theology, 9. On Ratzinger’s description of the crisis constituted by the
twentieth century, see Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 153-155, 158, Theology of History
in St Bonaventure, v. See also text accompanying n5 above.
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whether the universal is the historical, unfolding itself in history according to a
dialectical pattern resulting in the ever-greater realisation of the “World’s” “own
freedom on the part of Spirit”.23 Hegel himself represented the “turn to history”,
which resulted in time being considered synonymous with Being and “the logos [as
becoming] itself in history”.24 In short, the history/ontology question asks if abiding
truth is ‘inside’ (immanent to) or ‘outside’ (transcendent of) of history.

Framing the question in this manner underscores a key cleavage in contemporary
intra-ecclesial disputes as approbating or disapprobating the Hegelian ‘turn to
history’ as it relates those disputes to the hope-history debate and to broader cultural
divisions regarding what Eric Voegelin calls the perennial gnostic temptation to
‘immanentize the eschaton’, that is, to place in an inner-worldly framework
eschatological expectation.25 Dividing the opposing camps appears to be a chasm in
the appreciation of the meaning of history and its immanent possibilities. If truth is
understood as historically contingent, it is a short step to saying that history – with
the Church alongside – can and needs to develop according to apparently more
advanced political and ethical understandings. The papal office is seen as unmoored
from binding truth and tradition. The contrary claim argues that truth and being,
while mediated in and through history, nevertheless has its ultimate source ‘outside’
23

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J Sibree (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc: 1956), 19. C.f. Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 16: according to Hegel,
“the logos becomes itself in history”.
24
Rowland, “Timelessness of Truth,” 243 citing Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 16.
25
Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) discussed
in George H Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Since 1945 (Wilmington,
Delaware: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996), 43. Ratzinger predicted in 1996 that there would be
new forms of Marxism, a reality that has been borne out: Truth and Tolerance, 117. Some have argued
that prominent theologian, Walter Cardinal Kaspar, has affinities with Hegel’s thought and Karl Rahner’s theology
of grace: Thomas Heinrich Stark, “German Idealism and Cardinal Kaspar’s Theological Project,” The Catholic
World Report, 9 June, 2015: https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2015/06/09/german-idealism-andcardinal-kaspers-theological-project/, last accessed 25 March 2019. Stark notes Kaspar’s approval of
Hegel’s comment that “the whole truth is nothing other than essence consummating itself through its
development” (Walter Kaspar, An Introduction to Christian Faith (London, Burns and Oates, 1980),
156 quoting Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, trans. AV Miller (Oxford, 1977), 11). He also
quotes this comment of Kaspar’s from his An Introduction, 162, which has echoes of Rahner: “It is
impossible to make a clear distinction between secular history and salvation history…All reality is
dominated by the appeal and offer of God’s grace and so is potentially salvation history” (1.4). He
notes that one of Kaspar’s sources is K Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,”
Theological Investigations, vol 5, 115-134. See also the suggestion that Hegelianism is apparent in the
Church today: Anna M Silvas, “A Year After ‘Amoris Laetitia’. A Timely Word,” published in
Settimo
Cielo,
the
weblog
of
Sandro
Magister,
21
April
2017:
http://magister.blogautore.espresso.repubblica.it/2017/04/21/a-year-after-amoris-laetitia-a-timelyword/?refresh_ce, last accessed 28 February 2019, RR Reno “Pope Francis and his associates echo the
pieties and self-complimenting utopianism of progressives”: Public Square, First Things 278,
(December 2017): 68.
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history, as its transcendent origin and end. It is ‘timeless’ in Rowland’s terminology.
God’s revelation of himself in history points to an eternal reality outside of history,
participation in which history is to be brought as its telos and peras, end and
boundary, through transformative grace (3 and 5). At stake in the history-ontology
debate therefore is whether hope is understood to be oriented towards history’s inner
fulfilment or outside it.
For a Catholic theologian, philosophical questions of ontology’s relationship to
history also implicate theology, as well as today’s febrile intra-ecclesial environment.
Disputation of the sort characteristic in the Church today essentially concerns
differing theological and metaphysical tendencies, which manifest themselves in
differing ideas of what the Church’s relationship to the world ought to be. Competing
tendencies arose in the wake of the Second Vatican Council and remain unresolved.
Today’s disputes have exposed to the public eye what had largely remained hidden
theological and philosophical flux confined to competing theological journals.
Swirling around the ecclesial atmosphere are different theological formations, whose
origins are to be discovered in an excavation of the contesting positions and
dispositions in fundamental theology of the differing combatants in today’s
“theological star wars”.26

Rowland has pointed out that the answers that a theologian gives to certain
foundational questions in theology will determine the whole web of his theology.
Specifically, in applying Ratzinger’s history-ontology problematic to Catholic
theology, she suggests that the issue concerns how to account for the impact of
history in relation to questions of truth and the capacity for human beings to respond
to grace, without sacrificing the ontological insights of classic formulations of the
nature-grace relationship. All people everywhere have the capacity of receiving, and
are offered, the grace of justification, but exist in different historical-cultural milieux
that may affect the mediation of that grace. Thus, she suggests that, in terms of
Catholic theology, at the heart of the ‘crisis’ identified by Ratzinger concerning the
history-ontology relationship are how competing “theological schools” differently
account for the “relationship between nature, grace and history”. 27 Competing
26
27

Rowland, Catholic Theology, 93.
Rowland, Catholic Theology, 205.

12

approaches in fundamental theology understand this relationship in contrasting ways.
How they do so will impact upon the Church’s self-understanding and how she is
conceived in relation to the world and surrounding historical circumstances, and in
turn, how the hope-history relationship is to be conceived.

2. The Nature-Grace Relationship and Christology

Implicated in the history-ontology question is thus the nature-grace relationship, a
site of ongoing debate in contemporary theology. A foundational question implied in
the nature-grace-history relationship concerns how nature and grace, mediated
through Christ, ought to be understood in relation to one another. For guidance on
this question, Rowland points out, a theologian will generally choose from: Francisco
Suárez; Karl Rahner; or Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar. The
theologian(s) chosen will often be determinative of where one sits generally in
fundamental theology and also one’s attitude to the theological significance of the
‘world’.
Intrinsically connected to one’s decision on the shape of the nature-grace relationship
is one’s Christology. Nicholas J. Healy has pointed out that the heated nature-grace
debates in mid-twentieth century Catholic theology turned on how Christ was
perceived “in relation to creation”, and what “novelty and gratuity” he offers
nature.28 The answer to this question presupposes the content of one’s Christology.
Bruce Marshall comments, in comparing Rahner and Karl Barth as representative of
the Christological poles in theology, that a fundamental issue in theology turns on
whether priority is given to “a general religious anthropology allied with the idea of
an absolute saviour” (the Rahnerian position) or “the particular person Jesus Christ”
(the Barthian position).29 Whether Christ’s historicity, or the unity of his humanity to
28

Nicholas J Healy, “Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A Note on Some Recent Contributions to
the Debate,” Communio 35(4) (Winter 2008) 535; see also Aaron Riches, “Christology and duplex
hominis beatitude: Re-sketching the Supernatural Again,” International Journal of Systematic
Theology 14(1) (January 2012): 45, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2400.2011.00560.x, accessed 15 August 2020.
Rowland, Catholic Theology, 33, 205. John Milbank suggests a difference in approach between de
Lubac and Balthasar on nature-grace: The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Renewed Split
in Modern Catholic Theology, second edition (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge, UK: William
B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 69-84. See further Chapter 4.
29
RR Reno, “Rahner the Restorationist,” First Things 233 (May 2013): 50 discussing Bruce Marshall,
Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987). C.f. Rowland, Catholic Theology, 67, who notes the curious resonances of Rahner’s critique of
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his divinity as per a Chalcedonian Christology, is emphasised will determine how
novel he is taken to be in relation to human existence and human history.
Christologies that focus upon his historicity will downplay his unique role in
mediating grace. Christologies emphasising the subsistence of his humanity in the
divinity will maximise the novelty of Christ and his Cross.

Correlative decisions taken in the domains of nature-grace and Christology will also
parallel those taken regarding the Church-world relationship. A low Christology will
tend to see grace operating anonymously in the ‘world’ outside the visible Church,
whereas a Chalcedonian Christology will emphasise the unique mediation of Christ
and his Church. The former will see Christianity as an “open narrative”,
downplaying the significance of tradition and maximising the significance of praxis,
whereas the latter will not.30 The former will also be more amenable to claims that
the Church needs to change with the times.

The first fundamental position in Catholic theology on nature-grace is described as
Neo-Thomist.31 The Suárezian position considers nature as self-subsistent,
proportionate to its own end, and is thus prescinded from that which “surpasses
nature”.32 Consequently, human nature is defined without reference to “the Christ
event and the gift of grace that flows from his Cross”, even if paradoxically Thomists
defend Cyrillian Christology.33 That is, nature and grace subsist on entirely different

Lonergan with Balthasar and Ratzinger, on the grounds that Lonergan did not take sufficiently
seriously “the concrete person of Jesus”, quoting K Rahner, “Kritishce Bemerkingen zu B.J.F.
Lonergan’s Aufsatz: “Functional Specialties in Theology,” Gregorianum 50 (1969): 485-505.
30
Rowland, Catholic Theology, 205. For Ratzinger’s position on the ‘world’ considered theologically,
see Joseph Ratzinger, “The Christian and the Modern World,” in Joseph Ratzinger, Dogma and
Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, unabridged edition, trans. Michael J Miller and
Matthew J O’Connell, ed. Michael J Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 162-180, Tracey
Rowland, “Augustinian and Thomist Engagements with the World,” in Tracey Rowland, The Culture
of the Incarnation: Essays in Catholic Theology (Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2017): 4968.
31
On the taxonomy regarding the alternative readings of the nature-grace relationships, consisting of
Neo-Thomist (which corresponds to the Suárezian position), Transcendental Thomist (Rahnerian) and
Augustinian-Thomist (or neo-Augustinian: Lubacian/Balthasarian), see Tracey Rowland, “Natural
Law in Catholic Christianity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Ethics, ed. Tom Angier
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019) citing Fergus Kerr OP, After Aquinas: Versions
of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), n1 and text accompanying. See further Chapter 4.
32
Aaron Riches, Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B
Eerdmans Publishing Company: 2016), 13 quoting Francisco Suárez, De ultimo fine hominis, dis. 15,
sec. 2. See further Chapter 4.
33
Riches, Ecce Homo, 13.
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ontological planes and Christ, while understood in orthodox terms, is an extrinsic
intervention into nature’s own latent possibilities.

The second option is a Transcendental Thomist or Rahnerian theology of grace,
which argues that the transcendental orientation of the human person equates to an
‘always-already’ supernaturalised human existence (see further 1). It relates to a
Nestorian Christological tendency in contemporary theology to overplay Christ’s
historicity, paralleling the fifth century Nestorian emphasis on the humanity of
Christ. Unintended parallels with the Suárezian account, in which pure human nature
is emphasised, also appear. Riches points out that there is a “suggestive correlation”
between the Suárezian position and the tradition of homo assumptus theology in
Latin theology, which derives from ‘Nestorianism’ and is found in contemporary
theology’s desire to be “orthodox Nestorian”.34 There has been a “de facto
‘Nestorianism’” in attempts to construct “the historical Jesus”, which results in a
bifurcation between the “Jesus of history” and the “Jesus of Faith”. 35 The human,
historical existence of Christ is considered separately from his divinity, that is, not in
reference to its “[subsistence] in the Word”, which leads to a focus on the historicity
of Christ and his political influence, and not its necessarily divine character.36 An
“ascending Christology” is developed “from below”, which diminishes and questions
the relevance of Church teaching regarding Christ’s divinity and descent from
heaven, preferring instead to construct the “real Jesus” based on anthropocentric
experience consisting of sociology, history and politics.37
Common to Suarez and Rahner’s conception of the nature-grace relationship is
arguably an emphasis on human nature without reference to Christ. Rahner expressed
preference that he would rather be “orthodox Nestorian” over the “cryptomonophysitism” emphasising Christ’s divinity he detected in the pre-conciliar
Church.38 Thus, while Rahner scorned the concept of natura pura and developed a
34

Riches, Ecce Homo, 10-11 (quotation on 11).
Riches, Ecce Homo, 10-11.
36
C.f. Pope Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex, 30-31 (DS 3905) quoted in Riches, Ecce Homo, 1.
37
On the importance of starting Christology from ‘above’ as distinct from a methodology beginning
from below, see Riches, Ecce Homo, 3-4. See especially 4n7 in which he describes Roger Haight SJ’s
development of an ‘ascending Christology’ along these lines, understood as following on from
Rahner’s ‘ascending Christology’. Edward Schillebeeckx likewise develops a Christology in which
‘experience’ takes a primary place (1).
38
Riches, Ecce Homo, 9.
35
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theology of grace in response to neo-scholastic accounts of the relationship, the
effects of his conception of nature-grace paradoxically correlate to the suggested
effects of Suárezian theology. A common argument among scholars that dispute
Suárez’s categories – chief among them de Lubac – is that the consequence of the
natura pura logic is secularisation, resulting from the view that human nature can
produce its own natural beatitude independent of Christ.39 An evacuation of the
secular from specifically religious content often also appears as a result of the
adoption of a Rahnerian theology of grace by theologians, even if not Rahner’s
intention.40 The Rahnerian position on nature-grace tends to downplay the novelty
and gratuity of Christ, viewing human existence in transcendental terms as in itself
‘always-already’, anonymously supernaturalised and thus as itself containing the
possibility of its own fulfilment. In Kantian terms, Christ is viewed in exemplary
terms, rather than human nature’s ontological fulfilment.41 An immanentist
soteriology soon follows, in which profane and salvation history are conflated. The
secular takes on a theological legitimacy and the ‘world’ becomes a leading locus
theologicus.

The third choice in fundamental theology regarding nature and grace is the LubacianBalthasarian position on the relationship. The Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist (see
chapter 4 for an explination of this descriptor) orientation of de Lubac and Balthasar
sees Aquinas as holding, in line with the preceding Augustinian, patristic tradition
and against the later Suárezian account, that the human person has an innate, natural
39

On de Lubac’s argument that the concept of natura pura leads to secularisation see Fergus Kerr,
Twentieth Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 72-75, Rowland Catholic Theology, 95-99. Steven A. Long argues that
the extent to which the concept of natura pura contributed to “secularist minimalism in public life”
may be overstated: Steven A Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace,
(New York: Fordham University, 2010), 143.
40
Aidan Nichols describes a popularised Rahner, which may be faithful to Rahner’s intention or not
and contains, relevantly, the following notions: in fundamental theology, transcendental philosophy
anticipates Christian revelation; in soteriology, Christ’s paschal mystery is “exemplary rather than
efficacious”; and in the theology of history, “the universal openness of the human spirit to divine
transcendence in it supernatural offer of salvation is already deemed to be … ‘the experience of
grace’”: Rowland, Catholic Theology, 63-64 quoting Aidan Nichols OP, Beyond the Blue Glass:
Catholic Essays on Faith and Culture (London: St Austin Press, 2002), 112.
41
C.f. Robert Barron, The Priority of Christ: Toward a Postliberal Catholicism (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Baker Publishing Group, 2007), 32: “In Kant, for instance, it is not Jesus in his uniqueness
who determines the content of the categorical imperative; rather, it is the imperative that renders Jesus
intelligible as a religious symbol. And in Rahner, it is not the concrete Christ that specifies the nature
of absolute mystery but rather the experience of absolute mystery that renders Christ credible”. See
also Thomas Sheehan, “Rahner’s Transcendental Project,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl
Rahner, eds. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 41.
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desire for supernatural beatitude. The human person has only one, supernatural end,
which paradoxically – because supernatural – is beyond his powers to obtain.
Consequently, the particularity of Christ in relation to nature is emphasised, which is
allied to Chalcedonian Christology. Christ is the unique mediator between God and
humanity in whom the sacred exchange occurs: the Divine Word took on our sin in
order for us to be justified (c.f. 2 Cor 5:21). He descends “from above” in order to
redeem.42 He is the incarnation of “valid and binding truth”.43 Only in the unity of
the divine and human in Christ can the human person find the fulfilment for which he
longs.

An Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of nature-grace thus guards against a
latent ‘Nestorianism’ prevalent in contemporary Christology. Ratzinger summarises
the danger as consisting of:

a one-sided separation Christology (Nestorianism) in which, when one reflects on
the humanity of Christ, his divinity largely disappears, the unity of his person is
dissolved, and reconstructions of merely the human Jesus dominate, which reflect
more the ideas of our times than the true figure of the Lord.44

Ratzinger maintains the one subject that is the Word. The humanity of Jesus
necessarily takes its contours from the divinity of the Word. When Christ is
perceived as descending from above in a totally unexpected way to save fallen
humanity, an immanentist soteriology is precluded. Truth and salvation are not
immanent to human existence or history as such, which depend upon something
outside them for elevation into divine reality, even if the receptivity to this reality is
intrinsic to human nature itself.
Questions of Christ’s relationship to nature engage the history-ontology relationship.
An immanentist metaphysics raises issues regarding the relationship between human
nature and history and, therefore, the possibility or not of the mediation of
transcendent grace to the human person. One view of Hegelian historicism sees truth
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and human nature as historically contingent, in which “in his most essential
characteristics man [is] undetermined and therefore free to create his own nature”.45
It sees history as the immanent increase in the self-consciousness of freedom, with
the World and Reason being conflated. Tending to the pantheistic, it conceives of the
God-creation relationship in univocal terms, losing sight of the maior dissimilitudo
between God and creature. Divine reason is seen to be contained within history.
Perceiving nature or human existence as already-supernaturalised also arguably tends
down this track in its approbation of secularisation and the salvific significance of
history as such. At the same time, elements of contemporary Christology arguably
exhibit a crypto-Nestorianism, which embodies modernity’s univocal, dualistic
tendency to oppose the divine and humanity in competitive, contrastive ways. Truth
and grace can be seen to be immanent to the human person and human history and
not come from an outside source.

An analogical metaphysics, in contrast, protects the integrity of creation and history,
while allowing for the irruption of grace from outside themselves. It does not see the
relationship between the divine and created in dialectical terms but as ‘noncontrastive’ and ‘non-competitive’. Christ can then be seen in the unity of his
divinity and humanity, as the transcendent source of human desire for supernatural
fulfilment. Christ fulfils the capacity for grace inherent to human nature but in a
radical, novel way, as the fulfilment promised at the analogical heart of our being,
similar but with ever-greater dissimilarity to the divine.46
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3. The Utility of the ‘Incarnationalist’/‘Eschatologist’ Distinction?

A shorthand method in theological literature of describing different approaches to the
hope-history relationship, with their parallels for or against a Hegelian approach to
history, is to refer to various authors as ‘Incarnationalist’ and or ‘Eschatologist’.
According to Rowland, it was Léopold Malavez SJ who “drew a distinction between
what he called the incarnational and eschatological approaches to salvation
history”.47 The distinction between an ‘Incarnationalist’ and ‘Eschatologist’
perspective rests on how the relationship between profane history and the
eschatological fulfilment of God’s promises at the conclusion of time is conceived. It
concerns the soteriological significance of history as such and human activity within
it.
Generally speaking, the Incarnationalist approach sees Christ’s first coming as a
divine approval of history as such. The Incarnation drives inner-historical change
towards the promised future eschatological reality. According to Daniel Minch, the
‘Incarnationalists’ “emphasised the transformative mission of Christ and the church
[sic] in history” and so the “continuity between history and the kingdom of God”.48
The “incarnational approach” says that good action within history prepares for
eschatological reality.49 Action of this kind has eschatological significance as such.
The eschaton can in some sense be anticipated through historical, social and political
activity bringing about “earthly progress”.50 Thus, “profane history” and salvation
history tend to be conflated in a monist manner (akin to Hegel) and seen as belonging
to a single, indivisible reality (1).51

As a generalisation, Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez can be placed in relation to
the Incarnationalist category. Minch discusses the distinction between the categories
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in the context of analysing Schillebeeckx’s incarnational approach. According to
Rowland, Schillebeeckx’s approach to revelation, in which history is seen as a “locus
of revelation”, is important conceptual background to liberation theology’s emphasis
on the salvific significance of action within history.52 Gutiérrez is a chief proponent
of liberation theology. As will be shown in Chapter 1, Metz’s political theology also
tends to conflate world and salvation history. These authors emphasise innerhistorical praxis as having salvific significance. In this regard, there is a danger of
‘secularising the eschaton’ in these authors. They pay attention to promoting active
efforts to build a ‘better’ and more just society within history, arguably without
sufficient heed to the distinction between history and eschatology. From this, it can
be said in relation to the history-hope question that they produce ‘theologies of hope’
or futurity, in which hope is primarily understood to be directed to the ‘future’
realisation of these inner-historical realities.53
The ‘Eschatologists’ take a more dialectical view of the relationship between history
and eschatological reality. They answer the question Cur Deus Homo by arguing that
the Incarnation was God’s descent into history in order to raise humanity and the
created order out of itself into God’s eternity in the eschaton.54 While the historical
has consequent significance, Eschatologists consider there to be at some level a
radical discontinuity or qualitative difference between history and eschatology.
Christ’s revelation is understood as definitively transforming history by directing it
from within to something outside itself, which will involve a violent, catastrophic
elevation of creation away from its current state.

An eschatological understanding serves as a qualification on anything that can be
achieved in history and as a caution on placing eschatological significance on
political and social activity. Ironically, it is this vision that can better provide the
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critique of society that Metz’s political theology in particular purports to do. On this
view, any earthly projects need to “be converted to the gospel without remainder”.55
The site of eschatological meaning is found in the liturgy, sacraments and sanctifying
reality of the Church, not history as such. History is the pregnant, ‘waiting period’
for God’s transformative action in which souls are harvested for God (c.f. Mt 13:2430). Among the ‘Eschatologists’, Pieper has been numbered and, had he to choose,
Ratzinger would likely be sympathetic with the Eschatological end of the spectrum. 56
Pieper argues that the end of time will be characterised by catastrophe (2 and 5). As
Chapter 5 will show, Ratzinger posits an ‘eschatological attitude’ to politics. An
eschatological approach roughly corresponds, moreover, to the characterisation of
hope in Pieper and Ratzinger. For them, hope is not directed at a ‘better’, innerhistorical future but as receptive patience for God’s definitive and transformative
action to take nature and history out of something it cannot be of itself (2).

Although there is intellectual merit in the distinction drawn between the
Incarnationalists and Eschatologists, it is nevertheless a distinction with some but
limited utility. Characterising certain authors according to this measure can be
reductive. For example, Minch describes de Lubac and Teilhard de Chardin as
‘Incarnationalists’, with Louis Bouyer and Jean Daniélou as ‘Eschatologist’
counterparts.57 As Chapter 5 will show, de Lubac possesses a decided scepticism
regarding the possibilities of fulfilment being attained on earth. Although de Lubac
can be characterised as an ‘intrinsicist’, his concept of the supernatural emphasises
the role of the Cross in perfecting nature. There is recognition of the limits of human
capacity in his thought.

Ratzinger as an intellectual also generally seeks to reconcile or hold in tension
polarities, not divide them irreparably. He would likely agree with Christopher
Butler’s argument that the eschatological and incarnational need to be “held in
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tension”.58 On Butler’s view, the Incarnation is to be understood as initiating a
liturgical, “‘mystical’, ‘sacramental’ anticipation of the Last Things”. 59 Ratzinger’s
view of history as ‘already, not yet’ (3), in which the Liturgy is the situs of the
Parousia on earth and the Church is the mediator of eschatological reality, accords
with this understanding. Pieper considers that there can be a spes implicita in nonChristians on earth that aims at fostering fraternity among people, a kind of
anticipation of hope’s eschatological object (2). Political and liberation theology
asserts an ‘eschatological proviso’ that holds it impossible for historical and
eschatological reality to be identical (it is another question whether asserting such a
proviso is sufficient to avoid the pitfalls of an inner-historical conception of hope)
(1). As with all generalisations, the distinction is too general when applied to thinkers
whose nuances might be greater than a simple categorisation would suggest.
Moreover, prosecuting a distinction between ‘Incarnationalists’ and ‘Eschatologists’
itself manifests an either/or approach that fails to respect the mystery communicated
in revelation. While it is indispensable to use intellectual categories, the danger of
overemphasising the distinction can reduce Christian revelation to human mental
activity and therefore support a privileging of the ‘world’ and human activity.
Implicitly, the distinction can itself manifest an Incarnationalist perspective.
Appreciating its limited utility is thus an implicit disagreement with political and
liberation theology, which emphasises the impact of the Incarnation in history
arguably at the expense of overlooking history’s eschatological goal and limit.
Juxtaposing the Incarnation against the eschaton focuses on the inner-historical
effects of the Incarnation, which tends to lose sight of eschatological reality. On the
other hand, the inner-historical is not entirely devoid of significance and should not
be overlooked.

Ultimately, the relationship between history and the eschaton concerns an
irresolvable mystery that only eschatological reality itself will reveal. Seeking to
understand Christian activity in the world solely under the aspect of the Incarnation
or Eschatology pays insufficient heed to that mystery. As RR Reno points out, there
58
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are two perennial temptations concerning the attitude a Christian is to have to the
‘world’, especially the realm of politics. The first is to ignore it completely as
irreparably marked by “worldliness” (an extreme ‘Eschatological’ approach). The
other is to attempt to “baptise temporal politics” and give particular political projects
the veneer of sanctity (an extreme Incarnational approach). 60 Better, as Rowland
suggests, is to understand that the Incarnation and eschatological reality “are not
mutually exclusive” but is rather a “critical couplet”, an intellectual category in
Catholic theology that recognises the distinction between them without separating
them.61

In terms of the theological task, an important question becomes how to appreciate the
significance of the Incarnation without losing sight of the eschaton. Utilising the
distinction does enable discernment of where on the spectrum the respective authors
sit, and a judgment as to which approach better respects the mystery. A clear
demarcation exists between the different sets of authors, which distinguish them as
thinkers. Their views on hope and history reveal contrasting emphases and
tendencies with significantly different implications for how the theological task is to
be understood, what the true significance of Christian revelation is and how the
Church is to operate in the world. In short, the distinction is helpful in directing
attention to whether Christian hope and activity is primarily directed to ‘building up
the world’ or into an encounter with Christ that will sanctify the world.

Although none of the authors examined herein exclude reference to one pole without
referring to the other, arguably the ‘Incarnational’ approach embodied in
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez fails adequately to balance them in its focus on
inner-historical praxis. Unavoidably, such an approach begins from ‘below’ and
tends to appreciate insufficiently the higher eschatological calling, which is the
human vocation. Arguably, Ratzinger’s approach in particular enables a clearer
understanding that operative in history is an eschatological reality that is made
present in the sacraments and the liturgy. Such accords history its significance while
60
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pointing to its eschatological destiny. It is a healthier than a too-‘Incarnationalist’
approach. It holds in tension the two poles, always keeping in front of mind that all
human effort and human history – valuable as they are in themselves – eventually
passes away and that inherent to the concept of history itself is that it is bounded by
the all-powerful, all-knowing God.

4. The Concilium/Communio Split in Catholic Theology

Along with being principal protagonists in the hope-history debate and prospectively
reflecting somewhat the competing poles of contemporary ecclesial life, the
examined authors are also key representatives of two of the principal contemporary
Catholic theological schools or groupings, at least in the early instantiations of those
groups. The ‘Concilium’ and ‘Communio’ schools respectively arose out of the
Second Vatican Council and, along with the neo-Thomists of the United States, are
primary players in Catholic thought today.62 Understanding where the different
authors sit in relation to these schools is essential context for understanding the
contours of the hope and history debate and the dependence of these contours on
fundamental theology, and sets convenient prisms through which to understand the
differences in perspective in fundamental theology. What distinguish the two schools
are the significantly contrasting positions they take in fundamental theology,
especially with respect to nature and grace, which relate to metaphysics and the
history-ontology relationship.
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Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez belong to the Concilium school named for the
journal of that title founded in 1965 by, inter alia, Rahner, Schillebeeckx and Metz.63
The journal’s mission is to engage in theology “in the spirit of Vatican II”, while
being “sensitive to the challenges of our time” and taking its cues from “cultural and
religious experiences and socio-political developments”.64 It desires to respond “to
the longing for a new humanity and for the integrity of creation” in a “critical and
constructive discourse”.65 The mission statement reveals the tendency of Concilium
scholars to take a view of secular reality as a starting point, which, it is argued,
depends on or relates to a view of human nature or existence in itself as ‘alwaysalready’ supernaturalised. Secular reality tends to be considered apart from the
visible Church at the foundations of theology. Their conviction is that theology
should begin ‘from below’ with a consideration of these realities or the ‘lived
experience’ of the faithful, a legitimacy said to flow from the Incarnation.66 Their
desire is to construct a theology that will help generate a ‘better’ inner-historical
future for humanity, based on the view that human beings are capable of changing
history according to a dialectical understanding of it. Concilium theology is thus
influenced by a progressive dialectics. Key secular thinkers, such as Karl Marx and
those of the Frankfurt School, become important in such a task because they theorise
critical dialectics as the key to a progressive future (1).

Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez can be said to represent the Concilium position on
the hope and history debate. This thesis will endeavour to show that their
63
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contributions to the debate manifest an underlying option of the Concilium school for
the ‘world’ and anthropocentricity. With respect to the debate, key intellectual
‘fathers’ from the school are Schillebeeckx and Rahner. The former radicalised the
perception of the Church-world relationship, which dovetails with a Rahnerian
theology of grace that tends to integrate nature and grace and perceive grace as
operating anonymously in the ‘world’. Relatedly, Schillebeeckx and Rahner were
pioneers in developing a Christology ‘from below’ or an ‘ascending Christology’
focused on Christ’s historicity, eschatological proclamation and political
significance. At the headwaters of a Catholic theological turn to socio-politics and
the human person, considered in himself in his transcendent capacity without any
necessary reference to the particularity of Christ and manifested in political and
liberation theology, can be said to be Schillebeeckx and Rahner.

Political and liberation theology builds on self-consciously political and
anthropocentric foundations, flowing from a Schillebeeckxian reading of the Churchworld relationship and a Rahnerian theology of grace. Political theology and
liberation theology’s inner-historical conception of hope, grounded in praxis and
emphasising economic and political concerns, combines with a tendency adopt a
dialectical metaphysics indebted to Ernst Bloch (and behind him Hegel and Marx
and behind them, Joachim of Fiore), and a low Christology. As John Milbank points
out, “[t]he initial theological decision [in political and liberation theology] is…to
embrace secularization, and the horizon of the political”.67 Aidan Nichols notes that
“political engagement [and praxis] functions here as an antecedent epistemological
condition

for

the

development

of

appropriate

theology”.68

Behind

this

epistemological foundation is “Rahner’s theological starting point”, namely “the
person of today in his own self-understanding”.69

Metz and Gutiérrez vary the theological themes of Schillebeeckx and Rahner. As
Chapter 1 will show, Metz, a student of Rahner’s, radicalised his Transcendental
Thomism and applied it to the social-historical. Shunning existentialism and
67
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personalism, on the grounds of being too individualistic, Metz sought to construct a
practical fundamental theology, in which hope is deliberately directed to praxis; that
is, a political theology. Moreover, Metz’s political theology is the link between the
European headwaters of Schillebeeckx and Rahner and the Latin American context.
There Gutiérrez and others developed liberation theology, self-consciously
understood as developing a theology with implications for fundamental theology.70
Liberation theology presents a politically, historically, socially and existentiallyinflected concept of liberation that integrates the orders of nature and grace, world
history and salvation history, to the point of collapsing the distinction altogether, an
integration present also in Metz (1).
In the background to the Concilium scholars’ positions on hope and history is, it is
important to add, also the Protestant theologian, Jürgen Moltmann and his Theologie
der Hoffnung (1964). Along with Schillebeeckx, Moltmann constructed a theology of
hope that eschewed the ‘last things’ and promoted a practical conception of hope
seeking to “[transform] the world”.71 Moltmann helped generate what might be
termed the theologies of futurity, a term encompassing the theology of hope, political
and liberation theology.72 Overall, notwithstanding inevitable differences in focus
and context, Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez share orientations in fundamental
theology.73 With a low Christology and a latent Joachimitism (1.2.1), they present an
inner-historical conception of hope and an immanentist soteriology, in which
practical action is emphasised as the locus of hope.
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Pieper and Ratzinger are related to the Communio orientation in Catholic thought.
Balthasar, de Lubac and Ratzinger established a journal by that name in 1972 partly
as a counterpart to the Concilium thrust in theology. As de Gaál points out, while
akin to the Concilium approach in accepting the significance of the Second Vatican
Council, the Communio perspective differs because it does not see the Church as a
kind of parliament that can amend Church teaching. Rather, it emphasises the
Church’s unity across time and space in “Eucharistic communion with Jesus Christ”,
her Head.74 De Gaál notes that initially Ratzinger was on the editorial board of
Concilium. It was, however, “too much occupied with system” and downplayed
patristics and the historicity of revelation.75 Consistent with Pieper and Ratzinger’s
understanding of hope (2), the journal instead seeks to reclaim the centrality of
prayer in the theological enterprise, arguing that the breakdown of this relationship is
a cause of “contemporary problems”.76 Communio’s starting point is Jesus Christ,
from ‘above’, and not the ‘below’ of praxis and lived experience.
Philosophy, nevertheless, is important to Communio’s modus operandi. Communio
scholars generally eschew a contrastive and competitive metaphysics rooted in the
voluntarism of Duns Scotus. Thus, it does not ignore or downplay the human person
or reason, but does not set the person or human reason against a competitive, external
God. An immanentist dualism, such as might be apparent in a Hegelian-Marxist
system, is excluded and instead an analogical metaphysics presented. Thus,
Communio scholars would generally agree with Nichols’ conclusion that starting
with praxis in fact threatens the privilege that theology gives its own source –
Revelation of the Word as manifested in Scripture and Tradition, interpreted by the
74

Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2010), 50-51. See also Rowland, Catholic Theology, 91-138 on the hallmarks of
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Ratzinger, Milestones: Memoirs: 1927-1977, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1997), 143-146.
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de Gaál, Christocentric Shift, 23.
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Communio website: https://www.communio-icr.com/about (accessed 20 February 2019). Apart
from the Communio orientation, representative of the integration of the intellectual life with
spirituality would be AG Sertillanges OP, The Intellectual Life: Its Spirit, Conditions, Methods, trans.
Mary Ryan (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1987 with new foreword 1998):
see RR Reno, “The Loving Intellect,” First Things 261 (March 2016): 45. See also Morrissey,
“Pinckaers and the Renewal of Thomistic Theology,” 170-171. Jean-Pierre Torrell OP also
emphasises the connection between theology and spirituality in Christ and Spirituality in Thomas
Aquinas, trans. Bernhard Blankenhorn OP (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press,
2011).
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Magisterium – because of its centrality in Marxist thought. They recognise, contra
Hegel, the limitations of human theory and, contra Marx, guard against the fallacy
that all contradictions can be resolved on earth. Instead, while “[T]heory may instruct
the world, and praxis improve it… only a ‘beatific’ vision, and the advent of a
different kind of Agent, can redeem it.”77 As a founder, Ratzinger’s sympathy with
the journal is clear, evident in his, as will be argued passim, emphasis on the
centrality of Christ and his novelty vis-à-vis nature and history as its divine
redeemer, who descends from in heaven in order to bring them into the divine. In
Ratzinger’s theology, the ‘initial theological decision’ is the Revelation of Christ
understood in Chalcedonian terms (3), allied to an analogical metaphysics (4).78 His
views on hope and history must be considered in light of these theological
presuppositions.
Comment regarding Pieper’s place in relation to the Communio group and Ratzinger
is necessary.79 Not a theologian but a philosopher, Pieper’s principal works regarding
hope and history were published prior to the Council and the Concilium-Communio
split in Catholic theology. Nevertheless, for the purposes of Catholic theological
taxonomy, he belongs to the thrust in Catholic theology that Communio embodies.
The journal has published work of his. His philosophical work exhibits key
philosophical and theological presuppositions of Communio scholarship. As
Chapter 4 will show, Pieper anticipates or parallels a Lubacian reading of the

77

Nichols, “Story of Praxis,” 57-58 (quotation on 58).
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Jesus of Nazareth, written when pope: Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the
Transfiguration, trans. Adrian J Walker (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2007) (hereafter
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(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009). Pieper published over 70 works,
translated, Schumacher noted in 2009, into sixteen languages: B Schumacher, “A Cosmopolitan
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Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), Not Yet the Twilight: An Autobiography
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Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 2020).
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supernatural – foundational to his philosophy of hope is an understanding of human
nature that accords with that reading. Balthasar groups him among the early to midtwentieth century Catholic thinkers who laid the foundations for the shifts in the
understanding of the nature-grace relationship in Catholic thought.

Mainly concerned with the works of Aquinas and Plato, Pieper reads Aquinas
through an Augustinian-Dionysian patristic lens and not through the lens of later,
especially Baroque, scholastic lens. Pieper was indebted to Étienne Gilson for this
reading of Aquinas. Alongside Gilson, he developed a view of the faith-reason
relationship analogous to the Lubacian view of the supernatural and foundational to
Communio epistemology. He strongly rejects the idea of reading Thomas as the
founder of a closed system. Rather, he sees him as uniquely open to the fullness of
being, which precludes any rationalistic crypto-Wolffianism or Hegelianism on
Aquinas’s part. Moreover, Pieper does not strictly separate the domains of faith and
reason. Like Ratzinger, he is interested in the “border zones” between these realms
and considers philosophy to depend upon pre-philosophical and specifically
theological foundations.80 Contrary to those theologies that take Marx as its starting
point Pieper insists that theology grounded in the Word of God or an ‘original
revelation’ are at the foundation of true philosophising.81
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Although commonly described as a ‘Thomist’, Pieper is thus not a neo-scholastic
thinker. He shunned a neo-scholastic epithet and was concerned not with Aquinas as
such but with “what is the truth of things”.82 His starting point is Being simpliciter,
and not the thought of Aquinas, even if Pieper considers him to be akin to a Mozart
who could not be confined to a particular musical category but “[chose]
everything”.83 Correctly does Schumacher suggest that Pieper “constantly fought
against [Scholastic philosophy]”.84 In contrast, the lineaments of his thought, briefly
described here, associate him with the Communio school.

82

Pieper, No One Could Have Known, 62. C.f. Josef Pieper, “Important Support and Advancement
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The conclusion that Pieper is not a neo-scholastic but is, in a sense, a grandfather of
the Communio perspective makes intelligible his influence on Ratzinger. Traces of
Pieper’s thought can be found throughout Ratzinger’s corpus, especially in his work
on hope and history, as will be argued throughout. Nathan Arends, for example,
notes that the younger Ratzinger “is immensely indebted to the ideas” of Pieper.85 De
Gaál states that Pieper was a thinker “to whom Ratzinger is much indebted”. 86 He
places Pieper in the generation of scholars that moved away from the intellectualism
of neo-scholasticism to a Catholic theology grounded on the “Incarnate Word, Jesus
Christ”, which developed the nouvelle théologie and ressourcement that were the
intellectual forerunners of Ratzinger.87 Pieper belonged to the general European
Catholic intellectual milieu of the mid-twentieth century in which Ratzinger was
formed. Ratzinger’s intellectual genealogy includes nineteenth and twentieth century
‘Romantic Antecedents’, among which Rowland includes Pieper. She notes that
Pieper’s influence on Ratzinger is especially visible in the areas of the theological
virtues, hope and history, and the relationship between faith and reason, and
tradition. Part of Pieper’s appeal for Ratzinger was his concern with “the philosophy
of history”, a concern atypical of Thomists. In the background to the plethora of
Ratzinger’s works considering hope, she argues, stand Pieper’s treatises on Glaube,
Hoffnung and Liebe and his Über das Ende der Zeit.88
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Thought of Benedict, 280. The works Rowland lists (Guide, 72) include Ratzinger: Faith and the
Future (1971), The Theology of History in St Bonaventure (Habilitation passed in 1957, published in
English 1971), Principles of Catholic Theology (1982), Yes of Jesus Christ (1991), The End of Time
(2004), as well as Benedict XVI/Ratzinger’s encyclical on hope, Spe Salvi (2007). With respect to the
hope-history relationship, to these can be added Ratzinger’s essays “On Hope,” (1985) in Pope
Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger in Communio, Volume 2: Anthropology and Culture, ed. David L
Schindler and Nicholas J Healy (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge, UK: William B Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2013); “Eschatology and Utopia,”(1978) “Freedom and Liberation,” (1987) in
Joseph Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology, trans. Michael J

32

Ratzinger dedicated meditations on the three theological virtues to Pieper on the
occasion of his 85th birthday. As Rowland points out, his aim was to develop
theologically the philosophical insights of Pieper with respect to these virtues. He
used “Pieper’s philosophical meditations as a kind of textbook” for the retreat that
became this volume.89 The “basic pattern” of his reflections on “Hope and Love”
followed Pieper’s, and behind him Aquinas.90 Alongside de Lubac and Balthasar,
Pieper counts as one of the chief sources of Ratzinger’s thought, especially with
respect to hope-history.

Ratzinger inherited thus a theological methodology, which was partly indebted to the
philosophical work of Pieper. Pieper is a key philosophical source of Ratzinger’s
thought, along with Plato, Gottleib Söhngen and Romano Guardini. Ratzinger recalls
as a seminarian that Pieper was one of the “voices that moved us most directly” in
the areas of philosophy and theology.91 His treatises on the cardinal virtues figured
among the works of philosophy that Ratzinger first studied as student. Through his
career, he would read each new volume of Pieper’s and benefit from them.
Importantly, Ratzinger considered Pieper to be “the master” and credits him with
arousing in Ratzinger a philosophical interest.92 Ratzinger was attracted to Pieper’s
“[presentation of] a fresh interpretation of Thomas Aquinas”. Later friends and
Miller et al (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008); and his books: Faith and Politics: Selected
Writings, trans. Michael J Miller and others (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2018); The Unity of
Nations: A Vision of the Church Fathers, trans. Boniface Ramsey (Washington DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 2015); Benedict, New Song for the Lord and Ratzinger, Eschatology.
Josef Pieper’s treatises on the theological virtues were published in one volume in English in 1997
(Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997). His End of Time was last published in
English in 1999 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press). To these can be added his Hope and History: Five
Salzburg Lectures, trans. Dr David Kipp (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994) and his essays
“Pastless Future, Groundless Hope,” in Problems of Modern Faith: Essays and Address, trans. Jan
van Heurck (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1985) and “Hope – of What?” (1957) and “The
Hidden Nature of Hope and Despair,” (1955) in Josef Pieper, Tradition as Challenge: Essays and
Speeches, trans. Dan Farrelly (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 2015).
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92
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accessed 22 February 2016.
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colleagues, he identifies Pieper and himself initially as belonging to the ‘progressive’
camp attempting to renew the faith and later opposing the destructive radicalism that
followed in the Council’s wake.93
An example of the affinity between Pieper and Ratzinger is seen in Ratzinger’s
similar philosophical appropriation of Aquinas’s epistemology and his place in the
philosophical tradition. Like Pieper, Ratzinger considers Aquinas not to have
produced “the” philosophy or to be “the philosopher”, even if esteeming him as one
of “the originating figures of an enduring approach to the Ground of what is”.94
Contrary to stereotypical views of Ratzinger as an Augustinian, and Augustine and
Aquinas as mutually exclusive, he places high value on Aquinas. Akin to Pieper, he
does not, however, identify the boundaries of permissible Catholic reflection as
beginning and ending with Thomas. As is well recognised, his is a biblical and
patristic theology. Early in his work, he had an inclination for Bonaventure from the
medievals. Nevertheless, Pieper’s philosophical orientation to Being has an
important parallel in Ratzinger’s thought and underscores what they consider to be
the transcendent ontological ground of history, which guards against an immanentist
conception of hope.95 Pieper serves therefore as a philosophical substrate to
Ratzinger’s theology.
93
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5. Outline of Argument

To examine the hypothesis that different choices in fundamental theology have
implications for the hope-history debate, this study will explore in depth Ratzinger’s
own contributions to the hope-history debate and their philosophical and theological
foundations. Ratzinger will be especially focused upon as he is one of the most
important theologians of the twentieth century, especially post-conciliar. His works
and significance continue to be studied in depth and his contribution to the hopehistory debate, it will be suggested, will endure.96 His contribution to the debate is
valuable because of his insistence on the transcendent, Christological dimension of
hope, and history’s supra-historical, eschatological telos. He presents (and reminds
the Church of) “basic constant factors about hope and salvation” in times of

parallel in this dispute to the one in twentieth century between views prioritising ‘orthodoxy’ over
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historical crisis and change.97 His understanding of hope as patient orientation to a
supra-historical end in Christ and insistence that eschatology is not tied to a
particular philosophy of history guard against an immanentist reading of hope, with
its attendant dangers. He directs ‘praxis of hope’ to its proper end. Moreover, his
metaphysical and theological grounding, it is suggested, is sound.
This thesis will analyse Ratzinger’s offerings to the debate by particular reference to
the philosophical work of Pieper. Pieper’s philosophical-theological reflections
regarding the relationship between hope and history, and his metaphysics are worth
studying in their own right, but are also foundational to Ratzinger’s own views on
that relationship, eschatology and theological anthropology. As intimated above, an
understanding of Pieper is necessary to appreciate Ratzinger on hope and history.
Examined also will be Ratzinger’s theological rootedness in the AugustinianAegidian Thomism of Guardini, Balthasar and de Lubac’s concept of the
supernatural. The key link between a Lubacian understanding of the supernatural and
Ratzinger’s supra-historical conception of hope (indebted to Pieper) is, moreover, the
centrality of a Chalcedonian Christology in Ratzinger’s eschatology. Ratzinger’s
maintenance of the importance of Christ’s divinity joined to his humanity makes
intelligible both his views on the supra-historical nature of hope and a cruciform
soteriology. In Ratzinger is a conception of the nature-grace relationship, which sees
the human spirit as possessing a paradoxical orientation to supernatural beatitude
beyond its own powers to obtain. A consequent theological anthropology, which
conceives a human person’s hope as being oriented to personal fulfilment in eternal
life with God, is married to a Christology, which defends the particularity of Christ
and his transformative role for the human person and human history. Christ, true God
and true man is the stepping stone for humanity to ascend from within history to
eschatological reality.98 It is he who is the fulfilment and anchor of hope. Further,
linked to an understanding of the nature-grace relationship, which emphasises
Christ’s novelty in relation to nature is Ratzinger’s soteriology. His soteriology
focuses upon the Cross of Christ as a kind of ‘renunciation’ nature, especially
97

Philip McDonagh, “Uncovering the Sources of Creation: Pope Benedict XVI on Hope,” Logos: A
Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 13(4) (Fall 2010): 100, doi: 10.1353/log.2010.0003,
accessed 23 September 2012.
98
C.f. Riches, Ecce Homo, 1 citing Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex, 30-31 (DS 3905).
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‘sinful’ nature. Pieper’s philosophy, the nature-grace relationship, Christology and
soteriology constitute the foundation stones for Ratzinger’s views on hope and
history.
To appreciate the import of Ratzinger’s contribution to the hope-history debate, it is
also necessary to examine his theological disputants in that debate. Outlining the
Concilium authors’ contribution will bring into sharper relief the nature of
Ratzinger’s reflections on hope-history and their ramifications for fundamental
theology. Chief among his theological targets have been political theology and
liberation theology, including Metz and Gutiérrez. To lay bare the contrast between
Ratzinger and his theological opponents on the issue of hope and history, it is
necessary to compare his eschatology with differing conclusions and emphases
regarding the inner-possibilities of history, themselves rooted in different theological
starting points. Juxtaposing Ratzinger and his disputants reveals the roots of
contemporary ecclesial and theological cleavages and shows what is at stake in the
foundational choices made in fundamental theology. On the one hand is a particular
inner-historical concept of hope allied to a particular fundamental theology,
Christology and soteriology. Against an inner-historical conception of hope is
Ratzinger’s supra-historical conception of hope and eschatology, rooted in
Chalcedonian Christology and allied to a different option regarding the nature-grace
relationship, and soteriology.

Chapter 1 will therefore give an overview of Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez on
hope and history, as illustrative of what is described for the purposes of this thesis as
the Concilium view of the salvific possibilities of history. It is not an exhaustive
exploration but written for the purpose of providing context for Ratzinger. It will do
so in reference to four foundation stones in their theology and seek to demonstrate
the inner historical inflection they place on hope.

First, it will be shown that their understanding of hope and history possesses on an
inner-historical emphasis on praxis, which links them at least implicitly with a
philosophy of history that has overtones of Joachim of Fiore, Hegel and Marx in
which Christian eschatology is secularised. Consequently, they conceive hope in
largely impersonal, social, historical, political, economic terms, reducing the
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significance of the ‘last things’. To a significant degree, in Schillebeeckx, Metz and
Gutiérrez, hope is immanently framed and focused upon the inner-historical.

Secondly, an inner-historical conception of hope is connected to their adoption of a
low Christology. Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez, informed by an approach
dominant in twentieth century exegesis, focus on Jesus’s historicity and the
understanding of him as an eschatological, prophetic and political figure.

Thirdly, apparent in their understanding of hope and history are overtones of a
Rahnerian theology of grace, in which nature or, more accurately, human existence
as such is conceived as containing the supernatural existential, ontologically prior to
the “Christ event”.99 They affirm secularisation and human agency in ‘building the
future’, and incorporate a dialectical framework in their construction of theologies of
hope, which possess a focus on praxis.

From this also comes a fourth and closely related integer of the Concilium
perspective on hope-history, namely, an immanentist soteriology, which rests on or is
related to Rahner’s view of the coextensive nature of world and salvation history as
flowing out of the transcendental orientation of the human person. The coextensive
nature of profane and salvation history, which parallels an ‘Incarnationalist’
approach, lends itself to an integrated view of redemption. An immanentist
soteriology tends to collapse the distinction between the natural and supernatural, the
attainment by human means of earthly goods and eschatological reality.

A principal contention of this thesis is that the Concilium contribution to the hopehistory debate marries a Hegelian-Marxist disposition with a Rahnerian theology of
grace and a low Christology. Thus, the Concilium inner-historical conception of hope
is built upon an immanentist philosophy of history. Christ’s transcendent significance
is also reduced and understood in more immanent, historicist terms. His novelty in
relation to nature and his divinity are minimised, if not theoretically, at least in
practice. Maximised are the claims of human existence in itself, lending itself to an
immanentist soteriology in which economic and political liberation are important
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C.f. Riches, Ecce Homo, 13.

38

components. One’s views on hope and history are thus connected to one’s
philosophy of history, eschatology and soteriology, which in turn depend upon one’s
view of the nature-grace relationship and Christology.
The alternative, ‘Communio’ contribution to the hope-history debate that Ratzinger
represents, rests on contrary philosophical and theological foundations. Ratzinger’s
theological reflections on hope and history are grounded in Pieper’s philosophical
reflections on hope and history, themselves related to an analogical metaphysics.
They are made intelligible by reference to a Chalcedonian Christology and a
Lubacian view of the supernatural. Each of the subsequent four chapters contains an
exploration of the counterpart in Ratzinger and, where relevant, Pieper’s thought to
each of the four pillars of the Concilium viewpoint.

First, in Chapter 2, it will be shown that Pieper and Ratzinger conceive of hope in its
most fundamental sense as shorn of reference to earthly hopes and in personalist
terms. Hope relates to existential fulfilment in eternal life with God. In Pieper and
Ratzinger, hope is theocentric and understood as being directed to a supra-historical
end. It has intrinsically salvific, soteriological significance as a theological virtue,
imparting the seeds of eternal life.

Of its nature, hope generally and specifically as a theological virtue, belongs to the
realm of gift and is oriented to an object that the person who hopes cannot bring
about himself. Prayer is thus inherently tied up with the question of hope and an
activist account of hope is precluded. Prayer is the expression of the theological
virtue of hope, seeking the divine life that it hopes to receive from the Divine Giver.
An emphasis on hope as gift distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger’s conception of it
from a Hegelian-Marxist one, represented in the work of twentieth century Marxist
thinker Bloch and those theologians influenced by him such as Metz and Gutiérrez.
Consistent with a Marxist epistemology, Bloch presents hope as belonging to a
laboratory and thus manipulable according to the measure of human reason.
According to Ratzinger, history, characterised by human freedom and peccability,
cannot however proceed along a pre-determined path. Hope’s object is beyond the
control of the one who hopes and beyond history.
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Chapter 3 examines how Ratzinger presents Christ as the fulfilment of hope. It
explores the consequences of Ratzinger’s insistence on the importance of a
Chalcedonian Christology for understanding eschatology. A proper understanding of
eschatology flows out of a proper Christology. Christ is the fulfilment of hope and
our anchor in hope’s object, eternal life in heaven with God. He is ultimately the
object of hope. As possessing a perfected human nature united to the Word, Christ
fulfils moreover history, by enabling its transcendence. The intrinsic connection
between Christology and eschatology in Ratzinger is analysed to show an ‘already,
not yet’ conception of history. Christ’s Resurrection is the eschatological action of
God begun in history but pointing to a supra-historical realisation.

A view of history as containing already the seeds of its transcendent fulfilment, made
present and communicated through the life of the Church in the ‘Age of the
Gentiles’, militates against a critical-dialectic understanding of history as needing
human action to usher in an inner-historical period of redeemed history. The
transformation of defective history has begun in the Resurrection of Christ and
awaits culmination in the realisation of the eschaton. An eschatology that awaits
expectantly Christ’s Parousia, anticipated and made present in the liturgy, augments
the conclusion that hope is receptively patient and not activist. Hope is not directed
to the building up of inner-historical utopia. Rather, history is oriented beyond-itself
for its perfection.

Chapter 4 will examine in Pieper and Ratzinger the traces of an AugustinianAegidian Thomist conception of human nature as congenitally open to grace and
directly related to the divine. An Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of the
supernatural, exemplified in the thought of Balthasar and particularly de Lubac,
undergirds a view of hope as belonging to the realm of gift and beyond human
manipulation, and as oriented to personal, existential fulfilment beyond history. Each
of Pieper and Ratzinger conceives the rational, spiritual nature of human beings as
constitutively, ecstatically but paradoxically related ‘beyond itself’ to a fulfilment
achieved only in the receipt of a supernatural gift, that is, the beatific vision. The
natural desire for God contrasts with a Rahnerian concept of the supernatural
existential and relates to an analogical metaphysics, which views the human person
as ‘on-the-way’ to fulfilment. A theological anthropology claiming that the human
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person has an innate desire for supernatural fulfilment and is ‘on the way’ relativises
inner-historical objects of hope. Fulfilment of this kind consists in the possession of
eternal life with God in Christ and those in communion with him, which by
definition can only be given by the Divine Giver, beyond history.

Ratzinger nevertheless maintains the distinction between the orders of nature and
grace. Chapter 5 presents Ratzinger’s soteriology as cruciform, in which the defects
of sin-impaired human nature need to be overcome. Rahner’s claim that redemption
consists in humanity’s acceptance of itself is treated with scepticism. Ratzinger is
wary of the tendency present in the Concilium authors to collapse the orders of faith
and politics, a conflation following on from an antecedent confusion of the orders of
nature and grace. It explores Ratzinger’s alternative view of the means by which God
fulfils the potential for supernatural life inherent to rational nature. In particular it
notes the place of the Cross of Christ in Ratzinger’s soteriology as a precondition for
deifying grace to transform human nature. There is a level of ‘renunciation’ of
human nature and the wounds of sin and death necessary for it to come into its
fulfilment, which is at the level of the supra-historical. Ratzinger, according to the
Christology of his elaborated in Chapter 3, defends therefore the particularity and
novelty of Christ in relation to nature and history. He presents a soteriology of
transformation in “which human beings are redeemed and deified [and thereby
perfected] in the Son (filii in Filio)”, in the words of Aaron Riches.100 As Riches
writes, “Jesus is verus homo because he is verus Deus”.101 For Ratzinger Christ is the
fulfilment of humanity. Human nature as such and as marked by sin is incomplete
without reference to the particular Jesus of Nazareth.

The Conclusion will briefly recapitulate the themes explored though the thesis and
relate the cleavages between the Concilium and Communio schools to the principal
cleavage in post-Concilium theology between Balthasar and Rahner. As the
understanding of hope and history needs to be anchored to Christ, so too does
fundamental theology need to be grounded in and dependent on God’s revelation of
himself in Christ.

100
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Riches, Ecce Homo, xviii.
Riches, Ecce Homo, 15.
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The differences revealed in an analysis of the Concilium and Communio approaches
to hope and history, represented in the different sets of authors, thus depend upon the
choices made in fundamental theology. How an author conceives nature in relation to
grace will determine his understanding of the nature of soteriology. A view of human
nature as supernaturally elevated prior to the ‘Christ event’, tends to produce an
integrated view of redemption in which economic and political praxis play an
important, soteriological role. It also tends to see secularisation and the ‘world’ in
positive terms as the site of ‘anonymous’ grace. As Milbank argues, the evacuation
of the social-historical-political sphere of anything specifically or institutionally
Christian, on the grounds “it is already a grace-imbued sphere”, leads to a “pretheological” reliance on “sociology or Marxist social theory”.102 In turn, hope will be
conceived in largely inner-historical terms and take its cues from a Hegelian-Marxist
dialectic and the Frankfurt School. These see history as defective but capable of
immanent change and rest on a social-critical dialectic that understands the Church’s
task to change institutions and society, including herself. Because the Concilium
approach is a theology beginning from below, it will see Christology in ‘ascending’
terms. Its Christology is historicist. Hope is consequently driven by inner-historical
praxis.

In the end, differences of approach in the hope-history debate are embodied in the
positions a philosopher or theologian take (or do not take) with respect to the Person
of Christ. The Communio approach of Ratzinger begins and ends with Christ, in his
unique and novel grandeur. He sees history as oriented to extra-historical fulfilment
‘beyond itself’ in Christ, grounded on a view of human nature as intrinsically capable
of receiving grace but in itself not capable of effecting salvation. Given these
foundations, soteriology will emphasise the radical action of Christ on the Cross as
its precondition for fulfilment in his Resurrection. The centrality of Christ in this
picture is underscored by a Chalcedonian Christology, which begins from ‘above’.
An emphasis on the indispensability of the Paschal Mystery lends itself to a
conception of hope as a theological virtue, which orients the human person to eternal
life with God in Christ. Allied to an analogical, participationist metaphysics that
perceives the creature as ‘from and for’ God but as constitutively dissimilar from
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Him (4.3.3), hope is viewed as essentially personal (but not individualistic), relating
to the individual’s existential desire for fulfilment in God, transcendent of history
and its immanent possibilities.
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CHAPTER 1 THE CONCILIUM POSITION ON HOPE AND HISTORY IN
FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY1
1.1

Introduction

Chapter 1 will provide a broad, illustrative overview of the Concilium contribution to
the hope-history debate.2 It relates that contribution to its foundations in fundamental
theology. It will do so by exploring the marriage in Schillebeeckx, Metz and
Gutiérrez of a Joachimite hopeful expectation of an ‘Age of the Spirit’ (see 1.2.1)
and a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical philosophy of history which secularise Christian
eschatology, on the one hand, and a low Christology, Rahnerian theology of grace
and immanentist soteriology, on the other. The combination of these elements drives
an understanding of hope as a strategy to improve the world and usher in a ‘new
humanity’. To explore the Concilium position on hope and history in fundamental
theology, the Chapter will examine the four building blocks of that position, as
manifested

in

Schillebeeckx,

Metz

and

Gutiérrez.

The

components

are

complementary, and form a composite framework for an immanent understanding of
hope.
First, it will consider the authors’ conception of eschatological hope as focusing on
inner-historical praxis. A theological choice emphasising praxis tends to import a
Hegelian-Marxist epistemology and philosophy of history. Focus upon praxis entails
an understanding of hope that is impersonal and directed in significant ways to
social, political, economic and historical ends. There is a tendency to conflate earthly
and eschatological hope. An immanent philosophical emphasis relates therefore them
1

As implied in the Introduction, Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez are taken as representative of the
Concilium position. The Chapter does not purport to provide an entire overview of the positions on
hope and history contained in the journal Concilium, gleaned across the whole history of the journal.
Rather it uses these authors as a means to approach a Concilium perspective, especially in the early
years of the journal.
2
The Chapter will not to provide an encyclopaedic description of Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez’s
oeuvre or capture every nuance in their thought on hope and history, much less their fundamental
theology, but to paint in broad strokes their views on hope and history in fundamental theology, so as
better to enable analysis of Ratzinger’s work on hope and history.
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to a secularisation of Christian eschatology present in a dialectical philosophy of
history.

Secondly, it will explore the role of a low Christology in the formation of an innerhistorical conception of hope. In Schillebeeckx is a Christology that claims
epistemological priority for experience over-against any transcendent, dogmatic
Christological formulation. Consistent with dominant twentieth century exegesis,
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez interpret Jesus of Nazareth in historical terms and
as an eschatological-prophetic political figure. Emphasis upon Jesus’s historical and
political significance lends itself to an activist account of hope and reduces the
import of the ontological unity subsisting in the Word, which grounds the humanity
of Christ in his divinity.

The third and fourth, closely related elements of the Concilium perspective on hope
and history are a Rahnerian theology of grace and immanent soteriology. The
perspective is grounded in theology of grace, which views human existence as
supernaturally elevated (1.4.1). It will tend therefore to incorporate the explanatory
power of secular and immanent philosophies, such as Marx’s, and apply them to the
improvement of historical and social reality. Secularisation itself will be seen
positively.

A Rahnerian theology of grace therefore leads into the consideration of the fourth
element of the Concilium perspective on hope and history. Rahner’s view that human
existence inherently possesses the supernatural existential is joined to the notion that
humanity has the capacity to drive history forward in a salvific manner, and leads to
a coextensive view of profane history and salvation history. Consequently, there is
present in political and liberation theologies the tendency to collapse profane and
salvation history. Developed in these theologies is thus an integrated view of
redemption, in which social, economic, political and personal redemption are
interconnected. An integrated view of redemption also connects to a unitary view of
history and being (which echoes a Hegelian historicisation of Being). Hope, as
directed to salvation (c.f. 2.3), takes on an inner-historical colour.
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The Chapter will conclude with a comment on the relative significance of the
foundational metaphysical and theological choices implicitly or explicitly made by
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez in their understanding of the relationship between
hope and history. The Concilium perspective of hope and history is grounded
principally in a Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of history and a Rahnerian theology of
grace. Focused on the secular and immanent, a dialectical philosophy of history and a
Rahnerian theology of grace minimises the impact of Christ as the novel, divine
intervention from ‘above’ and maximises the salvific possibilities inherent to human
existence and human history. The starting point of the Concilium perspective on hope
and history is thus not the Person of Jesus Christ, understood in Chalcedonian terms,
but a secularly-framed political, social, historical praxis. Consequently, a low
Christology undergirds the Concilium position, which presents an alternative and
self-consciously understood practical fundamental theology. Entirely different
theological foundations ground therefore Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez than the
Communio approach (2-5).3

1.2

Eschatological Hope Immanently Framed: The Place of Joachim, Hegel
and Marx in the Concilium Position

This section will examine the mix of Joachim, Hegel and Marx, mediated via Bloch
and Moltmann, in the Concilium view of hope and history. The complex of these
factors grounds inner-historical conceptions of eschatological hope. It will ask the
question whether these authors fall within the intellectual genealogy beginning in
Joachim’s tripartite division of history and extending through Hegel and Marx to
Bloch. To answer this question, it will first trace briefly the idea of what Ratzinger
describes as the “secularization of Christian eschatological thought” through
Joachim, Hegel and Marx and Bloch, in which is present a specifically ultramundane, atheist conception of hope.4 Apparent in the ‘secularisation of Christian

3

C.f. the title to Metz’s key text of political theology: Faith in History and Society: Toward a
Practical Fundamental Theology.
4
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 13. Ratzinger’s formulation of the phenomenon relates to Eric Voegelin’s
idea of the ‘immanentization of the eschaton’. See Voegelin’s New Science of Politics and also Tracey
Rowland, “Variations on the Theme of Christian Hope in the Works of Joseph Ratzinger,” in Tracey
Rowland, The Culture of the Incarnation: Essays in Catholic Theology (Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus
Academic, 2017): 70-71. A chief text tracing the secularisation of eschatology is Karl Löwith,
Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). Toby Young describes an example
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eschatology’ is an inner-historical conception of hope, in which the energies of
eschatological hope and expectation are directed to the achievement of secular aims.
It is most marked in modern history in Marx’s expectation of the worker’s paradise.
The section will then suggest that the spirit of Joachim animates a Hegelian-Marxist
dialectical view of history in these authors, in whom Bloch’s conception of hope and
history and a Marxist emphasis on praxis are also present. In this light, the
understandings of eschatological hope in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez will be
considered. It is apparent that their impersonal, inner-historical conceptions of hope
reflect a tendency to place eschatological hope within an immanent framework.5

1.2.1

The Secularisation of Christian Eschatology

A characteristic feature of certain strains of modernity is the tendency to place within
a secular framework eschatological fervour and expectation. An epistemology, which
arrogates to humanity the capacity to manipulate nature, grounds the attitude that
humanity can direct and somehow ‘make’ history and accelerate eschatological
fulfilment. Eschatological hope is placed in the progress of history and human efforts
to realise that progress. Löwith summarises well the tendency: “the moderns
elaborate a philosophy of history by secularizing theological principles and applying
them to an ever increasing number of empirical facts.”6 The natural or empirical
becomes overlaid with traditional eschatological thought, and the two become
conflated.

According to Löwith, the secularisation of Christian eschatology maintains the
Hebraic-Christian idea that history has a finis and a telos. Modernity has inherited the
idea that history is directed to the realisation of a goal, which gives history a
of an immanent Marxist eschatology applied by the Black Panthers’ to the Civil Rights Movement:
“…the Panthers talked about wanting to forcibly redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, and
how they planned to release every black man serving time for violent crime, including homicide, to
help them do it. The millionaire socialites in the Bernsteins’ living room lapped it up and whipped out
their chequebooks afterwards in the hope of bringing forward the day of reckoning.”: “The rebirth of
Radical Chic,” The Spectator, 21 July 2018, 48 (emphasis added).
5
Patrick J Deneen has recently described that a fundamental aspect of liberal theory and practice is
also to reject the binding authority of the past, which he insightfully examines as part of liberalism’s
anti-culture: Why Liberalism Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018).
6
Löwith, Meaning in History, 19. C.f. Brad Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious
Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University
Press, 2012), 12.
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universal, eschatological meaning. Generally speaking, history is seen as a linear
progression.

An

“eschatological

motivation”

determines

the

“historical

consciousness” of diverse figures such as Isaiah, Augustine, Hegel, Marx and
Schelling.7 What was held by Christian faith as a mystery centred “on the suprahistorical events of creation, incarnation, and consummation” has, however,
morphed.8 The ultimate end of history has become immanent and inner-worldly,
resulting in the “secularization of [Christian faith’s] eschatological pattern”.9
History’s progress towards a telos has become immanentized. An example is
Friedrich Hölderlin’s “blessed hope” in the moral improvement of humanity and his
idea that “everything is working toward better days”.10 With an eschatological
consciousness, moreover, a “secularised and degenerate” understanding of the “New
Heaven and New Earth” has become a powerful historical agent. 11 According to a
secularised eschatological disposition, hope is placed in the development of history,
often driven by technological change.

A turn to an inner-historical conception of eschatological hope, in which salvation
can be planned according to scientific and political rationality, has a long pre-history.
Ratzinger considers that the twelfth century southern Italian Abbot, Joachim of Fiore
was the historical instigator of a changed conception of the meaning of history,
which resulted in the ‘secularization of Christian eschatological thought’. 12 Joachim,
according to Ratzinger, was the one who combined elements of preceding Christian
thought and practice by making “the fateful connection between monastic utopia and

7

Löwith, Meaning in History, 2, 18-19 (quotation on 18). Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History
in St Bonaventure, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971 and 1989), 143.
Ratzinger cites Löwith’s “development of the philosophy of history” at the outset of Theology of
History in St Bonaventure, v, 165n1. See also, however, Joseph Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” in
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, Eveline Goodman-Thau, The End
of Time: The Provocation of Talking about God, trans. and ed. J. Matthew Ashley (New
York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 17 where he notes that the appellation ‘linear’ cannot be
applied straightforwardly to patristic and medieval theology.
8
Löwith, Meaning in History, 19.
9
Löwith, Meaning in History, 2, 18-19 (quotation on 2).
10
Pieper, End of Time, 73.
11
Pieper, End of Time, 70.
12
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 13, Theology of History in St Bonaventure, v. Ratzinger discusses the effect
of Joachim in the world of ideas: Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, 235, Eschatology, 13, 211-212,
Theology of History, passim. See also Löwith, Meaning in History, 145-159. Nash points out that
Voegelin imputed a degree of responsibility for the ‘immanentization of the eschaton’ in the modern
period to Joachim of Fiore, a figure likewise treated by Ratzinger: Conservative Intellectual
Movement in America, 43-44. See also Chapter 3.
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chiliasm”.13 The ‘utopia’ sought by European monks – that is, the paradise that they
endeavoured to anticipate in their life and prayer – and the longstanding chiliastic
expectation that God would create a new world within history, was combined and
chronologised in Joachim.
Joachim’s thought contained two structural features. It immanetized hope and
generated the idea that the object of hope could be known and anticipated through
human work. He presented a theory that history can be divided into three stages,
reflecting the Trinity. According to his tripartite scheme of history, the triune God
was the agent of historical progress. History was understood to consist of three
periods or ages (‘days’), corresponding to the Haexameron, or six days of Creation.
The third aeon was the Age of the Holy Spirit, which was immanent to history and
would consist of the redemption of the history that had continued, scandalously, to be
defective after Christ.14 In the age of the Father, the Jews had been in bondage and in
the age of the Son, Christians had only partial freedom. According to Joachim’s
theology, however, the Third Age would be characterised by “complete ‘freedom’ of
the ‘spirit’” in which “nothing but freedom and love would reign”.15 Importantly, the
Third Age is immanent to history.
In Joachim, hope is immanentized and partly rests on human agency. The ‘Age of the
Spirit’ became the object of hope. Joachim “places his hopeful joy and confident
expectation” in the coming of this age.16 Furthermore, the revealing of “final
liberation” could be discovered by human reason.17 Joachim was convinced of the
third age’s imminence and prophesied regarding the Apocalyptic meaning of two
mendicant orders, understood later as the Franciscans and Dominicans.18 Moreover,
because the third age was immanent to history, it was obligatory to work towards its
13

Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, 235.
Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, 226, 233, 235, Ratzinger, Eschatology, 212.
15
Löwith, Meaning in History, 148, Ratzinger, Milestones, 110.
16
Ratzinger, Theology of History, 108.
17
Löwith, Meaning in History, 148.
18
Ratzinger, Theology of History, v, 39, 108, Milestones, 110, Pieper, End of Time, 150-151, Löwith,
Meaning in History, 151-152 on the Spiritual Franciscans. On the condemnation of the Spiritual
Franciscans, the role of the Franciscan Order in the rise of modernity and the tensions arising from the
Franciscans’ attempted refusal to claim ownership over property, including especially a consequent
privileging of the will, and the utopian spirit animating the Order, see the fascinating articles of
Olivier Boulnois, “Most High Poverty: The Challenge of the Franciscan Experiment,” Communio
42(3) (Fall, 2015): 460-461, 464-465, John Milbank, “The Franciscan Conundrum,” Communio 42(3)
(Fall, 2015): 467, 469.
14
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instantiation. As Ratzinger says, “utopia was historicized and made into a historical
goal to be striven for actively” by Joachim and his monks.19 On Joachim’s scheme,
supernatural hope thereby becomes mixed in with rational planning and receives
systematic expression for the first time.20 Hope takes on an intra-historical and
rationally-planned character in Joachim.
A key component of Joachim’s theology of history was what can retrospectively be
described broadly as its dialectical character. The advent of the Third Age would
bring about a qualitative change to history, constituting a rejection or dialectical
development from the past, which lacked the conditions of freedom. Hope was
driven by disillusionment with the state of history and constituted expectation of a
better future to be brought about by human action. In rejecting the past, the ‘not yet’
of Christian salvation embodied in Christ’s first advent (3) is in Joachim translated
into an expectation of the Third Age. Ratzinger notes that Joachim expected “a truly
good and redeemed history [that was] yet to come since an unredeemed and defective
history continue[d] after Christ”.21 The scandal of ‘unredeemed and defective
history’ was to be overcome by an imminent and immanent “redeemed history”,
which thereby became the locus of Joachim’s “joyful hope and his confident
expectation”.22 Joachim’s dissatisfaction with present history also translated “into
something of a program of practical action” in the form of the Orders that worked for
the Third Age’s coming.23 The scandal of Christianity’s apparent failure to redeem
history helped generate Joachim’s periodisation of history and an imminent
eschatological expectation of inner-worldly transformation.
The historicisation of Christian hope latent in Joachim’s utopic dreams developed
into a full-blown secularisation of Christian eschatology. Hope became increasingly
applied to an immanent end of history. Hope’s object coalesced into “concrete
utopias”.24 From Joachimite thought have thus come a number of “false
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eschatologies or gods” in European thought.25 Expectation of “political utopia”
replaced and secularised the religious hope for the Third Age in subsequent
centuries, in the context of increased confidence in human reason and the decline of
the appeal of religion.26 According to Ratzinger, the secular, intra-historical hope in a
“better world” characteristic of the Marxist vision, for example, replaced the biblical
Kingdom of God as the object of hope.27 A “secular faith in progress” divorced from
a Christian understanding of the meaning of history is present in secularised
eschatologies.28 Shorn of a specifically Christian eschatological awareness were
progressive philosophies of history.

The structural changes to the understanding of the meaning of history that Joachim
initiated were present in Hegel and Marx. They were also evident in “the totalitarian
systems of our own century” (2.2.3).29 The structural changes Joachim instigated
were, first, the view that history contained its own immanent “forward thrusting
process” and, secondly, that human activity can contribute to humanity’s redemption,
a redemption assured by the “logic of history”.30 Both of these features can be said to
be present in “Hegel’s logic of history and Marx’s historical scheme”, which
Ratzinger considers are the end result of Joachim’s musings. 31 Hegelian and Marxist
philosophies of history took on an eschatological flavour, while immanentizing the
telos to which history was travelling.

As intimated in the Introduction, Hegel famously posited that history develops
according to an immanent logic. Hegel presents an immanent philosophy of history,
which retains an eschatological, progressive consciousness. As Nichols notes, in
Hegel there is an “[attempt] to marry Christian theology to secular selfconfidence”.32 Beiser observes that Hegel was historicist in the sense that he
understood human society, belief and practice to grow organically in relation to
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“historical context”, as well as the notion that “history is progressive”.33 Hegel
explains the purpose of his philosophy of history in the following terms:

The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of
Freedom: a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature, it is
our business to investigate.34

‘Capital H’ History is conceptualised as “the process whereby the World-Spirit
comes to explicit consciousness of itself as free”, a process that it is rational.35
History thus progresses according to a logical, dialectical rationale and “culminat[es]
in the realization of freedom in concrete political and social institutions”.36 The telos
of history, “the final cause of the World”, is the Spirit’s “consciousness of its own
freedom”.37 Such constitutes the “essential destiny of Reason”.38 Moreover, the ‘unit’
of the progressive realisation of the Weltgeist is the state.39 Consequently, present in
Hegel are the two structural changes of running through the Joachimite line of
thought on the meaning of history. History develops according to its own immanent
logic and there is an element of human agency in pushing history along. The novelty
of Hegel was, however, to disassociate progress to history’s immanent telos from a
specifically Christian eschatological context, and to place it within a political
context.
Hegel’s philosophy of history and his philosophical dialecticism were the
forerunners for secularised eschatology in materialist, revolutionary form, especially
in the thought of Marx. Marx incorporated from Hegel the first structural feature that
Joachim introduced to the meaning of history, namely progression to an immanent
telos. Roger Scruton describes the effect of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of
History on the subsequent understanding of history as immanently progressive in the
following terms:
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His vision of the inevitable march of history from each epoch to the next, urged on by
the same dialectic that governs the spirit in all its spheres, has been one of the most
damaging of all philosophically inspired illusions, responsible for the quasi-religious
belief in progress and the ‘end of history’, and inspiring the revolution fetishism of
the Marxists.40

The secularised eschatology of Marxism is sheeted home to philosophical
foundations in Hegel.

While operating with different concepts and understanding history to progress
towards differently understood teloi of reason, Hegel and Marx’s philosophies of
history possess a progressive understanding of history. Daniel Bell notes that there is
a Hegelian-Marxist view of history, which sees history as following a dialectical
“progressive movement of consciousness” and “whose underlying tow [is]… the
telos of rationality”.41 Francis Fukuyama notes that Marx took from Hegel, among
other things, the notion that the historical process develops according to a
dialecticism, which will eventually see the ‘end of history’.42 Hegel and Marx
understand history to be teleological, progressing towards a particular goal.

Marxism developed, however, the Hegelian philosophy of history. Where Marx
departs from Hegel is that he sees the goal of history not to be the liberal state but
“the victory of the true ‘universal class,’ the proletariat, and the subsequent
achievement of a global communist utopia that would end class struggle once and for
all.”43 History is understood according to the materialist dialectic of a class struggle,
at the end of which is the triumph of the workers’ utopia, as the transformation of
humanity. The dialectic of class-struggle would result in a “dictatorship of the
proletariat”, after which a “new Jerusalem” would eventuate, in which all alienation
and division would be removed.44 In such a ‘new Jerusalem’, “historical alienation”
is overcome through the creation of a new world in which matter and humanity have
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been transformed.45 An “anthropological postulate” of Marxism consists therefore in
an inner-historical utopian hope of the ‘new humanity’.46 History’s telos is the
eradication of class conflict and the instantiation of a proletariat kingdom.

The notion of progress is the ultimate form of the Marxist vision of humanity. Such a
vision thereby links Marxist thought to a “strange eschatological consciousness” that
expects a “perfected state” necessarily arising from the dialectic of history, in which
freedom is experienced by all as belonging to human nature. 47 Marxism replaces the
transcendent God with the god of ‘history’.48 Marxism’s “[ideological] optimism is a
secularization of Christian hope” oriented to the ‘end of history’ and the realisation
of the “perfect society”, a manifestation of history’s divinity. 49 In this context, it does
not make sense to speak of a chronological end of time, although the progress of
history endemic to the Hegelian-Marxist vision posits a “fulfillment of time”, in
which history will have reached its goal and can admit of no further development.50
History progresses toward a utopia of transformed humanity.

Progressing history is viewed in the modern philosophies of history to which
Marxism relates as being within human power. Ratzinger notes that in the
contemporary period, history is seen not as the province of God but as something that
humanity can direct; history is material, which can be manipulated. It develops
according to rational planning and practical reason, which have evidently mastered
nature and the world: “[p]lanning has taken the place of providence”. 51 Albeit with
respect to a liberal, Kantian progressive view of history, Pieper quotes a 1922
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Dictionary of Philosophy entry on ‘History’. It argues that human activity, entailing
the mastery of nature and education, “will remold the conditions of life” and
contribute to a “unification of technological, cultural, and moral progress”, such
unity being the meaning of history.52 Ratzinger furthermore notes, in terms that
apparently allude to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, that there is now a “world
history” that takes up all partial histories and is the “single, indivisible” history, for
which humanity has responsibility.53 History is unitary and characterised by progress
that humanity must push along.

Marxism is thus characterised by a heady mix of the two changes wrought by
Joachim and is the epitome of secularised eschatology. Alongside the idea that
history progresses to an immanent end, is the Marxist thought that human agency
will bring about or accelerate the predetermined end. The proletariat, or working
class, possesses historical-eschatological agency. They are characterised in ‘quasireligious’, eschatological terms. The proletariat is the “chosen people”, who has the
task of pushing the historical process along through its action.54 According to
Löwith, Marx considered that:

If this class [the working class] becomes class-conscious, organized, and politically
directed, it will change the whole course of history ‘when the class struggle nears the
decisive hour’.55

Marx’s logic of history contains a call for political mobilisation and revolutionary
action. Only in activating the working class in this way, will it undertake its
appointed task of bringing history to its destined end. Human activity can thus help
bring about the ‘end of history’.

Marxism is an apogee of the changes to the conception of the meaning of history that
began in Joachim. It is an amalgam of belief in an eschatological but immanent end
to history, and the conceit that human rationality can predict that end and direct
human action to bring it about. Löwith characterises, therefore, Marx’s Communist
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Manifesto as possessing in its self-understanding scientific content, framed
eschatologically and bearing prophetic witness.56 Marx is an end product of the trend
beginning in Joachim, in which “we set our hopes for [human salvation] on planning
mechanisms”.57 Eschatological fervour and gnostic rationality are thus characteristic
of Marx.58 Joachim leads to Marxism.

A Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of history is

importantly predicated on

epistemological confidence. Hegel had advanced the possibility that “pure thinking
alone … [could] give us knowledge of reality in itself, the absolute or the universe as
a whole”.59 He presented a “closed system”, which purported to comprehend the
entirety of truth.60 Necessarily, Hegel’s epistemological assuredness extended to
perceiving the meaning of history. He presents “a basic structural formula [regarding
history] whose application … [renders] everything explicable”. 61 Inherent to Hegel’s
claims for total knowledge on the basis of pure reason is that “truth exists … only by
the scientific system of truth”.62 Knowledge is obtained by human rationality alone,
which encompasses knowledge of the movement of history.
Hegel’s epistemological confidence is apparent in materialist philosophy of history.
Nichols notes that “the total claims of Hegelian speculation” is mirrored “in Marx’s
hopes of revolutionary praxis as the agent of total (secular) salvation”.63 In the
materialist, Marxist epistemological equivalent to Hegel is Engels’ claim that
“exhaustive knowledge of all natural reality” is possible, a claim premised on
humanity’s capacity to produce things.64 Foreclosed is an apophaticism that demurs
on the claims of human reason. The notion that “practical experience, i.e.,
56
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experimental research and industry” can attain to total knowledge applies to material
conceptions of history.65 A contemporary liberal Hegelian example of a scientific
materialist reading of history approaching its telos is Fukuyama’s End of History.
Deneen explains that Fukuyama “provides a long materialist explanation of the
inescapable scientific logic…contributing to the rise of the liberal state”. 66 Although
shorn of eschatological fervour, Fukuyama’s work exemplifies the Hegelian-Marxist
tendency to amplify the claims of reason to predict or announce the ‘end of history’.

A consequent immanent philosophy of history is developed with eschatological
overtones, which simultaneously shrinks human reason’s capacity to attain to the
truth while enlarging claims made on its behalf. In contrast to the Christian view
expressed by Pieper that the ultimate meaning of history is disclosed by revelation
and must take its content from theology, a Hegelian-Marxist sees the human mind as
capable of comprehending the entirety of history and its direction. Severing
philosophy of history from “true theology”, however, results in “the unrestrained
proliferation of Utopian-millenarian expectations of intra-historical salvation”.67
Tethered to Joachimite periodisation of history but untethered from his Christian
context, a Hegelian-Marxist epistemology grounds utopian expectation in the
achievement of the ‘end of history’.

Twentieth century thinker Bloch exemplifies a Marxist secularised eschatology
originating in Joachim and represents an important application of it to the philosophy
of hope. Bloch presents a vision of ultra-mundane and not supra-historical hope. MR
Tripole notes that one of Bloch’s inspirations was Joachim, “interpreted in ‘leftwing’ Aristotelian-Marxist categories”.68 The two structural features originating in
Joachim’s theorising concerning the meaning of history – utopia’s historical
immanence and humanity’s obligation to work for it – are present in his multivolume Das Prinzip Hoffnung. First, Bloch’s materialist philosophy of hope is
immanently framed. In contrast to extra-worldly understandings of the objects of
65
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hope, Bloch views hope as exclusively intra-mundane. According to Bloch, objects
of hope not realisable in the world are “illusory”; only what can be realised within
the world constitute objects of hope.69 The world is the situs of redemption. Hope
cannot be placed in the “great beyond”.70 For Bloch, hope is only intelligible if it is
intra-mundane.

The utopia of the object of inner-worldly hope is, moreover, given socialist content.
Not only is hope confined to what is possible within the world, hope can only be
realised in the “socialist transformation of the world”.71 Furthermore, hope in the
coming of the socialist regnum humanum takes concrete shape in the political reality
of the Soviet Union. In the historical configuration of Communist Russia, the
“kingdom of freedom” finds its initial expression.72 Importantly, Bloch identifies the
Soviet Union as the manifestation of the initial stages of Joachim’s Third Age.73
Explicitly, he places himself within a Joachimite genealogy but applies it according
to the Marxist schema of history. The Third Age, immanent to history, is the product
of a material-dialectical and socialist progression of history.

An immanent, atheistic materialist framework for hope, enables and obliges
humanity to construct utopia, the second Joachimite feature present in Bloch. Bloch
interprets hope under the aspect of atheistic dialectical materialism. 74 His materialist
conception of hope is informed not by the prophetic tradition of the bible but a
Hegelian-Marxist understanding of history.75 For Bloch, humanity’s “regeneration
and reign” is predicated on the non-existence of God.76 Recognition of God’s nonexistence disillusions humanity and directs its energies to history’s improvement.
Bloch’s principle of hope obliges humanity to overcome dialectically the empirically
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bad state of the world so as to construct a “better world”. 77 Present in Bloch is
dialectical materialism that sheds God and seeks to overcome historical injustice.
Grounding Bloch’s claim that human efforts are to push history forward is a
Hegelian epistemology in materialist, Marxist form. Material reality is knowable and
manipulable according to the dictates of reason. Bloch inherits and applies Marx’s
famous statement that the philosopher’s task is not to interpret the world but to
change it. Bloch would agree that “Techne has become the real potential and
obligation of man”.78 The world, as the site of redemption, is open to human
intervention. It consists of a “laboratory of possible salvation”.79 Bloch posits a
‘laboratory of hope’, the name of which highlights the joining together of scientific
rationality and eschatological hope.80 Hope is placed thereby in what “can be planned
and produced”.81 It is “the product of human activity” in this “laboratory” alone, as
what is beyond humanity’s control and knowledge cannot be the object of hope.82
According to this intra-historical conception of hope, the object of hope is the
creation of a “perfect world”, thought achievable on the basis of scientific rationality
and politics.83 It is social and political activity through the medium of socialism that
will bring about all that can be hoped for.

Overall, Bloch combines epistemological confidence in the rational capacity to
manipulate material history with an expectation of the immanent realisation of
history’s telos. He stands at the end of a tendency to secularise Christian hope
originating in Joachim, mediated through Hegel and Marx, and provides an important
example of a perspective on hope and history, which is ultra-mundane and contrary
to traditional conceptions of Christian hope.
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1.2.2

A Dialectical Orientation to the Future in Political and Liberation
Theologies

This section will consider the presence of a dialectical orientation to the future in
Metz and Gutiérrez. It will provide an overview of the combination in Metz and
Gutiérrez of a Moltmannian eschatological consciousness, with a Blochian emphasis
on the future and Marxist emphasis on praxis. A dialectical orientation to the future
and concomitant rejection of the past as the site of injustice is indebted to a Marxist
dialectical reading of history and relates to a metaphysic of futurity. The trend of
secularising Christian eschatology that began in Joachim thus found its way into
post-War Moltmannian and political and liberation theologies. To a degree, Metz and
Gutiérrez choose a Blochian metaphysical approach to history and the future, and
emphasise praxis as motivation for social change.

The influence on Metz and Gutiérrez of the Joachimite train of thought culminating
in Bloch can be discerned by briefly examining the influence on them of Moltmann,
whom Joachim and Bloch impacted. Consideration will then be given to the
influence of Bloch and the notion of praxis on these thinkers. Bloch’s thought, and
the antecedent Joachimite, Hegelian and Marxist philosophies of history are
foundational choices for the theologians. They possess a dialectical view of history,
which sees the future as open ground for progress and improvement. Consequently,
they along with Schillebeeckx (whose relationship to the Marxist Frankfurt School
will be mentioned in 1.3), develop concepts of eschatological hope as impersonal and
driving inner-historical change (1.2.3 and 1.2.4).
Moltmann’s Theologie der Hoffnung encapsulates the impact of Joachimite thinking,
particularly found in Bloch, on the Concilium understanding of hope and history. He
explicitly acknowledges the common provenance of his and Bloch’s ideas in Joachim
and their “shared …belief in the Age of the Spirit”.84 He considers, moreover,
Joachim to be more influential than Augustine (who contrasted the City of God with
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the City of Man: 5.5) in the contemporary period.85 The biblical message, for him, is
full of “future hope of a messianic kind for the world”.86 In this sense, his is a
‘worldly’ hope, akin to Bloch’s idea of hope. Against eschatology that pushes the
object of hope to the Last Day and “beyond history”, Moltmann emphasises the
revolutionary impact of the Christian message of hope in present history.87 He
considers hope to have “mobilizing, revolutionizing, and critical effects upon history
as it is now to be lived”.88 Eschatology is not the doctrine of the last things, which
emphasises a break between history and the eschaton, but “the doctrine of the
Christian hope” so understood.89 Moltmann presents Christian hope as not focused
on what happens at time’s end, but as driving improvement of the future and
amounting dialectically to a decisive break with the past. The traditional emphasis of
the Church on the last things is rejected in favour of an interpretation of Christianity
driving inner-historical change.

A Blochian emphasis on the historicity and futurity of hope also informs Moltmann.
Ratzinger describes Moltmann’s Theology of Hope as developing “a wholly new and
different conception of theology from Bloch’s perspective”.90 Tripoli observes that
Bloch’s Das Prinzip Hoffnung “made Moltmann realise that hope in the future of
history was a thoroughly biblical principle left undeveloped in Christian theology”.91
Against a Parmenidean metaphysics emphasising God’s eternal present, Moltmann
incorporates a Blochian futurity in the concept of God himself. In an apparent
sideswipe at Thomistic metaphysics, which posits that God’s total existence is his
nature (4.4), Moltmann quotes Bloch’s statement that God has the “future as his
essential nature”.92 Contrary to an Augustinian-Thomist analogy of being (4.4.3), he
argues thus that he is not “in us or over us but always only before us”.93 God cannot
be possessed now but “can only [be awaited] in active hope” because he is
encountered “in his promises for the future”.94 God is to be encountered as promising
85
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the future and cannot be known now. The ‘God of hope’ himself is characterised by
futurity and awaits humanity in future.95 Bloch posits metaphysics of change, an
‘ontology of not yet being’ (see below), which supports Moltmann’s idea of hope as
the protagonist for inner-worldly change. The continuum between past, present and
future appears sundered, resting on a metaphysics that suggests that Being develops
and is not the analogical link between Creator and creation. Akin to Hegel, Being
itself is constituted by futurity, directing attention to the future and not the past or
God’s eternal present.

A dialectical concept of the relationship between hope and history follows. The
promises given by hope “stand in contradiction to the reality which can at present be
experienced” and drive “hoped-for transformation” in light of the promised
reality”.96 As Ratzinger observes, Moltmann’s understanding of the disjuncture
between what hope promises and present reality leads to an understanding of
Christianity as needing to change present reality under the “criterion of hope”. 97 For
this reason, theology needs to be read entirely under the aspect of eschatology as
“forward looking and forward moving”, which results in the present being
revolutionised and transformed.98 Moltmann argues that faith working itself out in
hope should generate “not rest but unrest, not patience but impatience”.99 On this
view, faith-hope “is itself this unquiet in man”; human disquietude is not calmed by
it.100 Hope’s focus, on this account, is on a sharp conflictual, contradistinction to the
reality of the world and an attempted amelioration of its ills. The hoping Christian is
one who suffers under and contradicts current reality. Hope drives the Church to be a
“constant disturbance in human society”, seeking to realise “righteousness, freedom
and humanity here in the light of the promised future”.101 An orientation to the future
drives an impatient desire to change present history.
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Moltmann’s theology of hope, which possesses an attitude of critical engagement
with the world and a revolutionary impulse to change it under a utopian aspect,
underlies the Concilium perspective on hope and history. It drives a ‘praxis of hope’
restless and impatient for inner-historical change, setting up a dichotomy between the
past and the future.102 Impatience with the present state of history connects
Moltmann to a Joachimite desire for the Third Age, which is reflected in especially
Marxist philosophy of history. It entails a rejection of the salvific significance of the
past and focuses on the future.

The political theology of Metz and liberation theology of Gutiérrez possess a
dialectical reading of history. Ratzinger characterises Metz’s “enthusiastic option for
history” as “an equally decisive rejection of the past…and tradition in favour of
program of what is to be done”.103 He describes the theology of futurity as
“invalidating history as it has been up to the present”.104 Collins notes that Metz’s
political theology is concerned to address the “concrete needs of the poor and
oppressed in the present” based partly on a critique of the history that led to that
injustice.105 Albeit with respect the Old Testament prophets, moreover, Gutiérrez
refers to these prophets’ “posture toward the future” and “awareness of a break with
the past”.106 Gutiérrez characterises eschatology as being opened to the future, even
if there remains a prophetic “concern for the present”.107 In a Moltmannian turn of
phrase, Gutiérrez argues that a material conception of salvation allows cognisance of
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the “human consequences of the eschatological promises and the power to transform
unjust social structures”.108 Metz and Gutiérrez share a dialectical reading of history
with Moltmann.
Although Metz to a degree critiques Moltmann’s metaphysics, a crisis in the meaning
of history, ontology and tradition is nevertheless apparent in political theology.
Ratzinger notes that the futurity of the theologies inspired by the theology of hope is
grounded in a questioning of history that it shares with Marxism. Consequently, a
“theme of discontinuity” characterises political theology, with the ironic
consequence that Metz’s emphasis on the historical is ahistorical.109 History contains
salvific significance only on the basis of hope for the future and a denial of present
history.110 The saving tradition bringing the salvation wrought in the past into the
present appears jettisoned in favour of a reading that the present should be changed
in light of an eschatological future and the memory of historical suffering (see 1.5.2).
Thus, political theology “more or less abandons the ground of theological tradition”
and rather “rests on immanently political considerations”.111 Tradition is replaced by
a dialectical reading of history, whose value is found in highlighting the injustices of
the past so as to motivate change for the future, the shape of which depends upon
political considerations.

Underlying the programmes of the theology of hope and its successors appears to be
the scandal that Christ’s Paschal Mystery has not changed history and that hope
necessitates a drive to change this history. Salvation is not seen as already having
taken place, with its effects communicated through time via the Church, but needs to
be brought about within history by human agency. Thus, Metz rejects an ‘already,
108
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not yet’ conception of human history in which salvation has already occurred in the
past, with its full realisation yet to be manifested. He thinks the critical question is
“how much time do we (still) have anyway?”, not a concern with an end
simultaneously ‘beyond’ history but incipiently realised within history. 112 The aporia
of Christianity – that Christ’s Resurrection appears not have changed history –
motivates a rejection of any suggestion of the salvific significance of the past and
generates a desire for inner-historical change in the future, grounded on instead the
memory of Christ’s death and Resurrection (3).
Ratzinger’s claim that political theology and a theology of revolution import Marxist
features bears examination. The Marxist dialectical view of history, especially the
Blochian variant, was an important inspiration for political and liberation theologies.
Gutiérrez argues that “Marxian thought exercises a certain amount of influence [on
the theology of hope] through the work of Bloch”.113 Milbank points out the
“unprecedented degree of influence” exercised by Hegelian and Marxist traditions in
contemporary Catholic theology, including on political and liberation theologies, a
conclusion supported by Gutiérrez.114 Milbank discusses their notion of grace in that
context (1.4). De Lubac also notes the connection between Bloch and liberation
theology, pointing to the attempts of liberation theologians Roger Garaudy and
Guilio Girardi to reconcile Marxism and Christianity. He rightly observes the
authority of Bloch’s Principle of Hope and Moltmann in Gutiérrez’s work.115

Ratzinger also suggests that there is an affinity between Marxist epistemology, and
Moltmann’s theology of hope and Metz’s political theology. The Marxist shift from
conceiving truth as correlated to being, or even discoverable in already
“accomplished deeds”, to “changing [and molding] the world” is paralleled in
political

theology’s

tendency to

emphasise

faciendum,

the

“makable”.116

Underpinning an emphasis on the makeable is the dialectical desire to change
history. The contemporary dominance of Marxist epistemology is reflected in
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“transposing belief itself to this plane”.117 Importance is consequently given to the
concept of praxis in Concilium thought, a feature recognised by its defenders.118 As
noted in the Introduction, praxis is a key component of Marxist thought and involves
epistemological priority being given to it. On the face of it, Marxist approaches have
influenced political and liberation theologies.
The influence of Bloch on Metz’s thought further bears out the claim that Marxism
has influenced political theology.119 Ashley notes that decisive in Metz’s theological
development was his interaction with the thought of Bloch. Particularly apparent is
the impact this encounter had on Metz’s understanding of metaphysics, time and the
nature of history. Having already conceived theology, like Moltmann, as beginning
from an eschatological perspective, Metz’s interaction with Bloch saw him conceive
theology as future-oriented. The future is, moreover, not determined by the past, but
involves the “coming into being of that which has not yet existed”.120 The reference
to Bloch’s conception of the “Noch-nicht-gewesene” incorporates his ‘ontology of
not yet being’, which echoes Hegel in positing that being itself remains to be
determined, albeit in material terms.121 The future is to be determined by reference to
the concept of utopia, which “is what pulls history forward”. 122 In Metz, the future
realisation of being plays a key role in determining the content of Christian hope.
While Metz does not uncritically adopt Bloch, his impact remains apparent in Metz’s
understanding of the importance of future time. Although Metz fills the content of
Bloch’s aetheistic utopia by arguing that God is “what is ‘ahead of us’”, he draws a
connection between Bloch’s “apocalyptic wisdom” and his own desire to conceive
time under the aspect of “Apocalyptic” and not in evolutionistic terms.123 An
‘apocalyptic’ perspective “in Christian hope” is designed to “bring Christian praxis
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…under the pressure of time”.124 Metz’s dismissal of an ‘already, not yet’
eschatology and his focus on the time remaining, implies an urgent need to do
something in that time.125 For Metz, like Bloch, future time is the potential subject of
free human action. “Imminent expectation” should not, implicitly contra Ratzinger,
be “continual expectation” of the end (3.5) but rather should import the “pressure of
time and the pressure to act into Christian life”.126 Similar to Moltmann, Metz
understands Christian hope to motivate action in the present, which has significance
because of a Blochian conception that the future and therefore history is
manipulable.127 A Blochian concept of time in Metz lends itself to an interpretation
of hope that is not a supposedly vague and empty expectation of the end of time, but
as a journey with specific historical content.128 Hope is specifically temporal and
therefore secular.

The centrality of praxis and the influence of the Frankfurt School of theology in
Metz are additional indicators of the presence of Marxist-inflected thought in his
political theology. Metz emphasises the theory-praxis relationship, which is related
to the Frankfurt School’s philosophy of history and marks a departure from
personalistic and existentialist concepts of faith (1.2.4). Frankfurt School thinkers
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno detect a “dialectic of Enlightenment”, a
philosophy of history that considers that theoretical rationality increasingly
understands “nature and society” and thus can help practical reason “shape” history
such that it “would progress steadily toward the goal of a truly humane society”.129
However, such reason needs criticism outside of itself, as all reason is contextually
determined. Enlightenment reason ends up being “instrumental”.130 It is unable to
determine its goals or ends. In short, there needs to be a social-critical reason
operative outside of instrumental reason to address the shortcomings of the effects in
society and history of that rationality.
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Rationality critical of the shortcomings of society, which reflects on the theorypraxis relationship, meshes with Metz’s Joachimite turn against the past. Metz takes
from the Frankfurt position the notion that reason is not abstract or universal but
shaped by social praxis. Metz posits a “primacy of praxis” in his theology.131
According to Ashley, Metz uses the concept of praxis to show that “human reason is
shaped in advance”.132 All “critical reflection” is socially conditioned, which
demands an overturn of the classic faith-reason relationship and examination of “the
relationship between the understanding of faith and socially contextualised
praxis”.133 To escape determinism, reason must reflect critically on itself.

Instead of relying on classic expositions of the faith-reason relationship, in which
revelation undergirds reason, Metz relates his theology to a Marxist dialectic of
critical reason. Rationality is not understood in relation to revelation but in terms of
the dialectic between theory and praxis, resulting in the view that faith is to provide
“a critical stance over and against its social environment”.134 Faith is to change the
injustices embedded in the current social-historical matrix. For Metz, political
theology “shares with Marxism the Marxist-socialist interest in persons becoming
subjects in solidarity, especially the underprivileged and the oppressed”.135 Although
critical of the immanence of historical-dialectical materialism, Metz nevertheless
argues that Christianity should promote a praxis that “breaks through the context of
social (historical, psychological) determinants”.136 As we will see, the purpose of this
praxis is to promote a vision of hope that is directed to the political imperative of
creating ‘subjects’ before God. Faith is aimed at a praxis of political change, from
which hope gets its context.
The marriage of Moltmann’s eschatological hope to a Blochian emphasis on futurity
and a Marxian focus on praxis is also evident at the foundations of Gutiérrez’s
liberation theology. He identifies Marxism and eschatological reflection as two of the
key elements of theology’s turn to a critical reflection on praxis. Praxis is a key
category for Gutiérrez’s work. As a result of its “direct and fruitful confrontation
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with Marxism” and its object of ‘changing the world’, theology has learned “to
reflect on the meaning of the transformation of this world and human action in
history”.137 With overtones of Bloch’s ‘laboratory of hope’ and redolent of
Schillebeeckx (see below 1.3.2), Gutiérrez describes the “grassroots experiments in
social praxis” of Latin America, as “fundamental” and in the nature of “laboratory
experiments”.138 He implies that more of these experiments are needed, presumably
to determine how this ‘transformation of this world’ is to take place.

What is more, theology is shaped by its encounter with Marx. The exchange between
Marxism and theology enables the latter to realise the contribution that “historical
praxis of humankind in history” makes to theological reflection.139 Theology can
then turn greater attention to what implications its reflections have for the
“transformation of the world”.140 As Fiorenza points out, the “Methodic Emphasis”
of liberation theology is to develop theory on the basis of praxis.141 Theory is,
however, consequently to serve the ‘transformation of the world’. Akin to Metz,
theology is subservient to praxis and the imperative of inner-historical improvement.
Like Metz’s political theology, liberation theology becomes secular and temporally
framed. The eschatological consciousness of Moltmann combines with a Marxist
emphasis on praxis to produce a politically-inflected conception of humanity’s task
for the future. From this combination comes a theological emphasis on orthopraxis.
The “eschatological dimension” opened up in theology is twinned with a central
place for “historical praxis” in theology.142 According to an eschatological
consciousness, “human history” is primarily characterised as openness to the
future.143 As constitutively open to the future, the task of human history is “a
political occupation”.144 The Gospel is understood as a praxis of ‘doing the truth’, in
which action is the integral component to changing the future under the aspect of
exchatology.
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The faith-praxis nexus in Gutiérrez entails a shift in focus from dogma to praxis.
Importing scientific notions of truth, Gutiérrez argues that faith is only “verified” in
the doing of truth, from which comes the notion of orthopraxis.145 A concept of
orthopraxis is not intended to displace orthodoxy but to change the Church’s
emphasis on doctrinal formulation to emphasis on “concrete … praxis in the
Christian life”.146 Significantly, he quotes Schillebeeckx’s criticism of the Church’s
focus on orthodoxy as resulting in the Church doing “almost nothing to better the
world”.147 For Gutiérrez, orthopraxis, driven by a consciousness of humanity’s
openness to the future, is necessary to drive history to a ‘better’ future, and direct
faith’s attention to the achievement of that task.
Underlying Gutiérrez’s idea that human history is constitutively open to the future –
the construction of which is a political task – is a Blochian metaphysics. A key
component of the contemporary development of the theology of hope, according to
Gutiérrez, is Bloch’s dialectical conception of hope, which rests on his metaphysics.
Although Gabriel Marcel (who was influential on Pieper) contributed to
contemporary reflection on hope, his emphasis was the personal dimension of hope.
He did not consider hope’s implication for history and politics. It was Bloch’s Das
Prinzip Hoffnung that brought attention to how human hoping for a better future
becomes an “active hope which subverts the existing order”.148 Bloch thus accepts
the Marxist dialectical imperative to change the world and reject the past through
revolution. Like Metz, Gutiérrez describes in apparently favourable terms the
‘ontology of not yet being’ in Bloch. Bloch’s ‘ontology of not yet being’ is
encapsulated in the formula “S is not yet P, the subject is not yet the predicate”.149
The nature of the subject is to be attained in the future; the subject’s essence can ‘not
yet’ be predicated of it. Ontology understood in these terms undergirds a
revolutionary attitude to the future, manipulable according to rationality.
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According to Bloch, moreover, a subject’s essence only develops “within a dynamic
and utopian historico-temporal process”.150 In other words, essence itself is solely
historically conditioned and future-oriented. Being will develop according to a drive
towards “its essence or utopia” that, in Bloch’s words, “lies itself on the Front”.151
An ontology positing the future fulfilment of being generates a vision of hope as “the
[motivating] force of this process”.152 Hope becomes intra-historical because it is
connected to a “dialectical process of history, now largely conducted by man, where
the ‘not yet’ of the futurum is educed purely from the latencies and tendencies of
creative matter”.153 Thus, Bloch’s metaphysics of change supports an immanent view
of hope as related to a dialectical vision of history, in which the future is emphasised
as the site of humanity’s efforts to construct utopia.
Gutiérrez highlights the historicity and futurity of being in Bloch’s metaphysics,
which contributes to his own dialectic utopic thinking. He observes that in contrast to
a “static ontology of being”, a “dynamic” Blochian metaphysics enables history to be
planned in “revolutionary terms”.154 Bloch emphasises the potentiality of being and
the “open-ended” nature of what is real.155 That Gutiérrez notices the plasticity of
being and its manipulability according to the dictates of planning is telling. He
appears to glean from Bloch a metaphysical approach that supports a view of history
as subject to revolutionary planning.
From Bloch’s metaphysics, along with the developments in the theology of hope and
political theology (see further 1.2.3), Gutiérrez thus incorporates dialectical utopian
thinking into his theology. A new, different historical epoch is desired. For Gutiérrez,
utopia refers “to a historical plan for a qualitatively different society”, in which there
will be new social relations.156 In terms redolent of Bloch, Gutiérrez argues that
utopia dynamically drives the “historical becoming of humanity”. 157 Utopia has
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become viable, moreover, in the revolutionary fervour of the twentieth century.
Consequently, utopia serves as a “subversive … and a driving force of history”.158 It
involves “denunciation of the existing order”, as well as an “annunciation for what is
not yet”.159 Between the two poles of denunciation and annunciation is “historical
praxis”, which is the opportunity for “building”.160 Utopia also belongs to the order
of rationality. Scientific thinking undergirds the “real and effective transforming
political action” in the present while “historical projections” are driven by utopia.161
Utopia involves a dialectical rejection of the current state of history and an
orientation to an immanently realised, through praxis, future utopic state.
In conclusion, at the foundation of Metz’s political theology and Gutiérrez’s
liberation theology is a joining of a Blochian metaphysics and dialectical view of
history, and a Moltmannian view of eschatological hope as driving historical change.
Clearly present in Gutiérrez is a utopic imagination. For him, scientific rationality
enables political improvement in the present, while a utopian ontology presents the
opportunity to plan for “a new humanity in a new society of solidarity”. 162 These are
two components of Gutiérrez’s integrated view of liberation (1.5.3), which posits a
direct relationship between faith and politics.163 In Metz, Blochian apocalyptic
expectation focuses humanity’s efforts on the future, efforts informed by the
exigencies of time. Temporality frames his political theology, which has in common
with Marxism a concern to alleviate conditions of oppression and create subjects. A
foundation stone for the nexus between faith and politics in Metz and Gutiérrez is
thus the combination of Blochian metaphysical focus on the future and dialectical
rejection of the past, an emphasis on praxis, and a reading of theology under the
aspect of eschatology conceived as driving concern for history.
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1.2.3

Inner-Historical Eschatological Hope in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez

Revealing the impact of the mix of Joachim, Hegel and Marx (especially as mediated
via Bloch and Moltmann), Metz and Gutiérrez, as well as Schillebeeckx, is how they
tend to conceive hope in inner-historical terms. It would be erroneous to sheet home
to Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez a simplistic adoption of the Joachimite spirit,
Hegel and Marx’s philosophies of history and a Moltmannian eschatological
consciousness. It can be argued, however, that in communion with these they possess
the tendency to place hope in the inner-historical realisation of a better world, which
relates to a Blochian metaphysics and emphasis on praxis as the means by which
such an object can be brought about.164 This section explores how the Concilium
authors understand hope, which reveals a tendency to understand Christian
eschatology in a secular framework.

Eschatological hope is understood to motivate inner-historical activity in
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez. The aim of human action is to construct a better
future for humanity, premised on the possibility that history can develop dialectically
in this way. A social, historical, political and economic approach characterises thus
their visions of hope. The focus of hope largely appears to centre on the immanent
realisation of these projects and not their transcendent overcoming in the Parousia or
the personal sanctification of Christians. The thread connecting Schillebeeckx, Metz
and Gutiérrez, from the general to the particular, is the conviction that Christianity
must get ‘its hands dirty’ and contribute to the realisation of progressive innerhistorical, improvement.165 Aligned to a certain reading of conciliar theology, these
authors consider that new understandings of the human person and humanity at large
motivate social and political action to work for the future. Moreover, they tend to fall
on the ‘Incarnationalist’ end of the spectrum concerning the relationship between
history and eschatological reality.

Evident in Schillebeeckx is the notion that Christian hope concerns the historical
future. Although Schillebeeckx considers hope’s object ultimately to be the Parousia,
hope nevertheless possesses an inner-worldly focus. While vision of the end
164
165

C.f. Löwith, Meaning in History, 19.
C.f. Rowland, Catholic Theology, 168, 173.

73

encourages “actual devotion”, an eschatological attitude motivates “the up-building
of a Christian culture which also hopes in its transcendent final realization”.166
Against a purely eschatological understanding of history in which there is no nexus
between “earthly efforts and Christian hope”, Schillebeeckx preferred “a socialcommunal vision of the Rule of God that must be worked for together and in the
present world”167 The hope for Christ’s return is linked “to the various humanist
efforts at renewing the world in the present time”.168 In this regard, there “is a clear
preference for socially oriented action towards renewing the world” and a focus on
“the incarnational aspect of Christian hope as part and parcel of human life in the
world”.169 Thus Schillebeeckx considers hope to be directed to the humanisation of
the world, “for a better world to come, more worthy of men”. 170 He considers that
Gaudium et Spes confirmed that “Man’s [sic] aim is to build a new world”.171 A
utopic, dialectical imagination animates Schillebeeckx, who views hope as involving
inner-historical improvement.

Despite recognising that God is the final actor in realising this hope, in Schillebeeckx
is present the idea of a fundamental continuity between human action within history
and such action’s eschatological realisation. Schillebeeckx gives human historicity a
privileged place and salvation history is understood “as a still-unfolding reality”.172
Arguing for continuity between history and its eschatological realisation places
Schillebeeckx at the ‘Incarnationalist’ pole of the spectrum identified in the
Introduction and relates him to a Rahnerian view of the coextensive nature of profane
and salvation history (1.4-1.5). In a sense, the continuity secularises or immanentizes
the eschaton by imputing a salvific significance to historical action.
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In Metz’s political theology, hope is given a decidedly inner-historical, socialpolitical cast and is directed to inner-historical progress. In his Faith in History and
Society, he offers the following programmatic definition of faith-hope for his
political theology:

The faith of Christians is a praxis in history and society that understands itself as a
solidaristic hope in the God of Jesus as the God of the living and the dead, who calls
all to be subjects in God’s presence.173
On this view, faith’s object is the God’s action in creating subjects. Subject-hood in
this context is not understood as divine filiation (5.4.3) but with social-historical
overtones. Thus, in formulating a Christian apologia for hope (c.f. 1 Pt 3:15), Metz
considers important the concrete historical and social situation of subjects. The
experience of “their suffering, struggles, and obstacles” is a central ingredient to the
understanding of hope.174 In Metz’s account of Christian faith-hope, faith possesses
an “historical-social” emphasis.175 As an inner-historical and socially-constituted
praxis, faith’s object is the creation of subjects through practical action. Christianity
cannot remain neutral in the face of “the historical struggle for global solidarity”. 176
Instead, it must “throw itself into this struggle with its motto of all persons becoming
subjects in solidarity before God”.177 Christian faith for Metz is, consequently, an
“apocalyptically expectant praxis (of discipleship)”.178 Discipleship entails an active
construction of the future under the aspect of eschatology.

Faith as inner-historical praxis is thus defined as a hope that all may together respond
to God’s call and become subjects before him, overcoming historical struggle and
oppression.179 Underlying the hope that ‘all may become subjects’ is a view, which
echoes Hegel, that history contains a dynamic that points to a “freedom that is to
come” in the “future”.180 Joined to a view of history as progressing towards freedom,
is the notion that Christian discipleship can and must involve work in solidarity to
173
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overcome oppression and injustice. A nexus between hope and earthly efforts to
construct an improved future thus exists in the political theology of Metz. Christian
hope involves historical activity seeking to construct a better society.

An understanding of hope as driven by eschatological expectation towards innerhistorical future progress, under the direction of ‘human hands’, is also visible in
Gutiérrez. He places himself in an intellectual line descending from Rahner and
Schillebeeckx, through Bloch and Moltmann. Indicating his agreement with Rahner’s
anthropocentrism, he understands that humanity has entered “a new era”, which is
characterised by an “anthropophany” or “human epiphany”. 181 He also cites
Schillebeeckx’s notion that eschatology drives a “future-oriented” history, noting
that eschatology’s orientation to the future is “inseparably joined” to attention to
“historical contemporaneity and urgency”, a view present additionally in
Moltmann.182 Siding himself with Bloch’s philosophy of hope, Moltmann’s theology
of hope (1.3.2) and political theology against the ‘eschatologists’, he considers that
eschatological awareness does not “escape from history”.183 Instead, eschatology is
“the driving force of future-oriented history” and implicates politics and social
praxis.184 One of Moltmann’s chief contributions, for Gutiérrez, is that he distanced
Christianity from “fear of the future”.185 Instead, hope is the acceptance of the future
as a gift. Gutiérrez aligns therefore his theology of liberation with the intellectual
movement originating in Schillebeeckx that considered eschatological hope to be
oriented to the inner-historical future.
Gutiérrez’s relationship with his Concilium intellectual forebears is further evident in
the content he gives hope. For Gutiérrez, because eschatological hope is oriented to
the future, its content has a political and economic hue. Gutiérrez argues that the gift
of hope:
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…is accepted in the negation of injustice, in the protest against trampled human
rights, and in the struggle of for peace and fellowship. Thus hope fulfils a mobilizing
and liberating function in history.186

Gutiérrez correlates hope to a political rhetoric particularly prevalent in the second
half of the twentieth century, namely that of human rights, peace and fellowship.
Hope is aimed at protesting current historical injustice and offences against human
rights in order to bring about peace and fellowship, which is a historical process of
emancipation.187

By referring to human rights rhetoric, the goal of inner-historical progress is more
specifically defined in Gutiérrez than in Schillebeeckx and Metz. Whereas political
theology is concerned with a general “constant critique” of prevailing conditions
undergirded by critical reason, liberation theology is concerned with “[o]vercoming
relations of dependence” and seeking conditions of equality. 188 Nevertheless,
Gutiérrez’s understanding of hope is connected to Schillebeeckx and Metz’s more
general desire to construct a better future. Gutiérrez lauds political theology because
it is less “tradition” oriented, emphasising instead “living and urgent issues”.189 Hope
is worked out not in works of charity, but in prosecution of a struggle in history to
overcome historical oppression. Like Metz, Gutiérrez understands Christianity to
involve an imperative “to participate in the liberation of oppressed peoples and
exploited social classes”.190 Consistent with Schillebeeckx’s reading of Gaudium et
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Spes, Gutiérrez argues that the goal of the “struggle against misery, injustice, and
exploitation is the creation of a new humanity”.191 A drive towards emancipation
aligns Gutiérrez with Schillebeeckx’s reading of the Second Vatican Council and
Metz’s view of an impending freedom. Futurity drives hope as inner-historical
activity seeking to achieve the realisation of earthly projects directed to liberation.

1.2.4

Rejection of Personalism and Personalistic Hope

The argument that hope is directed to the inner-historical future and centres on
human activity involves a rejection of a personally-conceived hope primarily
oriented to eternity. A rejection of personalism distinguishes the Concilium position
on hope and history from Ratzinger (2.2.4). Contained in Schillebeeckx, Metz and
Gutiérrez’s future-oriented theology of hope is a critique of twentieth century
existentialist theology, including Rudolf Bultmann’s, and the personalism associated
with Martin Buber. Apparent in their work is a suspicion of personalism, with an
attendant focus upon the social, historical and therefore political. For political and
liberation theology, individual, personal sanctification leading to eternal life is
relatively minimised in importance, as political and economic liberation is
proportionally maximised.
A critique of personalism is most strongly present in Metz’s political theology. Metz
turned away from a privatised theology and the transcendentalism of his teacher
Rahner (although its effect remains apparent – 1.4.2), which he detected in
existentialism and personalism. He developed a political, “futurist eschatology”.192
As Ashley notes, his encounter with Marxist thinkers of the 1960s, including the
Frankfurt School, caused him to turn to the political dimensions of faith and move
away from theology’s focus on one’s personal relationship with God and others. He
thus directed Rahner’s transcendentalism into a more social-historical trajectory (see
further 1.4-1.5). Consequently, he distanced himself from Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ dynamic,
which

distinguishes

him

from

Ratzinger’s

Buber-inspired

“dialogical

personalism”.193 He considers that the “inter-subjective experience of the I-Thou”
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minimises the significance of society and history and is thus too “apolitical”.194 In
contrast, the concept of “solidaristic hope” that Metz develops is universal,
concerned not primarily with the self but others.195 Only through others, does it
concern the self. In contrast to Ratzinger’s view that hope begins with the person and
involves others as are related to the person, for Metz, only when hope is universal
does hope become personal. Hope is directed to the social and historical.
Consequently, tied up into Metz’s political theology is a rejection of the ‘last things’.
An “individual eschatology” reduces the significance of history and society, focusing
instead on personal death.196 Individual eschatology contradicts Metz’s conception of
the nature of hope as ‘solidaristic’ and directed to the making of subjects before God

An impersonal account of hope is also present in Schillebeeckx. Schillebeeckx
argues against “a false, namely abstract, personalism”, preferring instead an
integrated view of salvation and an institutional setting for the operation of grace
(1.4).197 He considered that an earlier draft of Gaudium et Spes presented an outdated
Christian anthropology, which was “individualistic”.198 Consistent with his
eschatological option for the future and shift away from consideration of the ‘last
things’ in favour of an integrated view of redemption, Schillebeeckx does not
conceive hope in primarily personal or individual terms.199
Likewise, Gutiérrez’s integrated understanding of liberation also accords with a
minimisation of the importance of the personal dimension of faith. While questioning
the applicability of the secularised context of Metz’s political theology in a Latin
American context, Gutiérrez commends Metz’s critique of privatised faith. He
applauds political theology’s emphasis on the “political dimension of faith”.200 As
seen, hope for Gutiérrez performs an important, liberating role within history and
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counters injustice by serving ‘fellowship’. He directs hope’s attention away from
individual salvation to include social liberation.

1.2.5

Conclusion

Underlying Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez’s social, historical, political and
impersonal conceptions of hope is an understanding that history is capable of
immanent progress. Their versions of hope consider that eschatology should drive
inner-historical change. A view that history can dialectically proceed connects these
authors to a Joachimite expectation of a new history and new humanity, an
essentially Hegelian view of the dialectical meaning of history and a Marxist
privileging of praxis and the oppressed as the beneficiaries of historical action. The
combination of these factors reveals a tendency to secularise Christian eschatology
and to incorporate a-personal, political, social and historical elements into the
conception of hope.

1.3

Christology from Below: Eschatology as Imminent Expectation and the
Minimisation of the Last Things

The second building block of the Concilium position on hope and history concerns
Christology. In their reflections on hope and history, Schillebeeckx, Metz and
Gutiérrez join a dialectical reading of history to a low Christology, which emphasises
the humanity, historicity and political significance of Jesus. A low Christology is one
of the bases of their largely inner-historical and utopian conception of hope, in which
hope is oriented at least in part to the attainment of earthly political and social goals.
As intimated in the Introduction, there was a ‘paradigm shift’ in Catholic Christology
in the twentieth century away from traditional, supposedly ‘monophysite’,
Christology. Typical is a Rahnerian Christology from ‘below’, which possesses an
anthropological focus. According to Barron, “Rahner [insists] that Christology is
fully realized anthropology”.201 Consistent with a Rahnerian theology of grace (1.4),
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a low Christology perceives Christ through anthropocentric lens. An ‘ascending
Christology’ begins by reference to Christ’s humanity. A Chalcedonian high
Christology presupposing the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in
the one Person in Christ is thereby minimised (see further 3). Consequently, the
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, which involves “the predicating of divine
and human attributes of one and the same person – the Son [of God]”, is
underutilised.202 Especially, the predication of the divinity of the Person of Jesus of
Nazareth, to his humanity, appears overlooked in these theologies.

Schillebeeckx, who developed his own innovative Christology, and the political
theology of Metz and liberation theology of Gutiérrez share Rahner’s
anthropological focus. Entailed in their low Christology is, moreover, adoption of a
common contemporary exegetical picture of Jesus that privileges modern biblical
critical methods. A strand of contemporary exegesis interprets Jesus as an
eschatological, prophetic figure, who chiefly announced an imminent Kingdom. On
this view, he did not understand himself as the divine Head of a Church he was
establishing. Consistent with a view of eschatological hope as driving social and
historical change (1.2.3), Jesus’s preaching regarding social justice appears
paramount. Jesus is primarily understood as a harbinger of social change, not as
promising and pointing to eternal life and an alien God ‘above us’, but to a
“purposeful future”.203

This section will first describe the exegetical reading of Jesus as a prophetic,
eschatological figure. It will then provide an overview of how each Concilium
Christology as belonging to the works representative of this ‘paradigm shift’. He also mentions in this
context Karl Rahner’s Foundations of Christian Faith (1976), Jon Sobrino’s Christology at the
Crossroads (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1976) and Jesus in Latin America (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987), and Juan
Luis Segundo, The Historical Jesus of the Synoptics (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1985). C.f. Ratzinger,
Jesus(2), 312 (Glossary prepared by Publisher).
202
Thomas G Weinandy OFM Cap, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2000), 174. See: Riches, Ecce Homo, 42-45, who cites inter alia Weinandy, Does God
Suffer?172-213; and Roch A Kereszty O Cist, Jesus Christ: Fundamentals of Christology, revised and
updated third ed. (New York: St Paul’s, 2011), 247, 280.
203
Johannes B Metz, “God Before Us Instead of a Theological Argument,” Cross Currents 18(3)
(Summer 1968): 296-299, quotation on 299. International Theological Commission, “The
Consciousness of Christ Concerning Himself and His Mission” in International Theological
Commission: Texts and Documents, ed. Monsignor Michael Sharkey (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1989), 316-325, esp, 316, 321-323. A sample: “When he preaches the Kingdom of God, Christ is not
simply announcing the imminence of a great eschatological change, he is, first of all, calling mankind
to enter the Kingdom”: 322.

81

author’s Christology contributes to an immanentist understanding of hope in their
theology.

1.3.1

Exegetical Context

Undergirding the low Christological focus of the Concilium position on hope and
history is the eschatological exegesis initiated by Johannes Weiss and Albert
Schweitzer at the turn of the twentieth century. These authors’ exegesis resulted in a
minimisation of traditional eschatology’s focus on the individual’s death and the
state which it subsequently entered, the end of time, Christ’s return and the general
judgment.204 With the minimisation of the last things came a corresponding increase
in the importance given to present historical reality (reflected in Moltmann’s
theology of hope with its influence on the Concilium position – 1.2.2). Acceptance of
biblical criticism’s picture of Jesus, or at least its methodology, informs the authors’
view of the meaning of Christianity in a contemporary context. Inner-historical,
political and social significance is, according to this view, given to the Kingdom of
God.

The eschatological exegesis that Weiss and Schweitzer introduced argued that the
most dominant aspect of Jesus’s preaching was eschatology. Jesus’ proclamation
concerned an imminent end to the world and irruption of the Kingdom of God, in
which “God would reign”.205 Jesus’s proclamation of this Kingdom must be seen
exclusively in reference to the end times. The idea that the parable of the mustard
seed and like parables refer to a growing Kingdom is contrary to this hermeneutic. 206
As Ratzinger observes, however, in the secular mutation of the eschatological
exegesis, Jesus’s proclamation of the Kingdom should be interpreted according to a
‘regnocentric’ hermeneutic. The Kingdom does not refer Christ as the Kingdom-inperson (the autobasileia) mediated through the Church (3.4.4). Rather,
‘regnocentrism’ suggests that the Kingdom itself understood in a particular way, and
not a high Christological emphasis on Christ’s divinity and the founding of the
Church, is central to Jesus’ preaching and mission. The Kingdom refers to the
204
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directing of humanity’s energies towards a future “world governed by peace, justice,
and the conservation of creation”.207 The Kingdom is thus a driver of ‘eschatological
change’, in which the eschatological reality of a ‘new humanity’ is created within
history.208

Eschatological exegesis posits that the history of the Church amounted to a fall from
eschatological consciousness. The early Christians are said to have possessed an
eschatological consciousness, praying in the Pater Noster for the end and definitive
in-breaking of the reign of God, which is God’s action alone. As a result, the
Church’s subsequent institutional and eschatological history was the “history of an
apostasy”, a process of “de-eschatologizing” in which the focus switched from “a
praxis of hope” to “a doctrine of the last things”.209 A switch from praxis to the last
things amounted to “a systematic reversal of the original intention” of Christ’s
preaching.210 Akin to Joachim’s hope in an impending Age of the Spirit, early
Christian spirituality was characterised by “a joyful hope” for the imminent coming
of Christ, which was a “confident, corporate hope for the imminent salvation of all
the world”; Christianity subsequently deteriorated into a mere concern for
individuals.211 Hope became individualistic and fearful, directed ‘beyond history’
and not to hope’s inner-historical implications (c.f. 1.2.2).
Allied with this “alleged gulf” between Jesus’s preaching and the Christological
developments of the New Testament, was the rise of the Church in the place of the
Kingdom of God.212 The juridical, institutional Church was set against the aboriginal
eschatological consciousness of Christianity.213 As Ratzinger expresses it:
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Instead of the great expectation of God’s own Kingdom, of a new world transformed
by God himself, we got something quite different – and what a pathetic substitute it
is: the Church.214

An aboriginal eschatological consciousness is opposed to the apparent institutional
and juridical hardening of the Church in her history. A perception of the Church as
embedded in a corrupt world amounted to a loss of an eschatological consciousness
that drove historical change (Moltmann’s

reading of eschatology – 1.2.2). It

contributes to a dialectical reading of history in which even the Church is subject to
criticism and encouraged to lose its satisfaction with the present state of history. The
real message of Jesus is supposedly lost under the weight of history.

Reading the biblical witness under the rubric of eschatological expectation runs
through the inner-historical conceptions of hope in Schillebeeckx, Metz and
Gutiérrez. Attendant upon the adoption of this exegetical reading is the concomitant
rejection or reduction in impact of individual eschatology and the traditional doctrine
of the last things. As part of a Christology focused upon Jesus’s humanity,
significantly, it increases the relevance of, and scope of action within, human history.
As Ratzinger says of Moltmann’s argument concerning the significance of Jesus’
eschatological preaching for Christian faith, “faith [entails] an active involvement in
the shaping of the future”.215 Such an eschatological reading of Jesus promotes in the
Concilium perspective an orientation to future historical change and the minimisation
of traditional eschatological categories. Eschatological expectation drives the desire
to bring about eschatological reality within history, or to emphasise the continuity
between history and eschatology.

1.3.2

Schillebeeckx: The Primacy of Experience as the Christological
Hermeneutic

A theology of hope focused on contemporary inner-historical action is evident in the
work of Schillebeeckx. An eschatological reading of the ‘historical Jesus’ and a low
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Christological method are also key components of Schillebeeckx’s theology of hope.
This subsection will explore these themes.
A low Christological reading of Jesus and the Kingdom underpins Schillebeeckx’s
commitment to contemporary notions of critical praxis. Revealing sympathy with the
Frankfurt School and redolent of Gutiérrez’s emphasis on lived praxis, Schillebeeckx
explores what contemporary ‘Christian critical communities’ can learn from and
contribute towards modern critical theory’s desire for emancipation and freedom. In
this context, he observes that “a new understanding of Jesus of Nazareth and the
Kingdom of God” enables a “specifically Christian” criticism of Church and society.
Although rejecting some depictions of Jesus as a political revolutionary,
Schillebeeckx insists that sound exegesis demonstrated Jesus to be a “political
figure” with political significance. Significantly, exegetical focus on the historicity of
Jesus in the particular historical moment of twentieth century modernity led the
“critical communities…to long for freedom, humanity, peace and justice in society”.
Simultaneously, they resist repressive or oppressive “power structures” that
“threaten[ed] these values”. Focus on the “Kingdom of God mindful of humanity”
for Schillebeeckx led to an identity between Christians and “contemporary
emancipation movements”, even if one tempered by opposition to revolutionary
violence.216 An overlap exists thus between contemporary critical consciousness and
a Christianity dependent upon a view of Jesus as a political protagonist. The
Kingdom of God is perceived in ‘regnocentric’ terms. Praxis is promoted to
ameliorate social ills.
Schillebeeckx’s well known Christological volumes exhibit a further nexus between
an eschatological reading of Jesus’ preaching and inner-historical hope actualised in
present action. Apparent within these volumes is a low Christology that reorients
hope to worldly activity. Kereszty notes that in the Christology of Schillebeeckx
“Jesus is primarily the eschatological prophet”.217 Impliedly, he is not principally the
Son of God. Hovdelien points out that in Schillebeeckx’s first Christological volume,
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Jezus, het verhaal van een levende (Jesus. An Experiment in Christology), the
“historical Jesus” is presented, consistent with “leading New Testament scholarship,
as an eschatological prophetic figure”, whose concern was to proclaim “an imminent
kingdom of God”.218 Jesus is placed within his Jewish, historical context.219 His
preaching and deeds are seen to direct attention to the eschatological arrival of God’s
kingdom.

Consistent with eschatological exegesis, early Christianity was seen to understand
Jesus’s preaching regarding the Kingdom of God to presage the irruption of an innerworldly utopia. Schillebeeckx argues that the early Christian communities interpreted
Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom to entail “the creation of a better society on
earth, a society in which righteousness prevails”.220 New Testament Christians
understood the significance of “Jesus’ proclamation of the approaching rule of God”
in this light.221 In Moltmannian terms, the impending, eschatological rule of God was
to inspire inner-worldly action here and now. A regnocentrism is again apparent in
Schillebeeckx, understood in light of an eschatological interpretation of Jesus’s
preaching. Evident is a vision of Christian discipleship focused on the innerhistorical.

Underlying the connection between an eschatological frame of thought and innerhistorical praxis are methodological assumptions apparent in Schillebeeckx’s
Christology. A primary hermeneutical category for Schillebeeckx is the subjective
experience of God, not dogmatic formulation expressing objective truth, which
precedes experience. According to White, Schillebeeckx understands Christology
exclusively as a historical science. All Christological content must perforce be
historical, dependent upon the particular historical context in which it is formed. In
Hegelian terms, as historical, it is constantly evolving. As a result, there can be no
“trans-historical truths of Christology” accessible in every age, as proposed in the
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New Testament and ecumenical councils.222 The focus in Schillebeeckx’s
Christology is then the Christian community’s “basic evangelical experience of
God”, upon which is constructed speculative Christology.223 Hermeneutically, the
experience of God is paramount in Christology, not what unchanging dogmatic
Christological definitions relate regarding the natures and Person of Christ.
Experience of God is historically constant across historical epochs, the formulation
of which in historicist terms is necessarily dependent on context. Consequently,
speculative Christological constructions are secondary and relative to historical
circumstances. There can be no high Christology. We can experience God but not
reduce that experience to Christological dogma which endures.
Schillebeeckx’s methodological focus upon experience of God and historicallyconditioned speculative elaboration supports a theology of hope filled with practical,
inner-worldly content. Relevant in each generation is the experiential, practical
content attached to the experience of God, not whether it accords with speculative or
dogmatic formulation. Schillebeeckx interprets the ‘historical Jesus’ himself through
this hermeneutic. Jesus’s ministry was inspired by his own “Abba experience” of the
Father.224 Filial confidence in God as Father led Jesus to emphasise forgiveness,
associate with the socially marginalised and challenge Jewish and Roman authorities.
The speculative construction attached to this experience was Jesus’s proclamation of
the Kingdom of the God, understood under the aspect of eschatology. What Jesus
proclaimed was eschatologically inflected and focused upon the Kingdom of God as
bringing about social change. White summarises the position well:
Thus Schillebeeckx perceives in Jesus’s theological praxis a quasi-socialist,
politically liberationist form of ministry grounded in a prior religious experience, but
he also thinks it was articulated theoretically through the medium of the Judaic,
eschatological idioms of his era.225

Praxis and an eschatological consciousness are combined in Jesus’s preaching, the
essential content of which is ‘politically liberationist’.
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Paramount in Jesus’s life is thus his filial experience of God, which caused him to
identify with the oppressed and challenge those in authority. While the
‘eschatological idioms of his era’ might have been historically contingent, Jesus’s
experience of God inspires social change as the basis for hope. Hence
Schillebeeckx’s idea that Jesus’s eschatological preaching should inspire ‘critical
Christian communities’ (refer above) to be protagonists for change. Not relevant,
seemingly, in Schillebeeckx’s methodology is the communicatio idiomatum, in
which it is presupposed that, as the Son of God, Christ knew he was presenting
enduring doctrine relevant for all time (c.f. Mt 24:35, Mk 13:31, Lk 21:33). Instead,
his historically conditioned eschatological formulation of his filial experience of God
leads to an emphasis on praxis, which is promoted as the Grundnorm of Jesus’s
eschatological preaching.
Two key theological affirmations underpin Schillebeeckx’s Christological focus on
praxis. The affirmations reveal Schillebeeckx’s low Christology, and connects it to
the immanent metaphysical framework described in 1.2. As White notes, first is
Schillebeeckx’s metaphysical claim regarding “the radically kenotic historicization
of God himself”.226 In the Incarnation, God is joined radically to the politically
oppressed in history. Hence, Jesus had solidarity with the marginalised in his life.
Subsequently, the Church’s activity in history has been constantly to highlight this
identification (and act upon it). The task of the theologian is to illumine core Gospel
practices and God’s presence within history in relation to this identification.
Apparent in the idea of God’s kenosis, however, is the risk of predicating to the
divine nature – rather than the Person of the Word – a ‘historicization’ of being in the
manner of Hegel. It can place an immanent metaphysical framework around God’s
eternity and suggest that the identification itself is paramount. It is true that the Word
joined himself to (the whole of) humanity and entered history. He did so, however, to
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draw suffering humanity out of temporality and historicity into the eternity of his
Being, as the means to remove that suffering (c.f. 3).

Secondly, and as a consequence, Christological reflection in a post-metaphysical
period such as ours is, according to the Schillebeeckxian position, to move from an
ontological understanding of Christ to one focused on politics and praxis within an
ecclesial and sacramental setting. The Church’s life is to be characterised by
solidarity with the oppressed, involving inclusion of these into “corporate, political
and sacramental life”.227 Hermeneutics is oriented to the future and grounded on
“new horizons of political praxis”.228 In short, “[t]he Church must offer the solace of
religious and political hope to modern human beings bewildered in the face of the
existential problems of suffering and evil.”229 Theological affirmations of a radical
identity of God with the marginalised and Christological focus on political praxis lay
bare the inner-historical, political focus of Schillebeeckx’s theology of hope, and his
departure from a high Christology. Hope is ‘religious and political’. An accident of
Schillebeeckx’s low Christology is thus a shift of faith and reason from Christ
himself to what he as a historical figure means for the world.
In summary, Schillebeeckx understands Jesus’s significance as carrying strongly
political and inner-historical implications. Schillebeeckx’s theology of hope does not
align with traditional Catholic eschatology’s focus on the last ‘things’ but with the
theologies that adopted the modern eschatological exegetical view that the early
Christians expected an imminent Parousia.230 He possesses a regnocentrism and a
politically-inflected understanding of hope. Longed for are distinctly inner-historical
aspirations sought to be instantiated within a social-historical context. Ratzinger’s
observations, noted above, regarding the shift in focus from the Person of Christ to
the Kingdom of God understood under the aspect of inner-historical values is
therefore strongly apparent in Schillebeeckx. Instead of a high Christology reflected
in the faith formulations of the Church, which are only ever secondary on his
scheme, Schillebeeckx presents a Christology in which the experience of God is
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primary. A hermeneutic of experience enables Schillebeeckx to focus on
contemporary efforts to promote social justice.

1.3.3

Metz: Understanding Jesus through the Lens of Eschatological
Proclamation and Praxis

Foundational to Metz’s Christology is an eschatological reading of Jesus’s preaching
and the New Testament message, which is built upon a dialectical, critical use of
reason. A subsequent political theology in which hope is focused upon imminent
expectation and the striving towards the attainment of inner-historical aspirations
with political implications, is thereby formed. Minimised is reference to the
hypostatic union or the communicatio idiomatum. Maximised in relative importance
is the inner-historical significance of Christ.

Metz combines an eschatological reading of Jesus with a politically-inflected social
criticism. An indication of the importance of the biblical critics’ view of Jesus to
Metz’s political theology is his statement that “everything” in political theology is
connected to Jesus’s “eschatological message”.231 Metz shares therefore Moltmann’s
idea that all theology needs to be considered under the aspect of eschatology (1.2).
He accepts that Jesus’s eschatological preaching is the principal significance of the
biblical message. However, he also connects a focus upon critical reason and social
praxis to an understanding of Jesus as an eschatological figure.232 Implicit in the
“theory-praxis dialectic” of Metz indebted to the Frankfurt School, which emphasises
the connection between socially embodied reason and faith (see 1.2.2), is a notion
that an understanding of Jesus’s eschatological preaching drives reflection upon
praxis.233 However, reflection on the eschatological colour of Jesus’s preaching is
itself dependent upon a social context. Akin to Schillebeeckx’s bifurcation between
experience and speculation, it can be said that Jesus’s eschatology in Metz is taken
out of its original context and applied to contemporary concerns, often of a political
hue.
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Metz’s focus on the theory-praxis dialectic in relation to the figure of Jesus applies
eschatological exegesis to a concern with political and social action. Religion is
understood as generating practical action. Fiorenza notes that Metz critiqued
twentieth century existential theology for failing to bring together “faith and social
praxis, religion and society”.234 Jesus’s eschatological message was not applied to
praxis. Metz was surprised that the form criticism employed in contemporary biblical
research, which the existential theologians adopted, did not lead to an emphasis on
“the social, public and communal nature of the gospel message today”. 235 Metz’s
political theology, in contrast, aims to reconsider the relationship between religion
and society, and theory and praxis, in a modern setting.236

Reconceptualising the relationship between theory and praxis supports a political
reading of the Gospel, and a future-orientation of theology. Intrinsic to political
theology’s undertaking to connect faith to contemporary praxis is to promote the
notion that “the biblical eschatological promise includes images of liberty, peace,
justice, and reconciliation…images that are necessarily public”. 237 Metz writes,
moreover, that the biblical message generated “a historically engaged future
orientation”, combining a sense of transcendence and the future.238 As such, the
gospel proclamation cannot be interpreted in an individualistic or personalist manner.
The biblical message inevitably contains, according to the Metzian view, public,
social and political significance in its promotion of freedom, peace, justice and
reconciliation. Metz highlights contemporary motifs of emancipation as central to the
biblical message. Attached to a biblical exegesis, which reads Jesus as a political
figure interpreted under the aspect of an eschatological horizon, it evidences a
theological orientation towards the realisation of inner-historical, political ends. It
upholds the immanent understanding of hope described in 1.2.3.
Connecting praxis and eschatology leads to Christ’s significance being understood in
political terms, and manifests a low Christological emphasis in Metz. According to
Ashley, Bloch’s interpretation of the figure of Jesus and his relationship to utopia
234
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impressed Metz. Bloch considers that Jesus, and the Old Testament figure Job,
rebelled against the tendency of “institutionalized religion” to replace a utopia, which
drives history forward, with an “oppressive God”.239 In this light, Jesus is understood
as an embodiment of rebellion and an expression of utopian thinking.240 Jesus is
construed according to a Joachimite-Blochian reading of dialectical history, which
moves towards inner-historical utopia. Implicitly, the reading of Christian history as
involving a ‘downfall’ from an eschatological consciousness is invoked. At the least,
Jesus is identified with the margins of society. An implicit contrast thus exists
between a high Christological view of Christ as mediated through the Church and
Bloch’s view of Jesus. The former, emphasising the hypostatic union, understands
Jesus as history’s turning-point and transcendent purpose. A low Christology sees
Jesus as an historical expression of a desire for a better, utopian future, represented in
his critical stance towards prevailing organised religion, which suppresses this desire.

The idea that Christ particularly identified himself with the poor and suffering
underpins the nexus in Metz between reading Jesus through political lens and an
attendant focus upon praxis.241 Jesus’s identification with the marginalised is loaded
with political significance for Metz. According to Marsden, present in Metz is a
“spirituality of protest” based upon Christ’s plea from the Cross in St Mark’s Gospel
(Mk 15:34: Eˊloi, Eˊloi, laˊma sabbach-thaˊni), which he dubbed “Leiden an Gott”
(‘suffering unto God’). Jesus’s cry from the Cross is seen as a “protest on behalf of
suffering humanity with whom Christ is joined irrevocably in shared suffering and
grief”.242 Jesus’s actions on the Cross are understood as a protective (and implicitly
dialectical-critical) historical joining with those who have suffered in history.
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As a consequence of Jesus’s identification with the suffering, political theology’s
conception of the Kingdom of God is understood in immanent, protestive, political
terms. A political reading of the Kingdom is connected, moreover, to Metz’s notion
of the ‘dangerous memory’ of Christ’s passion, death and resurrection. The
‘dangerous memory’ is central to a political Christology. For Metz, the memory of
Christ “[commemorates] the advent of the Kingdom of God in the love of Jesus
towards marginated persons”.243 The memory of Christ’s suffering, in promising a
future liberation of the oppressed, carries political implications for history today.
Remembrance of Jesus’s identification with the “oppressed and rejected”, and
Jesus’s proclamation regarding “the coming of the Kingdom of God”, continues to
have a “liberating and redemptive” impact upon the present. 244 Remembering the
historical suffering of the ‘marginated’ should result, in Metz’s words, in
“uncalculating partisanship on behalf of the weak and unrepresented”.245 The
kerygma is thus seen in unashamedly contemporary terms: the “proclamation of the
saving message is translated into promises of freedom, justice, and peace”. 246 Jesus’s
significance is understood in regnocentric terms and in light of twentieth century
political terminology.
In summary, intrinsic to Metz’s Christology is to link the figure of Jesus, and his
eschatological preaching, to contemporary praxis and its concerns for liberation.
Jesus is read through the lens of twentieth century political concerns. Despite the
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‘eschatological proviso’ of Metz (see 1.5.2), which maintains a distinction between
the Kingdom of God and all historical societies, is an apparent reduction of the
Gospel and the Kingdom of God to contemporary political issues nevertheless
manifests itself in Metz.247 The saving message of Christ is ‘translated’ into a
‘memory’ that drives concern for freedom, justice and peace on behalf of the poor
with whom Christ especially identifies. Historical ‘suffering and grief’ is overcome
through the Church serving (political) liberation. A political Christology underpins
therefore a view of hope focused upon immanent historical action desirous of
creating conditions for a more humane way of life (1.2.3). Jesus is seen under the
aspect of utopia, that which drives history forward. A low Christology is thus joined
to a dialectical view of hope and history, as directed towards the realisation of innerhistorical, social and political improvement.

1.3.4

Gutierrez and Christ the Liberator

Joined to the futurity of Gutiérrez’s utopic and eschatological emphasis on innerhistorical praxis, described in 1.2, is his low Christology, which focuses upon the
humanity and historicity of Jesus. While Chalcedonian dogma is not necessarily
abandoned in Gutiérrez, his Christology arguably minimises the centrality of Christ’s
divinity to his identity, with a consequent emphasis on inner-historical praxis as the
real significance of Jesus’ life and message. Consequently, the promise of eternity is
downplayed and an eschatological aspect of Christ’s significance highlighted to
serve a particular understanding of liberation and to support a view of hope as
driving that liberation.

Liberation theology shares with Schillebeeckx and political theology, a low
Christological focus on the historicity of Jesus, which results in emphasis on the
plight of the poor. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith considered that Jon
Sobrino’s emphasis on Jesus’s humanity and historicity attenuated the New
Testament’s testimony regarding Christ’s divinity. Stålsett argues, however, that
Jesus’ humanity and historicity are linked to liberation theology’s “specific starting
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point”, namely its “contextual and victimological shift”.248 In this regard, liberation
theology begins from the perspective of the victims’ experience of “suffering and
exclusion”; in Schillebeeckx’s language, their “contrast experience[s]”.249 The
divinity of Christ is not the Christological starting point for liberation theology.
Instead, consistent with an ‘ascending Christology’ applied to the suffering of
historical victims, Christ is seen through the perspective of his humanity and his
identification with the oppressed.
Liberation theology’s Christology depends on the ‘victimological shift’. Christ is is
especially viewed as ‘Christ the Liberator’, an idea that takes its colour from the
suffering of historical victims. Fiorenza’s description of Leonardo Boff’s Christology
and his argument that the most apt title for Christ is that of ‘liberator’ illuminates this
Christological orientation. Although Boff and other liberation theologians do not see
Jesus as a revolutionary or Zealot, they see his preaching and mission as merely
carrying an implicit Christology. Impliedly, later theology must fill out
Christological understanding.250 Boff does so by applying the title Liberator to
Christ, which signifies that Jesus liberated people from human restraints, alienating
forces and death. Included in these are realities such as law, convention,
authoritarianism, sin, illness, and devils.251 The New Testament witness did not
present the foundation of an organically developing Christology recognising Christ’s
divinity but see Jesus as a political, antinomian and, it is conceded, supernatural
liberator.
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In liberation theology, the idea of Christ the Liberator is linked to other politicallyinspired notions, including with respect to the Kingdom of God. Jesus is connected
with the Exodus account, interpreted as God’s intervention on behalf of the
oppressed through the provision of liberation in a new land. Jesus’s persecution,
torture and death were emphasised and seen in connection with the Latin American
poor’s fight for ‘liberation’. Distinguishing itself from traditional theology, liberation
theology saw Christ’s Resurrection not as the promise that poverty and suffering
would be overcome in the afterlife but that God, in raising Jesus who had been
crucified, showed himself to be on the victims’ side.252 According to this
interpretation of the figure of Jesus, the Kingdom of God presages, “here and now”,
a society characterised by freedom for the oppressed.253 A historical struggle on
behalf of victims is thereby implied in this Christology, as well as an understanding
of the Kingdom of God as immanently political.

Along the same trajectory as Schillebeeckx and Metz and within the general context
of liberation theology, Gutiérrez pays particular attention to the ‘historical Jesus’ and
his political significance in his theology of liberation. Gutiérrez contends with a
reading that Jesus possessed an “apolitical attitude”, arguing that this is inconsistent
with the import of the bible and Jesus’s preaching.254 Like other liberation
theologians, Gutiérrez warns against a simple identification of Christ with a
“contemporary political militant”.255 Doing so would read into the “historical Jesus”
contemporary concerns particular to the contemporary age.256 Reading Jesus’s solely
through contemporary lens would fail to respect the reality of the historical Jesus and
ignore what was universally “valid and concrete for today” about his “life and
witness”.257 Although Gutiérrez’s desire not to read anachronistically and
simplistically current issues into Jesus is to be commended, he nevertheless reveals
himself to possess a low Christology similar to Schillebeeckx and Metz. His answer
to anachronism is not to emphasise the Chalcedonian claim regarding the hypostatic
union and therefore the eternity of Christ. Rather, it is to emphasis the historicity of
252
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Jesus and those elements of his life and work – at least as interpreted by Gutiérrez –
that have significance for the contemporary liberation movement.258

While Gutiérrez does mention that God was made flesh in Christ, he works to situate
Jesus historically and contextually. He constructs a picture of Jesus’ significance
based on that historical context. It is Jesus’s message and action within the historical
context that appears to have universal significance for Gutiérrez. In this regard, he
considers Jesus’ relationship to the Zealot movement. While Jesus was not a member
of the Zealots, aspects of their attitudes overlapped with his, including his
proclamation of the Kingdom’s arrival and his part in that arrival. What distinguished
Jesus from the Zealots was his supra-nationalist opposition to “politico-religious
messianism”, advocacy of “justice and peace”, and the “universal and integral”
liberation that he offers.259 Akin to Metz’s Blochian-inspired reading of Christ as a
rebellious figure, Jesus is stripped from a religious, institutional setting. Instead, he is
seen as proclaiming a universal message of opposition to powerful groups. Jesus
opposed Herod, the Sadducees and Pharisees, not as a nationalist but as such. He had
“a head-on opposition to the rich and powerful and a radical option for the poor”. 260
His death is also to be seen in political terms – Gutiérrez cites Oscar Cullman’s
conclusion that Jesus was condemned as a Zealot.261 Gutiérrez thereby perceives
Jesus’s import by reference to his historical proclamation and opposition to
institutional groups (which overlaps with a Marxist revolutionary consciousness –
c.f. 1.2.1). There is little reference to Christ’s eternity.

An eschatological exegetical and non-dogmatic reading of Christ, in which the
proclamation of the Kingdom takes prominence, is thus relevant to Gutiérrez’s
treatment of the political significance of Jesus. Gutiérrez discusses Cullmann’s idea
that Jesus’ political behaviour is to be understood in light of an “eschatological
radicalism”, which hoped for an imminent coming of the Kingdom of God.262 On this
view, eschatological radicalism caused Jesus to relativise historical and temporal
258
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realities. He was interested simply with individual conversion and not the
improvement of social structures, which was put off for subsequent history. Gutiérrez
also discusses “consequent eschatology”, the line begun by Schweitzer which
considered Jesus was mistaken in announcing an imminent advent of the Kingdom.
Gutiérrez describes this as “a difficult and controversial exegetical point”.263
Gutiérrez’s focus is not necessarily to resolve the point. He does not advert to the
Church’s tradition of interpretation regarding the intermingled eschatological Gospel
passages concerning the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of time (he refers to
twentieth century exegete Rudolf Schnackenburg instead).264 Nor does he refer to
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, which would preclude a conclusion that
Christ could be wrong about the imminence of the Kingdom. 265 An eschatological
reading of Christ in Gutiérrez is not determined by dogmatic understanding of Christ.
Rather, Gutiérrez’s Christological concern is to draw out the universal, political
implications of Jesus’ eschatological attitude. According to Gutiérrez, Jesus’s work
possesses a “universality and totality” affecting the core of political behaviour, which
thereby receives its true character.266 Jesus, in liberating humanity from sin, attacks
the source of “misery and social injustice”.267 He is understood as an instigator of
revolution:
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seek him’ (Ps 24:6)”. The destruction of Jerusalem, a symbol of the end, is understood to be what
occurred in the generation of Christ.
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For Jesus, the liberation of the Jewish people was only one aspect of a universal
permanent revolution. Far from showing no interest in this liberation, Jesus rather
placed it on a deeper level, with far-reaching consequences.268

Although Gutiérrez is correct to portray redemption as directed at sin, he presents the
significance of Christ in terms of his implications for liberation in subsequent
history, contrary to Cullman’s ‘eschatological radicalism’. Jesus began a ‘universal
permanent revolution’, language that evokes a Marxist view of history as being
propelled towards a liberated future.

Gutiérrez also paints a picture of the Gospel and the Kingdom of God in which its
political implications are at its heart. A dialectical, inner-historical conception of
hope is thereby wedded to a low Christology. He opposes a ‘spiritualist’
understanding of the redemption in favour of a materialist one (see further 1.5).269
The Gospel message, in being directed to the relationship between God and among
people, is socially transformative. Gutiérrez argues that the Gospel message is
subversive and that the Kingdom needs to be understood in political, material terms.
The Gospel adopts and gives full meaning to Israel’s hope for a Kingdom in which
domination is ended. The Kingdom is an advocate for humanity that opposes
political powers. Israel’s hope is understood as calling for a ‘new creation’ and the
“unceasing search for a new kind of humanity in a qualitatively different society”. 270
Thus, a liberationist reading of the Kingdom, resting on a revolutionary reading of
Christ, supports a dialectical view of hope and history.

Moreover, although Gutiérrez in line with traditional soteriology places the
elimination of sin at the centre of his conception of liberation, this elimination is
understood in light of the consequences it has for society within history. Hope in the
realisation of communion among God and persons is seemingly effected through the
medium of politics. Eschatological expectation regarding the transformation of
humanity and the new heaven and earth are closely linked to the striving for a more
just society. Gutiérrez distinguishes between the Kingdom and the establishment of
such a society, but argues that the former is not indifferent to the latter. The
268
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Kingdom’s announcement “reveals to society itself aspiration for a just society”,
which generates new avenues of pursuit of this aspiration.271 The revelation of the
Kingdom in Jesus is interpreted in historico-social terms and as the motivator of
political action.

Revelation, at least in this context, is for Gutiérrez not directed so much to the
Church as to society as such, and what it reveals is salvation or liberation in the form
of the promise of a better society. For Gutiérrez, a society characterised by
“fellowship and justice” is an embodiment or bringing about of the Kingdom.272
Hope is tied up with an interpretation of the Gospel as instigating political action: “to
preach the universal love of the Father is inevitably to go against all injustice,
privilege, oppression, or narrow nationalism”.273 Christ’s coming is perceived
through a low Christological lends as the instigation of inner-historical change, the
basis, therefore, of hope.

Gutiérrez shares the Concilium penchant for emphasising the historicity and
humanity of Jesus. Within the context of liberation theology’s victimological shift, in
which Christ is seen as liberator, an ‘ascending Christology’ in Gutiérrez begins with
the inner-historical implications of Jesus’s life and preaching. He is interpreted
through political lens, as the beginning of an ongoing revolution against historical
injustice and towards the promises of utopian society. The liberation he brings
involves not just freedom from sin but material progress. His low Christology thus
sits with a dialectical conception of history at the foundations of his views on hope
and history.
1.3.5

Conclusion

How Jesus is viewed is a chief determinant of how the hope-history relationship is
perceived. Resting on the methodology of modern, historical biblical criticism
unmoored from the high Christology of the tradition, the low Christology of
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez supports a political, inner-conception of hope.
271
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Resulting from the adoption of an historical approach to Jesus is a low Christology,
which pays scant heed to Christ’s divinity and eternity. It emphasises the political
and intra-worldly implications of Jesus’s ministry.

The Concilium authors do not necessarily jettison the high Christology of the
Church’s tradition. The dominance of their adoption of a low Christology has,
however, implications for their understanding of content of hope and the significance
of history, and reveals a key contrast with Pieper and Ratzinger’s conception of hope
and history.274 If Jesus is to be understood primarily under the aspect of eschatology,
then the mainstream of the Christian tradition has been wrong to focus on the ‘last
things’ as the real promise wrought by Christ’s coming. A low Christology, on the
other hand, leads to a focus on praxis as the content of Christian hope. Christ is
especially identified with the poor, with the implication that he instigated a historical
movement to liberate the oppressed. A political Christology complements therefore a
view of history’s immanent progress. A Concilium Christology is joined to a
dialectical view of history, with overtones of Joachim, Hegel and Marx.
1.4

An Immanent Theology of Grace

Another principal building block of the Concilium position on the relationship
between hope and history is the Rahnerian theology of grace, which informs the
inner-historical conception of hope of that position.275 Rahner presented one of the
three main perspectives on the nature-grace relationship in the twentieth century
(Introduction). He considers the human person to possess a ‘supernatural existential’,
an already-given human transcendental orientation to God. Adoption of the
‘supernatural existential’ can tend to minimise, however, the novelty of Christ and
his salvific work in relation to human nature. An approbation of human existence in
these terms also lays the foundations for an affirmation of secular reality, a tendency
present in the Concilium authors.
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This and the following section, which are closely related, will describe a Rahnerian
theology of grace and how it grounds an integrated view of redemption, which
accompanies the views of hope and history described in 1.2. It will briefly describe
Rahner’s theology of grace and how that theology relates to the Concilium authors’
affirmation of secularisation and their tendency to maximise human agency at the
expense of the direct mediation of the Church. It will then turn, in 1.5, to a
description of the integrated view of redemption present in Schillebeeckx, Metz and
Gutiérrez in which natural and earthly goods are conflated with eschatological ends.
Nature and grace tend to collapse into each other, supporting the inner-historical
definitions of hope described in 1.2.3. The objects of hope become historicised and
the subject of human planning and action.

1.4.1

Rahner’s Theology of Grace Briefly Described276

The purpose of discussing Rahner, who is recognised as a highly sophisticated and
intentionally ecclesial theologian, is not to make a case one way or another
concerning the validity of Rahner’s theology of grace.277 A danger always exists with
highly prolific and dense thinkers that their work is cherry-picked, misunderstood or
misappropriated. Rather, it is to highlight certain parallels that exist between
Rahner’s work and certain aspects of the work of Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez.
Thus, its focus remains not so much on Rahner himself but on the way in which his
views are echoed and applied in the Concilium authors and how therefore a
Rahnerian theology of grace, at least as interpreted or adopted, is at the foundations
of the Concilium position on hope and history. Arguably, the transcendental basis of
Rahner’s theology and his supernatural existential lend themselves to the adoption of
an anthropocentric starting point in theology, and the heightening of the importance
of universal philosophy (a tendency that Rahner’s method itself exhibits). They may
also lead to an immanentist reading of the nature-grace relationship, in which the
supernatural becomes, even if contrary to Rahner’s design, naturalised and
276
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anonymised. The orders of nature and grace, and the incarnational and
eschatological, become insufficiently differentiated in the Concilium perspective.
Such an anthropocentric shift may tend to lead to an over-emphasis on the human
capacity to contribute to redemptive liberation, or the notion that the achievement of
earthly goals contributes to and is part of that liberation.
According to several commentators Rahner’s theology of grace is grounded in
anthropology. He “commenc[es], in the modern mode, with theological
anthropology”.278 His theology begins from “our shared human experience”.279 He
starts “from below”, that is, “with something universal for every person, inscribed
into the a priori structure of knowledge”.280 Rahner’s strategy is to justify Christian
belief by showing first the credibility and possibility of belief in general. Belief shorn
of any specific reference to Christian revelation is so justified “by an appeal to
general criteria of religious and moral meaningfulness”.281 Rahner’s approach can be
described therefore as bringing Christian doctrine “before the bar of subjective
experience for adjudication, explanation, and evaluation”.282 It seeks consequently to
‘correlate’ Christianity to a universal and prior “religious experience”. 283 Thus, the
Christian religion is tethered or matched to the prevailing philosophy, inverting the
relationship between faith and reason. Universal philosophy becomes the
determinant of religion (see further 5.5.2).284
In Rahner, the ‘general criteria of religious and moral meaningfulness’ are found in
the Kantian, transcendental method, which he adopts and develops. His theology is
278
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indebted to the philosophy of Kant, Heidegger and Joseph Maréchal. According to
Oakes, Rahner answers Kant’s questions regarding what a priori structure of the
human mind is necessary to enable knowledge of the categorical, by arguing that the
human mind, in its knowledge of “any particular thing[,]… implicitly operates within
a horizon of being whose ultimate determinant is God”.285 Rahner uses the concept
of Vorgriff to denote “an active longing for God that is present in the human preapprehension (Vorgriff) of everything”.286 The transcendental a priori present in each
act of knowing contains an implicit longing for God’s infinite being.287

While Rahner recognises the importance of the revelation of Christ, arguably it takes
on a different significance under a Kantian, transcendental aspect. The transcendental
horizon in which the human person operates, according to the philosophy of religion
that is universal and “transhistorical”, gives him an “aural capacity to recognize
revelation”.288 Because the human person has the capacity, religion “is basically
independent of any historical event… [and is] available to everyone, at every
moment of one’s existence in history”.289 Historical revelation is thus relativised in
import. It “is not a miraculous bursting through of God’s word into history”.290
Rather, revelation ‘merely’ is the “realisation” or affirmation “in concrete terms of an
already unnamed but implicit faith”.291 It is viewed as confirming the anterior
supernatural existential, and its ordination to God and his communication of love,
that is, universal religious experience. Thus, the metaphysical justification for
adhering to the historical revelation of Christ is grounded not in the particular
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revelation of Christ itself but the human person’s capacity to hear it in the first place.
Religion becomes tied to a particular anthropology, which is its ruling guide.292

For Rahner, the supernatural existential is universal and affects the daily, secular and
historical existence of the person. The supernatural existential is itself the “abiding
existential” of the “real man”, which consists in an “ordination to the Trinity”. 293 In
arguing that the human person is the “subject [of]… the event of God’s selfcommunication”, Rahner argues that the supernatural existential is an “existential of
every person” and his “concrete existence”; antecedent to all “freedom”, “selfunderstanding” or “experience” is the supernatural existential as an “existential of
their concrete existence”.294 It “influence[s]” the human person’s life, with its
“concrete yearning for eternal Truth and pure and infinite Love”.295 It affects thus
every person in his real life, “at least in the mode of offer” of a “fulfillment
essentially transcending the natural”.296 Although the offer may be rejected, “every
person [as such] must be understood as the event of the supernatural selfcommunication of God”.297 Fulfilment is offered in the very fact of the human
person’s existence, in itself.

Rahner apparently holds that the human person, in his concrete existential situation,
is necessarily supernatural (if not graced). The human person lives in a state of
“supernaturally elevated transcendentality”.298 He is himself “God’s selfcommunication as an offer” of God’s love.299 So entwined is “God’s selfcommunication in grace” with the “basic structures of human transcendence” that it
is difficult to abstract that grace from those structures.300 The “[t]ranscendental
experience” of the human person includes a “modality of grace” and “is operative in
292

Oakes, Infinity Dwindled to Infancy, 351-352, 353 citing Rahner, Hearer of the Word, 14 (on 351352).
293
Karl Rahner SJ, “Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace,” in Theological
Investigations, Volume 1: God, Christ, Mary and Grace, trans. Cornelius Ernst, OP (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd Ltd, 1961), 313.
294
Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans.
William V Dych (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1978), 127.
295
Rahner, “Concerning Nature and Grace,” 314.
296
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 127.
297
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 127-128 (quotation on 127, emphasis in original).
298
A phrase from a sub-heading in Rahner’s Foundations of Christian Faith, 129: “Man’s
Supernaturally Elevated Transcendentality”.
299
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 129.
300
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 129.

105

[human] existence”.301 Although Rahner considers the concept of pure nature to
“necessary and objectively justified” (4.2.2), it is impossible to observe or know the
concept of nature “separated from its supernatural existential”.302 The supernatural
existential is fundamental to the existence of the human person as he has been
created, who is ‘always-already’ transcendentally elevated.
Implicitly present, perhaps, in Rahner’s conception of the anteriorly elevated
transcendentality of the human person is a view that justification or salvation can be
achieved immanently, or at least the supernatural is present in human existence as
such, without necessary reference to the particular grace of Christ. The human
subject contains “an infinity” such that “possession of God” is not “outside…the
infinite possibility of transcendence”.303 Rahner insists on the gratuity of the
“absolute self-communication” of God in the supernatural existential. However,
dependent on Kant’s transcendentalism, he argues that the human person finds full
realisation in the acceptance of the offer of God as he himself already is.304
Fulfilment of the ordination to God is the human person’s acceptance of himself as
the “divine self-communication”.305 Consequently, realisation is the human subject’s
acceptance of himself, because such amounts to acceptance of God, independent of
any specific historical revelation. We are redeemed through the acceptance of
ourselves as we are, because we are God’s Self-communication.
The secular becomes the expression of the transcendent. The human person’s own
experience of himself – and experience in this context is not limited to specifically
religious

activities – reveals himself to

be “the subject of unlimited

transcendence”.306 In turn, the human person is revealed to be “God’s absolute and
radical self-communication”.307 Because such implicit knowledge of God’s ‘selfcommunication’ flows from experience of the human person qua human person, it is
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not explicitly religious or Christian. Rahner acknowledges that, because each person
experiences this transcendence anterior to any specific religious conduct, it can come
in non-religious form and can in fact be so “unthematic” as to occur “in our secular
dealings”.308 As ‘every person … is the event of the supernatural self-communication
of God’ (quoted above), the person’s experience of himself is necessarily and
‘anonymously’ religious, whatever the context.

That human existence is said to contain within itself the offer of supernatural
fulfilment is arguably to immanentise the operation of grace and relativise the
importance of eschatological fulfilment. Although Rahner acknowledges an
eschatological tension between “God’s self-communication” in the human person as
such and the “not yet” of the beatific vision, “in grace the spirit moves within its goal
(because of God’s self-communication) towards its goal (the beatific vision)”.309
Human existence in itself is informed ‘always-already’ by the supernatural (“if not of
grace”).310 As Garver notes, the natural potency for the supernatural existential is
“one already laced with the traces of actual grace”.311 What “transforms human
being” is not revelation but the anterior supernatural experience of God.312
Transformation does not come at the hands of the external grace announced by
revelation. Elevation of nature has always already occurred within an immanent
framework.

The revelation of supernatural fulfilment in the grace of Christ is a confirmation of
what is existential to the human person. Grace in Rahner arguably is ‘naturalised’,
contrary to his intentions, or at least severed from specifically Christian revelation
(c.f. 4.2.2). It, or at least the supernatural, is brought down to the human existential
level (4.3). Grace, although gratuitous, is not seen in a paradoxical paradigm as it
would be according to the view of de Lubac (4), by which it extends the human
person beyond himself.313 Instead, the revelation of Christianity enables the person
308
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“to recognize his own experience in it”.314 The human person’s “existentiell
decision” affirms, after the fact, the person’s “original, transcendental experience”.315
Rather than drawing him out of himself, revelation (and the grace it brings) confirms
the anterior existential situation of the human person.

According to a Rahnerian theology of grace, revelation and the particular grace it
augurs can thus be seen to be extrinsic and not intrinsic to human fulfilment. The
acceptance of the supernatural call, which is an existential, does not require anything
other than the human person accepting himself as he is, as God’s selfcommunication. Ironically, as Garver points out, Rahner comes close to creating
another two-tiered system, this time with a “transcendental philosophy rather than
neo-scholastic metaphysics”.316 Most crucially, the second tier, representing the
grace mediated specifically through the visible Church, becomes less relevant.
Garver argues that the supernatural existential is “scarcely distinguishable” from the
Vorgriff natural to the human person.317 Grace becomes reduced to the fulfilment of
“natural expectations”.318 To put it in language closer to Rahner, the human person
existentially has the offer of God’s love built into his very existence, as he is
constituted. Christ and the historical-eschatological events of the Paschal Mystery
(3.3), which are the bases of the sanctifying grace that revelation promises, would
“remain extrinsic to us” according to a Rahnerian theology of grace. 319 At least, they
tend to be seen as the mere confirmation of what is latent to the transcendental
character of human existence as such. Thus, instead of fulfilling the natural desire for
the supernatural (4), the events of Christ’s “life, death and resurrection” are
incidental to our fulfilment.320 A caricature with a grain of truth may be to say that a
Rahnerian theology of grace makes Christ in his novelty and particularity less
necessary for justification than a view that emphasises that novelty and particularity.
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Thus, by virtue of the ‘supernatural existential’, the human person in his ‘existential
state’ (the ‘anonymous Christian’) in some way is already supernaturally elevated,
simply as a human person and without necessary reference to the novel action of the
unique Jesus of Nazareth. According to Reno’s appraisal of Rahner’s account of
nature and grace, a person is given “from the very outset… an intrinsic, anticipatory
grace”.321 To be sure, such a grace is supernatural and does not conceptually belong
to human nature as such. Nevertheless, it is a “supernatural existential” embedded in
the experience of being human as such prior to and independent of any specific
revelation of God in the Person of Jesus Christ.322 The human being “always already
experiences the infinite horizon of being”.323 Rahner argues that nature and grace are
not “two phases in the life of the individual that follow each other in time”. 324 In
opposition to extrinsicism, nature and grace in a sense co-mingle in the existence of
the human person. From this flows an immanent understanding of grace.
Conceptually, the ‘natural’ is not understood shorn of grace, but is “radically
graced”.325 Rosenthal suggests therefore that a Rahnerian conception of the
supernatural has the character of “immanentism”, according to which “human nature
as such is always in a condition of being supernaturally elevated” and “(man) is
already redeemed” prior to “justification by grace”.326 On this view, the grace of
redemption is immanent to human experience itself. Grace is operative within a
human framework because it is a given of earthly existence. It does not depend on
the novel action of God or his irruption into human history.
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1.4.2

John Milbank on the Apparent Approbation of the Secular and
Contemporary Notions of Liberation in the Concilium Perspective

True or not to Rahner’s intentions, connected to a Rahnerian trajectory in
fundamental theology is a Concilium affirmation of secularism, which minimises
reference to God and maximises human agency. If human existence in itself contains
the possibility of its own redemptive justification, it is a short step to perceiving an
inherent “harmony” between “religious and secular” tendencies.327 Milbank suggests
the Rahnerian, “German version” of the nature-grace relationship, which he (in his
own words) “crudely” and “misleadingly” summarises as “naturalising the
supernatural”, tends “in the direction of a mediating theology, a universal humanism,
a rapprochement with the Enlightenment and an autonomous secular order”.328 In
contrast to the Frenchman, de Lubac’s argument that humanism needs to be
‘converted’ (5.4.5), on this view a Rahnerian theology of grace approbates ‘a
universal humanism’ and a rationality that is unashamedly secular. It seeks to
‘correlate’ faith to the lineaments of secular culture. A Rahnerian understanding of
nature and grace tends therefore to result in a “‘baptism’ of secularisation”.329

Milbank argues that the major political and liberation theologians have at the
foundations of their theology the Rahnerian approach to nature and grace. Taking:
[the Rahnerian] option in fundamental theology…ensures that their theology of the
political realm remains trapped within the terms of ‘secular reason’ and its
unwarranted foundationalist presuppositions.330

Political and liberation theology posit an “autonomous [secular] sphere” which is
understood in terms of “pre-theological sociology or Marxist social theory” and not
by reference to theology.331 A secular idiom in the form especially of the Marxism of

327

Reno, “Rahner the Restorationist,” 48.
Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, 207. Rowland, Catholic Theology, 169 discussing Milbank’s
criticism of liberation theology in Beyond Secular Reason.
329
Rowland, Catholic Theology, 190 quoting Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, 232. C.f. Rowland,
“Beyond the Correlationist Paradigm,” 8-9, Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, 207.
330
Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, 207.
331
Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, 208.
328

110

the Frankfurt School becomes the ruling guide for theology. 332 The secular is
separated from specific Christian doctrine.

The liberation theology of Gutiérrez provides a particular example of the tendency of
theologies influenced by Rahner to adopt prevailing so-called universal philosophy
as the guiding norm for understanding Christianity’s content. Ratzinger notes the
“unexpected conversion of [Rahner’s] transcendental deduction into Marx-inspired
theologies in the generation after Rahner”.333 A “popularization” of Rahner shows
Christianity to be “interchangeable with the universal knowledge of mankind as a
whole”.334 Although not Rahner’s intent, Ratzinger detects a “certain logic” in this
reading of Rahner. The attempt by Rahner to justify Christianity by reference to
transcendental philosophy morphs in Gutiérrez into the utilisation of Marxism as a
“science” and “real moral postulate of mankind”.335 Although Rahner cannot be held
responsible for Gutiérrez’s adoption of Marxism, Rahner’s epistemological decision
to ground Christianity in an anterior universal philosophy is paralleled in the
favourable place of Marxism in Gutiérrez.336 Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation,
which we have seen privileges praxis, is an example of a Rahnerian-influenced
theology’s use of a ‘universal humanism’.

Approbation of the secular as such follows from the tendency of a Rahnerian
theology of grace to ‘naturalise the supernatural’. The secular sphere is “already a
grace-imbued sphere” in these theologies because of the transcendental nature of the
person.337 Despite political theology and liberation theology’s concern with the social
and disaffection with individualism, the former is nevertheless treated in terms of
Rahner’s

(individually-grounded)

“transcendentalism”.338

The

transcendental

orientation of the human person is applied to the social, which is peopled by
individuals with a “transcending impulse” or is treated as such as the “site of
transcendence”.339 The social and the political are understood as being the
“anonymous site(s) of divine saving action” or are the media through which
332
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supernaturally-elevated human persons operate.340 The social and political take on
subsequent significance.

An immanently framed view of salvation and liberation is accordingly developed.
Milbank explains that political and liberation theology splits salvation into “an
ineffable, transcendental, ‘religious’ aspect” that is only anonymously Christian, and
a “purely secular” “social aspect”.341 In both its individual and social aspects,
liberation is understood in Kantian, liberal transcendental terms. The social is
perceived either as the site where the individual’s transcendental freedom is
expanded or as itself a “process of ‘liberation’”, which involves the “[gradual
removal] of restrictions upon the human spirit”.342 A process of emancipation in
terms of the latter is “purely human”, according to which all “human needs … [can]
be immanently met”.343 Liberation is thus conceptualised, even in the case of
Marxism, as the maximisation of human freedom, understood in a voluntarist sense
as the removal of impediments on the will. The removal of such obstacles can be
achieved immanently through human action. Thus, when Metz and Gutiérrez (and, it
can be added, Schillebeeckx) speak of liberation (or emancipation) as an impulse for
which Christians are to work, they are incorporating notions of freedom developed in
liberal and Marxist philosophy. Salvation’s “content … is decided at the level of a
Kantian principle of practical reason” and, it can be added, is mediated through
Marxist means.344 Salvific liberation becomes devoid of specifically Christian
content.345 Moreover, they can be achieved immanently as the working out of the
transcendental impulse for freedom, which is ‘always-already’ embedded in human
nature.

As a result, nature and grace tend to be conflated. Whereas in Pieper and Ratzinger,
the natural and historical is in need of transformation and points ‘beyond itself’ (4
and 5), in Rahnerian-inflected theologies of hope, the secular is ‘already’ ‘imbued’
with grace. Application of a Rahnerian transcendental theology of grace to the social
underpins in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez an approbation of the secular as only
340
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anonymously Christian. In contrast to Ratzinger’s view that the natural is the
potential recipient of grace, which involves in some senses an overcoming of nature
(5), the natural, secular and political become paramount in the theologies of hope, as
we have seen. Faith and politics become mingled. In a strange reprisal of
extrinsicism, the natural is devoid of reference to God.

1.4.3

Approbation of Secularisation as Maximising Human Agency in the
Directing of Human History

The Concilium authors approve consequently secularisation. Consistent with
Hegelian-Marxist epistemology (1.2.1), they place primacy on human activity as
governing the world, directing history and contributing to liberation. Rahner, for
example, approves secularisation as the assumption by humanity of directing “(the
world’s) evolutionary development”, which means “that God no longer needs to be
involved to maintain the world’s stability”.346 Schillebeeckx likewise identifies
secularisation and the growth of human self-understanding, which occurs in history,
“with the growth of humanity itself”.347 Fiorenza notes that the determinative context
for Metz’s political theology was contemporary secularisation and the privatisation
of faith, whereas for liberation theology it was oppression and injustice in Latin
America.348 Both the early Metz and Gutiérrez welcomed the separation of action
and knowledge from religion, such that “ethical and political norms can now be
deduced etsi Deus non daretur”.349 Generally speaking, the Concilium school
approves secularisation as the process whereby humanity takes primary
responsibility for the direction of history.
Political theology particularly appreciates secularisation’s value. The early Metz
argues that the secular world and its history need to be confirmed in itself: Christian
responsibility begins with “the world in its permanent and growing worldliness”.350
In a phrase redolent of Hegel, Metz suggests that “the world determines itself” and
346
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“sets itself its own goals, which emerge automatically from within itself”
(necessarily without any reference to theology from ‘above’ and ‘outside’
creation).351 Acknowledging (and implicitly agreeing) that such a process is inherent
to Christianity itself, Metz quotes Rahner’s comment that the human person now
“creates the world himself”.352 According to Metz, he has become “homo creator, or,
to put it more carefully, homo manipulator”, the form of which is “technological
hominization and manipulation of the world”.353 The world and humanity’s future is
thus increasingly subject to “rationalized planning”, belonging to the realm of
politics.354 He observes that “the world …has fallen more and more into our hands
and projections”.355 The use of the phrase homo creator, even if qualified, is
revealing. The human person has taken on for himself the direction of secular history
that has its own immanent goals, which in Metz’s scheme, is taken up into salvation
history (see 1.5).

An analogous affirmation of secularisation is present in liberation theology. In
Müller’s defence of liberation theology, he argues that history itself is a
“transforming process”.356 Although recognising that this liberative process is “a
history of liberation by God”, he echoes Metz in suggesting that “God’s liberating
action” allows “the poor, oppressed and suffering” to become “personal subjects”
and active co-operators and participants in God’s liberating process.357 Significantly,
he argues that it is the action of these ‘personal subjects’ that “drive[s] history
forward to the goal of fully realized freedom”.358 In Gutiérrez’s words, humanity has
“a liberating and protagonistic role”.359 The Church does not simply “[administer]
351
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salvation” but is “actively the sacrament of God’s kingdom”.360 Significant agency
for the future of the world and liberation of humanity is on the view of these
theologians arrogated to humanity.

1.4.4

A Rahnerian Theology of Grace and a Secular View of the Hope

Rahner’s ‘anonymous Christianity’ can arguably lead to an immanentist
understanding of the hope-history relationship. The profane and the secular tend to
be collapsed into one another, and religious content and expectation is matched to a
predetermined philosophy. In liberation theology and to a degree in Schillebeeckx
and Metz, the supposedly universal philosophy of Marx is adopted as the paradigm
by which to understand the movement and content of hope. The realisation of earthly
projects becomes part of the realisation of eschatological hope (1.5.3).361

The tendency to separate Christ and hope is evident in the work of Thomas Sheehan,
a favourable interpreter of Rahner. He teases out some of the implications of
Rahner’s transcendental method. He suggests that “Rahner…is telling us: Give up
trying to transcend yourself”.362 He warns against a “religion”, “faith”, “church [sic]
or theology… that would alienate” the individual from his “this-worldly” self.363
Instead, we are to remain content within the particular “world” in which we find
ourselves, that is the human community.364 Explicitly, the human community in
which we should remain “does not demand anything of you that lies beyond nature”
(in contrast to a Lubacian view of the supernatural).365 Rather, it demands of the
individual to “follow [his] own light” and “tend the human fire lest it burn low”.366
The person is then to “[l]ive out [his] own personal and social becoming”.367
Signally, in so doing, we “will find a hope that is already blessed with fulfilment”,
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even if such a path is not religious or apparently atheist.368 Such a path contains
having “already arrived at the goal”.369
Sheehan’s passage is telling. It reveals implications attaching to a Rahnerian
theology, whether fair to Rahner’s intentions or not. A Rahner scholar presents here a
picture of “Rahner’s transcendental project” (the title of the essay) in unashamedly
secular terms, which follows on from Rahner’s own anthropological, transcendental
framework. Very rapidly it becomes an affirmation of ourselves as we are, to the
extent that forms of religion, including perhaps Christianity, can be seen to be useless
or antithetical to human flourishing and actualisation. Importantly it presents a vision
of hope as containing already its own fulfilment.
If Rahner’s theology of grace might arguably tend to immanentize the operation of
the supernatural, in certain hands, it can tend to secularise hope and separate it from
reference to Christ, understood Chalcedonian terms (3). If revelation is extrinsic to
human fulfilment, which is instead the acceptance of the self as it is, hope is not
directed to the communication of the fruits of Christ’s life, in which the human
person is drawn out of himself to participate mystically in Christ’s Paschal Mystery.
As we have seen, in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez hope tends to become
immanentised and dependent upon the realisation of what we can do for ourselves. A
Hegelian-Marxist dialectic in which the expectations of praxis constitute what is
hoped for, takes the place of a Christo-centric view of hope. Such a view of hope
meshes with a Rahnerian theology of grace.

1.4.5

Conclusion

A transcendental or Rahnerian understanding of the supernatural manifests itself in
the immanentist tendency of the theologies of futurity to ‘baptise’ secularism and
maximise human agency. The maximisation of human agency in directing history
and a view of hope in a secular idiom, depends on and relates to, even in bastardised
form, Rahner’s view of the person as supernaturally-elevated. In his theology, the
human person in his secular existence becomes the site of redemption. From this, it is
368
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a short step to viewing redemption in immanent terms according to non-Christian
philosophy. A Rahnerian theology of grace tends to support a view of hope,
therefore, in which humanity is the directing agent and in which the inner-historical
future is significant.

1.5

An Immanent Soteriology

A Concilium affirmation of secularisation leads to an immanent soteriology in which
redemption is seen to include the realisation of earthly progress. Opposition to
extrinsicism and a tendency to conflate nature and grace makes explicable
Schillebeeckx, Metz’s and Gutiérrez’s focus on, and optimism regarding, the
historical future. Paralleling the general thrust of Rahner’s concept of the
‘supernatural existential’, a generally incarnational and anthropological attitude in
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez emphasises the unity of the secular and the
sacred, and world and salvation history. It leads to a soteriological emphasis on
inner-historical activity. An inner-historical conception of hope, in which the
attainment of earthly goals and the building up of the inner-historical future are set as
objects of hope, matches such an immanent soteriology. An integrated view of the
nature-grace relationship and soteriology follows, in which salvation history is
coextensive with world history. As world history develops, so does the salvation of
humanity advance. A natural complement to a Hegelian dialectic of history, in which
history immanently proceeds to its telos, is thus present in the Concilium position on
hope and history. An immanent conception of grace, to a degree at least, places
salvation, and hope as oriented to salvation, within an immanent framework. Hope is
then directed to the realisation of immanent ends. The notion that world history (as a
history of the human person’s transcendentality) is coterminous with salvation
history (as the working out of that transcendentality) forms the groundwork for the
development of an immanentist soteriology and integrated view of liberation in
Rahner’s followers.

A view that humanity can accelerate or contribute to such liberation itself depends on
one of the aspects of Rahner’s thought, which is central to political theology and
liberation theology, namely the view of the coextensive relationship between
117

salvation and world histories. The tendency to collapse the distinction between the
profane and redemptive can lead to a version of hope that emphasises the immanent
at the expense of the transcendent. It can lead to an immanentist soteriology that
downplays the novelty of Christ and promotes an idealist, Hegelian view of
freedom.370 A Rahnerian tendency to conflate the orders of nature and grace (also
4.2.2) is visible in the corresponding tendency to collapse of the distinction between
world or profane history and salvation history. Rahner argues that there is “a single
meaning and a single dynamism running through the whole history of mankind”.371
Using his transcendental anthropology as the basis for his position on the meaning of
history, he suggests that “history is ultimately the history of transcendentality itself”,
that is, “man’s transcendentality”.372 Consequently, the supernatural existential “is at
once the single history of both salvation and revelation”.373 Although recognising
that salvation history and the “whole history of the human race” are not “identical”
because of the reality of sin and “rejection of God”, Rahner nevertheless argues that
these are “coextensive” and “coexistent”.374 A singular understanding of history is
thus present in Rahner.
Rahner’s idea of the coextensive nature of human and salvation history depends on
his transcendental conception of the human person. An important component of a
Rahnerian conception of the supernatural is the notion that world history is itself the
history of revelation because the human as he is in himself contains the seeds of his
own fulfilment. According to Rahner, the “history of the world” is “the history of
salvation” because it contains God’s communication of himself to the freedom of the
human person.375 Because the human person in his existence as such possesses the
supernatural existential, in which God communicates and offers himself to the
person, all of human history is necessarily the history of this salvation. Revelation is
likewise not confined to the record of revelation contained in the Old and New
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Testaments but comprehends “God’s self-communication”.376 World history and the
history of God’s salvation of humanity, although not one and the same thing, are
coterminous because the human person ‘always already’ has the supernatural
existential. The history of humanity is ipso facto the history of salvation, supporting
a view of hope of at least partially directed to the realisation of earthly goals. A view
of the coextensivity of world and salvation history is present in the Concilium
authors. This section is concerned with setting out the traces of Rahner in this regard
in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez, whose immanent soteriology supports an
inner-historical conception of hope. An inner-historical conception of hope tends to
blur the distinction between history and eschatology, conflate nature and grace and
integrate earthly liberation and supernatural redemption.

1.5.1

Schillebeeckx’s Soteriology

A tendency to place soteriology within an immanent framework, which thereby
serves inner-historical ends, is present in Schillebeeckx. In contrast to the
‘eschatological attitude’ of Ratzinger (5.5), a dominant theme in Schillebeeckx is
what Minch calls the “incarnational principle”.377 Schillebeeckx’s focus on the
‘incarnational principle’ and a rejection of an extrinsic reading of the nature-grace
relationship complements an integrated view of liberation. The world’s history and
salvation history are seen to be intermingled. Efforts to ‘humanise’ the world take
precedence over a patient watchfulness directed to the presence of Christ (3).
For Schillebeeckx, the hypostatic union means that there is a “secular meaning of
history”.378 A denial of, inter alia, “an extrinsic view of grace”, in which grace is
understood to be mediated through the institutional structures of the Church and not
found in the ‘world’, leads to an orientation away from the past and to the future
“humanization of the world”, even if that future is utopian and cannot thus be
realised.379 Although recognising that final consummation remains eschatological
and solely in God’s power, the dominant ‘incarnational principle’ in Schillebeeckx is
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said to require an “even more radical” commitment to the world.380 In this way, the
Church “can have the same orientation” as “social and political movements” in
seeking to “make the world a better place for others”.381 Such an attitude explains
Schillebeeckx’s approbation of critical Christian communities (1.3.2). The Church is
thus engaged in a “flight with the world towards the future”, instead of from the
world.382 For Schillebeeckx, flowing from a rejection of an extrinsic reading of the
nature-grace relationship is the view that the incarnation demands that the Church’s
attention be directed to the future and the ‘humanization of the world’, and her
identification with particular social and political projects.
An understanding of the Church’s functions as involving political tasks relates to
Schillebeeckx’s reappraisal of the Church-world relationship, which depends on or
parallels a Rahnerian view of grace and Concilium approval of secularism. Minch
points out that Schillebeeckx thought “the old distinction between nature and
supernature” to be redundant in setting out the relationship between the Church and
the world.383 In contrast to Ratzinger’s liturgical emphasis in eschatology (3), the
Church is not simply to be identified with the hierarchy or her liturgical functions.
Rather, in a phrase redolent of Rahner, Schillebeeckx argues that “anonymous grace”
operates outside the visible Church and hierarchy. 384 Signally, Schillebeeckx argues
that the “immanence” of grace must not be forgotten in the face of its
“transcendence”.385 Grace’s operation within the world appears to have as much
significance in Schillebeeckx’s scheme as its transcendence. Schillebeeckx is correct
to say that grace operates both immanently and transcendently but the risk of
emphasising its immanence is to consider that it is solely for immanent ends, rather
than transcendent ones.

A Rahnerian notion of anonymous grace thus underpins a conception of the Churchworld relationship that detects the operation of grace in the ‘world’. The ‘world’
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becomes therefore the ground of a dynamic and secular drive to the future. In itself,
the “world” is “a locus theologicus” and the “lived experience” of the laity ought to
ground the Church’s relationship to the world.386 In contrast to Pieper and
Ratzinger’s approbation of a living tradition (4.4), a focus upon the experience of
Christians in the world entails a dialectical rejection of the “absolute” normativity of
“past tradition” in favour of understanding the present and future in a dynamic
way.387 According to Schillebeeckx, the world retains its own theological
significance, and present and future history has its own dynamic and salvific
significance.
The intermingling of the Church’s efforts with those of political agitators matches an
integrated view of nature and grace and a social view of redemption. Resting on a
benign, “new image of humanity” humanity’s “aim is to build a new world”.388 If not
entirely conflating the orders of nature and grace, the overlap of the Church’s and
humanity’s functions in building a ‘new world’, leads to an emancipatory impulse
and a hope focused not on personal but social and historical fulfilment. In presenting
“social liberation as an integral ingredient of eschatological salvation from God”,
Schillebeeckx argues against “a false, namely abstract, personalism”.389 Evidently,
grace is not simply personal but is rather addressed to “the institutional element in
human life”.390 Eschatological hope rests on a view of salvation as involving ‘social
liberation’, which is necessarily inner-historical.

In Schillebeeckx, Christian discipleship is also seen through the lens of an immanent
soteriology. In his second volume of Christology, Gerechtigheid end liefde, genade
en bevrijding (Christ. The Christian Experience in the Modern World),
Schillebeeckx turns to a discussion of the early Christians’ experience of “salvation
as a reality”.391 In this discussion, Schillebeeckx touches on the idea of grace and the
nature of salvation. Schillebeeckx’s soteriology emphasises Christian “social-ethical
responsibility”, especially “in the encounter with suffering and injustice in the
386
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world”. Being a Christian means imitating Jesus’s life, which is paradigmatic for us,
and being involved in “the struggle for the humanum”.392 Salvation consists in
experiencing Jesus through imitation, an imitation that leads to inner-historical
improvement and struggle on behalf of the oppressed. Paramount is the subjective
experience of salvation as generating inner-historical action to improve the world and
participate in humanity’s struggle.
In contrast to Pieper and Ratzinger’s emphasis that hope is personal and oriented to
eternal life, and Ratzinger’s argument that subject-hood needs primarily to be
understood in terms of the response to grace (5.4.3), Schillebeeckx considers that an
integral notion of nature and grace leads to an emphasis on social, integral
redemption. Paralleling a Rahnerian-type recognition of the grace latent to human
existence, history and creation, Schillebeeckx’s understanding of nature and grace,
the Church and the world results in an especial focus on social and political action in
changing the world, rather than personal sanctification. According to this scheme,
nature appears not to need ‘renunciation’ in the manner of an Augustinian-Thomist
account (5) but to be developed according to its own principles.

1.5.2

The Political Theology of Metz

Schillebeeckx’s notion that ‘eschatological salvation’ includes ‘social liberation’ is
replicated in Metz’s political theology, which argues that a principal element of
redemption concerns the social and political order. Consequently, Metz views secular
and salvation history as integrated, which parallels a Rahnerian account of the
coextensive nature of world history and salvation history. A political concept of
soteriology that tends to confine the significance of Christ’s redemptive work within
an immanent frame is thereby present in Metz. Although Metz insists that his
‘eschatological proviso’ protects against a simple identification of political
aspirations with eschatology, his soteriology has distinctly worldly, political and
inner-historical implications.393
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Metz’s soteriology is linked to his low Christology. He argues that the memory of
Jesus’s suffering enables “soteriology” to be understood “as a political theology of
redemption”.394 According to Metz, the memory of Christ-crucified is the basis of the
promise of eschatological freedom for everyone. In a phrase revealing Metz’s
tendency to secularise the eschaton, he suggests that the new in the “eschatological
Reign of God has to be expressed in a carefully warranted and focused goal for
changing things”.395 In sharp contrast with Ratzinger’s understanding of Christ’s
death and resurrection (3) and an emphasis on Christ’s novelty in transforming
human nature (5), the memory of Christ’s passion and resurrection does not
constitute a “total leap into the eschatological existence of the ‘new human
being’”.396 Rather, it represents concrete human suffering, which serves as the basis
for the drive to create “a more human way of life”.397 The memory of Christ’s
passion and resurrection, and the eschatological promise of a new freedom support,
therefore, not a “passive expectation of the Parousia”, but “a productive and militant
eschatology”.398 Belief in the general resurrection possesses a political significance,
which recalls history’s accumulated suffering with the purpose of informing “our
action and our hope”.399 Christ’s passion and resurrection appears not to be
soteriologically significant as the eschatological realisation of the ‘new Adam’ (3, 5).
Soteriology is rather directed to historical, political action.
Christ’s Paschal Mystery has present significance as a memory, which is the driver
of historical change towards a better, promised future. It does not constitute a leap
into humanity’s eschatological future. Metz does not separate the memory of Christ’s
passion from his resurrection, and opposes therefore the traditional distinction drawn
between world history and salvation history, and the juxtaposition of inner-worldly
suffering with supra-worldly glory. He gives therefore qualified approval to the shift
in philosophical and “theological consciousness” apparent in Moltmann’s Theologie
Der Hoffnung and certain strands of modern philosophy, from a focus on the
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“hereafter” to one focused on “later”.400 He is concerned to avoid an “argumentative
soteriology”, which a-historically ignores historical suffering and focuses upon the
irrevocable salvation wrought by Christ.401 Metz differently emphasises the
significance of Christ and his redemptive activity for hope and history than the
general tradition. His soteriology is focused upon the memory of human suffering.
He critiques a soteriology that ignores historical suffering because centred on the
past event of salvation, which promises the ‘hereafter’.
Metz’s politically-inflected soteriology is instead concerned with ameliorating the
ills of the past in order to improve the ‘later’. He discusses recent theology’s
tendency to identify suffering in God as a result of kenosis. He suggests that a
speculative theology needs to be accomplished narratively, in “a memorativenarrative soteriology” that does not suspend or condition “the event of
redemption”.402 He thus applies kenotic theology to historical suffering and its
memory. While he does not think Christ’s cry from the Cross was atheistic, he
approbates a view of it as a “protest on behalf of suffering humanity”, that is, he
focuses on Christ’s historical identity with the suffering.403 Implicitly, he critiques
traditional, speculative theological understandings of soteriology as being too ahistorical and not focused sufficiently on the narrative of Christ’s identification with
the suffering.
Arguably, Metz’s emphasis on the historicity of Christ and his suffering is at the
expense of an emphasis on the Beatific Vision in Christ and the promise of the
extension of this vision to humanity (although this is not made explicit).404 In his
political theology, soteriology and therefore hope do not appear to be centred on the
possession of the Beatific Vision. His understanding of Christ’s redemptive activity
is not primarily the communication of promised eschatological life through the
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Spirit. The redemption of the world appears not to be framed by the prospect of
eternal life but is focused immanently on ameliorating historical evils.

Removing suffering appears to be an objective of a memorative-narrative
soteriology, implicitly linking Metz to a Marxist view of redemption. For example,
Marsden in his review of Metz’s political theology cites as apposite the liberation
theologian, Jon Sobrino’s idea that the purpose of discussion about the identification
of Christ and the suffering, the “crucified peoples”, is to remove them from the
Cross.405 In this regard, redolent of Schillebeeckx’s work on ‘Christian Political
Commitment’ (1.3.2) is Metz’s analysis of the relationship between the
contemporary desire for emancipation, which Metz’s considers is “epochal”.406
Emancipation is understood in the basic Marxist sense of the restoration to humanity,
of the human world and human relationships as developed in the “dialectic of
emancipation” of the Frankfurt School.407 Theology must not fall into “pre-modern”
attempts of construing the relationship between the Christian idea of redemption and
emancipation, but must “enter into critical dialogue with [the modern] history [of
emancipation]”.408 Christ’s redemption must then be understood in light of “the
human history of suffering…as the medium for a history of liberation that is
redemptive and emancipatory”.409 Metz does not simply equate emancipation with
redemption. He seeks to correct or complement emancipatory theory in reference to
Christian redemption. However, he understands redemption and emancipation under
the aspect of liberation from guilt, finitude, mortality and nihilism, as well as
political oppression and violence. Liberation, understood as intermingled political
and theological aspiration, emphasises the overcoming of earthly suffering the taking
possession by humanity of the world and human relationships.410

Accordingly, an integrated view of world history and salvation history is present in
Metz. He argues that:
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salvation history is the world’s history in which space is made for defeated and
repressed hopes and suffering to have meaning. Salvation history is that history of
the world in which meaning is promised to the vanquished and forgotten possibilities
of human existence – to which we give the name death.411

Metz’s formulation that ‘salvation history is the world’s history’ has noticeable
overlap with Rahner’s notion that world history is coextensive with salvation history.
Consistent

with

Milbank’s

comments

above,

Metz

develops

Rahner’s

transcendentalism, by appropriating it and applying it to a social-political-historical
context, in which Hegelian-Marxism has a place. World history is salvation history
as directed to the removal of suffering. On display in Metz is a clear collapsing of the
orders of creation and redemption/soteriology, nature and grace. Secular history and
profane history intermingle.

An integrated view of nature is relevant to the hope-history debate. According to
Metz, politics concern for the future and Christian hope cannot be neatly separated.
The transcendent and inner-historical mingle, even if Christianity’s role in the innerhistorical is indirect. Christianity’s role is to offer “a liberating critique of the social
and political reality” of the rational planning that is present in the secularised
space.412 In this way, eschatology is read as serving dialectical ends, and an innerhistorical soteriology. Relating Metz to the Marxist-inspired Frankfurt School is his
comment that the ‘eschatological proviso’ provides “a dialectical and critical
attitude” to contemporary society.413 Loaded with Hegelian and Marxist significance,
and distinguishing him from Ratzinger’s view of eschatology is Metz’s argument that
eschatology is seen not primarily as proclaiming the intrinsic imperfectability of
history (2.2.3), but to mobilise “the socially critical and… ‘political’ potentiality of
411
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its faith and its hope and love”.414 It is to make public “the eschatological promises
of the scriptural tradition – freedom, peace, justice and reconciliation”.415
Notwithstanding the ‘eschatological proviso’, Metz’s soteriology has an innerworldly focus. Echoing Moltmann, he says that the eschatological promises have “a
critical and liberating imperative for our own present time”. 416 An inner-worldly
dynamic is at play in Metz’s political theology, flowing from a view in which the
salvific implications of Christianity are tied up with inner-historical social and
political concerns, which relates to a view of eschatological hope as containing an
inner-historical thrust.

In conclusion, it cannot be gainsaid that Christ in the Incarnation joined with
suffering humanity in order to relieve that suffering. The principal issues in
soteriology concern, however, what suffering is being relieved and how it is taken
away. Metz’s apparent soteriological imperative to remove suffering contrasts with a
traditional understanding that it is precisely incorporation into Christ’s suffering on
the Cross that is the means for participation in Christ’s exaltation in the
Resurrection.417 On the traditional view eternal life in the ‘hereafter’ is the object of
this suffering hope, an eschatological vision that transcends history (a view, as will
be seen, present in Pieper and Ratzinger). Metz, on the other hand, tends to confine
the implications of the identification of Christ with humanity’s suffering to an innerhistorical framework driving political change. The hope that is the object of Christ’s
redemption tends not to be eternal life but appears coloured by contemporary
understandings of emancipation.
1.5.3

Integrated Liberation

Liberation theology presents a view of liberation as integrated, in which the orders of
nature and grace tend to be conflated. Secular aims and ideals are overlain with
eschatological significance, which relates to Schillebeeckx and Metz’s integration of
the profane and secular. An integration of nature and grace contains traces of
Rahner’s theology of grace and reveals an incarnationalist tendency. Liberation
theology tends to understand history and all of reality in monist terms. Matching
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Schillebeeckx and implicitly paralleling Metz, liberation theology possesses a
general “opposition to classical dualism” and its sharp differentiation between “a
spiritual and a worldly sphere”.418 Rather, as in Rahner, salvation and secular history
are coterminous, because the human person has a transcendental orientation: the
“history of salvation is nothing that is different from or outside the history of human
beings”.419 A monist appreciation of history and salvation is thus a “basic theological
fundamentum of Liberation Theology”, in which there is one history alone (una sola
historia).420 According to this view, there is:

the unity of salvation and liberation, redemption and earthly progress, the sacred
and the profane. Reality is one. There is no supernatural realm outside of and above
the natural realm of human history.421

As is apparent, liberation theology evidences the proclivity to collapse the distinction
between world and salvation. Liberation theology radicalises or applies Rahner to the
Latin American context, seeing ‘earthly progress’ as intimately tied to the
redemption.422 Redemption involves the progress of history.
Apart from arguably expressing a dubious metaphysics – in which natural and
supernatural reality are conceived in Hegelian, univocal terms – a unitary
understanding of salvation and human history lends itself to an inner-historical focus
at the expense of eternity. Soteriology is understood in immanentist terms.
Schillebeeckx and Metz’s arguments that the institutional and social is contained
within eschatological salvation is paralleled in liberation theology’s notion that
liberation involves economic and social progress. For example, Segundo, a liberation
theologian with especial incarnational tendencies, argued that salvation needs to be
understood in immanentist terms. Salvation for Segundo is located in humanity’s
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“building up of history”, which God has entrusted to it.423 Another example is
Müller’s comment that the attainments of:

Earthly goods such as freedom, human dignity, justice and the overcoming of hunger
and needs are signs, actualizations, and realizations of the one salvation of human
beings and humanity on their way in history to the eschaton.424

In Gutiérrez’s words, the “eschatological promises are being fulfilled throughout
history”.425 He argues that the Kingdom’s advent is signified by the “struggle for a
just world in which there is no oppression, servitude, or alienated work”.426
Continuing the Rahner-Schillebeeckx-Metz trajectory and with clear overtones of
Marx, liberation theology presents an understanding of history in which human
agency within the ‘natural’, historical and secular sphere takes on salvific
significance.427 Redemption is multifaceted yet unified process in which historical
achievement is a fundamental component.
Gutiérrez’s idea of ‘integral liberation’ is a principal example of liberation theology’s
tendency to integrate nature and grace, human and salvation history. Stålsett explains
that Gutiérrez’s Theology of Liberation presents a three-layered, integrated
understanding of liberation. First, on the “historical-political level”, liberation entails
economic, social and political attainment for “oppressed social classes and
people”.428 Thus, according to liberation theology, integral to the Church’s mission
as a “sign of salvation” is to confront oppression and injustice in history.429
Secondly, the “deeper”, “historical-existential” level is aimed at the personal mastery
of freedom such that there is “a permanent cultural revolution, to the forming of a
new human person, of a society that is qualitatively different”.430 Evident at this level
is a concept of emancipation understood in terms that resembles the Joachimite strain
423
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of thought. History is to see a ‘qualitatively different’ epoch akin to the Age of the
Spirit, as a result of dialectical, revolutionary struggle. Liberation involves human
activity directed towards the instantiation of a definitively altered human nature and
society. Integrated liberation incorporates historical, political and existential
concerns and relates them to a narrower understanding of salvation. It is only at the
third level that a traditionally soteriological dimension is introduced, in which
liberation involves the redemption of the human person by Christ from sin.
The notion of ‘integrated liberation’ presents the attainment of freedom as a
multilayered but unitary phenomenon. Gutiérrez emphasises that the three levels are
interrelated and part of Christ’s “redeeming work”.431 Müller is careful to distinguish
liberation theology’s understanding of history from a Hegelian one, in which history
is “the self-objectification of God”.432 He suggests that the relationship between
profane and salvation history is one of “unity-in-difference” with “neither a pure
separation nor a simple identification between earthly well-being and eternal
salvation”.433 Gutiérrez also argues against a ‘simple identification’ between
particular social realities with the realisation of God’s “eschatological promises”.434
However, on liberation theology’s own terms, supernatural redemption contains
within itself, inner-historical, social, economic and political liberation. The poor and
oppressed become, essentially, ‘masters of history’ moving it towards the realisation
of freedom. Liberation theology is not strictly Hegelian. Nevertheless, it bears a
family resemblance with it in containing within the concept of liberation, the Marxist
dialectical, revolutionary impulse to create new political and existential conditions
for a ‘new humanity’.

Liberation theology places itself within the theological developments of the twentieth
century that opposed extrinsicism. The judgment that a Rahnerian theology of grace
has influenced Gutiérrez’s liberation theology accords with its self-understanding.
Connected with this self-understanding, however, is the further claim de Lubac needs
to be added to Rahner’s place within liberation theology. Müller argues, contestably,
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that Rahner belongs to the same intellectual tradition as de Lubac. 435 He asserts that
liberation theology is an application of de Lubac’s “nouvelle théologie” and Rahner’s
“theology of grace” to a social-historical context.436 In appropriating Rahner and de
Lubac for liberation theology, Müller characterises liberation theology as part of the
general twentieth century theological move away from neoscholastic extrinsicism.
Liberation theology’s suggested place in the mainstream post-conciliar theology,
according to Müller, gives it theological credibility and “resolve[s]” the objections
brought against it.437 Müller thinks therefore that Gutiérrez’s liberation theology is a
legitimate expression of the views on nature-grace developed in response to
neoscholasticism, specifically as a continuation of de Lubac and Rahner. Liberation
theology is seen as a development of the strands of theology that arose in the
twentieth century, applied to a particular context.

In seeing liberation theology as a part of a continuing development running through
de Lubac and Rahner – as if they were examples of a unified thread – Müller
replicates Gutiérrez’s own appreciation of the significance of the nature-grace
debate. Gutiérrez’s appropriation of Rahner shows the dependence of his variant of
liberation theology on a Rahnerian view of the supernatural (but it will be argued in
4.2.3 not de Lubac’s). Gutiérrez argues thus that contained within de Lubac’s
theology (and Yves de Montcheuil’s) are the roots of liberation theology. De Lubac’s
rejection of the notion of pure nature allowed “the recovery of the historical and
existential viewpoint” and the idea that the human person has “but one vocation”.438
A Lubacian account of the supernatural is contained in liberation theology on
Gutiérrez’s understanding.
According to Gutiérrez, Rahner is moreover a link between de Lubac’s view of
nature and grace, and liberation theology. Rahner “continued thinking along
[Lubacian] lines”.439 His ‘supernatural existential’ showed that “the universal salvific
will of God creates in the human being a deep affinity which becomes a gratuitous
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ontologico-real determinant of human nature”.440 Human nature as such, in the
human person’s “concrete” and “existential condition”, possesses the ‘supernatural
existential’, which Gutiérrez considers relates to the claim of Blondel (influential on
de Lubac) that the human person is “oriented to [supernatural life] by necessity”.441
The concreteness of God’s call to the supernatural life, which de Lubac’s (and
Balthasar’s) conception of the supernatural recognises, is transposed into Rahner’s
‘supernatural existential’. The ‘supernatural existential’ is the theological framework
for Gutiérrez’s theology of integrated liberation.

Importantly, moreover, Gutiérrez links what he considers to be the continuity
between de Lubac and Rahner with Schillebeeckx and Metz’s rejection of
extrinsicism. He connects de Lubac and Rahner’s reading of the intrinsic nature of
the human person’s supernatural vocation with Schillebeeckx’s rejection of an
extrinsic reading of the Church-world relationship. Consistent with the analysis of
Schillebeeckx above, Gutiérrez argues that Rahner’s idea of “anonymous
Christianity” lends itself to Schillebeeckx’s view that there is “a Christianity beyond
the visible frontiers of the Church”.442 In line with Schillebeeckx’s reading of
Gaudium et Spes, which forms an important basis of his interpretation of the naturegrace relationship discussed above, Gutiérrez argues that the Conciliar document
promotes an integral understanding of the human vocation and development.
A consequence of Schillebeeckx’s reading of Gaudium et Spes is the breakdown of
the barriers between “faith and temporal works, Church and world”.443 Gutiérrez
quotes Schillebeeckx’s argument that the fluidity of the boundaries between the
Church and the world are also not one-way, because “mankind and the world” flows
into the life of the Church.444 Gutiérrez also quotes Metz’s similar suggestion that “in
a certain sense the Church is the world”.445 An understanding of the nature-grace
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relationship in these terms “gives religious value in a completely new way to human
action in history”.446 Evident in Gutiérrez (as well as Schillebeeckx and Metz) is the
Rahnerian view that grace operates outside the visible structures of the Church as a
pre-existent human reality. A view of ‘anonymous’ grace – that is, not bearing the
name ‘Christian’ or relating explicitly to the Church – grounds the view that the
‘world’ contains its own salvific significance. Related to the view that innerhistorical struggles for justice and so on can anticipate and actualise eschatological
reality.

In line with a Rahnerian view of nature-grace present in Schillebeeckx and Metz,
Gutiérrez presents therefore the view of ‘integral liberation’ briefly outlined above.
An integral view of liberation possesses a “profound integration” of the orders of
nature and grace.447 “Political liberation” has “economic roots” and is understood as
the means of overcoming the gap between the two orders.448 Liberation from sin
“implies a political liberation”.449 Christ’s Passover involves the “transition …from
justice to injustice”.450 Consequently, there cannot be liberation from sin without
political and human liberation.451 While distinct, political and human liberation form
“part of a single, all-encompassing salvific process” in which the growth of the
Kingdom is the “ultimate precondition for a just society and a new humanity”.452
Gutiérrez identifies historical examples of liberation as instantiations of the
Kingdom’s growth and as “salvific event[s]”.453 Christ’s “saving work” thus involves
the “creation of a more just and fraternal world”.454 The integration between the
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orders of nature and grace are such that historical ‘progress’ is seen as a working-out
of God’s salvific work. In Guteriérrez is clearly an immanent soteriology indebted to
Rahner’s theology of grace.

1.5.4

Conclusion

A Rahnerian theology of grace, or Transcendental Thomist configuration of the
nature-grace relationship, is a foundational component of Schillebeeckx’s theology
of hope, Metz’s political theology and Gutiérrez’s liberation theology. Its notion of
the intimate connection between the profane and salvific, history and eschatological
is present in Schillebeeckx’s conflation of the Church and the world, Metz’s political
soteriology and Gutiérrez’s integrated notion of liberation. A consequent, immanent
soteriology undergirds their inner-historical conceptions of hope. The historical is
given soteriological, eschatological significance because the secular is the realm of
an ‘always-already’ ‘supernatural existential’. The mere fact of being human carries
soteriological potential. An evacuation from the secular of a specific, institutional
religious content leaves a conceptual space for praxis, often linked to a Marxist view
of political and social progress as redemptive. A ‘baptism of secularisation’ thus
undergirds the view of history as being the site of redemptive human action.
Eschatological hope, which is necessarily directed to salvation, is at least partly
placed in the realisation of inner-historical earthly projects. Soteriology is aimed at
the achievement of immanent ends. An inner-historical conception of hope depends
therefore upon an immanent, Rahnerian theology of grace, which leaves theology
open to the influence of immanent philosophies of hope.

1.6

Conclusion

Chapter 1 has argued that Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez present an innerhistorical conception of hope. The Concilium authors answer the question of whether
hope at least partially can be realised within history largely in the positive. Although
not adopting an immanent framework for hope in toto, they nevertheless conceive
hope’s energies to be directed towards earthly, historical projects and goals.
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Eschatological hope is not oriented according to traditional eschatology’s framework
of the ‘hereafter’ but to the (historical) future.

This Chapter has argued that an immanent conception of hope depends upon the
choices Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez make in fundamental theology. First, the
Chapter related political theology and liberation theology to a Joachimite genealogy,
the line of thought originating in Joachim of Fiore, extending through Hegel and
Marx, resulting in Bloch’s philosophy of hope. It did so by exploring the role of
Moltmann and Bloch in Metz and Gutiérrez. The Concilium position on hope and
history is informed by a drive towards an open-ended future and contemporary
praxis. It was then able to show how Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez offer
versions of eschatological hope that drive inner-historical action and are impersonal.
Political and impersonal versions of hope distinguish the Concilium authors from
classic eschatology and contemporary personalist strains in theology. Hope is related
to dialectic expectations of a ‘new humanity’ and society.

Secondly, it explored the low Christologies of the Concilium authors. It showed that
each of Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez generally adopt the perspective of an
‘ascending Christology’. The biblical witness and Jesus of Nazareth are read through
the lens of modern biblical criticism. Jesus is viewed from ‘below’ and the historicity
of his life given especial focus. Consequently, a picture of Jesus is presented in
which classical Christologies emphasising his divinity are minimised and his innerhistorical import considered. His eschatological proclamation of the Kingdom is,
rather, seen as instigating inner-historical, immanent change.

Thirdly and fourthly, the Chapter examined the role of a Rahnerian, or
Transcendental Thomist, theology of grace in the formation of an immanent
soteriology in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez. An opposition to extrinsicism,
combined with a transcendental view of the human person and history tends, in the
words of Milbank, to ‘naturalise the supernatural’. An affirmation of secularisation
and an integrated view of nature and grace follow. Earthly, inner-historical realities
take on salvific significance, complementing a dialectical view of historical and
political progress.
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Overall, an inner-historical view of hope is rooted in certain claims of fundamental
theology, with varying degrees of influence. A principal choice grounding the
Concilium position on hope and history is the adoption of a Rahnerian view of the
nature-grace relationship. The ‘supernatural existential’, perceiving human existence
as ‘always-already’ transcendentally elevated, maximises the salvific import of
human existence, and secular reality and history as such. Necessarily, the novelty of
the particular Jesus Christ of Nazareth (and therefore the Church) is downplayed in
relation to creation. Christ is not primarily the divine irruption into human history,
pointing to an eschatological reality beyond it. Rather, he is the divine affirmation of
the latent salvific possibilities of human person and human history in themselves.
Consequently, the secular becomes a chief reference point for the Concilium authors.
Allied to a Rahnerian theology of grace, a dialectical reading of history and
contemporary norms of praxis are imported into theology. Hope becomes placed in
history’s movement towards liberation and emancipation.

As a result, the eschaton, although not completely identified with the historical, tends
to be secularised in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez. The Incarnationalist
propensity of the Concilium position emphasises the continuity between the
historical and eschatological reality. Discontinuity between the realities, while
acknowledged, is not prominent. The blurring of the lines between the profane and
the salvific, nature and grace, and the Church and the world, and the incorporation of
Joachimite and dialectical impulses into the Concilium perspective, result in
eschatological reality being secularised, at least to a degree. On its own terms,
especially in liberation theology, the realisation of earthly projects is a fundamental
component of liberation. Eschatology entails, in Metz’s words, an imperative ‘for
changing things’ (quoted in 1.5.2). Focus upon contemporary praxis incorporates
dialectical notions of history’s progress towards utopia and a ‘new humanity’. Praxis
is thus overladen with eschatological notions. To a degree, the imperative for
liberation and emancipation is a secular variant of eschatological reality. The
eschaton is placed in an immanent framework.
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CHAPTER 2 THE COMMUNIO PERSPECTIVE: HOPE UNDER THE ASPECT OF
ETERNITY

2.1

Introduction

Chapter 2 concerns the counterpoint in Communio – as represented by Ratzinger – to
the first component of the Concilium contribution to the hope-history debate. As
shown in Chapter 1, Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez define hope as directed to
inner-historical expectations and with reference to contemporary variants on the
Joachimite tendency to secularise Christian hope. In contrast, Ratzinger considers
hope’s object to be personal participation in eternal life. Hope is most true to its
character as the theological virtue of hope, which is infused in baptism and gives
eternal life, if incipiently, to the believer. Consequently, Ratzinger argues that innerhistorical, social and political conceptions of hope are misconceived and in fact
dangerous. He is deeply suspicious of any tendency to secularise eschatological
reality and is sceptical regarding the claim of philosophies of history to comprehend
the meaning of history.1

Ratzinger does not paint an individualistic picture of hope, ignorant of its social or
inner-historical dimensions. His conception of hope does not avoid the questions
raised by the theologies of futurity in the twentieth century. 2 His theology regarding
hope is not simply a reprisal of the traditional categories of eschatology (the ‘last
things’). Nevertheless, underpinned by Pieper’s philosophical analyses of the nature
of hope and the relationship between hope and history, he understands hope to be
related to the human person’s desire for existential fulfilment in an extra-historical,
eternal life of love. Ratzinger’s is thus a personalist and in that sense a-political

1

This Chapter does not give an exhaustive overview of Ratzinger’s views on hope, much less
Pieper’s, but focus on those elements regarding it that show hope’s object to be eternal life.
Schumacher gives an exhaustive account of the philosophical nuances of Pieper’s philosophy in his
Philosophy of Hope.
2
In fact, Ratzinger’s conception of salvation history as ‘already, not yet’ (3.4) gives present history its
significance, precisely because it is considered under the aspect of eternity.
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account of hope, conscious of contemporary questions about the person and the
meaning of history.3
The Chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first concerns Ratzinger’s
critique of inner-historical conceptions of hope, especially as manifest in the Marxist
thinker Bloch, who was influential to the Concilium perspective (see 1.2.1).
Grounded in Pieper’s philosophical view that hope’s object is not subject to the
control of the one who hopes, Ratzinger considers secularised eschatology to be
mistaken, including as manifest in the Concilium perspective. Views of hope as
resting on the perfectibility of history misapprehend the nature of history, which
cannot immanently be perfected. Moreover, they wrongly present hope as impersonal
and political. Hope oriented to a ‘later’ stage of historical perfection not personally
concerning the one who hopes is unintelligible for Pieper and Ratzinger. Instead,
hope is intrinsically personal and must answer the question of what occurs to the
individual in the ‘hereafter’. Thus, a compelling account of hope will treat and
answer the issue of death. Many inner-historical understandings of hope tend not to
focus on the importance of this question and inadequately deal with it.

Whereas the first section of this Chapter to a degree considers what hope is not, the
second shows how Ratzinger positively accounts for the content of hope. It considers
the theocentric content of fundamental hope. The notion of fundamental hope
depends on a distinction he draws from Pieper between everyday hopes and a
singular, more fundamental hope. The fundamental or authentic hope points beyond
the everyday and intra-mundane to eternal life in God. Eternal life is what fulfils the
human person and thus, ultimately, is the object of his hope. Ratzinger, again
dependent upon Pieper, gives a definition of eternal life as supra-historical and a
definitive participation in God’s eternal being.

Eternal life as an object of hope is an intrinsically theological notion. Hope is a
theological virtue, a gift imparted in baptism orienting the person to eternal beatitude
in God. In baptism, eternal life is inchoately but substantially present in the soul of
the believer. As such, hope has a ‘performative’, inner-historical aspect. It affects the

3

C.f. Rowland, Guide, ch 1, esp. 11, 15-17. See also ch 1of her “Beyond Baroque Scholasticism”.
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present. However, unlike intra-mundane conceptions of hope, its effect on the
present is not as an impatient impulse to change history in the name of rejecting the
past. Rather, hope is receptive, patient and fundamentally prayerful. The ‘active’
nature of hope is precisely in opening up the world to God’s eternal presence, as the
hope that points history beyond itself.

2.2

Distinguishing Ratzinger from an Inner-Historical Conception of Hope

This section begins with a brief elaboration of Pieper’s philosophical principle that
the one who hopes cannot manufacture the object he wishes to attain. It will then
consider Ratzinger’s critique of modernity’s tendency to secularise Christian hope
and his proposition that history cannot be perfected. Instead, it is personal and
contains an imperative to transcend death and history.

2.2.1

Critiquing Bloch: Hope’s Object Cannot be Manufactured

For Pieper and Ratzinger, the notion that hope’s object is attainable by the capacity
and efforts of the person who hopes is contrary to the nature of hope. In reference to
ordinary, living, everyday language, Pieper argues that the object of hope, strictly
speaking, “is beyond the control of the one who hopes”, because the language of
hope does not refer to what can be effected by one’s own power.4 He argues that
“one does not ‘hope for’ something that can be produced by planning”. 5 Rather, in
everyday language, we speak of hoping for things beyond our control, for example,
good weather, the absence of war and long life. Even if the one who hopes can
contribute in small ways to the achievement of the object, with respect to what is
determinative, the person is powerless: “he cannot simply cause, generate,
manufacture, produce, or create the thing hoped for”.6 For Pieper, everyday language
shows that hope’s object is beyond the capacity of the person who hopes to achieve.

To establish the idea that hope depends on causes outside the power of the hoping
person, Pieper gives the example of a craftsman who hopes to complete a particular
4

Pieper, Hope and History, 23.
Pieper, “Hope – of What?”, 116.
6
Pieper, Hope and History, 23.
5
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project on time. Completion on time is dependent upon variables beyond the
craftsman’s control. The craftsman might be ill; the weather might be bad; and so on.
If the craftsman says, however, that he hopes to complete the project according to
specification, then it might be doubted whether he was capable of completing the
project at all. A craftsman does not rely on hope to complete tasks he can by his own
powers. If he does, he is a poor craftsman. From these considerations, Pieper draws a
“very serious and highly momentous” conclusion, as formulated by Gabriel Marcel:
the “only genuine hope is one directed toward something that does not depend on
us”.7 Hope characteristically involves relying on someone else or circumstances
outside of our control. Hope is not controllable or subject to planning.

That hope is necessarily reliant on circumstances beyond the control of the person
who hopes is what distinguishes a Christian vision of hope, as espoused by Pieper
and Ratzinger, from a Marxist-inspired one. Both critique in particular Bloch’s
reading of hope under the aspect of dialectical-materialism.8 Consistent with a
Marxist epistemology and contrary to Pieper and Ratzinger, it is not possible, on
Bloch’s view, to hope for things beyond the control of the one who hopes.9 Rather,
hope belongs in a ‘laboratory’ and can be manufactured according to dialectical
rationality. Hope, for Bloch, is ‘the product of human activity’ (quoted in 1.2.1).
Bloch’s view of hope as being controllable is underpinned by the Marxist view that
history inevitably progresses. As seen in Chapter 1, the dialecticism of Hegel and
Marx forecasts an inner-historical fulfilment or salvation for humanity within a
universal history, which can be brought about at least partially through human
rationality.

Pieper and Ratzinger contend that a materialist conception of hope, evident
especially in Marxism, which posits that history’s fulfilment will necessarily follow
the law of history, is necessarily inconsistent with the nature of human hope. Intrinsic
to the character of hope is that its object has the possibility of not being realised.
Thus Pieper says that it is nonsense to speak of hope “for something that occurs

7

Pieper, Hope and History, 24. Pieper cites and credits Marcel as being influential on his later work
on hope: Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 10.
8
Pieper, Hope and History, 53, Rowland, Guide, 73.
9
Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 32, Pieper, Hope and History, 78.
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anyway and necessarily”.10 Those who consider that a classless society will
inevitably result from natural laws are not, “strictly speaking”, discussing an object
of hope.11 The idea that history inevitably progresses to its telos contradicts the
character of hope as belonging to the realm of the possible, not the certain.

Marxist views of history and hope as politically manipulable contradict the concept
of hope. Pieper considers the notion that the object of hope can be brought about by
the “purely political and thus …what can be planned and produced” through a
“program of practical action” to be mistaken.12 Pieper appeals to an anthropological
claim: “it is obviously characteristic of men by nature, as those who truly hope, to be
directed toward fulfilment of just the kind that they cannot bring about
themselves”.13 Any attempt to manufacture hope, especially in the realms of politics
and rational planning, misconceives it and the nature of human hope. Not only daily
objects of hope but also the larger, transcendent hope (2.3.1) are beyond the control
of the one who hopes.
Ratzinger likewise considers that to plan practically and politically for hope’s objects
misunderstands the nature of hope. He follows Pieper’s criticism of Bloch closely.
He

notes

that

Pieper’s

“rigorous

analysis

demonstrates”

that

hope

is

anthropologically necessary “because what is done and feasible does not satisfy”. 14
Hope, as a human reality, exists in order to point the human person beyond what he
can do himself. Hope belongs to the realm of gift and is an “absolutely gratuitous gift
of God”, which is not owed to us, but “transcends every law of justice”. 15 The human
person is not satisfied with the intra-mundane and controllable but searches for
transcendent fulfilment. Versions of hope that confine its object to the level of the
feasible anthropologically mistake hope. The confused anthropology of modernity
presents man as “self-sufficient” and capable of eradicating evil by his own

10

Pieper, Hope and History, 22.
Pieper, Hope and History, 22.
12
Pieper, Hope and History, 83.
13
Pieper, Hope and History, 84. As will be suggested in Chapter 4, Pieper appeals to a particular
theological anthropology that sees the human person as naturally oriented to a fulfilment beyond his
own powers to effect, which matches an Augustinian-Thomist account of the supernatural.
14
Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 32.
15
Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter on Integral Human Development in Charity and Truth:
Caritas in Veritate, 29 June 2009 (Strathfield: St Pauls Publications, 2009), n34.
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resources.16 Furthermore “it confuse[s] happiness and salvation with immanent forms
of material prosperity and social action”.17 What can be achieved ourselves cannot be
the object of hope because, implicitly, we only hope in what will satisfy us and
provide existential fulfilment. Such existential satisfaction is beyond our power to
bring about.18 Hope does not belong on the level of the feasible and the makeable.

2.2.2

Ratzinger’s Critique of Blochian-Inspired Theologies

Ratzinger critiques the theologies of futurity informed by Bloch’s thought and
Moltmann’s Theologie der Hoffnung (1.2.2). Ratzinger describes a line of thought
running through Bloch and the “many theologians” influenced by him. 19 Included in
this line of thinking is Gutiérrez’s Theology of Liberation.20 Thus, he groups
together, Metz and Gutiérrez (and it can be added implicitly Schillebeeckx), along
with Moltmann, into “a generalised theology of hope” and political theology that
have its antecedents in Joachim.21 Although he is careful to commend certain aspects
of Moltmann’s theology, and liberation and revolution theology, he opposes the
intermingling of Hegelian-Marxism and Christian theology, which he detects in
Blochian inspired theologies of futurity.22

Ratzinger argues that the Blochian view of hope posits a deification of history,
resting on the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic that history itself will contain its own
eschatological telos. Undergirded by the new theological virtue of optimism, it works
for the revolutionary liberation that will usher in the promised utopia.23 In contrast

16

Benedict, Caritas in Veritate, n34.
Benedict, Caritas in Veritate, n34.
18
Like Pieper’s, Ratzinger’s claim rests on a particular theological anthropology to be explored in
Chapter 4 and a positive conception of hope, the content of which needs to be filled out further below
in this Chapter.
19
Ratzinger, Yes of Jesus Christ, 42. C.f. Rowland, Faith, 39.
20
Ratzinger, Yes of Jesus Christ, 126n1. See also Michael Sutton, “The Progeny of Joachim of Fiore,”
730.
21
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 13, 212, 273 (quotation on 273), c.f. Church, Ecumenism, and Politics,
228.
22
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 58. See also Heim, Life in the Church, 172. De Lubac is another Communio
scholar who detected the influence of Bloch on the theology of hope and its successors. De Lubac’s
La Posterite spirituelle de Joachim de Flore argued that Bloch belonged to the Joachimite lineage and
had deleterious impact on contemporary theology. The intention of his study was to describe “the
farrago of theological nonsense unleashed by Bloch”: Sutton, “The Progeny of Joachim of Fiore,”
730.
23
Ratzinger, Yes of Jesus Christ, 42. C.f. Rowland, Faith, 39.
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the Blochian perspective considers, the notion that history is under the guidance of
providence and for hope therefore to be placed in benevolent providence to a
“perilous and irresponsible anachronism”,.24 Hope should not be based on faith but
rather should consist of a “strategy of hope” based on rational calculation.25 Such
rational calculation consists of the control or manipulation of the direction of history
that is now explicable on a rational basis.26 Hope in history belongs to the realm of
human action, precisely that which can be achieved by our own power.

Ratzinger is however especially suspicious of the Marxism underpinning elements of
theologies of hope. He considers that Marxism destroys theology “through its
politicization as conceived by Marxist messianism”.27 The mixing of Christianity and
Marxism is especially destructive because it maintained a biblical hope but replaced
God’s power to effect what is hoped for with political activity: “Hope remains, but
the party takes the place of God”.28 Christianity is politicised and eschatological
energies are wrongly directed to immanent ends, resulting in totalitarianism (see
below). Indeed, his chief criticism of a “secular-utopian idea of the Kingdom [is] that
it pushes God off the stage”.29 In Blochian-inspired theologies of hope, hope tends to
be reduced to the Marxist, immanent level of what can be worked towards in the
historical future. Ratzinger argues that a general theology of hope and “present-day
political theology…comes close to dissolving the Eschaton into Utopia”.30
According to Ratzinger, the danger of conceiving hope in inner-historical concerns
is, however, that Christian hope becomes denuded of its “essential content”.31 A
“deceptive surrogate” (political utopianism) takes its place.32 Ersatz hope based upon
what we ourselves can achieve in the political, historical realm replaces transcendent
Christian hope in eternal life (see 2.3).
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Ratzinger, Eschatology, 210.
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 210.
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Ratzinger, Milestones, 137.
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Ratzinger, Milestones, 137.
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Ratzinger, Jesus(1), 55.
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Ratzinger, Eschatology, 273.
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Ratzinger, Eschatology, 59.
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Ratzinger considers that Christian hope is emasculated by “the transformation of
eschatology into political utopianism”.33 Theologies of futurity effectively answer
the question of ‘which hope?’ wrongly by positing as the answer, the immanent, if
not complete realisation of the Kingdom of God through political, social and
historical means. In these theologies, Christianity is thus characterised as a “strategy
of hope”, in which “Christian… hope is simply being re-expressed in humanly
realistic terms”.34 Bearing the mark of Bloch’s philosophy of hope, the theologies of
hope reduce Christian hope to the level of what is feasible, that is, what can be
achieved through human power.
2.2.3

History cannot be Immanently Perfected

A key element of Pieper and Ratzinger’s critique of inner-historical conceptions of
hope is their rejection of the idea that history immanently progresses towards a
perfect state. They exclude the idea of an “intra-historical perfectibility of the world”
at the hands of humanity.35 Ratzinger and Pieper argue that any idea that humanity
can construct, or at least work towards, a utopia within history misunderstands the
nature of history and hope as ultimately oriented to a supra-historical object, and the
limits of human rationality.
There are two bases on which Pieper and Ratzinger rest their analyses of history’s
imperfectability: theological and philosophical. The theological basis of their
argument relies on the Church’s tradition and biblical revelation. Ratzinger notes that
the Church has opposed as contrary to the faith chiliasm. The Church sought to
“preserve biblical tradition in its proper form” against chiliasm, which was based
upon John’s Apocalypse and Christ’s thousand-year reign prior to the end and final
judgment their foretold. The “triumph of orthodox dogma” countered Joachim’s idea
that history was divided into three significant ages.36 Ratzinger places the theologies
of liberation in a chiliast context and implicitly condemns them on the basis that
orthodox Catholic faith has resisted chiliasm.37
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Ratzinger, Eschatology, 59.
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 58-59, quotation on 59.
35
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 213.
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Ratzinger, Eschatology, 212, Theology of History, 107.
37
See Ratzinger, Eschatology, 212, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, 228, 230-255, 252-69.
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The consequence of the Church’s rejection of chiliasm was the denial of the notion
of “definitive intra-historical fulfilment”.38 Christian hope and “eschatological
expectation” do not entail a concept of historically immanent perfection and, in fact,
claim as impossible the idea that world can be fulfilled immanently. “Faith in
Christ’s return” from ‘outside’ history, which Ratzinger considers to be the genuine
content of Christian hope, is inconsistent with this idea.39 Moreover, Christian social
teaching, according to Ratzinger, demonstrates its greatest bite in “promis[ing] no
earthly paradise, no irreversibly and definitively positive society within this
history”.40 Catholic social teaching opposes revolution, but rather promotes reform as
the path to the improvement of society.41 The Christian faith, as understood by
Ratzinger, relativises any claim to historical utopia.

The Church has rejected a notion of intra-historical perfection because it contradicts
biblical revelation. The Scriptural depiction of the end of the world denies, according
to Ratzinger, any “expectation of definitive salvation within history”.42 The
catastrophe prophesied as characterising the end of time, confounds an idea of innerhistorical success. The ‘signs’ of “war, catastrophe and the persecution of the faith by
the ‘world’” demonstrate that the historical preparation for the end of time does not
depend upon “some consummate ripeness of the historical process”.43 The divine
action comes, rather, in response to history’s inner-decadence and incapacity for, and
resistance to, the divine. Far from containing the seeds of historical regeneration,
history is instead marked permanently by the eschatological signs of wars and
catastrophe. Ratzinger is thus sceptical regarding the capacity of ‘peace research’ to
constitute the basis of a hope that such strife can be overcome.44 For Ratzinger, the
Bible precludes the idea of inner-historical perfectibility.

Pieper also argues against the notion that history can be perfected from within, by
reference to revelation concerning the End. For Pieper, “the revealed prophecy of the
End” implies that, while history is approaching its goal, it does so not as an effect or
38
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result of the historical process, but only in the mode of “deliverance”. 45 The End will
be therefore characterised by “an extreme crisis… [which] will be utterly
catastrophic”.46 The End’s historical dimension will involve “a downfall”.47 Human
history will not end with the victory of goodness, truth, reason and justice, but
something akin to catastrophe understood as “a monstrous intensification of
power…a universal tyranny of evil”.48 The revelation in “apocalyptic prophecy” of
the reign of the antichrist underscores history’s catastrophic end.49 Moreover, history
is “always” directed to this “catastrophic end”.50 History is constituted by the fact
that it will end and end catastrophically. The book of Revelation reveals that history
will not continue, but rather terminate. The historical end of time will involve not
success but failure.

An affirmation of biblical prophecy concerning the catastrophic end of time sharply
opposes a progressive logic of history. Pieper thus critiques the tendency of modern
philosophy to overlook the mystery of the Apocalypse and its revelation regarding
the state of history before ‘the End’. Consistent with a Hegelian epistemology
arrogating to itself claims of total knowledge, these philosophies fail to refer to
biblical revelation.51 Consequently, these philosophies proposed inadequate and
erroneous conceptions regarding the shape of future history. He says that “[h]uman
history will not arrive at its fulfillment by way of an unbroken, continuously
progressing developmental process”.52 History gives no immanent indication that
human society is able to reach fulfilment, but is characterised by catastrophe. The
biblical witness to the continuing presence of evil within history, and at its end,
suggests an incapacity for this evil to be overcome immanently. Contrary to
immanent philosophies of progress, history’s end will be marked by rupture and not
immanent perfection.

What revelation discloses to be the perpetual presence of evil within history relates
closely to the philosophical bases upon which Pieper and Ratzinger reject the
45
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possibility of an inner-fulfilment of history. Ratzinger specifically contends against
hope in “a definitive intra-historical fulfilment” on rational as well as theological
grounds.53 Broadly speaking, it can be said that Pieper and Ratzinger philosophically
contradict the notion of an immanent perfection of history on anthropological
grounds. Ratzinger identifies two anthropological grounds for holding that history
cannot be perfected from within. First, history itself is characterised by “perpetual”
or “permanent” freedom. Secondly, humanity is marked by freedom, openness, and
constrained by limits and peccability, which suggests the possibility of historical
failure.54 Both bases are interrelated and preclude a definitive state of intra-historical
perfection. They can be treated together.

To fill out what Ratzinger means by the openness of history and humanity, reference
to Pieper’s philosophy of history is necessary. As Pieper argues, the question of
whether human hope can be satisfied within history depends on what history is
understood to be. According to Pieper, an event only becomes ‘historical’ when
human agency is brought to bear upon it. Otherwise, it is simply a natural process.
‘Human history’ only arises therefore when a “personal response” is engaged, that is,
“when what is specifically human comes into play”.55 As a result, the historical
involves “freedom, responsibility, decision, and therefore also the possibility of
willful blunder and guilt”.56 The possibility of inner-historical failure is characteristic
of history because the genuinely historical is the human. The human involves
freedom, choice, responsibility and sin.57 Each historical event is therefore singular,
unrepeatable and non-interchangeable.

Consequently, for Pieper and Ratzinger, history does not proceed according to
human rational calculation. No historical event can be predicted or deduced from
what has preceded it.58 To the contrary, only “prophetic” intelligence is able to say
anything regarding the historical future.59 The future, because it will involve the
53
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‘historical’, “resists any kind of advance calculation or speculation”.60 A philosophy
of history cannot derive “from the course of history anything like a basic structural
formula whose application would then render everything explicable”. 61 The notion
that hope and history can be planned overestimates humanity’s rational capacities.
As Ratzinger says, “human planners can never anticipate the fresh concepts and
insights of a new generation”.62 Human knowledge and technological advancement
cannot be predicted as they are unknowable to the present generation.

Perfected history also cannot be expected on the basis of a materialist philosophy of
history, which overlooks human freedom. Ratzinger argues that the fundamental
error of Marx was his assumption that the ‘New Jerusalem’ would remove all
alienation and division. Marx – and “Marxist-inspired liberation practices” – ignored,
however, that the human person remains free and possesses the freedom to commit
evil as long as history persists.63 A planned, inner-historical hope opposes freedom
because each generation must choose the good anew.64 It cannot be chosen ahead of
time for it. Underlying Marx’s erroneous philosophy of history is the materialism on
which his philosophy ultimately rests, which mistakenly asserts that improvement of
economic conditions will result in the liberation of humanity. 65 Material
improvement does not necessarily result in moral improvement and revolution
cannot create a new humanity. There can, in other words, be “no definitive human
condition within history” or “definitively stable irreversible social order”. 66 A
materialist conception of redemption that expects a transformation of matter and
humanity and therefore history based upon economic conditions is false.
The underlying materialism of Blochian Marxism – the idea that the human person
can hope in what he himself can bring about within history – is in fact an
“anthropological perversion” and a “profound error”.67 The ‘perversion’ and ‘error’
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rests on the belief that the object of human hope belongs not to the human person’s
moral dignity and personality but to “planning mechanisms”, even if these contradict
or do not support what is truly human.68 The construction of “an irreversibly positive,
definitive society” would paralyse freedom, because in such a scenario, it is the
structures supposedly guaranteeing the perfect society that determine the human
person, who will then act according to the structures. They will act with no real
freedom and happiness will be an external imposition. ‘Liberated’ humanity will in
fact be enslaved.69 Genuine human values are thereby inverted: the planning
mechanism becomes supreme and the human person secondary. Planning for hope,
far from bringing about genuinely human salvation, will bring about tyranny and
totalitarianism.70 Ratzinger thus links his critique of Marxist understanding of history
to a deeper anthropological crisis regarding the depersonalisation of humanity. The
moral freedom of humanity has been replaced by a belief in ‘scientism’ and
technologically wrought salvation, a revolutionary deus ex machina that will
“inexplicably” result in the “new man and new society”.71 Marxism condemns the
human person to enslavement.

For Ratzinger a hope that does not proceed from and respect the dignity of the human
person, which rests on his moral freedom, is a false hope. A Blochian ‘laboratory of
hope’ contradicts the philosophical idea that hoping for things we can bring about
ourselves is unintelligible. Even more so, it contradicts the human person’s spiritual
nature and openness to a transcendent, supra-historical destiny which can be brought
about not by human effort, but correspondence with grace (4). It also contradicts the
necessity for salvation to consist in a definitive removal of sin and the need for the
human person to overcome himself – the ‘new humanity’ can only arise as a result of
transformative, deifying grace (5). If hope is understood entirely in impersonal and
inner-historical and therefore social, historical and political terms, then the personal,
transcendent destiny of the human person is forgotten. The individual is sacrificed at
the altar of the god of history in the name of revolutionary liberation.72 Ratzinger
sees this with penetrating clarity, which perhaps explains his opposition to an
68
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impersonally-cast and socially-inflected hope, such as is present in Marxism
generally, but also in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez (1).

2.2.4

The Personalist Nature of Hope

For Pieper and Ratzinger, hope is only intelligible if spoken of in personalist terms
and if its object transcends death, that is, is supra-historical. A personalist conception
of hope links Pieper and Ratzinger to the ‘I-Thou’ personalism of Buber, providing
sharp contrast to a Metzian-inspired political theology, which deliberately distanced
itself from an existentialist, personalist theology. Although personalism and
existentialism need to be differentiated and understood as multifaceted, and Pieper
and Ratzinger by no means accept existentialism in toto, their conceptions of hope
and history nevertheless are grounded in the view that the human person possesses a
need for existential fulfilment, a fulfilment that extends beyond time and history. 73
Hope is characteristically personal. Ratzinger suggests that “by its very essence hope
refers to the person” and that its object is a personal need. 74 Pieper argues that it is
only an “individual … particular person” that has the capacity to hope. 75 He also
observes that hope aims at “true fulfilment”.76 An orientation to ‘true fulfilment’
must be understood in personal terms: it is unintelligible to hope for the fulfilment of
others if it does not include my own fulfilment. Thus, characteristic of hope is not
simply that “[i]t will turn out well for mankind” but, more so, that “[i]t will turn out
well for us, for me myself”.77 Hope begins in the human person’s own desire for
fulfilment and is unintelligible if the promised object does not affect that individual
personally. It involves concern for the personal fulfilment of others but not at the
73
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expense of one’s own fulfilment, so that, for example, a human person cannot sin for
the sake of someone else’s salvation.78 Romanus Cessario notes thus that Pieper’s
conception of hope is cast according to “the language of personal fulfilment”.79
Indeed, “[h]ope, like love, is one of the very simple, primordial dispositions of the
living person”.80 Hope is necessarily personal.

As personal, hope relates to the desire of the heart for God. Pieper and Ratzinger
share a theological anthropology, which understands this desire of the heart as
ultimately the desire for God. Cessario quotes Pieper’s claim that hope involves the
human person reaching out, “‘with restless heart,’ with confidence and patient
expectation toward…the arduous ‘not yet’ of fulfilment”.81 Reference to the ‘restless
heart’ invokes the Augustinian motif central to the Christian tradition regarding the
restlessness of the human heart, a restlessness that derives from its orientation, and
need, to rest in God.82 Hope is based on a desire for existential fulfilment, which is
necessarily personal.
Personally-cast hope in Pieper and Ratzinger does not equate to individualism.83
Unlike Metz, where hope seems to begin in hoping for others’ success in becoming
‘subjects before God’ and only then does it become hope for the person (1.2.4), hope
in Pieper and Ratzinger’s understanding begins in the person and then extends to
others. The successful outcome for others is relevant to oneself because he is
personally affected by their success as a relational being. Contrary to the
conclusion’s dismissal of personalism, Ratzinger considers the human person to be
essentially relational (see 4). Hope is not for Pieper and Ratzinger simply about
whether ‘I, myself’ will enjoy the beatific vision without regard to whether anybody
else will. For Ratzinger, such would not be beatitude; beatitude is essentially
78

C.f. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 26, 4 where Thomas argues, prima facie
surprisingly, that the human person should have greater charity towards himself than his neighbour
(trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, Indiana: Christian Classics, 1948).).
79
Romanus Cessario OP, The Virtues, Or the Examined Life (London and New York: Continuum,
2002), 34.
80
Cessario, The Virtues, 34 quoting Pieper, Hope, 27: see Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 100 (emphasis
added).
81
Cessario, The Virtues, 34 quoting Pieper, Hope, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D. (San
Francisco, 1986), 27: see Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 100.
82
St Augustine, Confessions, I, 1, (trans. RS Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961)).
83
Benedict, Spe Salvi, nn 13-15. C.f. Joseph Ratzinger “Foreword” in Henri de Lubac, Catholicism:
Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans. Lancelot C Sheppard and Sr Elizabeth Englund, OCD
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 11-12.

151

corporate. As noted above, Pieper considers hope to be salvation for ‘us/for me’.
Hope is for ‘us’ but, as personal, begins in the ‘I’.

When hope is understood in personalist terms, inner-historical hope is shown to be
inadequate. Impersonal hope in the bettering of society or the eventual advent of
inner-worldly, eschatological utopia is relativised. Ratzinger says that “a hope that
does not concern me personally is not a real hope”. 84 Hope for “anyone else
anywhere else”, that is, someone else not especially connected to the person
geographically, by friendship or the bonds of charity, is not really hope.85 As Pieper
observes, even if a person might speculate as to the technical and other possibilities
that might arise in the future – for example, longer life expectancy or those arising
from “electronic information technology” (!) – these have no strict relevance to the
speculating person.86 Because hope is personal, it becomes unintelligible to speak of
a ‘laboratory of hope’ whose objective is the “restoration of utopia” at some point, no
matter how distant, in the future under the guidance of a logic of history. 87 Thus,
Ratzinger observes that although it is incumbent upon the Christian to improve the
world, a “better world” in the future “cannot be the proper and sufficient content of
our hope”.88 Hope, instead, concerns the person, which necessarily precludes a
perfected history he will not enjoy.

2.2.5

The Imperative for Hope to Transcend Death and the Historical

An important element of a personally-conceived hope is that it addresses death.
Pieper argues that a significant problem with progressive expectations regarding the
future is that they fail to account for the issue of death, rarely discussing its reality.
His pungent criticism of Blochian schemes of hope is contained in the simple but
84

Benedict, Spe Salvi, n30.
Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 32. C.f. the debate of the mid-twentieth century between CP Snow and FR
Leavis upon the publication of the former’s The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, published
in 1959 and republished in 2013 by Martino Fine Books, Eastford, CT. Roger Kimball discusses
Leavis’s critique of Snow’s emphasis on “social hope” over-against the “individual condition”: Leavis
asked, “What is the ‘social condition’ that has nothing to do with the ‘individual condition’?” Roger
Kimball,
“‘The
Two
Cultures’
today,”
New
Criterion
(February
1994):
https://www.newcriterion.com/issues/1994/2/aoethe-two-culturesa-today, last accessed 25 March
2019.
86
Pieper, Hope and History, 87.
87
Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 32.
88
Benedict, Spe Salvi, n30.
85

152

telling rhetorical question, which asks how some future historical state can be the
object of the hope of a person who will not see its realisation, because he will likely
be dead. In short, the hoping person will not live to see the dawning of the “golden
age”.89 For Pieper such a fact contradicts the nature of hope itself. According to his
conception of hope, a person who hopes “anticipates some real thing”. 90 Such a
person hopes for the personal possession of something substantial that is understood
as good.91 Hope in some impersonal future historical state is therefore rendered
meaningless in the face of the fact of death because it can contain no personal
possession of the good. The good must be capable of being possessed beyond death.
Ratzinger adds theological depth to Pieper’s observations by exploring how Marxistinspired liberation theologies are deficient with respect to the question of death.
Their inner-worldly conception of the achievement of justice and freedom contains
an inadequate treatment of the desire for these goods. Ratzinger observes that a
conception of justice and freedom, which fails to account for the reality of death, will
remain insufficient. Those who have already died will be “cheated” if justice will
only be wrought at some point in the far-off, inner-historical future.92 In other words,
desire for these goods is unintelligible if it does not answer the problem of death. Nor
is it helpful to argue that these people may have contributed to the achievement of
such future liberation, if they themselves do not enjoy it. Such people have not in fact
entered into the state of justice, because they have died not experiencing this state. A
greater injustice will in fact follow, because justice will forever remain beyond the
reach of those who have died, if justice is conceived solely in inner-historical terms.

As a result, liberation can only be true liberation and hope genuine, if they transcend
the boundary of death. As Ratzinger argues, “[w]ithout the solution of the question of
death, everything else becomes unreal and contradictory.”93 He notes that even
Marxist thinker Adorno recognised the inadequacy of an inner-historical conception
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of justice and the need for past injustices to be overcome.94 The internal
contradictions of Adorno’s position, however, become apparent. Adorno held that,
although there needs to be some sort of resurrection of the dead for past injustice to
be overcome, such a notion of “the resurrection of the flesh, [is] something that it is
totally foreign to idealism and the realm of the Absolute Spirit”.95 Contained in the
Hegelian-Marxist notion of hope for the realisation of justice is an inconsistency,
which fails to answer the question of a hope that transcends death.

Recognising the inadequacy of a purely inner-historical conception of hope, the
question becomes one regarding which vision of hope adequately ensures justice is
given to the dead, and is therefore more compelling. On the one hand, there is the
Hegelian-Marxist vision of dialectical historical development that helps inspires
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez’s conception of hope. Even if the theology of
hope and political and liberation theologies frame their reflections under the aspect
of eschatology, it remains unclear how hope that emphasises political, social and
historical development adequately transcends an immanent, inner-historical
framework. The alternative to a Hegelian-Marxist vision of hope is, on the other
hand, that prosecuted by Pieper and Ratzinger, which sees hope firmly under the
aspect of eternity (see further below), including the prospect that there will be a
judgement at the end of time, which restores justice.96

The question of hope inevitably involves the question of death and what lies
‘beyond’ it, which contrasts with an inner-worldly future-oriented hope. Pieper notes
Bloch’s Marx-inspired polemic against an opiate “consolation in the hereafter”,
which it is said perpetuated historical injustice and palliated the oppressed into
searching for riches in heaven at the expense of striving for justice on earth.97
Although recognising the possibility of religion being used to numb the masses,
Pieper insists that it nevertheless remains imperative to consider the ‘hereafter’,
especially in relation to the nature of hope. For Pieper, the term “hereafter” should
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not be considered a noun, but rather as an adverb in relation to time and place. The
‘hereafter’ is thus to be considered, not as a “region” or “landscape” capable of
description, but as simply that which is beyond death: “What is meant is the other
side of death, and nothing else”.98 For Pieper, this is a personal and deeply relevant
question for each individual because it “concerns the concrete future that awaits us
all”.99 Self-evidently, the ‘concrete future’ for each individual involves the question
of what happens after death (see 2.3.4).
The question of what happens in the “hereafter” drives the question of the object of
hope. An individual who hopes wants a “realist-oriented understanding” of what
awaits him at death, not some “abstract speculation and fantasy” regarding the
future.100 Pieper points out that hope must have a legitimate basis in order to be
something more than wish-fulfilment. In reality, Pieper argues, abstract “‘thisworldly’ and purely intra-historical expectations about the future”, which sideline the
question of death, are the real deceptions because they do not concern the “concrete
existences” of individuals and are thus truly ‘beyond’ the hope of these people.101
Related is Ratzinger’s comment that inner-worldly versions of hope offer a
‘deceptive surrogate’ (2.2.2). Hope in the improvement of society, Pieper says, is “no
hope at all”.102 In contrast, true fulfilment can only occur, if at all, “‘beyond’ our
corporeal and historical existence” (a possibility that can only be known through
faith).103 As a corollary, an object of hope is only real when it is realisable beyond
death.

Instead of offering hope, by answering the question of death, immanent philosophies
of history mask an underlying despair. The “forced optimism” (Pieper) of the general
contemporary bourgeois culture connects to the “ideological optimism” (Ratzinger)
of the philosophy of history, which underpins secularised Christian hope.104
Ratzinger argues that “ideological optimism” of progressive liberalism and Marxism,
despite the recognition of its importance by some Marxist thinkers, seeks to elide the
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issue of death. Focus on the supposedly progressive movement of history towards its
culmination in the “perfect society” overlooks death.105 The philosophy of history
characteristic of this ‘ideological optimism’ amounts to “a lie” seeking to cover an
underlying despair in the face of death.106 For this reason, Ratzinger observes, there
is great anxiety and fear that arise when ‘ideological optimism’ is confronted with
accidents such as Chernobyl, which give lie to the progressivism inherent in these
philosophies. Such accidents also confront people with the reality of death and the
questions it generates, that is, “what is really important”.107 ‘Ideological optimism’
cannot, however, offer any hope for a future realisable beyond death because it rests
on nothing more than we can produce.108 By definition, this cannot extend beyond
death.

The contrast between a Christian vision of hope and an inner-historical conception of
hope, in its failure to account adequately for hope as extending beyond death, is
thrown into relief in the case of martyrdom. For Pieper and Ratzinger, hope is
unintelligible if cannot account for those willing to die as martyrs (or to endure
worldly failure). A conception of hope must render explicable the hope of those
whose earthly prospects, including even in the search for truth and justice, have
vanished. It must explain the possibility of hope in those in “absolutely despairing
situations”, including those who await execution.109 Indeed, genuine hope remains
unperturbed by the threat of this “catastrophic end” whether manifested in death, the
reign of evil or martyrdom.110 Contrary to versions of hope, in which hope’s object is
placed in earthly success, genuine hope persists in the face of the destruction of all
earthly prospects. Martyrs can only have hope to the extent that it is hope for a suprahistorical object, the promise of which affects them personally. Aligned to a view of
hope as supra historical is the view that genuine hope exists outside the framework of
historical success.
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2.2.6

Conclusion

Pieper and Ratzinger argue that history cannot know its own fulfilment. This section
has explored the argument of Pieper and Ratzinger that history is not immanently
perfectible and that hope cannot be placed in a ‘laboratory’. Hope’s object is not
controllable. To secularise Christian hope and subject it to human manipulation is
thus to misapprehend its nature. Hope, instead, must transcend the historical and
intra-mundane, including the spectre of death. Pieper lays the philosophical
foundations for treatment of the theocentric nature of hope in arguing, convincingly,
that hope must be concerned with what happens after death, as flowing from the
personal nature of hope itself. Both Pieper and Ratzinger show the shortcomings of
expecting inner-historical fulfilment. To the content and shape of fundamental hope,
left open by a philosophical and theological critique of inner-historical conceptions
of hope, we will now turn.

2.3

The Theocentric Content of Fundamental Hope

To answer to the question of what happens in the ‘hereafter’ beyond death is to give
specific content to the vision of hope in Pieper and Ratzinger. This section explores
how Pieper and Ratzinger provide theocentric and Christian content to what they
describe as ‘fundamental hope’, which is oriented to eternal life beyond death. First,
it will explore the distinction in Pieper, which Ratzinger adopts, between everyday
hopes and a singular, fundamental hope. Separate from the realm of the everyday and
intra-mundane, fundamental hope’s object is unspecifiable, beyond human
knowledge and a transcendent reality. Related to hope’s transcendent and nonspecifiable character is its ‘not yet’ character. The human person is in the status
viatoris, the state of ‘being on the way’, which precludes any possibility of the
earthly fulfilment of hope. Hope, rather, is connected to the human person’s desire
for a transcendent fulfilment beyond death, which relates to the transcendent nature
of the human person.

For Pieper and Ratzinger, hope has a theocentric content. Eternal life in God fulfils
the person’s longing and therefore hope for existential fulfilment. Pieper and
Ratzinger’s similar descriptions of eternal life as participation in God’s eternity will
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thus be explored. As oriented to eternal life, hope reaches its summit as a theological
virtue, which gives the believer a foretaste of the eternal life it anticipates. As a
theological virtue, hope is given by God to direct the human person back to him. God
is thus the ultimate object of human hope. As oriented to the gift of eternal life in
God, hope is directed to a possession that cannot be obtained by human efforts.
Consequently, hope is connected to prayer. Moreover, only as prayerful can hope
impact upon current history. Hope is ‘performative’ to the extent that, with faith and
charity, it seeks to make present God on earth. Thus, hope is not activist and
impatient, but patient and receptive, awaiting God’s action to fulfil human hope.
2.3.1

The Distinction between Everyday Hopes and Fundamental Hope

‘Fundamental hope’, according to Pieper and Ratzinger, is characteristically oriented
to what transcends history and everyday reality. Pieper and Ratzinger each draw a
distinction between everyday, temporal hopes and a single, fundamental hope.111 The
singularity and authenticity of fundamental hope distinguishes it from the realm of
everyday hopes and point to infinity beyond death and the transcendence of
temporality. The reality of fundamental hope is the basis of their claim that hope is
essentially oriented to a supernatural and extra-historical object.

To examine the distinction between everyday hopes and fundamental hopes, Pieper
analyses the difference drawn in language between ‘hopes’ and ‘hope’. 112 He focuses
attention on the relative lack of subtlety in the English and German languages, as
compared to the French, in denoting the phenomenon of the distinction between
lesser hopes and fundamental hope. Perceptively pointing to the difference between
the French espoir and espérance, he notes that the former tends to be used in the
plural – the “thousands of things” for which people hope in their everyday lives. The
latter in contrast, appears to exclude such plurality.113
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In addition to examining everyday language, Pieper refers also to the clinician
Herbert Plügge’s phenomenological analysis of people who had attempted suicide or
had an incurable illness. Plügge observed that the experience of hope in those people
was two-tiered. Along with common hopes, also present was a qualitatively different
hope. Plügge described this hope as “fundamental” or “authentic” and contrasted it
with the plurality of “ordinary” or “everyday” hopes.114 Based on Plügge’s analysis
Pieper implies two classes of hope. First, the myriad, every day aspirations and
motivations of human beings as they live their daily lives and, secondly, a more
fundamental, overall hope.
Ratzinger adopts Pieper’s two-tiered approach to the phenomenon of hope. He
suggests Pieper “explained in striking fashion” in his Hoffnung und Geschichte
(Hope and History), the nature of hope.115 He observes that “[d]ay by day, man
experiences many greater or lesser hopes, different in kind according to the different
periods of his life”, but that there is also a “genuine hope” distinct from these.116 Like
Pieper, Ratzinger acknowledges the presence of everyday hopes and does not seek to
deny their legitimacy, but distinguishes them from a singular, ‘non-everyday’
hope.117

Underlying the distinction in Pieper and Ratzinger between hopes and a singular
hope is recognition of the unique nature of the object of fundamental hope. The
object of fundamental hope differs in kind from the objects of everyday hopes.
Pieper argues that hope can be understood in terms similar to the way that Plato
argues that love and ‘making’ should be understood. While there are different objects
of love (parents, country, and friends), the term ‘lover’ in Plato signifies simply
erotic lovers (not parents and so on). Likewise, many people make things but only
the poet is, according to Plato, a ‘maker’. Similarly, although there is a multitude of
genuine “objects of human hope”, such as good weather or world peace, “there
appears to be only one single object that, by being hoped for, renders a person simply
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‘one who hopes’”.118 The one who hopes does not hope for everyday objects but is
one who possesses the singular hope.

To establish his claim, Pieper approaches the distinction negatively. Only the person
who loses the fundamental hope can be described as “without hope”. 119 Someone can
be described, thus, as one who hopes even if his daily objects of hope are
disappointed, so long as the underlying hope remains present. An underlying hope is
genuine hope, which explains the possibility of the hope of martyrs. Analogously,
Ratzinger approaches the distinction by discussing hope’s antonym: fear. Each
person has daily fears to confront – Ratzinger gives the examples of a “vicious dog”
and “daily annoyances” – which contrast, however, with an ultimate fear that one’s
life may become ruined or unbearable, ultimately by descending into loneliness.120
The latter fear belongs to a different class of fear than the everyday fears that we
confront. Similarly, hope has two different classes of object, the disappointment of
only one of which constitutes genuine hopelessness. Hope, in its most fundamental
or authentic sense, refers to an underlying singular object, the prospect of which
ensures the existence of hope.

Pieper takes his analysis a step further and argues that the falling away or
disappointment of daily or everyday hopes is the necessary precondition for the
realisation of the ‘fundamental hope’. This, he says, is what is “really worth thinking
about” concerning Plügge’s results.121 Plügge found that “true hope” comes into light
when the objects of everyday hopes are lost through a process of disillusionment
(Enttäuschaung). When one realises that earthly goods such as bodily health are not
necessary for “real well-being”, genuine hope for the “other” hope emerges.122 The
disappointment of the daily or everyday hopes serves not merely the correction of a
false belief but an existential liberation that overcomes the fact of the terminal illness
in those Plügge studied.
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Pieper extends Plügge’s conclusions and applies them universally. All of us face the
prospect of death and will be eventually confronted with the disappointment of our
daily hopes. The disillusionment offered by the prospect of death provides, however,
an opportunity for hope to be directed to its proper object. It can liberate the person
by expanding his existential horizons beyond the intra-mundane. The disappointment
of natural hopes allows the person to realise that only “one’s orientation to being”
remains.123 Pieper even suggests that the process of disillusionment that is necessary
for one to experience genuine hope.124 In any event, in Pieper’s understanding, it is in
light of the failure of the everyday hopes that fundamental hope emerges, which is
suggestively connected to an orientation to the possession of being (see further 4).

In a theological context, Ratzinger makes similar claims regarding the abiding
presence of an underlying hope in the face of the loss of the objects of everyday
hope, which reveals the true tenor of hope as directed to the object of faith. He refers
to the Letter to the Hebrews (10:34) and the author’s statement to persecuted
Christians that, even though they have lost their ta hyparchonta, that is, their
property on which they depend to live, they have a “better possession”
(hyparxin/hyparxis) (namely, faith), which endures despite the loss of the daily
possessions.125 Faith can endure even in the face of dispossession and, at the
extreme, martyrdom.

Although Ratzinger writes about the definition of faith, his argument is relevant to a
discussion of the two-tiered nature hope and reveals fundamental hope’s object to be
the object of faith. He considers faith and hope to be closely connected.
Consequently, if faith endures, so then does hope, even if the possessions in which
one formerly placed faith and hope for a secure life are taken away. Ratzinger argues
“that it is precisely through the loss” of these things that Christians recognise the
“better possession” they have gained through faith, and the hope that corresponds to
that faith.126 In a theological context, which parallels Pieper’s philosophical
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discussion, Ratzinger considers that it is through the falling away of those things in
which we place hope for a secure life, that the underlying hope corresponding to faith
remains.127 Moreover, in another analogue to Pieper, Ratzinger argues that this
dispossession is liberating. A “freedom” is gained relative to everyday property,
exhibited for example in martyrdom or the vow of poverty of religious. 128 Similarly,
Ratzinger argues that “the great hope” cannot be extinguished even in the face of
smaller or larger historical failures.129 The hope that faith promises is, on this
account, the fundamental hope, which endures the exigencies of temporal, historical
existence.

An important corollary to the idea that an underlying authentic hope can perdure
when temporal (and therefore historical) objects of hope are lost, is the notion that
these temporal goods will not ultimately satisfy a person’s hope. For Ratzinger, faith
“relativizes the habitual foundation, the reliability of material income”. 130 Ratzinger,
referring to the existential lack that drives the phenomenon of human hoping,
observes that no moment in life will fulfil expectation: more always will be
expected.131 With the human person’s supernatural end in mind, he argues that “[w]e
cannot stop reaching out for [true life], and yet we know that all we can experience
or accomplish is not what we yearn for”.132 Daily hopes that drive human activity,
especially the hopes Ratzinger describes as pertaining to youth (such as meeting the
‘right person’, career or other success), give way to the realisation that satisfaction of
such hopes is insufficient for fulfilment. Attainment of the daily objects of hope may
give the appearance of being totally satisfying. In their fulfilment the person realises
however that these objects did not constitute “the whole [of that for which there is
127
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hope]”.133 What will satisfy is, rather, the object of the true hope. Impliedly, as will
be filled out below, hope’s object is infinite. It transcends temporal or historical
objects of hope, which cannot satisfy the human person’s longing.134 Only eternity
will satisfy infinite human longing. The hope underlying the human experience is
thus distinct from everyday hopes and points to a transcendent fulfilment.

2.3.2

The Transcendent Nature of Fundamental Hope

Two elements of Pieper and Ratzinger’s description regarding ‘fundamental’ hope,
which they contrast with everyday hopes, make the transcendent nature of hope
apparent. First is the singularity of the fundamental hope. Second is the description
of fundamental hope as authentic.

As is implicit in the preceding discussion, for Pieper and Ratzinger, real or genuine
hope is a single hope.135 Such is clear in their language regarding this hope. In
Pieper’s elaboration of Plügge’s conclusions regarding the loss of everyday hopes
and the emergence of fundamental hope, he uses the phrases “true hope”, “hope per
se” and “existential hope”.136 Pieper quotes Plügge’s findings concerning
“fundamental hope” and the “authentic hope” that arises when “ordinary, everyday
hope” is lost.137 Pieper’s language classes fundamental hope as singular.
133
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Ratzinger’s description of hope likewise emphasises the singularity of fundamental
hope and its connection to Christian faith. He refers to the “genuine hope” studied by
Plügge and likewise quotes his use of the phrase “fundamental hope”. 138 Throughout
his encyclical Spe Salvi, Ratzinger uses the expression, “the [or ‘this’ or ‘that’] great
hope”.139 He also adds the adjective “true” to the phrase: “that true, great hope”.140
Perhaps most significantly, in his Eschatology, Ratzinger utilises the phrase, “the
Christian hope” to describe what he considers to be genuine, Christian hope.141
“Christian hope” is also used throughout Spe Salvi. Although used without the
article, hope is understood in the singular. The adjective ‘Christian’ indicates
moreover that he considers this to be what authentically Christian hope is.142 Hope
refers to a singular, authentic reality, which is specifically the object of Christian
hope.

The adjectives that Pieper and Ratzinger use to describe hope thus indicate the
transcendent nature of fundamental hope and that it has a particular object, which
alone can answer hope. Ratzinger argues that, “the great hope…must surpass
everything else”, including the “greater or lesser hopes that keep us going day by
day”.143 Implied, moreover, is that there is only one particular object that corresponds
to the ‘fundamental’ or ‘authentic’ hope. Pieper suggests that, in the dis-illusionment
of everyday hopes, hope turns “toward its true object”.144 Genuine hope has only one
object, which will satisfy hope’s longing.
An important characteristic of the object of ‘true hope’, which reveals its
transcendent character, is that philosophically speaking it cannot be known in itself.
This marks out Pieper and Ratzinger’s conceptions of hope from a Blochian-inspired
idea of hope, which as noted sees hope as belonging to what can be known and
manipulated in a ‘laboratory’. If hope concerns what is beyond our powers to bring
about, it is also relates to an object that cannot be completely understood by human
138
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reasoning. Particular to the Christian understanding of hope is “the non-specifiability
of the object of hope”.145 The person who genuinely hopes knows not the time of its
fulfilment, its form or scope, and in fact concedes the potential for hope to be
fulfilled in a manner that transcends any human conception of this fulfilment.146
Human rationality cannot grasp the object of fundamental hope. It could be said that
its contents can only be known negatively: we know that ultimate hope cannot be
satisfied intra-mundanely and that therefore it is transcendent of history. We know
what is hope’s object is not, but its positive description needs revelation.

As unspecifiable, the object of fundamental hope is almost entirely distinct from the
realm of everyday objects of hope, which can be classified according to human
knowledge. These latter objects, in Pieper’s summary of Plügge’s observations,
pertain to the “worldly future” or objects to be found within the world.147
‘Fundamental’ hope, however, is not oriented to any worldly thing that can be
specified in an “‘objectlike’ way”.148 The object of fundamental hope, in contrast to
something that can be so named and conceptualised, is “‘indefinite’, ‘nebulous’,
‘formless, ‘unnameable’”.149 According to Gabriel Marcel, “‘absolute’ hope”
transcends “‘particular objects’”, cannot be conceptually grasped and perhaps can be
said not to have an object at all.150 Hope in other words is not directed to a
scientifically knowable or classifiable object that is intra-mundane.

The object of fundamental hope thus cannot be possessed in the manner of an object.
It is not confined, à la Bloch, to the worldly and historical, something that can be
manipulated like an object. Rather, “[t]rue hope” transcends the everyday objects
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from which the experience of hope initially springs.151 Importantly, for Pieper, the
person who possesses genuine hope does not engage in projects directed “to militant
implementation of predefined plans and goals or eschatological images of order”,
which often end up destroying human solidarity (see 2.2.3).152 Once someone tries to
control the object of hope or even imagine it concretely, hope loses something of its
nature.153 We can complement thus the conclusion that hope is not controllable with
the claim that fundamental hope is not manipulable because it pertains to an object
beyond human ken. In fact, as Ratzinger observed above, it is dangerous to do
because it tries to coerce into human categories a reality beyond them.

Pieper and Ratzinger argue, however, that the unspecifiability of hope does not mean
that the object of hope is nothing. Hope is oriented to a reality, even as that reality
extends beyond everyday experience. For Pieper, in language redolent of an
analogical metaphysics (4), the genuine object of hope belongs to a “mode of being
quite different from that of all objective goods and all conceivable changes in the
external world”.154 Hope in its most authentic sense refers to an object beyond
human knowledge, even if it can be known that there is an object of hope.
Fundamental hope, in a sense, refers to an object of greater dissimilarity than
similarity to the objects of everyday hope, which must therefore be sought beyond
the historical.

Ratzinger, likewise refers to the non-specifiability of hope and, in connecting it to
human desire, argues that it is oriented to a real object. In Spe Salvi, he refers to St
Augustine’s description of docta ignorantia. This “learned ignorance” is the
knowledge that one does not know the essence of what is ultimately desired.155
Nevertheless, the human person is certain a reality exists that will in fact satisfy the
urge for happiness.156 The very fact of the desire suggests the possibility, and
grounds an expectation, of its fulfilment.
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Elsewhere, Ratzinger suggests that the experience of human limitation (“despair over
self and over the rationality of being”), coupled with the never-satiated desire of
human longing, transforms hope paradoxically into a “secret joy”. 157 In realising the
paucity of earthly experience, the human person’s imperative for happiness causes
him to perceive the possibility of possessing a hitherto unthought-of happiness. Such
happiness will transcend any experience of earthly happiness. In conceiving its
possibility, moreover, the human person comes to a kind of certitude regarding its
attainment. Hope goes “beyond all human accomplishment” but can be presently
possessed in the knowledge of the potential happiness that lies beyond earthly life.158
Fundamental hope’s object is dissimilar to anything that can be known on earth, but
is grounded in a present desire for and taste of transcendent fulfilment.

2.3.3

Hope is Oriented to what is ‘Not Yet’

Complementing the notion that fundamental hope is transcendent is the idea that
hope is oriented to what is ‘not yet’. Both Pieper and Ratzinger consider hope to
possess in its basic structure a ‘not yet’ character. Ratzinger argues that hope selfevidently concerns the future and the human person’s expectation of the possession
of a future happiness and joy, which he does not currently possess.159 Even if, for
Ratzinger, it is possible for hope to anticipate the future happiness to come, it
remains “not yet” while the human person remains in a temporal state. 160 Ratzinger’s
language of ‘not yet’ relates him to Pieper’s conception of hope. Pieper’s philosophy
of hope is undergirded by the concept of status viatoris, in which the human person
is understood as “being on the way” to an existential fulfilment ‘not yet’
possessed.161 For Pieper, hope is the “[preeminent] …virtue of the status viatoris”
and thereby “the proper virtue of the ‘not yet’” because it orients the human person
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to the comprehensive fulfilment of what is ‘not yet’ in the temporal sphere.162 Both
Pieper and Ratzinger consider that the reality of the human person’s temporality
grounds the ‘not yet’ character of hope. While bounded by history, hope’s object will
always ‘not yet’ be possessed.163
Consideration of the ‘not yet’ character of hope reveals it to possess a dynamic,
forward-looking character related to the human desire for fulfilment. For Ratzinger,
hope belongs to the “dynamism of the provisional”, transcending “human
accomplishment”.164 Hope is connected to the dynamism of human desire which
drives the hoping person beyond himself to obtain what is not yet possessed (c.f. 4).
In relation to St Augustine’s linking of prayer, desire and hope, Ratzinger comments
on his reference to St Paul’s description “of himself as straining forward to the things
that are to come” (Phil 3:13).165 The use of this phrase evokes the ‘not yet’-oriented
character of hope and the human person’s striving to possess the object of hope, not
yet obtained. While the ‘not yet’ of hope subsists, the hoping person cannot remain
satisfied. Ratzinger quotes Goethe’s Faust, “Linger a while: you are so beautiful”
and argues that the dynamism of hope stops this diabolic attitude. 166 An attitude
preventing rest in the temporal relativises any everyday hope or good as being
ultimately unsatisfying. Hope drives the human person forward to what is beyond
history.
The dynamic ‘not yet’ of hope, which motivates the person to desire more, to strain
forward, is opposed to worldly satisfaction and reaches out to eternal life. Pieper
quotes the Vulgate of the first half of the same verse of St Paul referred to by
Augustine (Phil 3:13): “Brethren, I do not consider that I have laid hold
[comprehendisse] of the [the goal] already”.167 He links the ‘not yet’ character of the
human person as viator (that is, a wayfarer or pilgrim) with the possession of the
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goal of that striving, “to be a comprehensor, [which] means to possess beatitude”.168
Scott Hahn and Curtis Mitch note that the “prize of salvation has yet to be won since
the competition is still in progress”.169 St Paul, as the archetype of Christian living, is
a wayfarer ‘not yet’ in possession of eternal life, and the salvation that is the
“resurrection from the dead” (Phil 3:11). He does not yet grasp or comprehend what
he is working towards, eternal life. The appropriate response to this state of affairs is,
moreover, not despair but hope in eventual fulfilment.170 Intrinsic to hope, then, is a
dynamic orientation outside of oneself and the possession of earthly goods towards
the ownership of beatitude and salvation. Hope keeps us driving forward for a better,
eternal life that cannot be found on earth.

2.3.4

Hope Relates to Personal Fulfilment outside Time and History

The object of fundamental hope touches on the being of the human person, who is
directed to extra-historical fulfilment. It therefore concerns existential fulfilment.
Pieper argues that hope pertains to something transcendent of the realm of objects,
that is, one’s being and “what one ‘is’”.171 Hope tends thus to personal, existential
fulfilment and is, in the words of Plügge’s provisional conclusions, oriented to “selfrealization in the future” and the “well-being of the person”.172 As a result, Pieper
connects fundamental hope to the “rightness” of the person’s life because it is
oriented towards “true fulfilment”, a fulfilment that can only be realised beyond
history and death.173 “Christian hope” is not resignation that nothing but supernatural
hope can provide happiness but:
…is first and foremost an existential orientation of man to his fulfilment in being, to
the fulfilment of his essence, to his ultimate fulfillment, to the fullness of existence (to
which, of course, the fullness of happiness – or rather, bliss – corresponds).174
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Thus, hope orients the person to the (only) reality that will fulfil him. Virtue, of
which a certain type of hope is a kind, ensures that the “person is right”.175 Hope, on
this transcendent, authentic level, helps the person live the right way, according to
reality.176 The reality Pieper refers to is God as the ground of all being and the suprahistorical destiny of the human person, as oriented to participation in God’s being.
Hope orients the person to that participation.

The claim that hope belongs not to the realm of the intra-mundane, but to personal
fulfilment rests on the creaturely metaphysics of Pieper and Ratzinger and the human
person’s desire for the supernatural good (4). Hope is tied into a theological
anthropology of transcendent desire, which sees the human person as having a
supernatural destiny. Cessario, having utilised Pieper to introduce a discussion of the
“anthropological presuppositions that undergird the classical treatment of the
theological virtue of hope,” explains that the passion of hope belongs to the context
of “the general dynamics of human longing”.177 The anthropological presupposition
for understanding hope is the human person’s desire for God as the ultimate Good.
For Pieper, contained in the concept of hope is “[l]onging, yearning, desiring,
wishing, hungering and thirsting” for the “good”, understood in the Aristotelian and
Thomistic sense of “all that one longs for”.178 Pieper argues that personal “wellbeing” involves the fundamental hope springing “from the very depths of our soul,
with a much more vital, a truly unconquerable, intensity” than possession of a
particular thing.179 Hope thus “presumes the existence of desire” to which it is
oriented, a desire that is connected to the human person’s “self-realization”.180
Ultimately, hope directs the person to the possession of the Good that is God.

For Pieper and Ratzinger, hope relates to a personal desire for fulfilment outside of
space and time. For Pieper, genuine or authentic hope must consist of a hope in
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salvation “whose ground is not intra-mundane”.181 Hope concerns a desire for love.
Tied into the transcendent nature of the object of hope is the human desire for a gift
of love, which overcomes death. Ratzinger argues that the greatest fear of the human
person is the fear of irrevocably “losing love”.182 Conversely, hope is only possible
when love is present. Further, the fundamental hope that surpasses everyday hopes is
the certainty of receiving “the gift of a great love”. 183 As suggested in 2.2.1, hope
orients the human person to an object that cannot be controlled and as such, can only
be received in the manner of a gift. That gift is the receipt of a love, which surpasses
the limitations of death and creaturely finitude.

The kind of love, therefore, toward which genuine hope is oriented, is not simply
human love, essential as that is. It consists of a desire that reaches “toward the
infinite” and “toward a world redeemed”.184 According to Ratzinger’s anthropology,
every human person cannot but desire a “true life” that death does not touch, even if
we cannot conceptualise of what this life consists.185 In Pieper’s words, Christian
hope has as its object “the abundant reality of life”.186 Significantly, while
“unknown”, this life consists of the “true ‘hope’” that motivates human activity.187
Genuine hope seeks the possession of an eternal life, which conquers finitude.
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2.3.5

Eternal Life as the Object of Hope

The issue of hope as directed beyond history and the worldly to an infinite love and
existential fulfilment inevitably raises the issue of eternal life. Eternal life exists in
the ‘beyond’ or ‘hereafter’, which is minimised in significance in the schemes of
Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez (c.f. 2.2.4). Pieper and Ratzinger both argue that
the object of authentic or fundamental hope is ultimately eternal life and salvation.
For Pieper, the ‘abundant reality of life’ (2.3.4), that is the object of hope is
salvation. Supernatural hope assures the person in grace that his life will end in
“eternal life”.188 Relying on the “classical theology” of Aquinas, Pieper argues that
one of the defining characteristics of a Christian is that he “looks forward – in hope –
to the ultimate fulfilment of his being in eternal life”.189 Such a fulfilment consists of
“ultimate ‘success’ in life”, what the tradition terms “‘salvation’ (Heil)”. 190 Pieper
groups the possession of eternal life together with a cluster of ideas denoting
personal (and communal) fulfilment: “the perfection of man”, “bliss”, “salvation”, “a
New Heaven and a New Earth” and “Paradise”.191 He refers to the traditional
appellation given to this perfection of the human person’s being, viz. “the visio
beatifica, the ‘seeing that confers bliss’”.192 The beatific vision is that in which
eternal life consists, the cognitive grasp of God. Pieper, quotes St John’s Gospel to
bear this out: “Eternal life is knowing Thee”.193 For Pieper, the goal of the authentic
or fundamental hope of the human person is salvation, consisting of eternal life in
God.

Ratzinger also argues that eternal life in God is the object of fundamental human
hope. He observes that that the label ‘eternal life’ intends to signify the “true ‘hope’”
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driving the human person’s desire to possess “true life”.194 This true life is eternal
life because it is whole and incapable of being disturbed. It is life ‘to the full’.195 To
Pieper’s prima facie more traditionally Thomist understanding of eternal life as the
beatific vision, Ratzinger also adds a more explicitly voluntarist dimension. The
desire for love, which he says is a chief attribute of the fundamental hope that the
human person possesses, is linked to eternity. He argues that human love contains
“an implicit appeal to eternity”, even if such love will be insufficient for that
purpose.196 The human person hopes in a love that cannot be defeated or
extinguished by death. Hope is oriented to the possession of an eternal life of love in
God.

Pieper and Ratzinger provide strikingly similar descriptions of eternal life as the
object of hope. They acknowledge that the shape and content of eternal life as the
object of hope is “unknown” to us because necessarily transcendent of earthly
experience.197 Ratzinger argues that conceptualising eternal life involves attempting
to “imagine ourselves outside the temporality that imprisons us”. So understood,
eternal life can only be described analogically:
Eternity…is something more like the supreme moment of satisfaction, in which
totality embraces us and we embrace totality…It would be like plunging in the ocean
of infinite love, a moment in which time – the before and after – no longer
exists…such a moment is life in the full sense, a plunging ever anew into the vastness
of being, in which we are simply overwhelmed with joy.198
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For Ratzinger, true life awaits the human person beyond the horizon of temporality
and history. Eternal life will satiate the desire for existential fulfilment in the eternity
of God.

Pieper also provides a description of eternal life. He discusses the notion that
contemplation will satisfy the human thirst for happiness. Instead of conceptualising
the object of this thirst as the satisfaction of mere intellectual curiosity, he asks
rhetorically: “Would it not be more to the point to speak of love, of becoming one
with the Infinite, of drowning ourselves in an ocean of joy?”199 The “ultimate
happiness” that is the contemplation of the beatific vision relates to eternal life as the
object of human hope.200 The eternal life Pieper describes refers to a satiation of
human longing for love and joy, which will not die. The parallels between Pieper and
Ratzinger’s descriptions of the end of human hope are striking. Apparent in each
description are references to ‘ocean’, ‘love’, and ‘joy’. Comparable are the
references in each to ‘totality’ and ‘Infinite’. The similarities suggest an influence of
Pieper on Ratzinger’s conception of eternal life.

Ratzinger argues that it is under the aspect of eternal life, sought to be conceptualised
in these terms, that Christian hope and its object, and what Christian faith teaches the
Christian to expect, is to be understood.201 Christian hope is hope in the possession of
eternal life as personal ‘fulfilment of his being in eternal life’, in the words of Pieper
(quoted earlier in this sub-section). Fundamental hope is oriented to the life of love
and joy that is the divine life.

2.3.6

Hope as a Theological Virtue

Pieper and Ratzinger’s conceptions of hope as oriented to eternal life connect them to
the Church’s traditional understanding that hope is a theological virtue oriented to
the possession of eternal life. Their descriptions of eternal life as the object of hope
correspond to the Catechism’s description of Heaven. The Catechism quotes
Benedict XII’s Benedictus Deus of A.D. 1336 as describing what the souls in heaven
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possess, even before the final judgment: they “see the divine essence with an
intuitive vision”.202 Heaven is the end of and fulfils human longing, and is “supreme,
definitive happiness”.203 The Catechism links the state of heaven with the possession
of everlasting or eternal life. The theological virtue of hope, moreover, is necessarily
connected to possession of this eternal life. It is the “virtue by which we desire the
kingdom of heaven and eternal life as our own happiness … [and] it opens up [the
human heart] in expectation of eternal beatitude”.204 The theological virtue of hope
orients the human person to the possession of his fundamental hope, namely eternal
life understood as participation in God.

As a theological virtue, hope in its primary aspect has God and his eternal Being as
its object. Pieper goes so far as to quote St Ambrose’s comment that the one “who
does not hope in God” is inhuman; human hope properly has God as its object.205
Paralleling Pieper’s description of hope (2.3.4), Ratzinger argues that the theological
virtue of hope recognises that God is necessary “for the realization and fulfilment of
one’s own being”.206 Pieper argues that hope is only a virtue if it is a theological
virtue, because it orients the person to “supernatural happiness in God”. 207 Thus, “the
great hope, which must surpass everything else … can only be God” and the “great,
true hope which [endures] …can only be God”.208 God alone, the infinite, eternal
ground of all being can enable the human person to obtain the object of its desire for
infinite happpiness. He only can be the object of true hope.

All the other descriptors and elements of hope that Pieper and Ratzinger identify find
their unity in God as the proper object of human hope. For Ratzinger, hope has as its
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object “unbounded love”, which is “unbounded power”.209 As a result, “God and
hope go together”, in Ratzinger’s words, because Christian revelation teaches that
“God is love” (1 Jn 4:16).210 Ultimately, all hopes for Ratzinger point to the great
hope of possessing “the great and boundless love”, which amounts to “hope in
paradise, the kingdom of God, being God and like God, sharing his nature (2 Pet
1:4)”.211 If love is hoped for, God, as love, is that which will satisfy this desire for
love. Hope depends, in Ratzinger’s words, upon the “indestructible power of
Love”.212 Christian hope aims for a “gift of love…given us beyond all our activity”
by the only one capable of giving such gift.213 The possession of God, ultimately, is
the object of fundamental hope, because only his indestructible love, which belongs
to him by nature, will provide the love the human person hopes to receive and which
will be for him eternal life.

As a theological virtue, hope also has God as its principal subject. By this is meant
that God is the agent who brings hope’s object about. God is the final cause of hope
and that on which hope depends for its object to be obtained. Ratzinger explains how
the revelation of the name YHWH (‘I AM WHO I AM’) showed God to be
transcendent of the contingent and historical, and the source of supra-historical
hope.214 In the revelation of God’s name, “new hope” was given to the enslaved
Israelites because this name constituted “the call of hope”. 215 In this encounter,
Moses was able to see that God is “the personal Being, [who] deals with man as
man”.216 As personal, God is on the level of I-Thou and not space, and consequently
transcends the numen locale limited to particular locations. He is the “near-at-hand
God”, close to each person.217 He “who is”, is superior to all pagan deities and
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powers, which fall away.218 The powers of the world pass away and what remains is
God’s eternal being (c.f. Mt 24:35 and parallels). He transcends space, time and all
contingent powers. He deals with humanity on a personal level, which means that he
is concerned with human issues.

Personal and transcendent of space-time, God alone can offer life that overcomes the
contingency of created reality and of history. He is supra-historical and the “God of
the Promise”, who draws humanity out of cosmic recurrence and points it towards
future events, which will culminate in the goal of salvation history. 219 Thus, God is
the “God of hope in the future” and the guarantor of history’s meaning with history
having an irrevocable direction towards its “meaning and goal”. 220 As Being Itself,
God transcends all becoming. The Personal God who is the source of all being,
transcendent of history and space, can be the only genuine ground of hope. The ‘God
who is’, relativises all inner-historical claims to salvation and utopia, as well the
despotic claims of Baal and Moloch.221 History is made meaningful through the
revelation of God’s name as he who is. History becomes oriented to a telos and
escapes being confined to a recurrent circle. However, unlike inner-historical
conceptions of hope, a teleological understanding of history grounded on hope in
God’s eternity is not immanentist. God promises eternal life and the consummation
of history, because he is Eternity. He is the ground of hope, who gives history
meaning precisely by transcending it. Hope is placed in the name of the eternal Lord,
not history’s immanent perfection (c.f. Ps 33:20-22). The ‘future’ object of hope is
extra-historical.

With God as its agent and object, the theological virtue of hope transcends the
natural plane and is oriented to the gratuitous gift by God of himself. Its object,
eternal life, is “salvation that cannot be had in the natural world”.222 Hope in eternal
life is ultimately hope in possession of the supra-historical, eternal God, that is, that
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which exists beyond all human “potential and possibilities”.223 Conceiving hope as a
theological virtue thus distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger’s conception of hope from
a Blochian immanent idea of hope as belonging to the realm of what is knowable and
doable at the human level (see also 2.2.1). As indicated in 2.2.1, Ratzinger
understands hope as belonging to the realm of gratuity. As Schumacher notes, for
Pieper, that hope as a virtue can only be theological is of “capital importance” and
indicates that it is a “gratuitous gift”.224 The theological virtue gives the person “hope
of divine salvation, eternal life”, which itself is characterised by gratuity.225 Pieper
quotes Cajetan, “hope expects from God’s hand the eternal life that is God himself:
‘sperat Deum a Deo’”.226 Despite our best efforts, divinity cannot be obtained by the
power of the human person but depends solely upon the gift of the only one capable
of granting the gift, the transcendent God.

As a theological virtue, hope involves also salvific redemption at the hands of God.
As a result, it involves personal grace and sanctification. Hope conceived as a
theological virtue relates to the promise of the salvation of the human person in
eternal life with God, brought about through grace. Ratzinger argues that the
Christian is saved in hope (Rom 8:24) because Christian faith-hope offers
“trustworthy hope” oriented to the possession of eternal life. 227 Redemption is not
brought about by human action but by the love of God revealed and made efficacious
in Christ.228 Hope involves the elevation by God alone of the human person into a
supernatural, sacramental life, which exceeds his historical and natural capabilities
and the reality of sin (see further 4 and 5). Pieper comments that the “‘greatest hope’
[that is, in eternal life] can only be fulfilled through initiation into the mysteries”, an
insight sensed by Plato but which refers fully to the Christian sacraments.229
Theological virtue involves a “supernatural potentiality for being”, which “entirely
surpasses” the human person’s natural capacities and is based on “a real grace-filled
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participation in the divine nature” (citing 2 Pet 1:4).230 Theological virtue derives its
character from a “truly divine substance in man, in grace”.231 The hoping person
possesses “the grace-filled impetus of the hope of eternal life”.232 The virtue of hope
is “wholly supernatural” and is based solely upon grace. 233 Access to the divine life
in eternal life, to which hope is oriented, is opened up to the person based on the
reality of God’s gift of grace, which consists of a participation in that divine life.234

The participation in the divine life that is the end of hope is initiated through
baptism. Ratzinger argues that baptism gives the baptised ‘faith’, and through faith,
‘eternal life’; baptism gives (the beginnings of) eternal life to the baptised. Ratzinger
comments that “faith is the substance of hope”.235 Ratzinger’s argument that faith
makes substantially present in the baptised soul eternal, divine life, and therefore
hope’s object, depends upon his interpretation of Heb 11:1.236 According to
Ratzinger’s reading of this verse, faith gives the believer an objective proof of the
things for which they hope, that is, eternal life. Referring to Aquinas’s understanding
of habitus, Ratzinger argues that faith gives the believer a “stable disposition of the
spirit” such that “eternal life takes root in us and reason is led to consent to what it
does not see”.237 In giving faith to the baptised, the human person is given the object
of his fundamental hope, eternal life.

As a result, the faith given in baptism should not be understood as projecting the
object of hope entirely into the future. Faith is not simply a “not yet” but involves the
objective reality of eternal life being present within the soul of the baptised ‘already’,
even if only in embryonic form.238 The “essence” of what is hoped for, namely the
happiness of eternal life, is present in faith as a habitus in the believer’s soul.239 Hope
thus involves the presence of the divine life in the soul in the form of grace, grace
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that already gives the baptised possession of that for which he hopes and prepares
him for the definitive imparting of that gift. The theological virtue of hope is thereby
necessarily redemptive. It makes a person apt to receive the definitive gift of eternal
life beyond death, because that life is already present within him through the gift of
faith given in baptism.240 It is that life to which the virtue of hope and fundamental
hope is directed.

2.3.7

Hope as Performative

The theological virtue of hope, in making present the object of hope in the believer,
affects present history. In presenting hope as oriented to eternal life, Pieper and
Ratzinger do not depict it as jettisoning the significance of the present. Hope in the
‘hereafter’ does not ignore history. Pieper and Ratzinger’s conception of hope should
not be seen as entirely oriented to eternity or disinterested in history or the present.
Eschatological hope is not severed from concern for the present or the state of the
world (see also 3).

Because baptism makes present the eternal future that lies ahead of the human
person, the lines between future and present become blurred. The (promised) future –
eternal life – is made present in the believer’s soul, thus changing the present,
because future realities are brought into it. Likewise, present things are taken into the
things of the future. Consequently, the present is overlain with the reality and
promise of eternal life. Ratzinger comments that what is unique regarding
240
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“Christianity’s place in the world and its openness” to the future is an “interweaving
of present and future”.241 The “not yet” of eternal life “is in a certain sense already
here”.242 In this regard, Pieper argues that the Incarnation has “in a certain sense”
crossed the “boundary of death separating this world and the next”.243 Invoking
Plato, he writes that the object of hope is a “Great Banquet” beyond time, at which
the human soul contemplates “true being” and so satiates itself.244 In Christian terms,
the Eucharist begins and pledges this “blessed life at God’s table”. 245 Pieper points
out the necessarily communal aspect of this hope and argues that there is implicit
hope (“spes implicita”) in human attempts to build up fraternity, including those
motivated by an “image of a perfect human society”, which is thus linked in a hidden
way with Christian hope.246 All that is good in “earthly history” will not be lost.247
Hope in eternal life, which is made real in the sacraments, transforms the present.
Ratzinger considers thus that hope is ‘performative’ and not just ‘informative’.
Christianity does not simply provide information about certain things, which can be
apprehended in the intellect. It impacts how life is lived in the present. It is, or should
be, “life-changing”, transforming the manner in which time and the future are
perceived. Hope causes the hoping person to live in a new way, because he has been
given “the gift of a new life”.248 Because hope objectively changes the baptised
through the gift of eternal life, it changes the human person’s life from one of dark
hopelessness to a life of true hope. Hope is ‘life-changing’ because the ‘thing’ hoped
for, is “already present”, and being present, gives the hoping person “certainty”
regarding this eternal or new life, even if it has not yet ‘appeared’. 249 As a result,
present life takes on a “dynamism”, orienting the person beyond himself.250 Hope
allows us to go beyond ourselves because we no longer worry about everyday
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possessions.251 Hope can direct the human person away from selfish insecurity
towards security, which enables charity and concern for the other to flourish.

As a result, there is some overlap between the theologies of futurity and Pieper and
Ratzinger’s conception of hope. Ratzinger acknowledges the importance of the
questions raised by the theologies of hope: that is, questions of the future and the
praxis that is joined to hope. Ratzinger acknowledges that hope has a bearing on the
“transitory” and that “hope for heaven” does not exclude “loyalty to the earth”.252
Hope is cosmic, involving “hope for the earth”.253 Pieper and Ratzinger share some
of the concerns of the theologies of futurity. Hope is not self-centred expectation of a
good outcome for the individual person but involves the making-present of, and
preparing for, eternity here and now.254

What distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger from the theologies of futurity, however, is
the manner in which hope is conceived to be ‘performative’. As Collins points out, in
Ratzinger’s terms, hope is ‘performative’ because it is personally redemptive,
involving coming into relationship with Christ. What hope achieves (or promises in
the manner of a substantial pledge, as it were) is the redemption of the person. In
reference to Spe Salvi, Collins writes that:
…hope is not a mere idea of progress that one assents to in the intellectual realm,
but an experience of the whole person as one comes into contact with the God who
has come close in Jesus Christ.255
In orienting the person beyond himself to an object outside himself, viz., the
redemption of eternal life as communion with God, a person’s present behaviour is
changed. It will become animated by a charity founded on encounter with Christ,
which hopes that others will likewise find redemption – eternal life – in him.
Ratzinger illustrates hope’s redemptive effect on the person through the example of
St Josephine Bakhita, the Sudanese slave who eventually became a Canossian Sister,
and her encounter with Christ. Ratzinger explains that as a result of St Josephine’s
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liberating encounter with God in Christ, she was motivated to promote missionary
activity, convinced of the need to bring such liberation to as many people as possible.
Redemptive hope needed to be passed onto all people. St Josephine had experienced
the freedom to hope for a future beyond earthly well-being and wanted to
communicate that hope to others.256

The action of the Christian, especially through the virtue of charity, should thus be
seen as an outflow from this redemptive encounter with Christ and understood in
personalist terms. Hope, and the liberation that it promises and already if
embryonically effects, ought not to be primarily understood under the rubric of
activism or political action, a view that the theologies of futurity risk adopting. Even
if Gutiérrez’s presentation of ‘integral liberation’ involves an understanding of
redemption from sin, such an understanding of redemption and liberation is starkly in
contrast to a Ratzingerian notion of redemption (see further 5). It tends not to
differentiate the political from the notion of redemption. Contrariwise, liberation in
the case of St Josephine entails the hope that “Love” awaits us in the person of Jesus
Christ.257 Although St Josephine was liberated from slavery, Ratzinger’s presentation
of the hope in her focuses not on this emancipation but the liberation brought about
through her relationship with Christ and the missionary attitude that this encounter
generated. The figure of Christ brings hope in himself, a hope stronger than, and
transcendent of, historical struggle and oppression.

Moreover, as Pieper notes, while there are commonalities between hope directed
merely to the creation of a just society and Christian hope, there are differences.
Hope understood in the latter sense takes on the colour of religion or the
eschatological and is aimed at a reality that activity “to change the world” cannot
effect.258 The genuinely hoping person does not engage militantly in an attempt to
bring about “eschatological images of order” but rather seeks “what is wise, good,
and just” (that is, what is eternal) in any given moment.259 Furthermore, genuine
progress, Ratzinger avers, occurs only under the aspect of a hope that promises a
256
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“true future beyond death”.260 Such a claim can be said to be true because it does not
attempt to colour inner-earthly activity with a primarily eschatological flavour, and
so recognises the limits and possibilities of such activity (see also 5). At the same
time, it is free from an immanently grounded despair that cannot seek an object
transcendent of history but is motivated by a promise of eternal life that in itself
seeks to bring others along with it. Referring to the close relationship between the
theological virtues, it can be argued that redemptive hope generates a charity seeking
eternal life, both for oneself and for others.261 Genuine hope drives action not
primarily under the rubric of eschatology and the desire to build a better society,
contra the Concilium position on hope and history, but to achieve God’s will in a
relationship established in faith and hope, which open up to a future eternal life
beyond death.

2.3.8

Hope as Prayer

The Communio perspective on hope and history is further distinguished from the
Concilium position by its emphasis on prayerful receptivity as an appropriate attitude
of hope. Pieper and Ratzinger unearth a relationship between hope and prayer,
especially supplicatory prayer. Hope as prayer to a degree synthesises Pieper and
Ratzinger on hope as a theological virtue and performative but directed to an eternal
life that only God can grant. In Pieper and Ratzinger’s accounts of hope, (understood
also in connection with the conception of the supernatural that undergirds the
account, which will be elaborated in Chapter 4) prayer is a fundamental aspect of
hope and one of its key manifestations. If the object of hope is beyond the power of
the one who hopes to bring about himself and is oriented to eternal life – and thereby
to be understood as a theological virtue oriented to God and given its power by him –
prayer (and relatedly, the sacraments and the liturgy) and not activism is perhaps the
260
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most appropriate or primary response to the hope of eternal life. Prayer asks for what
cannot be obtained by one’s power.

An important link between hope and prayer is the virtue of humility. According to
Pieper, supernatural hope depends upon the natural virtues of magnanimity and
humility. Humility acknowledges the “inexpressible distance between Creator and
creature”.262 Such humility is tied into prayerful hope because it recognises the
difference in being between God and creature (4), which only God can span, and
places hope in God’s action to grant the human desire to participate in the divine life.
Ratzinger likewise considers humility and dependence on God to be essential to
prayerful hope. Hope depends upon “the humility to be able to receive what we are
given over and above what we have deserved and achieved”.263 He argues that prayer
begins in what grounds hope, namely, the “longing for paradise” and that the hopeful
person is one who prays, because this person does not yet possess all things.264
Prayer is predicated on the humble recognition of our inadequacy and the lack in us
that grounds hope. It is directed to the one whose goodness and power can bridge this
gap.
Prayer expresses hope and dependence on God, rather than one’s own powers. Hope
relies on “God’s goodness”, and is not a pious, Pelagian desire for security. 265 Unlike
those who hope, the person who despairs does not pray, because he relies on his own
capacity to bring about what he wants.266 Ratzinger quotes Pieper’s comment that the
praying person on the contrary, remains open to receiving the unknown gift (of
eternal life) and is certain that his prayer is efficacious, even if what he seeks is not
specifically granted. Prayer, especially as supplication directed towards the
omnibenevolent and omnipotent God, expresses hope. In fact, such prayer may be
hope’s “most adequate” expression.267 Prayer is the appropriate response to the
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paradox of our human situation, because in it we ask for the gift we cannot give
ourselves from the One who can (4).
A key parallel in Pieper and Ratzinger’s understandings of prayer as the practical
expression of hope concerns their treatment of the Our Father, as interpreted by
Aquinas and presented in the Roman Catechism. The imprint of Pieper on Ratzinger
is clearly apparent in this context. Ratzinger writes of his initial surprise that the
Catechismus Romanus contained the claim that the Our Father teaches the Christian
what the object of hope is. Upon reflection, Ratzinger realised that hope and the
Lord’s Prayer belong closely together: “[j]ust what hope is becomes clear in the
prayer”, which is the measure of the connection between prayer and hope.268 The Our
Father is “an exposition of hope”.269 In it, daily fears, including the ultimate fear of
hopelessness and of losing faith and communion with God, are transformed into
(everyday) hopes and the great hope that has the Kingdom of God as its object.
Understanding the Lord’s Prayer as an expression of hope reveals hope’s
‘performative’ character. In the Our Father, prayer becomes “hope in action”.270 It
has as its subject everyday concerns that are taken up into the ultimate hope for God
to reign. They are thereby placed under the aspect of eternity. Ratzinger refers to
Aquinas as being the inspiration of the Roman Catechism’s connection between hope
and prayer. Thomas argued in the Summa Theologiae that “prayer is the
interpretation of hope” and, according to Ratzinger, in Thomas’s uncompleted
Compendium of Theology, that the “Our Father is the school of hope – its actual
practice”.271 Prayer, as the expression of hope, is its practical, performative
manifestation. Prayer becomes ‘hope in action’ because in it are placed people’s
daily concerns, which are then turned over to God’s providential action. Hope is
placed in God’s providence and not human planning.
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Thomas’s idea that prayer interprets hope is also present in Pieper. He notes
Thomas’s expression “petitio est interpretativa spei”.272 In his treatise on Hope,
Pieper expands upon Thomas’s treatment of prayer and hope in his unfinished
Compendium. Prayer is “interpretativa spei” because “[p]rayer and hope are
naturally ordered to each other” and prayer expresses and proclaims hope. 273 Pieper
quotes Thomas as saying that Christ taught the Our Father, which guides us to
“living hope” and directs Christian hope “especially…to God”. 274 In other words,
prayer is ‘hope in action’. It brings into daily life, through the human action of
prayer, the reality hoped for. Ratzinger says that “[p]raying is the language of hope”
and that “[p]rayer is hope in execution”.275 Pieper writes that hope “speaks” through
prayer.276 Prayer and hope are thus intimately connected. Prayer is hope’s
expression. Prayer itself is the action of hope because it expresses trustful reliance on
the Creator. Likewise, hope becomes active in prayer because prayer is the human
action that most seeks to make hope’s object (which is also prayer’s object) a reality.
In Spe Salvi, Ratzinger expounds further on his the notion that prayer is ‘hope in
action’ by explaining that prayer is the ‘school of hope’. He refers to Augustine’s
view of the close connection between prayer and hope, and his idea that “prayer [is]
an exercise of desire”.277 For Augustine, and Ratzinger following him, prayer is the
site in which the hope that matches existential desire is expanded. Prayer purifies
hope and desire, and grows the person’s capacity to receive the gift of God, which is
the “great hope”.278 As Ratzinger writes, prayer “actualizes and deepens our
communion of being with God”.279 In prayer is learnt that desire for mediocre
comfort is a “misplaced hope”.280 Consequently, prayer makes the person more apt to
hope for that which transcends even legitimate everyday hopes. In the Our Father,
worries become wishes, which in turn become hopes and ultimately hope in the
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realisation of God’s Kingdom and of participating in the divine nature, that is, eternal
life. Thus, prayer expresses “the one hope” that God’s kingdom will come and his
will be done on earth as in heaven: here is re-expressed the ‘great hope’ that can be
summarised in one word, ‘God’.281 Prayer makes us apt to receive this object and
thereby causes hope to grow.
An interpretation of prayer as ‘hope in action’ distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger’s
accounts of hope from an activist one. According to Ratzinger, the masters of prayer
are the “true teachers of hope” and do not peddle “false hopes”.282 Implicit in this
claim is the idea that those who do not pray cannot communicate genuine hope. It is
only in prayer that genuine hope can be discovered and nurtured. Without it, hope is
mere activism, devoid of God. Ratzinger affirms therefore the necessity of prayer in
guarding against “activism” and “growing secularism” in many Christians
undertaking charitable activities.283 He warns against the temptation of seeking to
resolve all the problems that God’s providence has apparently failed to resolve,
arguably a temptation to which inner-historical conceptions of hope can fall prey.284
In connecting hope and prayer, hope becomes prayerful and receptive, contrary to an
activist desire to change the future according to the dictates of rationality.

Underscoring the contrast between an activist hope and prayerful hope is that the
latter possesses a personalist, contemplative and receptive character. Ratzinger
argues that prayer consists of “being in silent inward communion with God”.285
Prayer springs from personal interiority. It begins in the heart and concerns personal
communion with God. Thus, Ratzinger argues that for prayer to purify, it must be
personal. In its personal dimension, “it must …be very personal, an encounter
between my intimate self and God, the living God”.286 The fruit of such prayer is
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greater openness to God as well as a greater capacity to serve others. In praying like
this, the person praying is made “capable of the great hope”, that is, eternal life
(because the one who prays touches God).287 Action is a secondary outflow of this
personal interiority.
Ratzinger considers ‘active hope’ to be the fruit of prayer. Prayer and hope are active
by keeping the ‘world open to God’. Ratzinger uses the felicitous phrase, “ministers
of hope”, to describe the fruit of the personal encounter with God. 288 Prayer
generates an “active hope” that seeks to minimise evil, but also to “keep the world
open to God”, the precondition for genuine human hope.289 As Ratzinger describes,
in a different context:

A man open to the presence of God [in prayer] discovers that God is always working
and still works today: We should, then, let him enter and let him work. And so things
are born which open to the future and renew mankind.290

‘Active hope’ then does not primarily consist in a generic agitation for a ‘better
society’ but has as its object that ‘God’s will be done’, whatever shape that may take.
The future is genuinely and only opened up when God is acting through the prayer
and work of his saints.291 Hope clearly has an active dimension; it is not quietest
fatalism ignorant of the needs of others. But it is active precisely in being a channel
for God’s life and work to enter into the world, in which God is recognised as the
principal actor.

Ratzinger considers the hope expressed in the Our Father to be performative by
making God present on earth in this way. In the ‘active hope’ of prayer that God’s
kingdom come, Ratzinger argues that “earth…will itself become heaven”. 292 Such a
statement needs to be qualified by the Pieperian insight, with which Ratzinger would
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readily agree, that the instantiation of the New Heaven and Earth requires the
transposition of temporality into eternity (4).293 Hope is however theocentrically
grounded. In a sense, wherever God is, is heaven. He is present in the world in an
intense way where “faith and hope and love are”.294 His Kingdom is present,
moreover, insofar as he is loved and his love is able to penetrate us. The earth
‘becomes’ to the extent that humanity allows God to be present to it, and to operate
in it with humanity’s cooperation. The earth will become heaven, moreover, when
that presence becomes definitive at the cosmos’s transformation at the end of
time (4.4.3).

A theocentric understanding of hope, which an understanding of hope as prayerful
reveals, focuses therefore on God and the doing of his will here and now, with the
promise of its future fulfilment. For Ratzinger, all human hoping is centred on God’s
will – that it be ‘done according to thy word’ (c.f. Lk 1:38).295 Seeking to do God’s
will in the present manifests hope. Consequently, God’s Kingdom does not belong to
an “imaginary hereafter…in a future that will never arrive”. 296 God is not, contra
Bloch, Moltmann, Metz and Gutiérrez, the ‘God of the (historical) future’, but the
God of the “today, yesterday and forever” (4).297 Hope is not directed to an imprecise
future historical or utopian state, or even eschatology stripped of its theo- and
Christo-centric meaning. Rather, hope is oriented to God and the manifestation of his
will in the present, which promises a future eschatological, heavenly state. Hope is
active in being centred on the God immanent to and yet transcendent of history.

Prayer fosters, therefore, hope and charity. In prayer, the person learns to hope in the
‘great hope’ that is God and his love, and its constituent manifestations: the Kingdom
and promise of paradise; and that his will be done, which includes fundamentally that
the human person becomes united to him in the divine life, eternal life (2 Pet 1:4; c.f.
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1 Thess 4:3). Prayer enables a person “[to enter] into [God’s] special closeness”.298
The person who prays is in communion with the object of hope, and participates in
charity in the life of God.
In becoming so connected to God, the praying person then becomes a ‘minister of
hope’. He possesses a desire that the world, like him, becomes ‘open to God’ and
that, it could be added, others may be filled likewise with the life of God – that God
may be all in all, the great hope expressed in another way (1 Cor 15:28).299 In the
words of the Catechism, prayer allows the person “to share in the power of God’s
love that saves the multitude”.300 The charity that bonds the person with God is
transformed into an outward desire that others be brought into the divine life. In this
way, it can be suggested that ‘active hope’ is principally driven by an encounter with
God and a subsequent charitable impulse to spread the life of God – and therefore
salvation – among souls and society, an essential part of which involves opposition
to evil. If this interpretation of Ratzinger is right, hope needs to be understood not in
an activist way, but as humble and receptive awaiting God’s action to impart his life,
a promise of divine life amplified through the prayer of the saints.301

2.3.9

Hope is Patient for Eternity and Receptive of God’s Action

If hope has prayer as its main expression and God as its object, it recognises that it
depends on God’s action. The human person is only ever able to cor-respond to
(‘respond with’) God’s initiative. Hope is active only as a response. Consequently,
hope can only ever be patient and receptive, because it awaits Someone else’s
initiative, and what God’s will, and not our own, dictates.302 Characterising hope as
patient marks out Pieper and Ratzinger from a more activist, ‘impatient’ account of
hope apparent in a Moltmann-inspired theology of hope (1). They would heartily
agree that the world cannot be left as it is and that the hoping Christian needs to
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oppose evil and use his time well under God’s providence. They do not, however,
consider impatient hope as the means to effect, or as that which motivates, social
change.

Hope is characterised, rather, by humble patience relative to the ills of the world.
When Ratzinger asks in the words of Scripture “Lord, holy and true, how long will it
be?” (Rv 6:10), he affirms God’s power and love for us, even in the face of
“incomprehensible and apparently unjustified suffering in the world”.303 The primary
actor presumed in this question is God – ‘how long will it be?’ until you do
something about it. The question is not Metz’s, ‘how much time do we (still) have
anyway?’ for us to act based on an impatient hope restlessly seeking a ‘better
society’ (1.2.2). Consequently:

[h]ope is practised through the virtue of patience, which continues to do good even
in the face of apparent failure, and through the virtue of humility, which accepts
God’s mystery and trusts him even at times of darkness.304

In this way, hope is related to faith in God and charity. Faith assures us of God’s love
for us, manifested in the sending of his Son. Faith generates the love of God in Christ
and becomes a light in the darkness (c.f. Jn 1:5). Love is that which responds to the
darkness of evil, although hope also struggles against the triumph of evil.
Importantly, faith “transforms our impatience and our doubts into the sure hope” that
God governs the cosmos and will ultimately emerge victorious.305 Ratzinger thus
presents hope as dependent upon faith in the love of God. Hope is patient endurance
in the face of evil (but not a resigned, hopeless Stoicism), which is manifested in
charity and which recognises God as the sovereign. Hope is not urgent in the sense of
impatient activism, but is expressed through steadfast commitment to doing good,
even while aware that only God can definitively eradicate the evil present in creation
and human hearts.
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Pieper and Ratzinger consider hope to persist in the face of evil and its apparent
triumphs. It is no accident that Pieper gives as an epitaph to his 1930s treatise on
hope a quotation from the Book of Job (13:13): “Though he slay me, yet I will trust
in him.”306 Pieper, who wrote this treatise in tyrannous 1930s Nazi Germany,
considers that the genuine nature of hope consists in trust in the Lord, amidst all the
difficulties of life and even to the point of death and martyrdom (2.2.5). Likewise,
Ratzinger cites the example of Job in the context of humanity’s cry to God in the
face of evil, to point out the immensity and power of the Almighty. Ratzinger also
quotes St Augustine’s dictum to the effect that we cannot comprehend God’s ways; if
we do understand someone, it is not God.307 Hope persists in scenarios that perplex
believers, grounded in faith in God’s impenetrable wisdom.

Related to the disillusionment necessary for true hope to emerge (2.3.1), those
suffering evil do not ultimately hope in the definitive, inner-historical creation of a
just society (even if everyday hope is placed in the ending of war and so on). The
person may not live to see such peace, because he is ‘slain’ and lived in a murderous
regime. Consequently, Pieper and Ratzinger’s depiction of suffering Job as hoping
patiently in God’s providence amid the trials and evils of history contrasts sharply
with the Blochian view, which influenced Metz, of Job as a rebellious, utopian figure
(1.3.3). Patient, suffering and hoping Job does not seek the overturn unjust structures.
Rather, in Pieper and Ratzinger, God, as the object of hope, is understood to be its
principal source and the means by which evil is addressed. Hope is humble and
patient acceptance that God’s inscrutable ‘will be done’.
The presentation of hope as patient awaiting God’s action in the face of evil recalls
Pieper and Ratzinger’s views that hope is fundamentally oriented to the suprahistorical. Pieper states that: “Hope is the confidently patient expectation of eternal
beatitude in a contemplative and comprehensive sharing of the triune life of God.”308
Hope consists of awaiting an eternal life of contemplation beyond the travails of
history. As the object of eternal life, moreover, how Pieper characterises
contemplation reveals how he conceives hope (which links also to hope’s prayerful
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dimension). He argues that contemplation refers to a “purely receptive approach to
reality” and consists in a “silent perception of reality”, although such receptivity
should not be construed as passivity but rather active clarification of the truth so
perceived.309 Such contemplation belongs to intellectus, the cognitive power of
“simple intuition”; it is thus distinguished from discursive ratio (4.3.8).310 If eternal
life consists in the receptive looking at the eternal truth, which is God, and eternal
life is the object of hope, it is unlikely hope would consist in restless activism and
protestive agitation for social change. Hope, like the contemplation it presages, waits
for contemplative participation in the divine life.
Pieper’s notion of hope as patient expectation of eternal life links to Ratzinger’s
conception of hope. For Ratzinger, characterising hope as patience rests on the
‘substance’ of eternal life incipiently present in the baptised soul. The ‘sure hope’
that God governs the universe of which Ratzinger speaks, is connected to patience
and circles back to the distinction between everyday goods and the substance of
eternal, that is, divine life. Ratzinger contrasts the distinction drawn in the Letter to
the Hebrews between hypomone (10:36) and hypostole (10:39). Hypomone,
according to Ratzinger usually rendered as ‘patience’ (in the RSVCE it is
‘endurance’), is “perseverance” and “constancy” in the face of trials, and the
precondition to “receive what is promised” (10:36).311 The character of hopeful
endurance contrasts with the “dissimulation” and worldliness, or even pusillanimity
(the RSVCE has ‘shrink back’), expressed in the term hypostole.312 Christian hope is
based on the possession of a better reality, which “relativises” everyday possessions
as the basis for living.313 It rests on an entirely different “mode of being”, a “solid
foundation” that even death cannot defeat.314 Thus, the Christian possesses a “lived
hope” that is certain of the promise it already contains. 315 Hope endures in
expectation of the gift of eternal life, which overcomes dependence on worldly

309

Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, 73.
Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, 74 quoting Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 59, 1 ad 1:
“Intellectus et ratio differunt quantum ad modum congnoscendi, quia scil. intellectus cognoscit
simplici intuiti, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud”.
311
Benedict, Spe Salvi, n8.
312
Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 35.
313
Benedict, Spe Salvi, n8, Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 35.
314
Ratzinger, “On Hope,” 35.
315
Benedict, Spe Salvi, n9.
310

194

goods.316 Thus, for Ratzinger, hope is patient expectation because it links to the
eternal beatitude it promises, in contrast to the flimsy hope that possession of worldly
goods can provide.

2.3.10 Conclusion

Pieper and Ratzinger conceive hope in theocentric terms, as oriented beyond history
to eternal life in God. In its ultimate form, hope is a theological virtue oriented to life
in God, underpinned by an existential longing for an infinite, undying love, which
transcends death and the historical. Fundamental hope is thus oriented to
participation in the divine life, which is made substantially present in the soul
through baptism. Baptism gives the believer the theological virtues, which makes
him apt to receive the gift that is the object of his hope, God’s own life, which can
only be received. Hope is characterised by prayerful, receptive patience for the gift of
God’s action, in contrast to an activist, planned strategy of hope.

2.4

Conclusion

As representative of the Communio position on hope and history, Ratzinger presents
a view of hope as primarily oriented to eternal life in God. Dependent on Pieper’s
views on the relationship between hope and history, his view of hope thus contrasts
with the Concilium view of hope as possessing an inner-historical orientation.

Chapter 2 has shown negatively and positively what Pieper and Ratzinger consider
hope to be. The first part of the Chapter discussed their critique of a HegelianMarxist conception of hope. As hope’s object cannot be controlled, it cannot be
manipulated according to human rationality or a logic of history discernible to
human reason. Rather, history is characterised by freedom and peccability. It must
316
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look ‘beyond itself’ for perfection. Hope cannot therefore be placed in history’s
immanent realisation, contrary to the Joachimite impulse underlying Hegelian and
Marxist inner-historical conceptions of hope, which inform the Concilium position.
Contrary to the deliberately impersonal understanding of hope of the Concilium
perspective, Pieper and Ratzinger consider hope to be intrinsically personal. Hope
belongs to the realm of the ‘I-Thou’ and is unintelligible if it is simply oriented to
future earthly progress. Hope must overcome death and is explicable only in relation
to the person.

As personal and oriented beyond death, hope has eternal life as its principal object.
The second part of the Chapter showed the theocentric shape of fundamental hope.
For Pieper and Ratzinger, there is a distinction between ‘everyday hopes’, which
may or may not be realised on earth, and a singular, fundamental object whose
content is unknown and unrealisable on earth. The Christian faith helps fill out the
content of this fundamental hope in eternal life and links hope’s personal character
with the transcendental destiny of the human person. As Ratzinger argues, it is the
“hope of faith” and not intra-historical conceptions of hope that “reveals to us the
true future beyond death”.317 Hope is connected to human desire and longing for
existential fulfilment in being, characterised as the infinite joy of eternal life.
Fundamental hope has as its object eternal life in God, that is, salvation and
redemption.

As a theological virtue, hope is a gift and cannot, therefore, be conceived as
something manipulable according to human rationality. Because hope’s fundamental
object is by definition not within the power of the one who hopes to achieve by his
own powers and oriented to a supernatural reality, hope is most true to itself as a
theological virtue. As a theological virtue, hope is a gracious gift from God given in
baptism, which justifies the person and orients him to eternal life in God. Belonging
to the realm of gift, moreover, hope is intrinsically connected to prayer. Hopeful
prayer is the humble, receptive patience for God’s initiative. Only in this way does
hope become active, in the sense of opening the world to God’s initiative and

317

Ratzinger, Yes of Jesus Christ, 49, Eschatology, 4.

196

presence. Hope is the prayerful endurance in the face of the world’s evil. As
endurance, hope fits the person for the possession of eternal life, hope’s true object.
Grounded in a choice for an extra-historical conception of hope and Pieper’s
philosophical treatment of hope and history, Ratzinger presents thus a view of
fundamental hope under the aspect of eternity. The object of hope is necessarily tied
into what happens ‘beyond’ death and cannot be limited to what is immanent to
history and society. Eternity drives an understanding of hope as ultimately oriented
to what is supra-historical, an infinite reality that alone can be the fulfilment of
human aspiration and history.
Accordingly, hope is intrinsically bound up with the ‘last things’ and the ‘hereafter’,
as traditionally conceived in eschatology. Unlike Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez,
Ratzinger does not see this as problematic. He explicitly defends the need to discuss
in eschatology those elements that traditionally constitute discussion of the ‘last
things’, namely, heaven, hell, purgatory, judgment and immortality of the soul. This
is so even if it also necessary to discuss hope and praxis in connection with the future
and how the present relates to it, as do theologies of futurity. A discussion of the ‘last
things’ is not necessary simply as a result of the weight given to them by traditional
treatments, but because they are central to an understanding of the ‘beyond’ and its
effect on the present.318 It is under the aspect of eternity, and not simply the future or
an eschatological horizon understood as a future utopia, that the present and praxis
must be conceived. Hope is best considered as generating action in the light of God’s
eternity. A theocentric understanding of hope precludes an immanentist
understanding of hope, which focuses on the historical future, but points the human
person to its eschatological future, made present in history in Christ, the God-man.
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CHAPTER 3 THE CHRISTOLOGICAL SHAPE OF HOPE AND ESCHATOLOGY IN
THE

3.1

COMMUNIO PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The theocentric nature of hope and its supra-historical orientation, which were
considered in Chapter 2, become fully intelligible for the Communio perspective on
hope and history only under the aspect of Christ. For Ratzinger, Christ, understood in
Chalcedonian terms, is the bridge between history and eternity. He is the means,
through the Incarnation and the Paschal Mystery of his death, Resurrection and
Ascension, by which fundamental hope’s object – eternal life – is made available to
the human person.1 With Pieper, Ratzinger would argue that Christ, “in whom dwells
the fullness of the Godhead”, is the source of supernatural life and, therefore, hope.2
He is, therefore “the only true hope of the world”.3 In him, through the working of
the Holy Spirit, humanity accesses the divine, its deepest hope. 4 Christ is thus the
principle and source of fundamental hope and the theological virtue of hope.
Chapter 3 explores the Christological foundation of Ratzinger’s position on hope and
history, and the unity that he considers exists between Christology and eschatology.
Eschatological hope must be treated with, and get its shape from, Christology. It
constitutes thus the Communio response to the second element of the Concilium view
on hope and history. In the Concilium position, a low Christology appears to serve an

1

C.f. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, 18
November 1965, 2 (in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, new revised
edition, ed. Austin Flannery OP (Northport, NY/Dublin: Costello Publishing Company/Dominican
Publications, 1975).
2
Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 105 quoting Col 2:9; c.f. also 99.
3
Joseph Ratzinger, “The Undefeated Light,” originally published in Hochland (1959/60): 97-100
translated from the German by Tracey Rowland in 2019 and published in the Christmas edition of the
London Catholic Herald, December 2019.
4
C.f. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church: Lumen Gentium, 21 November
1964, in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, new revised edition, ed.
Austin Flannery OP (Northport, NY/Dublin: Costello Publishing Company/Dominican Publications,
1975), 4.
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already-formed inner-historical emphasis and eschatological hope, which are
dependent upon immanent philosophies and theologies, and not Christology. A
Chalcedonian Christology seemingly does not determine their understanding of hope
and history.

Ratzinger eschews, contrariwise, an exclusive concentration upon the historicity of
Christ and the inner-historical, social and political implications of his mission.
Rather, he insists upon the importance of Chalcedonian Christology, as relating to
“the divine-human mystery of Jesus”, for an appropriate understanding of salvation
history, eschatology and hope.5 The hypostatic union of Christ’s humanity to the
divine nature in the one Word definitively underpins his Christology and his views

5

Ratzinger, Eschatology, 195. For further on Ratzinger’s Christology see, for example, Oakes, Infinity
Dwindled to Infancy, 372-381, de Gaál, Christocentric Shift, Peter McGregor, Heart to Heart: The
Spiritual Christology of Joseph Ratzinger (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016).
Especially in Ratzinger is the Christological dimension of hope made present. It is here that
Ratzinger’s more specifically theological understanding of hope is brought to the fore and can be
considered as a theological departure from Pieper’s more philosophical reflections on the nature of
hope and history. Even in this apparent difference, however, it is argued that there remains a
substantial concordance between Pieper and Ratzinger and that Pieper’s philosophical reflections find
their full meaning in Christological reflection. He would not dispute the general thrust of Ratzinger’s
theological reflections. Pieper explicitly relates his philosophical work to a theological framework,
stating for example that “[i]t would never occur to a philosopher, unless he were also a Christian
theologian, to describe hope as a virtue”: Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 99, Schumacher, Philosophy of
Hope, 117. Schumacher agrees with this reading of Pieper’s early work but suggests that such an
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philosophical. Schumacher argues that this criticism is ameliorated to some degree by reference to
Pieper’s evolving thought after 1935, in which Christ is connected only three times to hope and a
specifically Christological reading of hope, in which “Christ is the true reason for our hope and its
fulfillment”, is not present: Schumacher, Philosophy of Hope, 117-118, 131n114 (quotation on 117)
(Schumacher’s argument is alluded to at 2.3.2).
Although it is true that Pieper’s later work, including his Hoffnung und Geschichte, does not
specifically refer to Christ as the object of hope, such a lack of reference to Christ should not be taken
to indicate that Pieper necessarily resiles from his earlier Christological reading of hope. His
comments regarding the Christological shape of hope in his 1930s treatise have enduring relevance for
his understanding of hope. So much is apparent in the Preface of the omnibus edition of Faith, Hope,
Love, written in 1986, in which Pieper notes that Über die Hoffnung is “changed…only a little”, albeit
with the need for considerable supplementation by other works: Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 10. The
supplementation by his later work does not cancel out the Christological dimension of his account of
hope in the earlier treatise, but adds philosophical depth to his earlier reflections, especially
concerning the hope-history relationship. As will be argued in the next chapter, Pieper does not
conceive of nature and grace in extrinsic terms; for him, hope is specifically theological and cannot be
considered apart from Christologically-indexed grace. Moreover, in a reflection cited by Schumacher
as one of the few instances after 1935 in which Christ is mentioned in connection with hope, Pieper
argues that the “main” or fundamental hope only has a solid basis if Christ has been risen from the
dead (c.f. 1 Cor 15:14). That Pieper does so specifically in reference to “Christendom’s sacred book”
shows that hope can only be understood fully – as being something more than wish fulfilment – in
reference to Christ: Pieper, “Hope – of What?” 118; Schumacher, Philosophy of Hope, 131n114.
Christ is thus necessary for hope to be comprehended ‘in its depths’. It can be suggested, then, that for
Pieper, hope – at least with respect to the underlying, existential fundamental hope – must be read
Christologically.
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regarding the relationship between hope and history, and history and ontology. The
Incarnation, in which humanity and the historical are taken up into the divine, and
Resurrection of Christ, as the harbinger of humanity’s glorious future in the
eschatological Adam, supports a vision of hope as oriented to definitive, eternal
communion with God outside of history, with its roots within history. Christological
eschatology insists therefore upon the limits of history. History is not the site for the
perfection of humanity but of the sacramental communication and anticipation
through the Church of the promise of eternal life to it.

Only in Christ, therefore, do the relationship between hope and history, and the
meaning of the Kingdom of God, become explicable. Congruent with a Chalcedonian
Christology, which points to the future glorification of humanity by its participation
in the divinity of Christ, Ratzinger argues that history is to be characterised under the
aspect of ‘already, not yet’. The “eschatological action” of God begins in the
Resurrection of Christ, who in his Ascension participates definitively in the life of
God.6 Salvation has ‘already’ been wrought in Christ’s Paschal Mystery, the fruits of
which continue to be communicated through history “until he comes”. 7 Nevertheless,
the full realisation of eschatological reality remains incomplete. It is ‘not yet’
apparent. It will only become so in the perfection of history outside itself. Hope is
thus centred on the eschatological work of God in Christ, incipient to history but
definitively consummated outside of it. Hope is directed to Christ, as the sign and
fulfilment of eternal life and cosmic redemption, not the realisation of immanent,
inner-historical goals.

To explore these issues, the Chapter is divided into a number of sections. The first
discusses the Chalcedonian Christology, which frames Ratzinger’s treatment of
eschatology and salvation history, and therefore hope and history. Ratzinger insists
on an underlying unity between Christology and eschatology, which distinguishes his
view of Christ from the Concilium perspective. Secondly, it will explore the
relationship between eschatology and the Paschal Mystery, and how the
eschatological Adam is humanity’s genuine future, anticipated in the Risen Christ.
Thirdly, it will explore the implications of conceiving the Resurrection as
6
7

Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 186.
CCC, 1076 quoting 1 Cor 11:26.
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eschatological for understanding the meaning of history and the Kingdom of God.
The Resurrection, rooted in history, makes eschatological reality already present in
history in the ‘Age of the Gentiles’, while pointing beyond it. Fourthly, it will
explore more specifically the Christological content of eschatology, and the effect
this has conceiving hope and history. Of a piece with a conception of hope as patient
and receptive, hope consists of waiting on the Lord, who is the turning point of
history. Finally, it will consider how the union between Christology and eschatology
differentiates Ratzinger from the Concilium view of hope and history.

3.2

The Unity of Christology and Eschatology

Key for Ratzinger is his claim that eschatology cannot be separated from
Christology. He argues that there is an “internal unity of christology and
eschatology”.8 Ratzinger implicitly opposes an exclusive focus on eschatology and,
therefore, the tendency of Moltmann and Metz to place all of theology under its
perspective (1).9 Unlike the Concilium perspective on hope and history, in which
immanent theology and philosophy are central, Ratzinger places Christology at the
centre of his conception of hope and history. He argues that the legitimacy of
positions taken on hope and eschatology depend upon the “integrity of Christology”
and that “the truly constant factor [in the Church’s eschatological attitude across
history] is Christology”.10 Eschatology takes its shape from Christology, not
Christology from eschatology.

As eschatology is to be determined by Christology, it is important to understand
exactly which Christology informs Ratzinger’s theology. Ratzinger affirms a
Chalcedonian Christology, in which Christ’s divinity is expressly recognised, as
normative for theology. An insistence on the divinity of Christ does not, however,
lead Ratzinger to jettison the humanity of Christ. The Chalcedonian expression of the
mystery of Christ contends that his humanity needs to be read under the aspect of his
divinity, but not to the extent of a Monophysite absorption of that humanity.
Acknowledgment of the humanity of Christ supports Ratzinger’s view of the
8

Ratzinger, Eschatology, 196.
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 196, c.f. 59.
10
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 12, 53 (quotation on 12).
9

201

importance of history and it as ‘already, not yet’, as humanity awaits its
eschatological perfection. Nevertheless, acknowledging the centrality of Christ’s
divinity to Christology reveals the limited theological utility of the ‘historical Jesus’,
and allows a criticism of immanentist readings of Jesus.

3.2.1

The Chalcedonian Shape of Ratzinger’s Christology

Ratzinger employs a Christology dependent upon the definitions of the
Christological Councils of the first millennium. As has been implied, there is
particular recognition in his work of the significance of the Council of Chalcedon
(A.D. 451). Chalcedon dogmatically defined that Christ possesses both a divine and
human nature, which are, “without confusion or change, without division or
separation”, united in the “same Only-begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus
Christ”.11 Ratzinger argues that “Chalcedon continues to indicate, to the Church of
all ages, the necessary pathway into the mystery of Jesus Christ”, even if it needs to
be reappropriated today in light of differing notions regarding its key concepts of
‘nature’ and ‘person’.12 He states that “Chalcedon [is] the definitive ecclesial
formulation of Jesus’ Divine Sonship, [and] still … the pivotal truth that decides
everything”.13 Thus, Chalcedon is of crucial significance in Ratzinger’s Christology
and, indeed, the whole of his theology. It opens up the mystery of Jesus Christ, by
pointing to his ontological unity with the Father, and therefore his divinity.
Ratzinger’s insistence on the divinity of Christ – and the corollary notion that his
humanity needs to be perceived in light of his divinity – is one of his chief
11

Quoted in J Neuner SJ and J Dupius SJ, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the
Catholic Church, seventh edition, ed. Jacques Dupuis (New York: Alba House, 2001), 614-615, (DS,
301-302); quotation from 615/302.
12
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 159. He also argues the Chalcedon cannot be understood properly without
reference to the ‘Neo-Chalcedonian’ theology of the Third Council of Constantinople, which grapples
with the nature of the unity of the divine and human natures in Christ and the relationship between
being, and consciousness and experience in Christ: Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced
One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1986), 37-38; see also Kereszty, Jesus Christ: Fundamentals of Christology, 256. On what Ratzinger
considers are the limits of the historical method and the need for exegesis to be undertaken with a
correct hermeneutic, see Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 42ff and 3.2.2.
13
Joseph Ratzinger, “Christocentrism in Preaching?” in Joseph Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching:
Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, unabridged edition, trans. Michael J Miller and Matthew J
O’Connell, ed. Michael J Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 42. This is also quoted in
Rowland, “Ratzinger on the Timelessness of Truth,” 255, which brought to the author’s attention this
passage.
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Christological principles. It has led critics such as Lieven Boeve, a Belgian
theologian in the mould of Schillebeeckx, to accuse Ratzinger of “[subordinating] the
historical to the eternal, the human to the divine, nature to grace”. 14 As Rowland
observes, Boeve may be correct to argue that Ratzinger “[holds] to a high
Christology”.15 She rightly argues, however, that Ratzinger as a theologian tends to
hold in tension “critical couplets”, such as “history and eternity, humanity and
divinity”, which might otherwise appear irreconcilable.16 Ratzinger does not oppose
categories so much as tries to unify them, while respecting their differentiation.

A Chalcedonian Christology guards against the construction of an irresolvable chasm
between humanity and divinity, or the absorption of the former by the latter. With
respect to Christology, Ratzinger cannot be accused of Monophysitism or
Nestorianism. The former would overplay the divinity of Christ such that his
humanity is subsumed. The latter would overemphasise the distinctness of his
humanity such that his divinity becomes separated from his humanity (a tendency
arguably apparent in Concilium Christology).17 In fact, a Chalcedonian Christology
precludes Ratzinger from the charge of being a Monophysite or Nestorian. As noted
in the Introduction, a Christology emphasising the unity of the divine and human,
such as developed recently by Aaron Riches, insists that the human and divine can be
conceived together as a unity, and not as representing poles that cannot be
breached.18 Ratzinger’s insistence on the enduring value of Chalcedon, which
recognises the divinity and humanity (and therefore the eternal and historical) are
held in unity in the Person of Christ, enables the human and divine to be conceived
together as a unity without detracting from either.
Ratzinger’s adoption of a Chalcedonian Christology does not, therefore, mean an
exclusion of historical considerations in reference to the divine Christ, who possesses
14

Lieven Boeve, Theology at the Crossroads of University, Church and Society: Dialogue, Difference
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a human nature. Ratzinger’s Christology can be described as a unity in duality of
both the high and low elements of Christology. According to Ratzinger, supposedly
more Johannine ‘high’ Christology focused upon ontology and the Incarnation
“form[s] an inseparable whole” with a more Pauline ‘low’ Christology emphasising
history and the Cross.19 Although there exist between the theologies of the
Incarnation and the Cross insurmountable “polarities”, these polarities are not
“contradictions” but point to an underlying unity.20 For Ratzinger, this unity is
glimpsed in the identity in Christ between his being and his actualitas. In his being
as Son, Christ serves and possesses an exodus pattern of going out beyond himself.
Christ’s “doing” on earth coincides with his “being” as Son of God.21 The purpose of
the Incarnation is the offering of Christ on the Cross, the going out beyond himself in
the offering of his life, a historical pattern that replicates the Trinitarian processions.
As a result, as Rowland points out, Ratzinger “eschews any kind of dualistic choice
between the being-Christology of Chalcedon and the event-Christology of the New
Testament” (see further 3.2.2).22 The divine and human natures in the historical
mission of Christ need to be read together in a unity.

Chalcedon permits furthermore Ratzinger to underscore the underlying unity of the
ontological and biblical in the proclamation of Christ’s divinity. He considers that
Chalcedon (as well as Nicaea (A.D. 325) and Constantinople I and II (A.D. 381,
681)) expresses a synthesis between Hebrew and Greek thought, which allows the
historical and ontological to be united (the ‘human’ and ‘divine’). He argues that the
Council of Nicaea’s use of the phrase “of one substance with the Father” when
applied to Jesus, to be the philosophical expression of the biblical term “Son”,
showing that we are to understand Jesus as ‘Son’, not metaphorically, but literally.23
In so doing, we can have confidence that Jesus “is the Son of God”, which means

19

Pope Benedict XVI, Journey to Easter: Spiritual Reflections for the Lenten Season, trans. Dame
Mary Groves OSB (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987), 96, Jesus(1), 269, Rowland,
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that the God (‘of the Promise’ – 2.3.6) has come close in the Person of Jesus and that
we can stand, live and die by (and therefore hope in) the truth signified in the biblical
term ‘Son’.24 For Ratzinger, then, the ontological language used in the early Councils
does not distort Christian faith but indispensably reveals the heart of the biblical
message concerning the Person of Jesus Christ and his possession of divine and
human natures. Jesus is not an adopted son of God or his avatar, but his Son by
nature – he “is God” – which marks him out in the history of religion and makes him
uniquely capable of being the object of faith, and therefore hope.25

An intrinsic relationship exists therefore between salvation history and Chalcedonian
Christology, history and ontology. Rowland points out that for Ratzinger,
Chalcedonian Christology expresses “the core of salvation history” and that, in fact,
such dogma is “nothing less than the ‘definition of the term ‘salvation history’’”.26
For Ratzinger, salvation history as involving God’s dealing with humanity and
humanity’s “transitus”, or Passover into God, must be read under the rubric of
Chalcedonian Christology.27 Everything that Ratzinger says regarding hope and
history is consequently conditioned by reference to his concern to consider together,
‘without confusion and without separation’, the union of the divine and the human
meeting in the Person of Jesus Christ. Christ possessed a ‘divinised’ humanity and,
as Son of God, descended from on “high” in order “to rescue the perishing” and
enable humanity to ascend to the Father.28 Salvation history is the process by which
the historical is taken up into God’s eternal being through the Passover of Christ’s
existence, as a free response of humanity to God’s offer of salvation. Chalcedon
expresses precisely this notion of salvation history. It does not simply state the
divinity of Christ but how this divinity was joined to humanity in order to elevate the
latter into eternity. It clarifies that humanity is brought into the divine, and thus
grounds hope in the possibility of eternal life, the object of fundamental
hope (2.3.5).29
24
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3.2.2

The Importance of Dogma and the Limits of Emphasising the ‘Historical
Jesus’

Congruent with a methodology, which does not sunder ‘ontological’, Johannine and
‘historical’, Pauline Christologies, Ratzinger is concerned to incorporate relevant
exegetical findings in his theology. Nevertheless, he argues that the historical method
has limited utility and that the figure of Jesus needs to be read within the
Chalcedonian dogmatic tradition of faith. Ratzinger maintains that the ‘historical
Jesus’ cannot be theologically neutered and placed within the confines of historical
methodology. The ‘historical Jesus’ of the historians is not the ‘historical Jesus’,
which is the object of faith.30 Jesus is a historical figure but as the “Son” of God
transcends his historical limits and cannot be confined to historians’ categories.31
Instead, a theologian needs to look to the tradition of faith, as expressed in the
Christological Councils, and not simply historical exegesis, to appreciate Jesus
correctly.
The ‘historical Jesus’ and the ‘Christ of faith’ are not to be juxtaposed as if two
different people. The Gospels present an authentic picture of the ‘historical Jesus’.
Moreover, Ratzinger is convinced that faith in Christ is historically defensible, even
if such a conclusion transcends what historical exegesis can discern. He compellingly
suggests that the fully-developed biblical Christology evident in St Paul’s Letter to
the Philippians, which postulates Lordship for Christ based on his divinity and
obedience (Phil 2:6-11, Is 45:23), must have been based on an initial greatness in the
figure and activity of Jesus. The biblical depiction of Christ is not a concoction but
flows from an encounter with Jesus of Nazareth. As a result, the biblical testimony

30

For example, he argues – against Walter Kasper’s interpretation of his Introduction to Christianity –
that Jesus’s historically irrefutable death on the Cross is the basis of his theological reflection. From
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regarding Christ is consonant with the later dogmatic definitions concerning the
divinity and humanity of Christ.32 Faith can thus be placed in the divinity of Christ.

As indicated in 3.2.1, Ratzinger recognises the mutually corrective roles of the
theology of the Incarnation and the theology of the Cross, and ontology and history
and that dogma and history need to be read together. A theology of the Cross seeks to
overcome a static conception of being, which ignores or downplays history and the
reality of sin. It lends itself to an understanding of Christianity as critical of society
and even the Church. A Concilium criticism of society, Church and the sin endemic
in social structures, and political theology and liberation theology’s practical
orientation to overcome these injustices can in that sense be read under the rubric of
the theology of the Cross. A theology of the Incarnation, on the other hand, focuses
on the being of God and how the divine sanctifies humanity in the Incarnation, which
thereby becomes “the real future of man” (and therefore his hope).33 Ratzinger’s
attempt to see the unity in these polarities underscores his insistence on the
importance of ontology and the need to consider the figure of Christ within the
parameters of orthodox Christian faith, even while maintaining the relevance of
historical considerations and avoiding a static ontology. He eschews a one-sided
focus on history.
The unity of the ‘high’ and ‘low’ in Ratzinger’s Christology has important
consequences for his theology and his conception of hope. In bringing the historical
and ontological together, Ratzinger’s Christology corrects an overemphasis on
history and criticism – arguably evident in Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez – at
the expense of Christ’s being and eternity. Contrary to Schillebeeckx’s Christological
focus on experience, he reorients attention to what is perennially valid regarding the
saving figure of Christ. Nevertheless, he recognises that theology has a properly
practical element. Significantly, the practical import of theology is, however, to
facilitate the growth of the theological virtues of faith, hope and love, not per se to
change ecclesial practices, even if these might be necessary in order to serve the
32
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higher priority of facilitating the divine life in the Christian. Theology as an ecclesial
science, rather, offers something greater than sociological improvement. What it
offers is distinctive, a unique object that grounds genuine hope and takes faith out of
the realm of the purely inner-worldly. Hope is thereby not based upon sociological
improvement.34 That theology can offer supra-historical hope depends, instead, upon
the enduring legitimacy of dogma, which indicates a transcendent, timeless reality.
To approach the authentic Jesus, and how he can therefore be a source of hope, faith
as dogmatically defined is necessary. Dogma teaches, consistent with the testimony
of the bible, that Christ is the incarnate Son of God and, as such, the meeting point of
humanity and eternity. He is humanity’s destiny and, therefore, object of hope,
precisely as transcendent of history even while joining humanity and history to
eternity (see 3.3).35

Privileging Chalcedon differentiates Ratzinger from an exclusive focus on the
historical Jesus, which he considers is futile. As Rowland points out, his biblical
exegesis and fundamental theology do not consider the “historical-critical method of
biblical exegesis [to be] the only valid foundation for theology”. 36 He is not confined
to questions merely regarding praxis and the political significance of the figure of
Jesus and the Gospel generally. Ratzinger thus differentiates himself from “an empty
Jesuanism” that sought to drive a wedge between ‘Jesus’ and ‘Christ’, and focused
on ‘event-Christology’ over against ‘being-Christology’.37 Such a distinction for
Ratzinger is self-defeating and inconsistent with Chalcedon. Jesus as a man only has
“decisive [relevance] for all times” if he is the Christ of God. 38 Only if “Jesus is the
Son of God” can the ‘event’ of Jesus have any consequence. 39 The unrepeatable
event of the Incarnation rests on the “Is” of “Being” and “is God’s deed”.40 Faith
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assures us that “Jesus is Christ, God is man”.41 Emphasising Jesus’ Divine Sonship
enables therefore Christology to escape historicism and assures genuine
Christocentrism. Christocentrism is unintelligible unless it is theocentric and
“acknowledges the Christ in Jesus”.42 Without such recognition of the divinity of
Christ, “allegiance to a merely historical Jesus is hopeless escapism”.43 There
remains a 2000 year gap between the historian and Jesus, which cannot be spanned
by historical method. Only the Church as a believing subject enables the person
today to seek the figure of Jesus Christ, the Risen Lord and Son of God. 44 The Risen
Lord alone can ground hope, not the historians’ Jesus, who would remain confined to
his historical context.

Historical readings of Jesus, which do not pay sufficient heed to his ontological
status as Son of God, can also risk erroneously mixing politics and eschatology.
Ratzinger is sceptical of the capacity for political readings of Jesus, which confine
his significance to the inner-historical, to ground hope. In contrast to Gutiérrez’s
avowed political reading of Jesus, albeit one that does not simply identify Jesus with
the contemporaneous Zealot movement (1.3.4), he argues that Jesus was himself a
historical failure in the prophetic line of Jeremiah, and therefore cannot be
interpreted to support expectation of inner-historical fulfilment (or, it could be added,
liberation). Ratzinger sees Jesus as prophesying Jerusalem’s final destruction. Jesus
predicted Jerusalem’s end because of an impermissible, chiliast mixture of faith and
politics present in the Qumran War Scroll, which was the historical background to
Jesus’s ministry. A chiliast “synthesis of eschatology and politics” is thus foreclosed
to the follower of Christ.45 For Ratzinger, Jesus cannot be read through a political
lens. He was a political failure who preached against mixing eschatology and
politics.

Hope for the early Christians was not understood in political terms or directed to the
realisation of political goals, such as the removal of Roman rule of Jerusalem.
Instead, early Christian hope pointed to a supra-historical end. Ratzinger sees the
41
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Christians’ flight to Pella, Jordan to escape the Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 as clear
evidence of their distance from the ‘Zealot’ movement, and its interpretation of the
biblical message and Jesus’ life and teaching. Significantly, he suggests that the early
Christians’ “hope is of an altogether different kind” from that of the Zealots.46 They
saw that the dispensation of the Temple and its sacrifices were ended in “salvationhistorical terms”, with the “crucified and risen Christ” in their place. 47 As such,
Ratzinger argues that Christianity cannot be understood as “bring[ing] a message of
social revolution”.48 Christ was “not engaged in a fight for political liberation”.49
Christ did not proclaim himself as the Messiah who would politically bridge the gap
between the current aeon and the aeon of God’s direct rule. He did not associate
himself with a Davidic dynasty.50 The figure of Jesus needs thus to be understood
apart from the Zealots’ expectation of God’s direct intervention, which politicised
Israel’s eschatology in its understanding that hope equated to a political instantiation
of a messianic kingdom. Instead, as the divine Son of God, his mission heralded a
new stage of salvation history, in which the limits of political aspiration are
transcended.
3.2.3

Conclusion

A feature of Ratzinger’s theology is his understanding of the irreplaceable
importance of the Council of Chalcedon and its synthesis of the ontological and
historical in Christ for appreciating salvation history. If salvation history is the
historical process by which humanity is redeemed through reconciliation and
participation in God, the simultaneously divine and human Christ, as defined in
Chalcedon, is centrally significant. In him does humanity enter into the divine in the
Incarnation and Paschal Mystery (see further 3.3). History thereby pivots on and
finds its meaning in the Risen Christ, who becomes humanity’s hope (3.5).
Understanding hope as oriented to eternal life with God is thus incomplete without
reference to the place of Christ, as perfect God and perfect man, in salvation history.
He is the Redeemer who opens up the prospect of eternal life with the Father, which
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is the ground of hope in salvation. He is the situs in which humanity passes over into
the divine.

An emphasis on the joining of the human to the divine in Christ marks out
Ratzinger’s Christology from the low Christology prevalent in Schillebeeckx, Metz
and Gutiérrez. A privileging of Christ as the Incarnate Word in Ratzinger grounds a
competing understanding of the hope-history relationship. As suggested in Chapter 1,
it may be that Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez do not specifically abandon
Chalcedonian Christology. If such Christology is, however, not at the forefront of
any considerations of hope and history, those considerations risk floundering on their
own immanence and rest on nothing but historical research and human activity. A
ground of hope is instead sought in contemporary notions of praxis, a Joachimite
hope in a ‘new humanity’ or an always-already supernaturally elevated human
existence.

An exclusive focus on low Christology turns out to be of limited utility. Pace
Schillebeeckx, who argued that Christology cannot light on enduring ontological
formulations but can only rest on historical appropriation of the experience God
(1.3.2), if Christ is not God, he can have no abiding political or critical relevance. In
short, if Christ is not divine, it becomes unclear what about him can ground genuine
hope other than a vague, subjective experience of God. If hope is, as argued in
Chapter 2, oriented to an eternal reality outside the control of the hoping person then
a mere historical figure, no matter how politically relevant or morally inspiring,
cannot ground hope. He or she will always remain historically conditioned and
therefore in some way inaccessible to the contemporary person. Hope cannot be
placed in a mere human person.

3.3

Eschatology and the Paschal Mystery

Ratzinger’s notion that Chalcedonian Christology expresses salvation history is
important in perceiving the manner in which Jesus can ground hope. He can be a
source of hope only if he is ontologically the Son of God, who nevertheless embraces
history and joins humanity to divinity. The joining of the historical to the ontological
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expressed in Chalcedon is apparent in the notion of the ‘eschatological Adam’, which
is a key motif in Ratzinger. The story of salvation is the tale of humanity’s
recapitulation in him, in which humanity is brought into its genuine divinised future,
a process reflected in the notion of the eschatological Adam.51 The concept of Christ
as the eschatological Adam therefore unlocks the Christocentric key to salvation
history and how Christ is the source of hope. It reveals eschatological reality to be
fundamentally Christological in shape, underscoring the unity of Christology and
eschatology. Rather than being merely a political figure, Christ is the eschatological
Adam, in whom humanity is taken up into the divine. He becomes humanity’s future,
the ‘new Adam’ and the object of human hope.

The notion of the eschatological Adam is, moreover, intrinsically connected to the
Passover of Christ. Christ’s own death, Resurrection and Ascension accomplishes the
‘transitus’ of humanity into the divine, which captures the essence of salvation
history (3.2.1). Christ’s Resurrection itself is eschatological because it represents the
beginning of the culmination of God’s saving plan, which is to incorporate humanity
into the life of God. In Christ is this drawing-in achieved (c.f. Jn 12:32). His
Ascension consists of this participation by humanity in divinity and anticipates the
eschatological reality of the eschatological Adam, in which all of redeemed humanity
participates in the life of God. The Risen and Ascended Jesus is thus the ‘new
humanity’ to which humanity and its hope are directed as humanity’s eschatological
realisation.
This section will outline the place of the eschatological Adam in Ratzinger’s
theology. It will then explore the importance of the Paschal Mystery in conceiving
Christ as the ‘last man’, who is thereby the end of Christian hope. In the Passover of
Christ, humanity enter into the life of God, the object of human hope.

3.3.1

Christ, the Eschatological Adam

An understanding of Christ as the ‘eschatological Adam’ is strongly present in
Ratzinger. In reference to his theology, Rowland explains that “Christ is the
51
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eschatological Adam to whom the first Adam already pointed, the true image of God
who transforms man once more into a likeness of God”.52 In respect of Christ,
Ratzinger invokes the Pauline concept of the “last man”, the rendering of which in
the original Greek is the suggestive εσχατος Αδαμ (eschatos Adam) (1 Cor 15:45).53
For Ratzinger, the ‘last man’ is “the final man, who takes man into his future, which
consists of his being, not just man, but one with God”.54 Ratzinger summarises his
eschatological vision in the following way: “Hence man’s future means being one
with God and so being one with mankind, which will be a single, final man in the
manifold unity that is created by the exodus of love.”55 Manifest in Ratzinger is a
recurrent appeal to the notion of the ‘last’ or ‘final man’ or ‘eschatological Adam’ to
describe the telos of humanity as being joined irrevocably to the divine, through a
passing over from mere humanity, into a humanity wedded to God.

Christology and eschatology, as the culmination of salvation history, are thus
interrelated. Ratzinger refers to Patristic and Scholastic theology’s tendency to see
Christology as containing two elements: one, looking back to original sin’s
overcoming in Christ; the other looking forward to humanity’s future realisation in
Christ as the ‘last man’. In this ‘last man’ is “the revelation and the beginning of the
definitive mode of human existence”.56 Therefore Christology “is most deeply
concerned with the future of man, which can be accomplished only as the future of
the whole human race”.57 In the claim that Christ is the ‘final man’, in whom
humanity is to be drawn, humanity’s eschatological and Christological future is
revealed.

The unity between Chalcedonian Christology and eschatological hope is thus evident
in the concept of the eschatological Adam. Humanity’s eschatological hope is for it
to be divinised, which takes place in the Passover of Christ and is expressed in
52
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Chalcedonian dogma. Communion between God and humanity, and among
humanity, is achieved through the incorporation of humanity into the ‘single, final
man’, that is, the ‘eschatological Adam’. Humanity’s eschatological hope is for it to
be recapitulated in the Person of Christ, who reveals humanity’s future to itself and,
in showing that “God ‘is’ man”, already promises a cosmic redemption.58
Underlying Ratzinger’s vision of Christ as the ‘final man’ is a theological vision of
humanity’s eschatological future as the culmination of salvation history, in which
Pauline and Patristic view of the Mystical Body of Christ is important. Referring to
St Paul and the thought of Teilhard de Chardin (even as he is aware of the limits of
its biological terminology), Ratzinger describes Jesus as taking “the next
evolutionary leap, as it were” for humanity, by taking humanity out of selfishness
and into the unity of the body of Christ, by being one in Christ (Gal 3:28). 59 In
Christ, humanity touches its future, and is in fact its future already realised. Faith in
him constitutes the drawing in of humanity into “one single Adam, one single ‘body’
(who is) the man to come”.60 St John’s Gospel likewise records Christ’s
proclamation that he will draw all of humanity to himself when he is lifted up on the
Cross (Jn 12:32). The “man of the future” is the man who is for others, who
sacrifices himself.61 The eschatological Adam will be the body of humanity as the
Mystical Body of Christ.62
Apparent in Ratzinger’s analysis of the eschatological Adam is the Christological
basis for his conception of hope. Like the theologies of futurity, Ratzinger considers
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that Christian faith involves “a looking forward”, in which hope consists.63 Unlike
these theologies, however, he considers that the mere looking out to the future runs
the risk of utopianism, when it bases its aims on nothing more than human ingenuity.
Rather, Christian hope is based on the past of Christ’s saving action on the Cross, the
eternal present of God’s being, and the “Omega of history” who is the man to come,
“in whom God and world will touch each other, and, thus, (constitutes) God in
world, world in God” (c.f. also 1 Cor 15:28).64 Hope finds its zenith in the God-man,
Jesus Christ, who is humanity’s (already) future realisation.

An eschatological conception of Christ guards therefore against a secular humanist
reading of him.65 Ratzinger’s use of the concept of the eschatological Adam
underscores that he considers being drawn into the Body of Christ to be humanity’s
true future. It distinguishes his conception of hope from a nebulous orientation to a
historical future grounded in human activity and anchors it in the concrete Christ,
who as the Son of God and Son of Man draws humanity into the divine life. The
‘better humanity’ of which Schillebeeckx, Metz and Gutiérrez speak as the hope of
human is taken over in Ratzinger by the concept of Christ as the ‘new man’. The
eschatological hope to which we are directed is ineluctably related to Christ,
understood as Son of God, and involves the divinisation of humanity that has already
occurred in the Incarnation and glorification of Christ, and which is the object of
hope.

3.3.2

The Paschal Mystery as the Ground of Hope

The Passover of Christ is central to Ratzinger’s eschatological-Christological account
of hope and understanding of Christ as the ‘last man’. Christ’s Passover is the (sole)
means by which humanity enters into its eschatological future because it is itself
intrinsically eschatological. For Ratzinger, the Resurrection stands at the heart of the
Gospel and proclaims that the power of death has been overcome by God’s power.
Such action of God gives history “an entirely new hope”. 66 History, hitherto

63

Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 242.
Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 242.
65
C.f. Rowland, Faith, 32-33.
66
Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 185.
64

215

characterised by death, is given a ‘new hope’ because the Cross and Resurrection of
Christ are God’s ‘eschatological action’, that is, the eschaton, which is God’s “final
action”.67 The Gospels thus present the Cross and Resurrection of Christ as “the final
hour” of history, involving the singular Resurrection that conquers death.68 God’s
final act is to overcome death for humanity, which is recapitulated in the final man,
whose death and Resurrection makes this possible. The Resurrection is therefore
eschatological because it contains “a cosmic and future-oriented character”; faith in
the Resurrection “is a faith of hope in the fullness of a promise that encompasses the
whole cosmos”.69 The Resurrection of Christ grounds eschatological hope because it
anticipates the cosmic redemption and the triumph of life over death at the end of
time.

Ratzinger understands salvation history through the lens of the Paschal Mystery. For
him, all of salvation history needs to be read under the rubric of the “Passover of
Jesus Christ”.70 In the Cross and Resurrection of Christ, the “inner meaning” of
Israel’s Passover is revealed; the Cross and Resurrection constitute the “ultimate
Passover”, in which is taken up all of salvation history, giving it its full meaning. 71
Salvation history is thus “an exodus history”, begun in Abraham’s departure from his
land, through the liberation of Israel from slavery in Egypt, culminating in the αγάπη
εις τέλος of Christ, his radical loving into the end (c.f. Jn 13:1). Concordant with the
Christology that detects a unity between the Son’s ‘being’ and ‘doing’ (3.2.1),
Christ’s death entails the “total exodus from himself, a going-out-from himself
toward the other”.72 Christ’s Passover is the meaning of salvation history. Joined to
Ratzinger’s claim that Chalcedon likewise expresses the meaning of salvation history
(3.2), it can be suggested that the Paschal Mystery and Chalcedon are intimately
connected. Ratzinger’s Christological reading of salvation history and eschatology
are amplified in reference to the Passover of Christ. The Paschal Mystery represents
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the exodus of humanity “pass[ing] from former ways to newness of life”.73
Chalcedon expresses that this reality is present in Christ, eschatologically so in the
Resurrection. Christ’s Passover inaugurates the eschatological future of humanity as
joined to divinity, and is the source of hope.
Christ’s entry into the sanctuary through the obedient offering of his flesh on the
Cross (Heb 10:20), is the summation of the exoduses through history and the
capstone of salvation history. Christ has gone out from himself into the reality of
God. His death rends the Temple veil separating God from the people and opens the
path for humanity to enter into God through the reconciling sacrifice of Christ.74
Thus, in Christ’s Cross and Resurrection, which is his Passover that constitutes a
“mystery of transition” from death to life, is the new humanity constituted.75 The
Resurrection “gathers all salvation within itself”.76 Christ’s piercing in the side
echoes the opening of the first Adam’s side and offers divine life, through blood and
water, Baptism and Eucharist, to the Church, which is the sacramental sign of this
new humanity. In the sacrifice of the Cross are therefore present atonement for
humanity and the basis for the possibility of being drawn up into “his body”. 77 In
Christ’s reconciling sacrifice on the Cross, and in his Resurrection and Ascension,
the Passover of Jesus Christ is the culmination of salvation history and anticipates
humanity’s eschatological destiny.
The Resurrection and Ascension of Christ mean that, contrary to the Apostles’
expectations, Christ did not usher in a new messianic, inner-historical Davidic
kingdom. The messianic, eschatological reality constituted in Christ is not
exclusively intra-mundane. Christ’s destiny, and the future of humanity, was rather
to enter into God’s “dominion over space”, a dominion grounded in God’s analogical
relationship to creation as its “premise” and “ground”.78 Consequently, Resurrection
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and Ascension hope entails a supra-historical destiny for humanity, joined to the
Creator’s transcendent governance over creation.

In the Resurrection, an entirely new order has thus been instituted. In Jesus(2),
Ratzinger relates the concept of “evolutionary leap” with the Resurrection of
Christ.79 Earlier, he had utilised the concept in his Introduction to Christianity in
connection with Christ as the ‘last man’, to describe him as constituting that ‘leap’ in
human development. The eschatological Adam is the ‘final man’ because he is Risen
and participates in God’s life, which is the qualitative ‘leap’ for humanity. In doing
so, he creates a “space” for the immortal soul to fulfil its natural orientation to
immortality (see further 4).80 The “cosmic body of Christ”, which is the Risen Christ,
thereby becomes the situs in which humanity enters definitive communion with God
and one another.81 In the Risen, Eschatological Christ, humanity participates in
eternity, which is its quantum leap.
The Resurrection and Ascension thus consists in humanity’s participation in the
divine life. For Ratzinger, the Resurrection constitutes an “ontological leap”, in
which Jesus’ humanity “…touches being as such, opening up a new dimension that
affects us all, creating for all of us a new space of life, a new space of being in union
with God.”82 In the Resurrection, Jesus “entered the vast breadth of God himself”.83
In Tertullian’s evocative terminology, with Christ’s Resurrection, “spirit and blood”
are now located ‘within’ the divinity.84 In the Ascension, moreover, Jesus “was taken
up into God’s very being”.85 Suggestive of the Chalcedonian expression of the
mystery of Christ, Ratzinger claims that the ‘evolutionary leap’ allows “for the union
of the finite with the infinite, for the union of man and God” and for the subsequent
“conquest of death”.86 Humanity has been taken irrevocably up in to the divine life in
the Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus of Nazareth. In referring to the ‘leap’ of the
Resurrection as the anticipation of humanity’s eschatological fulfilment, Ratzinger
describes therefore humanity’s hope as ontological participation in God’s eternity. In
79

Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 274.
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 274.
81
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 274.
82
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 274.
83
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 244-245.
84
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 274 citing De Resurrect. Mort. 51:3, CCSL II, 994.
85
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 287.
86
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 247.
80

218

the Resurrection, Christ enables humanity to attain to “a new possibility of human
existence…that affects everyone and that opens up a future, a new kind of future, for
mankind”.87 The Resurrection grounds hope in a definitively better future, which
consists not in the improvement of history but the instantiation of a new humanity
through the eschatological Resurrection of Christ.

As the culmination of the Paschal Mystery, the Ascension is the manifestation of
hope. It represents humanity’s definitive, ontological participation in the life of God.
Ratzinger argues that the liturgical feast of Christ’s Ascension expresses “the essence
of Christian hope”.88 He refers to the closing prayer’s plea that the faithful’s heart be
turned to “where our substance already dwells”, in Christ who is in heaven with the
Father.89 Through Christ’s Ascension, humanity dwells with God: as a result, “our
substance is already in paradise”, which is the hope of humanity. 90 The humanity of
Christ has entered definitively into the divine power through the Resurrection and
Ascension. Because of the ontological unity of humanity, moreover, through the
hypostatic union of Christ’s humanity to his divinity, as expressed at Chalcedon, the
human race as it were is united to God. One who hopes is, as a result of the
Ascension, one whose “life enter[s] into reality itself, to live in and by the body of
Christ”.91 Through the Ascension, in Christ, humankind is with God. The ‘better
future’ in which we hope is the joining of humanity to the divinity, and the promise
of an eternal life that conquers death and consists of a new, ontological reality for
humanity.
It is consequently Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension, which unlocks the key to
eschatological hope. The Paschal Mystery effects the mystery of salvation history, in
which humanity is taken up into divinity. Ratzinger would affirm with the Christian
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tradition that without the Resurrection, Christian faith is meaningless and that it is
the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ, and the promise of the General
Resurrection, that constitute the object of human hope (1 Cor 15:12-34). Only
Christ’s Resurrection grounds the existence of the “main” (which can be read as a
reference to ‘fundamental’) hope in eternal life and divine salvation.92

3.3.3

Conclusion

Eschatological hope is thus grounded in the Paschal Mystery, in which humanity
passes over into the divinity. In the eschatological Adam is this reality present. The
Risen and Ascended Lord is the future of humanity that is divinised, and the end of
human history.

3.4

Salvation History is to be read as ‘Already, Not Yet’

Conceiving the Resurrection as eschatological and centring eschatological hope on
the Risen and Ascended Christ carries implications for the way Ratzinger conceives
history. The Communio position understands history from the time of Christ as
bearing the mark of the eschatological. Salvation history is simultaneously ‘already’
and ‘not yet’. The Church and the Kingdom of God do not drive history according to
its own immanent potentiality but within history bear witness to, and communicate,
eschatological reality, which stands outside history.
This section describes the ‘already, not yet’ nature of salvation history by exploring
the eschatological and historical character of the Resurrection. It will then explore
the implications of conceiving salvation history in this way, and the importance of
the concept of the ‘Age of Gentiles’ and a Chalcedonian Christological reading of the
Kingdom in Ratzinger’s conception of history as ‘already, not yet’.
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3.4.1

The Resurrection as Eschatological and Historical

As noted in 3.3.2, Jesus’s Resurrection is eschatological because, in anticipating
humanity’s participation in divinity and glorification, it is God’s ‘final action’. The
Resurrection is, therefore, by definition supra-historical. Having been raised into the
divine life, the Risen Christ now “stands above” history. 93 His Resurrection, as
eschatological, “transcends history” and is not a historical occurrence like his birth or
crucifixion.94 The end-state of history is thus instituted in Christ’s Resurrection. It
represents humanity’s transcendence of death and becoming. The Resurrection is the
humanity’s definitive entry into divine life and not a mere return to the historical
existence and death that preceded it.

The eschatological Resurrection of Jesus nevertheless bears on, and is bound up in,
history.95 History is altered through the eschatological action of the Resurrection.
The Resurrection “burst[s] open history and usher[s] in a new dimension commonly
described as eschatological”.96 Ratzinger notes that Jewish faith expected a
resurrection of the dead. However, it did not expect such a “new mode of life” and an
associated “inbreaking of a new world” to occur in the “midst of the continuing old
world”, that is, in historical existence.97 Rather, the eschaton expected by the Jewish
faith at the end of time happened “in history”.98 Despite its transcendent dimension,
the Resurrection is rooted in history because it concerns a historical personage who
died (within history). The Resurrection simultaneously “reaches above history and is
founded and anchored in history” and “up to a certain point still belongs there”.99
Ratzinger consequently makes the apparently bold claim that the Resurrection entails
the “transposition into history” of eschatology.100 God’s eschatological activity
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possesses “historicity”.101 In a sense, through the Resurrection and, we will see, the
Church and the liturgy, the historical becomes a receptacle of the eschatological.
Nevertheless, even as the Resurrection is rooted in history, Ratzinger’s
understanding of the simultaneously eschatological and historical nature of the
Resurrection is not a secularisation of the eschaton. The eschatological is not
confined to the historical. The Resurrection, while historical in a sense, is
eschatological precisely because it points to a trans-historical reality, the utterly new
eschaton in which humanity is taken up into the divine reality. It is only intelligible,
moreover in light of a Chalcedonian Christology, which sees the union of the divine
and human in Christ. Precisely as Chalcedonian, however, the historical is implicated
in the eschatological because of the joining of the human to the divine. It shows the
Paschal Mystery as taking humanity into the divinity immanent to but also
transcendent of creation.

3.4.2

The Implications of the Resurrection as Eschatological for Conceiving
History as ‘Already, Not Yet’

Understanding God’s eschatological action in the Resurrection as implicating the
historical has consequences for conceptualising the relationship between eschatology
and history. It affects the meaning of eschatology and the salvific import of history
after the Resurrection and the possibilities thereby implicit in historical action and
change for the future. For Ratzinger, that the “eschaton already takes place in history
rather than just at its end considerably alters the nature of the eschatological as
such.”102 The eschatological does not belong entirely to the future, consisting of the
establishment of God’s Reign at the end of time. That the eschatological has
happened in (and beyond) history, in the Resurrection of Christ means eschatology is
not predicated on a dialectical view of history, which rejects the past and expectant
of a future utopia. Rather, it is grounded in the historical life and death, and
eschatological Resurrection, of Jesus Christ, who in rising from the dead, ushered in
humanity’s glorified future.
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The meaning of salvation history is thus affected by the Resurrection’s character as
simultaneously historical and eschatological. Related to Oscar Cullman’s conception
of salvation history, Ratzinger considers that it is to be read “under the double sign of
‘already’ and ‘not yet’”.103 He avers that the “separation between middle and end”
(see further below) signified in an understanding of history as ‘already, not yet’
affects “both the idea and reality of what we call salvation”.104 Salvation is rooted in
the change that the Resurrection makes to history. The eschaton has incipiently,
‘already’ begun in Christ’s saving Paschal Mystery, which makes available the
means of salvation within history, while anticipating eschatological reality outside
history, which is ‘not yet’ realised.
In construing salvation history as ‘already, not yet’, Ratzinger relies on two key
figures: Cullmann and Jean Daniélou. To explain salvation history as ‘already, not
yet’, Cullmann uses a metaphor drawn from the Second World War. He compares
Christ’s (first) coming with ‘D-Day’, the determinative military battle which put the
Allies on the course to victory. There was, however, a gap between ‘D-Day’ and
‘victory day’, the moment of the victory’s realisation. Likewise, Christ’s advent is
the “turning point” of history (the “mid-point” in Cullmann’s scheme), even if it did
“not coincide with the end of world history”.105 In Schnackenburg’s lapidary terms,
“[t]he time of fulfilment was not yet the time of completion”.106 As a result, history
may continue for an indefinite duration even if the ‘victory’ has already been won.107
According to Cullmann’s idea of salvation history then, there is an important
distinction between Jesus’s advent and the definitive realisation of victory.

Ratzinger detects a parallel between Cullmann and Daniélou. Daniélou distinguishes
between “middle and end, τέλος [telos] and πέρας [peras]”.108 Referring both these
terms to Christ, Daniélou distinguishes between Christ as the “end” or “goal” of
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history (telos) and Christ as its “boundary” or “limit” (peras).109 The former refers to
history’s fulfilment, whereas the latter refers to its chronological limit or end.110
Christ is simultaneously the fulfilment and end of time, yet there remains a
separation between Christ’s fulfilment of history as its telos, in his first coming, and
the end of time, at his Second Coming.
A conception of salvation history as ‘already, not yet’ signifies that Christ has
‘already’ won the decisive battle. Referring to the “true meaning of Christmas”,
Ratzinger states that it “is the birthday of the undefeated Light”. 111 In the darkness of
history and the seasonal recurrence of the death of winter and the growth of spring,
there is now “certainty … [that] the light will not die, but has already achieved final
victory”.112 He has “dethrone[d]…the world elements”, a reference to the
eschatological signs anticipated in the Gospels.113 The victory of Christ is seen in his
eschatological glorification in the Resurrection and Ascension, stemming from his
revelation in the flesh at Christmas.
The ‘already’ element of salvation history needs, however, to be paired with the ‘not
yet’ component. ‘Not yet’ has Christ’s victory been consummated. Sin and death
seemingly continue their dominion in our historical existence. In Ratzinger’s words,
“from a worldly perspective, nothing has been changed” in Christ’s first coming;
Christianity apparently “makes no difference” to the nature of world history. 114 The
“messianic hope” promising the relinquishment of the tools of war and an
uninterrupted peace has “not been fulfilled, but remain[s] an expectation of the
future” (Is 2:4, Mi 4:3f).115 The past Christian event did not, seemingly, cure history
of its defects. As discussed in Chapter 2, history remains peccable. Life in God has
not been communicated definitively to the Body of Christ. Thus, while Christ
himself participates in eschatological reality, his followers do not while history
remains to be completed.
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3.4.3

The ‘Age of Gentiles’

The distinction between ‘victory’ and ‘end’ implies a distinct and necessary stage in
salvation history, which is characterised by the reality of victory without its full
actualisation. An important stage, it allows the body of Christ through history to be
drawn into the eschatological Adam. Ratzinger describes Cullmann’s “vital
distinction” between the victory and its realisation, stating that the Gospel
pronounces a “new epoch: the age of the ‘already’ and ‘not yet,’ the already realized
midpoint and the still future end.”116 A distinction between victory and its full
realisation creates therefore an “intermediate age”, an “interval … [which] is a
decisive factor in Jesus’ message”.117 In this intermediate period, “not yet [is] the
arrival of open veritas”, the culmination of history’s movement from umbra-imagoveritas.118 Instead, it is the age of the imago, in which the light is more clearly seen
but still as image rather than in verity. The age corresponds not to the arrival of
paradise but the Israelites forty-year exodus, a period of simultaneous exile and
liberation.119 Christ’s Paschal Mystery inaugurates thus a new age in salvation
history, which bears the character of a won but unrealised victory.
Ratzinger’s insistence on the notion of an ‘intermediate age’ as integral to the Gospel
proclamation distinguishes his eschatology from one that reads Jesus’s proclamation
through a lens of ‘imminent expectation’. He contends against the exegetical
argument that Luke’s Gospel invented an ‘age of the Gentiles’ in the eschatological
discourses of Christ (Lk 21:24). Positing an ‘interim period’ in such a way
purportedly recast the “temporal axis of the Gospels and of Jesus’ original message”
and created “the time of the Church as a new phase of salvation history”. 120 An
imminent chronological expectation of the end of the world was displaced with the
fabrication of a new period in which the Church is to operate and was the Church’s
reading back into Christ’s message the “delay” it experienced in the arrival of the
Parousia.121

116

Ratzinger, Eschatology, 53.
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 53, 60.
118
Benedict, “Grace and Vocation without Remorse,” 176.
119
Benedict, “Grace and Vocation without Remorse,” 176-177.
120
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 42.
121
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 35-36.
117

225

Against an exegesis of imminent end, Ratzinger argues that all Synoptic Gospels
proclaim a period of the Gentiles, during which the Gospel is to be taken to all
nations (Mt 24:14, Mk 13:10). Thus, contrary to Gutiérrez’s interpretive hesitations
regarding the ‘eschatological discourses’ (1.3.4), he considers Luke’s historical
account of the fall of Jerusalem to be separate from a description of the world’s end.
Rather, Jerusalem’s fall signified the beginning of “the dispersion of Israel”, “the
hour of the Gentiles” and an “open-ended future for the world”.122 Moreover, Mark’s
use of “in illo tempore” to connect Jerusalem’s fall with the end is but an editor’s
construction and not a chronological account of the relationship between the
events.123 Similarly, Matthew’s use of the Greek euthys to describe the manner of the
Parousia should not be interpreted as “immediately” but “suddenly”. 124 For
Ratzinger, entirely consistent with the message of the Gospel is an Age of the
Gentiles, with no pre-determined end or immediate chronological connection to the
fall of Jerusalem.
Ratzinger’s reading of the Synoptic tradition as proclaiming not an imminent end of
the world but an Age of the Church or Gentiles is congruent with a broader
Communio reading of history. Daniélou argued that the content or meaning of history
in the ‘already, not yet’ period is the Church’s missionary task to build up
sacramentally the body of Christ. Missionary charity is directed to the evangelisation
of peoples in expectation of the Parousia, with the Parousia dependent in some way
on the proclamation of the Gospel to the nations. A similar vision of the meaning of
history after Christ animates John Henry Cardinal Newman, who argued, with
reference to a high Christology, that “once the Christ [the high Priest] had
come…nothing remained but to gather in His Saints…and nothing more was left to
do”.125 The purpose of history – what ‘we’ are ‘doing’ as ‘Church’ – is not to build a
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better future but draw people sacramentally into the mystical body of Christ, in order
for them to become saints.

Recognition of a period of the Church also relates to the Augustinian view of two
societies remaining present within history, the City of God and the City of Man.
Between the two cities is “dramatic tension”, because of the transition between the
historical epochs of “total history” brought about by Christ’s victory. 126 History has
entered a new phase, which could be described as eschatological, while continuing to
bear the marks of sin. In Daniélou’s words, the “true society is today the people of
God, the church [sic]”.127 In this people of God subsists the Kingdom of God, which
has already come with Christ (see 3.4.4). The Christian is thus a citizen of the City of
God, which has not yet won total victory, while living in a passing world (c.f. 1 Jn
2:17). In this period of waiting, the Christian is called to expand Christianity with a
“missionary charity” that “hasten[s] the day of the Parousia for themselves”.128 There
is an ‘interim period’ of world history in which the Church is to take the Gospel to
the ends of the earth (Mt 28:19).
An idea of there being an “interim time” between victory and fulfilment is therefore
crucial to Ratzinger’s conceptions of eschatology and the kingdom of God.129 The
eschatological nature of the Resurrection, which was also historical, continues to be
present in history in the Church from the first advent of Christ. Ratzinger argues that
the New Testament does not present an eschatology that merely projects the
eschaton’s realisation long into the future. Instead, “the ‘eschatological’ is always
also somehow present”.130 Ratzinger thus develops “an eschatology of the present”,
which, although retaining the expectation of a definitive, transformative coming of
Christ that has not yet occurred, gives eschatological significance to the “adventus
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medius, the middle coming”.131 Ratzinger borrows the concept of adventius medius
from St Bernard of Clairvaux, who distinguishes it from the first and second
comings. The ‘middle coming’ refers to Christ’s presence in the world now through
the sacraments, circumstances and saints.

The adventius medius has eschatological significance as the period in which the
Gospel is communicated across space and time prior to its definitive realisation at the
end of time. Ratzinger considers that the concept of a time of the Gentiles as a
necessary “prelude to the End” belongs to the heart of the Gospels – because
eschatology aims at the universal “salvation of all” – and is not an arbitrary
addition.132 The “time of the Gentiles” is “essential” to “the history of God and
man”.133 He argues “that Jesus did not want to bring the perfected new world of
peace in an immediate way”.134 Implicitly, he intended to establish the interval as the
space in which humanity chooses for or against God. It is the period of “God’s
patience”, in which he “reigns from a tree” (Regnavit a ligno Deus).135 The Age of
the Church is not characterised by definitive “cosmic transformation” but is the “time
of freedom”, in which the “crucified love of Jesus Christ” is offered to humanity, the
free response to which allows humanity to be gathered into God’s Kingdom.136 For
Ratzinger, the interval between Christ’s first and second comings forms a
fundamental component of salvation history. It enables the universalisation of the
offer of salvation, which will not be coerced but offered freely.137
Ratzinger rejects therefore an eschatology of ‘imminent end’. He acknowledges “the
unmistakeable traces of an expectation that the world will end soon” present in the
New Testament.138 He argues, however, that an interpretation of imminent end fails
to explain early Christianity’s self-understanding, as well as its continuing appeal
once such an imminent end did not occur. Ratzinger points to parables in the Gospels
such as the catch of the good and bad fish (Mt 13:47) and the wheat and darnel (Mt
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13:24-30), as well as references to the Kingdom of God being like a mustard seed,
which grows into a large tree (Mk 4:30-32), or a leaven (Mt 13:33, Lk 13:20). These
parables preclude an “apocalyptic interpretation of Jesus’ Kingdom proclamation”
and thus “a purely imminent eschatology”.139 The Gospel does not proclaim an
imminent and conclusive irruption of the Kingdom with the first coming of Christ.
To speak of a growth of the Kingdom would therefore be unintelligible if Christ’s
message exclusively is to be interpreted under the lens of imminent expectation.
Rather than Christ’s proclamation regarding the Kingdom giving rise to expectation
of an imminent irruption of God’s reign on earth, Ratzinger suggests that his
statements regarding the Kingdom expressed “its meagre dimension within
history”.140 Jesus proclaimed that the Kingdom of God was to exist within history
and to grow throughout time, being paltry in scope. Christ’s proclamation regarding
the closeness of the Kingdom and its presence among us shows “a process of coming
that has already begun and extends over the whole of history” (Mk 1:15, Mt 12:28,
Lk 17:21).141 Although certain Gospel passages give rise to the theory of imminent
expectation, Ratzinger suggests that the countervailing passages concerning the
growth of God’s Kingdom necessitates an alternative conclusion. God’s Kingdom is
already here incipiently and is to spread throughout history in the Age of the
Gentiles, not in the form of utopia but as the City of God on earth.

3.4.4

A Chalcedonian Christological Reading of the Kingdom

An ‘already’, ‘not yet’ view of salvation history supports Ratzinger’s interpretation
of Christ’s proclamation of the Kingdom as already present within history and
operative in the Age of the Gentiles but not definitively realised. Relevant in this
regard

is

the

Chalcedonian

and

therefore

Christocentric,

theocentric,

pneumatological and Trinitarian reading of the Kingdom of God that Ratzinger
presents. Ratzinger tends to identify Christ with the Kingdom of God, and the
Kingdom with the Lordship of the one Trinitarian, God. The Kingdom is not
therefore to be definitively instantiated within history and understood in temporal,
139
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geographic or political terms. Expectation of a political inner-historical Kingdom of
God is therefore mistaken.

Ratzinger casts the Kingdom in Christocentric and therefore personalist terms. He
refers to a concept deriving from a “splendid coinage of Origen’s”, that is, the idea
that “Jesus is hē autobasileia, ‘the Kingdom in Person’”.142 He, Jesus himself,
constitutes the Kingdom. Thus, Ratzinger does not think that the Kingdom is a
geographical notion comparable to political jurisdictions, which have a concern to
modify “earthly circumstances”.143 For Ratzinger, eschatology’s “departure-point is a
person, not a program”.144 If the Son is the “answer to the question of the Kingdom”,
Jesus’ proclamation concerning the Kingdom cannot be reduced to “(merely)
changed living conditions”.145 It does not fundamentally concern sociological
improvement but must always be referred back to Christ and his soteriological
significance (5). The Kingdom is, therefore, not a “space-time” concept, but a
Christological one.146 The Kingdom is centred on Christ the person (and those drawn
into his Body).

Ratzinger prefers Christological, and in turn theocentric and pneumatological,
interpretations of the Kingdom. The supposed distinction between the pre-Easter
proclamation of the Kingdom and the post-Easter proclamation of Christology is
rendered nugatory by the notion that the Kingdom is present in Christ. The
proclamation of the Kingdom is a proclamation of Christ, and so concerns
Christology and is continuous with the post-Easter proclamation. In being an
intrinsically Christological notion, moreover, the Kingdom of God is theocentric and
pneumatological, and therefore Trinitarian. In Jesus’ message concerning the
Kingdom, he is proclaiming the presence of God’s action in the “midst of them”,
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meaning that God is proximate to humanity.147 Precisely because Christ is God, God
in Christ is working in “history in a wholly new way”. 148 Furthermore, because
Jesus’ action is divine, the Kingdom is pneumatological. The Kingdom is not simply
to be equated with Jesus’ physical presence, but also with “his action, accomplished
in the Holy Spirit”.149 Jesus constitutes the Kingdom because it is “through him that
the Spirit of God acts in the world”.150 Consequently, the proclamation of the
Kingdom of God is fundamentally theocentric and trinitarian. It concerns God
because it points to the mystery of the Person of Jesus Christ and refers to “God’s
presence in his own action and being”.151 God comes into history in a novel way and
establishes his reign in the Person of Jesus Christ, through the working of the Holy
Spirit.

Understanding the Kingdom according to Chalcedonian Christology unlocks,
moreover, the meaning of salvation history as ‘already, not yet’. Ratzinger argues
that the “answer to the question of the Kingdom is… no other than the Son” because
he bridges “the unbridgeable gulf between already and not yet”. 152 Old Testament
hopes in historical signs of God’s eschatological activity in a human Messiah and the
incommensurability of an eschatological transformation within that history find an
“inner unity” in the God-man Jesus Christ.153 His coming at the end of time, as “a
pure act of God”, is not a historical development but is “without precedent”, yet
entails also humanity’s redemption with its cooperation, which occurs from
history.154 The split between telos and peras, victory and consummation, middle and
end, finds its answer in the Person of Christ, to whom humanity and divinity is
predicated and into whom humanity is being drawn.
Christ is the simultaneously ‘already’ directing humanity to its ‘not yet’ realised
future. In Christ, whose Resurrection as has been noted is God’s eschatological
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activity and humanity’s glorification, “the future is present”.155 ‘Already’ is the
“Kingdom at hand”.156 Christ in his humanity mediates God’s eschatological action
in history; in his divinity, he acts immediately as God. There is thus an incipient
realisation ‘already’ of the eschatological reality of the Kingdom of God here and
now in the proximity of God’s action in the Church through the Holy Spirit.
Nevertheless, precisely as God, Christ’s reign is not confined to history and points to
eschatological fulfilment ‘not yet’ present. God’s reign “transcends and reaches
beyond the whole of history”.157 Christ as the eschatological telos of history reveals
that it cannot be perfected within itself but that its consummation will occur outside
of history, even while he is that telos come within history and marks its boundary as
its peras. Thus, in Christ, the Kingdom is already present in history and thereby
anticipates the uninterrupted reign of God that will be instantiated outside of history.
3.4.5

Conclusion

This section has presented Ratzinger’s view of salvation history as simultaneously
‘already’ bearing the traces of victory, while that victory has not yet been realised.
His ‘already, not yet’ of history depends upon a view of the Resurrection as
eschatological and historical. Through the Resurrection, the eschaton has already
been effected, even as the Resurrection touches on but is not confined by history.
Although victory has been accomplished in Christ’s Paschal Mystery, its fruits
remain to be communicated through history in the Age of the Gentiles. As essential
to eschatology is to universalise Christ’s victory, the Church is through history to
seek to draw into the Body of Christ the saints of God. In this regard, the Kingdom is
to be understood in Christological and Trinitarian terms, not spatial-temporal terms.

3.5

Eschatological Hope is Centred on Christ

A view of salvation history as bearing ‘already’ the eschatological reality manifested
in the Resurrection transmitted in an ‘eschatology of the present’, which itself points
to a ‘not yet’ realised fulfilment outside history, is comprehensible only in reference
to the Person of Christ. Relatedly, eschatological hope, as directed to the eternal life
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promised by Christ’s victory finds its source and direction in the Person of Christ,
who is human and divine and who has gone ahead of us into God, and who bears
within himself the ‘already, not yet’ of salvation history. Hope is intrinsically
Christological.
This section will outline Ratzinger’s view that it is Christ himself who is the object
of hope, not inner historical improvement. The object of hope is not chronological
but as the divine-human Christ ever-present to history. Hope is thereby directed to
him, and involves waiting on him, who is the turning point of history.

3.5.1

Christ the ‘Skandalon’ is the Basis for Hope as ‘Already, Not Yet’

A Christocentric, personalist understanding of the Kingdom and salvation history as
‘already, not yet’ reveals Christ as the answer to the aporia arising from the gap
between victory and its consummation. For Ratzinger, it is precisely in the scandal of
the difference between victory and realisation, and the history that continues to be
marked by sin and death, that the centrality of Christ to eschatology becomes
manifest. Paradoxically, as a result of the scandal, Christianity “directs man, beyond
all his relationships, to what is essentially himself”, namely his incorporation into the
‘single, final man’, which is the eschatological Adam.158 Christ himself is the
“skandolon”, the stumbling block that enables humanity to realise that the “essential
thing” is not historical progress, economic or political liberation, but Christ the
“Cornerstone”.159 In the “impatience and embarrassment” of waiting for worldly
transformation, the Christian realises that Christ is the object of Christian hope and
eschatological expectation, not a “religiously grounded shangri-la”.160 In this way,
Christ becomes the object of eschatological expectation, a conclusion which
relativises all other claims on hope.

The object of hope and eschatological expectation is Christ present in the Church,
whose victory thus exists within history, but who awaits humanity as history’s goal
outside of that history. For Ratzinger, the important content of the Gospel and
158
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therefore of Gospel hope is that Christ “is alive now, that he is Life itself, in whom
we, too, come alive”.161 The New Testament shows that Christ, in whom “paradise is
opened”, is “paradise, light, fresh water, [and] the secure peace” to which human
hope is directed.162 According to Ratzinger, “…lived hope…is a looking-forward in
Christ’s presence, with Christ who is present, to the perfecting of his Body, to his
definitive coming.”163 Ratzinger thus describes hope’s object as involving “being
with Christ”, which opens up participation in the eternal bliss of heaven.164
Significantly, it is this abiding relationship that is the “lasting motive of Christian
joy”.165 Hopeful joy is grounded in an already present communion with Christ, which
is oriented to the perfection of his mystical Body at the end of time.
Hope in Christ contains therefore the character of ‘already, not yet’. The ‘already’
nature of hope is based upon the future eschatological reality that Christ
communicates in the “present”, based on his past saving actions. 166 Ratzinger argues
that “the future is hidden in the present”.167 There is a “continuing relationship” that
Christ has with his followers and the world, an abiding relationship grounded in the
“perfect tense” of God’s historical-eschatological action in the Resurrection.168 The
perfect tense’s signification of a “past event with present effect” in relation to the
Passover of Christ is the authentic “present tense” for the Christian, who enjoys now
the fruits of that eschatological action while awaiting the fulfilment of “its promise
and its future”.169 Evident is, however, the “living eschatological tension”
constitutive of Christian hope’s expectation of the Parousia in the ‘already, not yet’
intermediate stage of salvation history.170 Ratzinger (and Pieper) cites Augustine’s
claim that “[o]f course we do not yet see what we hope for”. 171 Christian hope in the
future reality already won by Christ possesses the tension of eschatological
expectation for an as yet unrealised consummation.
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The communion with Christ, which forms the basis of the ‘already, not yet’ Christian
hope, is based on the sacramental communication of the fruits of the Paschal
Mystery. Baptism imparts the substance of eternal life to the believer (2.3.6),
enabling the baptised to participate in Christ’s death, Resurrection and Ascension
(c.f. Rom 6), and anticipate heavenly glory. The baptised possess an “already
hidden” life with Christ, who is in God, which means that even in historical existence
we are “‘raised’ with him at the Father’s right hand (c.f. Col 3:1-3)”.172 The union of
the divine and human in Christ means humanity is joined to Christ’s victory in
heaven ‘now’. Christology and hope are intrinsically related because in Jesus’ entry
into the inner sanctum, the “sure and steadfast anchor of our life” has entered into the
dwelling of God.173 Through union with the victorious Christ the human person
anticipates his own victory. ‘Already’ does the believer lays a claim on the object of
hope – to be united with Christ and enjoy heavenly bliss in the ‘final man’ – even if
he cannot claim that object definitively.

The abiding relationship with Christ given in Baptism and which grounds the
believer’s hope is perpetuated in and nourished by the Church’s liturgy. The liturgy
communicates the fruits of the Paschal Mystery through time, anticipates the
fulfilment of redemptive hope and reveals the Christocentric nature of hope. The
Church’s liturgy, especially the Eucharist, contains the mystery of Christ and is thus
itself the ‘already, not yet’ of salvation history. It makes present Christ in the Church
in history but points to history’s transcendent culmination in the Heavenly Banquet
when Christ returns.
In this regard, Pieper’s observations that the ‘Great Banquet’, in which the person
feasts and communes with divinity outside time, is the object of hope (2), resonates
with the Christocentric nature of Ratzinger’s concept of hope. For Ratzinger, the
New Testament speaks of what is “unspeakable” – Christ’s Parousia – in the
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language and imagery of liturgy.174 The liturgy is the graced sphere “in the world” in
which God is touched.175 Consequently, Christ’s Second Coming intensifies and
fulfils what is already made present in the liturgy. As a corollary, the Liturgy is “a
Parousia-like event taking place in our midst”; hence, “[e]very Eucharist is
Parousia”.176 The liturgy, therefore, simultaneously contains the trumpet call
announcing Christ’s Second Coming (c.f. Mt 24:31, 1 Cor 15:52), while also “even
more truly” bearing within it “the tensed yearning” for the manifestation of “Christ’s
hidden Glory”.177 The liturgy is the ‘already, not yet’ of Christian hope because it
actualises Christ’s presence, which is to be definitively revealed.

Understood in this way, the liturgy both is an act of hope and grounds hope in the
Lord’s return. It is an act of hope because it orients the Church to what is to come,
while making it also present. The “cultic event” of the liturgy, which involves
encountering God, is an “anticipation that points beyond itself”.178 It fosters hope
because it is the space in which “Christ’s coming occurs as an ‘eschatological event’
in the midst of the world” even as it is directed to a future fulfilment. 179 The hoping
Christian is “to live the Liturgy as a feast of hope-filled presence directed towards
Christ, the universal ruler”.180 Christ is the “true temple”, who is simultaneously “the
world’s future in the world’s present”.181 As a result, he is the “‘true Israelite’ (cf. Jn
1:47)” in whom God’s Kingdom inheres and whose reign is made “present in the
liturgy”.182 The Eucharist is a central element, therefore, of Christ’s “coming that has
already begun and extends over the whole of history”.183 Jesus returned from death in
the Resurrection, continues to come to the Church in the Eucharistic liturgy, and is
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the one whose future coming is proclaimed in the liturgy. He is thus “the hope of the
world”.184 Christ, made present in the liturgy, grounds and is the Christian’s hope.

3.5.2

Eschatological Hope is Not Chronological

As oriented to the Person of Jesus Christ, conceived in Chalcedonian terms,
eschatology – like the Kingdom – is not chronological. Its emphasis is not the
spatial-temporal dimension but rather the Parousia personified in Christ, who is
transcendentally present to history. In Ratzinger’s pithy words, “Christian hope is not
some news item about tomorrow or the day after tomorrow”.185 The Lord’s response
to the Apostles at the moment of his Ascension (“It is not for you to know times or
seasons…”) (Acts 1:7) rules out any “[s]peculation over history” and “looking ahead
into the unknown future”.186 Rather, the union of the historical and ontological in the
God-man, Christ who ascended into heaven and participates in God’s dominion,
orients eschatology away from any need to calculate or ‘chronologise’ the End.

Nevertheless, the historical has significance for the End precisely in pointing beyond
it. In his humanity, Christ bears within himself the historical. Consequently, the
‘signs’ of Christ’s coming, which presage the end of time (Mt 24:3), amount to
“historical preconditions” of the End.187 In consideration of the End, historical events
such as war, catastrophe and persecution are relevant. However, the signs are
universal and recur throughout history, preventing “a dating of the End”.188 Rather
than allowing speculation regarding “where” or “when” the End will be, these signs
direct people in all times and places to cast their attention to the End as such.189
Through the Incarnation and the Resurrection of Christ, history is pointed towards an
incommensurable end by the existence of the historical signs of the End.

Instead of seeking to chronologise the end, eschatology is concerned with the reality
that has been actualised in Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension. The End is not far
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off in the distant future but is immediately present to all of history. As God is present
to creation, so is the dominion eschatologically realised in Christ’s Ascension (3.3.2).
To quote Newman:
When He says that He will come soon, ‘soon’ is not a word of time but of natural
order. This present state of things, ‘the present distress,’ as St Paul calls it [1 Cor
7:26], is ever close upon the next world and resolves itself into it.190

The End, manifest in historical crisis and catastrophe, has an “ever present” bearing
on historical reality because historico-temporal reality, speaking analogically,
‘always’ touches up against the “wholly other”.191 The ‘wholly other’ refers to
Christ’s relationship to history as the Divine Word. As God, he stands entirely
outside history and yet is immanent to it. Consequently, his “coming is quite
incommensurable with historical time and its immanent laws of development”.192
Revelation teaches us that Christ’s Second Coming, which constitutes the unknown
hour of fulfilment, will come suddenly and confound human plans (Mt 24:36: Mk
13:32; Lk 17:26-30, 21:34-36).193 It cannot be dated or calculated according to
historical logic, because the eschatological is not in itself historical. Rather, as a
consequence of the Paschal Mystery, it is now part of God’s simultaneous radical
transcendence from, and immanence to, history.
Ratzinger’s conception of eschatology as not being chronological also aligns with
Pieper’s understanding of the import of the theological tradition concerning the
apocalypse. As we saw in Chapter 2, according to Pieper’s more general conception
of the non-specifiability of hope, ‘the time and date of fulfilment [of hope is]
unknown to us’.194 He argues, moreover, that contained in the prophecy of the
Apocalypse is a claim regarding the “non-datability of the events” of the End.195 It is
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“spurious apocalyptics” to try to predict the moment of the End based on historical
“‘omens’”.196 ‘Impatient’ desire to know the chronology of the end distracts attention
from the main point of prophetic apocalyptics, namely that it involves trans-historical
deliverance and, in Ratzinger’s conception, revolves around Christ. Pieper quotes
Aquinas that neither short nor long durations of time can be described to identify the
moment of the End.197 Hope’s object and its fulfilment are outside our
prognostications because it is directed to the Person of Christ.
Underlying Pieper and Ratzinger’s position regarding the non-possibility and nonnecessity of calculating the moment of the end is a classical, analogical metaphysics
(see further 4), and a Chalcedonian Christology.198 The End is ‘ever-present’ because
God is immanent to but transcendent of history, a reality disclosed in the
understanding that God is similar but ever-greater than creation. In an argument
directly contrary to Hegel’s immanent ontology (and Darwinian evolutionism),
Ratzinger argues that Christ “is not the product of evolution or a dialectical stage in
the processive self-expression of reason”.199 That is, Christ is not the end result of
immanent historical laws or logic of reason. Instead, he is “the Other” who stands
outside time and death, and opens them from that position.200 Through Christ,
moreover, God will come in a human and divine manner, in a manner that thus
transcends history’s logic but which nevertheless “concerns all history”.201 Christ, as
God, is ever-greater than history but more intrinsic to it than itself. In him, moreover,
is recapitulated the historical. However, as Chapter 4 will argue, the transposition of
history into eternity will be cataclysmic and beyond human reckoning because
temporality and eternity belong to different orders of being.

For Ratzinger, history stands immediately in relationship to the eternal God, who has
already wrought eschatological victory in the Passover of Christ. In summary,
therefore, the “final hour” described in the New Testament as applicable to the
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present age (the RSVCE has “last hour” – 1 Jn 2:18) expresses not “chronological
content”, but a constant, universal “certain inner closeness to the end”.202 The Church
is thus close to the Christ who is “coming” and “going” in his Passover and whose
Resurrection “stands above” history but “nevertheless in relationship to it” (1 Jn
2:18-22, 2 Jn 7, Jn 14:15-31).203 In doing so, the Church is near to the End, not
necessarily chronologically but as actualised in Christ’s Incarnation and Paschal
Mystery, the ever-greater God immanently present to creation and whose humanity
has already been divinised. Christ will come again at a time not known, but he has
come in the Resurrection and keeps coming in the life of the Church in the Age of
the Gentiles. These consideration underscore that eschatological hope is thus not
chronological but Christological, centred on the presence of Christ.204

3.5.3

Hope as Waiting on the Lord in the Present

Centred on Christ, the eschatological Adam, Christian hope consists in a joyful,
vigilant awareness of the presence of Christ in the Church and the promise of the full
apocalyptic ‘un-covering’ of that presence. Eschatology involves looking towards the
Risen and Ascended Lord especially present in the Eucharist, whose Second Coming
cannot be calculated according to a logic of history or upon a chronological basis.
Ratzinger’s eschatology finds its locus in the personal presence of Christ.
Eschatology has a personalist orientation. It is characterised by a posture of “looking
to our Lord”.205 Understood in this way, Christian hope consists of “relationship with
Christ’s person and longing for him to come close”.206 In Ratzinger’s words and
evocative of an ‘eschatology of the present’, “Christianity is the present”.207 The
appropriate Christian eschatological attitude can thus be summed up with the
catchword “watchfulness”, which entails “openness for the wholly other God”, both
at the end of time and amid the exigencies of history, towards the Christ who is
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eschatologically ‘ever present’.208 The early Christian cry of “Marana tha” or
“Maran atha” captures for Ratzinger the multilayered nature of expectant
watchfulness for the Lord’s manifold coming, including in the Eucharist.209 It can be
interpreted as, “Lord, come!/Come, Lord Jesus” or “the Lord/he has come”.210
Contained in this attitude of watchfulness, as opposed to misdirected emphasis on the
future, moment of the End or periodisation of history, is thus a readiness to be called
to account by the returning Lord, who remains proximate (c.f. Lk 12:35-40).
Parallels can be seen between Ratzinger’s view of the appropriate eschatological
attitude and Pieper’s view of hope. Analogously to Ratzinger, Pieper argues that “the
vigilant resistance of an alert and steady watchfulness” is necessary to protect against
the antonyms of hope, acedia and despair.211 Despair, and especially acedia, can be
characterised as a forgetfulness of the general promises of Christian hope but also of
the proximity of the Lord, whose coming is proclaimed in historical events. It can be
argued that necessary for hope is vigilance. It protects the hope in the possession of
the hoping person and has ever in mind the Second Coming of the Lord, a Coming
that the travails of history always announce and which is anticipated in the
Eucharistic coming of the Lord. Thus, the early Christians possessed the joy
attendant on hope that comes from knowledge of the Risen Christ and his
“closeness”, while remaining aware that they lived in the Age of the Gentiles, which
had to run its course.212 Consequently, they were simultaneously subject to
afflictions, while participating in the growth of the fruits of the Paschal Mystery
through time and space.213 Hope overcomes tribulation by vigilantly keeping in mind
Christ’s constant presence.
A watchful awareness of Christ’s coming does not generate eschatological fervour
that displaces concern for inner-historical activity. Precisely by being directed to the
Christ who is present, historical action is significant. Consistent with a view that the
Resurrection is simultaneously of history but fundamentally eschatological,
Ratzinger notes, in reference to what is of enduring significance in the work of
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Joachim, that “the work of Christ is seen to be firmly rooted in history”. 214 With
reference to the example of Aquinas, Pieper argues that he counted as “self-evident”
the need to be prepared for the global reign of the antichrist at the end of time and the
possible necessity of being martyred.215 The Christian’s attitude to history should,
however, not be marked by disproportionate focus on eschatological cataclysm but a
“mute readiness” for the End, which does not distract from the tasks in front of the
person, that is, “activity within history”.216 Eschatology, as directed to Christ’s
immanent and transcendent presence for Pieper and Ratzinger does not amount to a
single-minded focus on the end of time at the expense of attention to the matters of
history.

For Ratzinger, further, eschatology takes on a missionary character in the historical
present. In the context of consideration of the Liturgy as Parousia, he argues that the
attitude of watchfulness for the Lord’s coming takes on “the character of a
mission”.217 He suggests that the Liturgy should “prepare for [Christ] a dwelling in
the world”.218 The Liturgy is, therefore, not an act of navel-gazing. Rather, it is an act
“where [the Church] enters into the heart of the world, and works actively for the
latter’s liberating transformation”.219 The Church’s mission in the interim period,
then, is “to let the Liturgy be real”, namely to manifest the ‘eschatological event’ that
comes to the world in the Liturgy as an anticipation of that “final reality”, which in
the ‘already, not yet’ period can only ever be an “image”.220 It prepares humanity for
the coming of the Lord by preparing a dwelling for him in the Church and in
people’s hearts. Thus, concordant with the Communio understanding of the Age of
the Gentiles as the drawing-in of the body of Christ, the historical anticipates its
promised eschatological transformation. The Liturgy, as the world’s “[gracious]
point of contact with God”, makes present the eschatological reality of Christ’s
Parousia to the world, and so prepares it to be freed it from its historicity and to be
joined to Christ’s liberating victory.221
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The focus of eschatological hope is therefore on the manifold coming of Christ and
the preparation, in history, of eschatological fullness. In the ‘interim period’ between
victory and culmination, arguably the locus for this hope is the Liturgy. It is the
privileged setting for the adventus medius and allows the presence of Christ in the
Liturgy to be magnified while preparing a ‘place’ for the Second Coming. Innerworldly action is to be directed to manifesting to the world Christ’s eschatological
coming in the Liturgy and the sober performance of historical tasks under the aspect
of his eschatological presence.222 More generally, the Christian is always close to the
end and Christ, the telos and peras of history is always near. The Christian is thus to
watch for him and his presence, and prepare for his manifold coming by remaining
close to him, by doing his will in the world.

Ratzinger does not therefore place hope simply under the aspect of the future à la the
theologies of futurity, or even the full realisation of the eschaton at the conclusion of
history, but directs it to Christ’s resurrected presence in which future realisation is
incipiently present. It is worth quoting Ratzinger at some length to relay the pith of
his position:

By gazing on the risen Christ, Christianity knew that a most significant coming had
already taken place. It no longer proclaimed a pure theology of hope, living from
mere expectation of the future, but pointed to a ‘now’ in which the promise had
already become presence. Such a presence was, of course, itself hope, for it bears the
future within itself.223

A conception of hope that expects an inner-historical redemption of history and
which dialectically draws a line through the present to reject the past in the name of a
hoped-for future overlooks this Christological perspective. The eschaton is ‘already,
not yet’ present in the Person of Christ, whose presence itself contains the promise of
the future glory embodied and anticipated in his Resurrection and Ascension. As de
Gaál notes in reference to Ratzinger’s Christology, the Paschal Mystery is not simply
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a past event, “but abides in heaven”.224 Made present on earth through the Church, it
promises future glory. Ratzinger argues, therefore, that the true content of the Gospel
renders expectation and calculation of imminent end as of secondary importance.
The Gospel’s focus is, rather, the Person of Christ, understood in a Trinitarian way,
who is in heaven and in whom victory and the Kingdom has already come, but the
moment of whose definitive realisation is in the hands of God.225

3.5.4

Christ is the Turning Point of History

The determinative significance of Christ to a conception of eschatological hope is
extended to history, with the important consequence that history is not to be
periodised and hope not placed in history’s dialectical progression. Ratzinger
interprets history through Christological lens, a position resting on a view of the
centrality of Christ to time, as presented in the Church’s theological tradition. As
Dawson puts it in connection with Augustine’s view of history, the “coming of
Christ is the turning-point of history”.226 Ratzinger likewise perceives Christ as
history’s axis. For Bonaventure and, it could be said, Ratzinger, “Christ is the true
center and the turning point of history”.227 Notwithstanding differences between
Bonaventure and Aquinas, Ratzinger detects in both of them a view of the history of
creation in which there is a “two directional” movement of time and creation from
God and back to God.228 Bonaventure uses the terms egressus and regressus to
capture this movement, whereas the terms commonly applied to Thomas’ scheme are
exitus-reditus. Paralleled in both, however, is the central place given to Christ in the
schema. He is the turning point at, and through, which history, time and creation
returns to God, the source of all being. Thus, in an etymological connection to
Bonaventure’s egressus, Aquinas argues that in the Incarnation, the “rivers” of
creation are turned back to God.229 Ratzinger invokes therefore prominent medieval
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theology’s positing of Christ as history’s axis, the point at which creation turns back
to God, its source.

A Chalcedonian Christology predicated on the joining of the Word to humanity
underpins the view of Christ as history’s turning point. An anthropology, which
understands the human person as the bridge or “mean” “between spiritual and
corporeal nature”, is also relevant.230 Ratzinger considers the human person to be a
“bridge”, where the material and spiritual “meet and mingle” and in which “the
material world is lifted up into the spiritual realm”.231 In the mystery of the
Incarnation, this human nature is joined to the divine nature and in this way
humanity, and therefore the whole of creation, is turned back to God. Thus, in a
circular understanding of time and history, creation reaches its perfection by ‘rising
to its source’ and returning to the Origin.232 In Ratzinger’s understanding of history,
Christ is the lynchpin of creation’s turn back to God.

On the basis that Christ is the turning point of history, Ratzinger departs from
Joachimite eschatology and its parallels in twentieth century theology. Joachim’s
eschatological joy, stemming from an imminent expectation of a Third Age of the
Holy Spirit, is misplaced. Instead, Christ is the meaning of history, in whom the
historical and its transcendence are found, and also the source of eschatological joy.
A periodisation of history and joyful expectation of inner-historical fulfilment direct
attention away from the centrality of Christ, and chronologises hope. Christ is the
answer to Joachim’s periodisation of history.
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Instead of positing a periodised history, Ratzinger reads the chief proponents of
medieval theology as pointing to Christ as the centre of history. According to
Ratzinger, Aquinas rejected Joachim’s method of application of the Old Testament to
the New Testament. The Old Testament was seen by Joachim to “point to a similar
course of events in the New Testament”.233 For Aquinas, however, the Old
Testament did not point to a parallel sequence of events culminating in an Age of the
Holy Spirit in the Age of the Church, but to Christ. Thus, Aquinas’s “solution to the
problem [of Joachim’s “historical speculation”] is simply ‘Christ’”.234 Bonaventure
also rejected Joachim’s idea of “an age of the Holy Spirit” because the final age,
even if it bears the marks of the Spirit’s power, is nevertheless in itself “an age of
Christ”.235 The final age is Jesus’s “own time”.236 In Bonaventure’s Hexaemeron, the
seventh and final age is “the New Testament Christ-time”.237 Consequently, as Christ
is the “axis of world history” and the fulfilment of the Old Testament, there can be
no separate inner-historical Age of the Holy Spirit consisting of a radical,
eschatological transformation of that history.238 Rather, history has already found its
meaning with Christ, who has ushered the ‘already, not yet’ stage of salvation
history. The ‘age of Christ’ and his Church will persist until the end of time.

The Christological reading of history apparent in Thomas, Bonaventure and
Ratzinger opposes a rejection of supposedly unredeemed history in the Age of Christ
and the cleavage between an attitude of eschatological imminent expectation and the
juridicalisation of the Church, evident in an eschatological exegesis. Instead of being
“untrue to her mission” and capitulating to the “spirit of the anti-Christ”, by
replacing eschatological expectation with an ‘institutional’ Church (see also 1.3.1),
the Church proclaims Christ-crucified, God and man, as the centre of history (1 Cor
1:23).239 He is the skandolon, which points to himself as the victory, the object of
Israel and humanity’s hope. In him creation turns back to its source and already
contains the promise of the Parousia. It has definitively arrived in the eschatological
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event that is the Resurrection even as that event points to a trans-historical reality.
The victory that has already been won in Christ will not develop into another
historical stage or ‘paradigm shift’ but will only be consummated outside of time in
the eschaton.

Moreover, in emphasising Christ as the lynchpin of history, Ratzinger does not in
that way overlook the Trinitarian or pneumatological meaning of history. There is an
intrinsic connection between pneumatology and Christology, because it is the Holy
Spirit that communicates the “once-for-all event” of Christ’s Incarnation and Paschal
Mystery through history.240 As we have seen, in Christ’s Resurrection and
Ascension, Christ’s humanity becomes a participant in God’s divinity. In this way,
he is a participant in the life of the Holy Spirit.241 Moreover, the actions of the
Persons of the Trinity are “at once common and personal”.242 There is no separation
between Christ’s saving action and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. There can
thus be no inner-historical eschaton or periodisation of history in the expectation of
an Age of the Holy Spirit distinct from the eschatological Adam in whom all of
humanity and history will be recapitulated through the Holy Spirit. There will be no
definitively new historical epoch. We are in the ‘last age’.

3.5.5

Conclusion

For Ratzinger, Christ is the fulfilment and object of hope. Centred on Christ,
eschatological hope is not directed to inner-historical improvement. Instead, his
apparent historical failure points to himself as the transcendent object of hope,
actualised and nourished in the Liturgy-as-Parousia. Centred on Christ,
eschatological hope is not periodised or historicised, but consists in steadfast
orientation to the Lord, because he is the centre and meaning of history.
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3.6

Differentiating a Chalcedonian Eschatology from Inner-Historical
Conceptions of Hope

The centrality of Christ to Ratzinger’s eschatology and the unity he detects between
eschatology and Christology differentiates them from inner-historical conceptions of
hope centred on praxis and a dialectical reading of history. For Ratzinger, instead of
being found in inner-historical perfection, hope and history’s fulfilment is in the
Risen and Ascended Christ, simultaneously victorious and pointing to that victory’s
full unveiling at the end of time. In linking humanity’s future to its glorification with
God in the eschatological Adam, Ratzinger presents moreover a supra-historical,
divine reality as the human destiny to which hope is oriented.
An affirmation of Christ’s divinity and the reality of his Resurrection distinguish
Ratzinger’s eschatological hope from the Concilium tendency to see hope as driving
inner-historical change. As noted above (3.2), he is not merely interested in the
historical figure of Jesus, who would “remain purely human”. 243 While Concilium
authors may affirm the reality of Christ’s Resurrection, it appears not to be their
Christological focus. For example, Metz’s comment that the memory of Christ’s
death and resurrection does not entail a “total leap into the eschatological existence
of the ‘new human being’” directly contradicts Ratzinger, who argued that the
Resurrection did entail such a leap (3).244 Whatever Metz’s meaning regarding the
nature of Christ’s Resurrection, seemingly paramount is that it signifies for
humanity, not a participation in Christ’s ‘ontological leap’ forward into the life of
God, but a memory that drives social change (1.5.3). The Resurrection does not
constitute a qualitative leap for humanity: for Gutiérrez at least, that leap occurs on
the basis of a dialectical historical jump (1 passim). For Ratzinger, however, the
Resurrection and Ascension promises precisely an ‘eschatological leap’ into the
‘existence of the ‘new human being’’ (3.3). A low Christology focusing on the social
and political ramifications of the historical figure of Jesus, thereby grounding hope in
inner-historical change, is contrasted against a view that it is the Resurrection, which
is the basis for a new scenario for humanity and is in fact that new scenario.245

243

Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 242.
Metz, Faith in History and Society, 108 (quoted also at 1.5.3).
245
Ratzinger, Jesus(2), 241-242.
244

248

The Resurrection underpins Ratzinger’s notion that salvation history bears the
character of ‘already, not yet’, a notion which separates him from eschatological
theologies of futurity. Metz rejects reading salvation history in this way because it
supposedly involves a search for the amount of salvation ‘already’ but ‘not yet’
obtained, thus distracting from what he considers to be the central question of how
much time is left.246 To characterise an ‘already, not yet’ reading of history as
treating salvation in a mathematical way is curious. It posits as mutually exclusive
the concepts of ‘already’ and ‘not yet’, without acknowledging that they can coexist
simultaneously by virtue of the analogical joining of humanity (the historical) and
divinity (the ontological) in Christ.247 Doing so overlooks the Christological locus of
hope and salvation, which undergirds the notion of ‘already, not yet’, and places it
instead exclusively on the future. In Christ, who is God and man, it has been made
possible for humanity in history to partake in the divinity which transcends history.
In his Resurrection, hope’s object, salvation, has entirely been won. Christ goes
before humanity and participates in the life of God, even if it is not yet realised for
the rest of humanity.
Conceiving the Ascended Christ as the anchor of hope, in whom hope’s object is
actualised in the victory already won, differentiates Ratzinger’s conception of hope
from an inner-historical notion. Hope does not belong in the realm of future utopia
but is present in the Person of Jesus Christ. To the extent the believer is united with
Christ, he already enjoys the object of hope. Aquinas suggests that the metaphor of
anchor, when applied to Christ as our hope, shows that “hope secures the soul in God
in this world”.248 Christ is the “foundation” of hope while also being its “actual
fulfilment”.249 Through Christ, “we are [already] saved” (Rom 8:24). 250 Thus, the
fulfilment of our hope is actualised already in the Ascended and Risen Christ to
whom the believer is joined through the theological virtue of hope.
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A Christocentric conception of hope guards also against utopian projections of hope
in the historical future. Ratzinger argues that the “new man is not utopian”.251 He
exists in the Person of Jesus Christ and thus hope becomes not “merely future”. 252
Apposite is Augustine’s comment that we are (already) the body of Christ the Head,
who is the fulfilment of our hope and thus in whom “everything [we hope for] is
already present”.253 The objects of genuine hope – eternal life, communion and
liberation – are not “mere expectation[s] of utopia” but are real and present “today”
insofar as there is communion with Christ.254 In Christ Ascended, the genuinely new
humanity is present. He is not the result of historical dialectical change, but God’s
eschatological action in Christ.
Ratzinger’s Christological eschatology opposes a mixing of eschatology and utopia,
which appears to underwrite the impatient desire to change history and exclusive
orientation to the future of inner-historical conceptions of hope. He argues that
“utopia”, conceived in a narrow sense as practical reason’s search for justice, should
be what drives practical action. ‘Utopia’ in this sense is not to be confused with
eschatology, which speaks to the “receptive patience of faith”. 255 Utopian and
eschatological thought are oriented to different objects. By referring eschatology to
Christ, in whom the ‘already, not yet’ is spanned, Ratzinger answers thus differently
the aporia regarding the scandalously unchanged state of history. The ‘scandal’
points to Christ as the object of patient and vigilant watchfulness, a state entirely in
contrast to a Moltmann-inspired dialectical vision of hope, which impatiently seeks
to change history in the light of utopia (1.2.2). It contradicts, for example, Metz’s
rejection of a ‘passive expectation of the Parousia’ in favour of ‘a productive and
militant eschatology’.256 Militancy and productivity are opposed to the patience of
Christian eschatology grounded in a watchful attitude directed to the Lord.
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For Ratzinger, a Chalcedonian Christology underscores his conviction that hope and
eschatology are fundamentally supra-historical and beyond the reach of human
manipulation (refer to 2). Hope’s “proper realm”, according to Ratzinger is not
concerned with manufacturing objects of hope in the worldly sphere.257
Eschatological orientation to the presence of Christ does not involve the “working
out of a philosophy or theology of history”.258 Ratzinger suggests that human
rationality is “finite and feeble” and gains significance only in light of the Risen
Christ.259 God’s reign, present in the Church, “is not within man’s capabilities to
achieve …or even merely to hasten its coming”.260 The perfection of history will not
be a consequence of inner-historical “rational planning”.261 Its perfection, rather, will
occur outside of history in its eschatological transformation (4.4.3).

Ratzinger argues therefore that secularising Christian eschatology is in direct conflict
with genuinely Christian understanding of hope and history. The critique of innerhistorical conceptions of hope is, indeed, heightened by bringing into it a discussion
of the antichrist, which Ratzinger correlates with immanentizing tendencies. As
Christ is the transcendent saviour of history, so the antichrist is the one purporting to
save history according to its own logic. Ratzinger thus opposes, as constituting “the
‘antichrist’”, an “unconditional enclosure of history within its own logic”.262 The
conflation of Hegelian-Marxist philosophies and theologies of history to the principle
of evil is here unmistakeable. Failure to attend to the transcendent source and goal of
history, and the corollary confinement of history’s significance to an immanent plane
opposes Christ. Supreme evil is the intensification of an attitude that looks to
history’s own resources, grounded in a logic of history supposedly discernible to
human rationality, to bring about salvation.

In this regard, an attitude of dependence on human rationality to manufacture hope is
the zenith of pride and presumption, an attitude that purports to fix the ‘not yet’ into
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‘yet’ by its own powers. As Ratzinger says such a planned salvation is “the salvation
proper to a concentration camp and so the end of humanity”.263 In this regard, Pieper
notices the striking similarity between medieval symbology regarding the antichrist
and the contemporary mid-twentieth century context: the medievals understood the
antichrist as “bring[ing] with him a cremation furnace”.264 One only need think of the
crematoria of the Holocaust, the incendiary effect of atomic weaponry or the gulags
of Soviet Russia to discern the prophetic foresight of the medieval understanding of
the reign of evil that the antichrist will instantiate. The wickedness of the twentieth
century bears witness to the pernicious effects of deifying history and conceiving the
object of hope as capable of being produced by human means.265

That eschatology takes its character in reference to a Chalcedonian Christology
demonstrates that history is perfected only outside itself and not immanently. As has
been argued, eschatology “is not a scenario for the rest of history” but has a Christoand therefore theocentric form.266 History is oriented and “perfected beyond itself” in
the return of Christ, a return that will be ‘incommensurable’ with history’s own
immanent laws.267 As a result, only “that indestructible love which triumphed in the
risen Christ” can give history its perfection.268 Ratzinger argues that it is “faith in
Christ’s return” from outside history, which guarantees that history will be
consummated.269 Consequently, eschatology oriented to, and in fact absorbed by, a
Christology, in turn subsumed into a doctrine of God, guarantees the perfectibility of
history. God in Christ is the telos of history. Only from a divine source outside can
history reach its fulfilment. Thus, for Ratzinger, eschatology claims that history is
intrinsically imperfectible but extrinsically perfectible. Moreover, solely in
recognising this extrinsic perfectibility can history itself be considered meaningful
and thereby become open to the possibility of its perfection. 270 Because history
cannot hold the source of its own goodness, it must look to an exterior, divine,
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ground of its own significance, namely, Christ, the Word who has entered history to
point ‘beyond itself’.

Viewing eschatology through a Christological lens means that hope is not merely
directed to expectation of future historical action of God, accelerated by human
effort, but his action now mediated through the life of the Church, which contains the
promise of future heavenly glory. Christian hope and eschatology contradict
therefore an arrogation of the divine guidance of history to its conclusion, to human
ingenuity or discernment of a rational logic of history. The ‘interim time’ between
victory and consummation does not concern the building up of inner-historical
utopia. A reading of the historical epoch following Christ’s first coming as a ‘middle
coming’ renders as misconceived and in some senses irrelevant the ‘imminent
expectation’ interpretation of Christ’s message. Ratzinger’s reading of the Kingdom
is not that it augurs inner-historical utopia but is historically limited, and concerns
the Church’s mission in the ‘middle coming’ to draw people into Christ’s Body. In
Ratzinger’s eschatology, the world and history is given significance, but relative to
the promises of eternal life and the Parousia of the Christ. Only God’s action outside
of time will give history its consummation, when the pierced Christ, who entered
behind the curtain separating humanity from divinity “through his flesh” (Heb
10:20), will come from beyond history “with clouds” to perfect that history.271 As we
cannot hope in ourselves, we place hope instead in the “One”, who is our everlasting
Saviour.272 In him alone, should our hope be placed.

3.7

Conclusion

Rooted in a Chalcedonian Christology, Ratzinger presents a view of hope that is
Christocentric in form, completing the theocentric picture of hope presented in
Chapter 2. To claim that Christ is the anchor and fulfilment of hope (3.5) depends
upon apprehending him as perfect God and perfect man. The Risen Christ is the
ground of human hope. In his Resurrection, humanity is taken up into divinity. As
shown in Chapter 2, participation in the eternity of divine life is that for which the
271
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human person hopes. For Ratzinger, the human race’s destiny is to participate in the
divinity through being recapitulated in the eschatological Adam, the Christ who is
simultaneously divine and human. Hope is thus intrinsically supra-historical and
eschatological. Eschatology and therefore hope are Christologically-indexed.

Resting on the Chalcedonian axiom of the union of the human and divine natures in
the Word, Ratzinger offers a synthesis of Christology and eschatology, which affects
how hope and history are to be related to one another. Contrary to a strict
‘Eschatologist’ reading of Ratzinger, grounding hope in the Risen Lord does not
jettison the significance of history. The Resurrection is the eschatological action of
God, which means the ground of hope is present within history while pointing
beyond it. Eschatological hope and expectation are centred in the Risen Lord who
remains present within history in the liturgy and the sacraments, a Parousia that itself
points to the definitive Parousia.
History is thus to be read under the double sign of ‘already, not yet’. ‘Already’ has
salvation been won, but ‘not yet’ has the victory been definitively realised. An
‘already, not yet’ conception of history moves the locus of hope away from innerhistorical activity geared towards the future. Instead, it centres on the Risen Lord
present among us. The Incarnation and the eschaton are thus intrinsically linked: the
Incarnation does not drive historical change to a new historical epoch, but joins
humanity to divinity and points to humanity’s future in the eschatological Adam.
Conclusions regarding hope and history are therefore only intelligible under the
aspect of a Chalcedonian Christology, which treats as axiomatic the unity of the
divine and human in the Word.

The unity of eschatology and Christology in Ratzinger distinguishes him from innerhistorical conceptions of hope. The Concilium position on hope and history explored
in Chapter 1 tends to expect future historical utopia, and depicts Jesus, in his
historicity, solely or predominantly as the generator of political and social
improvement, and the secular as the graced sphere in which humanity can work for
the future. A low Christology of this sort emphasises the ‘historical Jesus’ and the
political dimensions of the Gospel and is directed to praxis, with a consequent
marginalisation of the being (and therefore divinity) of Christ. In contrast,
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Ratzinger’s views on hope and history are predicated on a Chalcedonian Christology,
which emphasises the ontological, divine nature of Christ, and understands the
humanity of Christ in reference to his divinity, without sacrificing its integrity.
Contrary to the political theology of Metz, the Resurrection is understood as
constituting the ‘eschatological leap’ of humanity. The ‘new humanity’, which is the
object of dialectical expectation in the Concilium perspective is contrasted against
Ratzinger’s emphasis on the Resurrection as the ground of hope. Christ is perceived
eschatologically as the divinised man, who already reigns in glory. For Ratzinger,
humanity’s hope is centred on this divinisation. Its future is already realised in the
Risen Lord, who ascendit in caelum, sedet ad dexteram Patris. Participation in this
reign of glory, not primarily the historical future, is the object of human hope.
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CHAPTER 4 HOPE IS ORIENTED ‘BEYOND ITSELF’ – THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE

4.1

NATURE-GRACE RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

In 3.6, Ratzinger’s comment that history is oriented ‘beyond itself’ was noted. The
phrase ‘beyond itself’ is suggestive of a key theological and philosophical insight
underlying Ratzinger’s claim that fundamental hope has a supra-historical, extramundane object in eternal life in Christ. It captures his conviction that human nature
and history must look to a source outside itself for fulfilment. A theological
anthropology, which argues that the human person has a natural desire for a
supernatural end, underpins Ratzinger’s view that the fulfilment of each of nature
and history is ‘beyond itself’. This Chapter will examine therefore how Ratzinger
conceives the rational spirit as oriented ‘beyond itself’ to a supernatural end, which it
cannot itself give.
The Chapter focuses on the conception of the nature-grace relationship in Ratzinger’s
theology. It argues that Ratzinger’s account of the relationship between nature and
grace depends upon or parallels de Lubac’s (and related Communio thinkers,
including Balthasar’s) “Aegidian Thomist” account of the supernatural and Pieper’s
related understanding of the human person.1 Ratzinger’s understanding of the
1

As is well known, debates regarding the nature-grace relationship remerged with some heat in the
middle of the twentieth century in 1946 with the publication of Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel: Etudes
historiques: see e.g. Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie”.
For a recent interpretation of de Lubac’s work on the “natural desire for a supernatural end”,
see Jacob W Wood, To Stir a Restless Heart: Thomas Aquinas and Henri de Lubac on Nature, Grace,
and the Desire for God (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2019). It is to him
that the expression “Aegidian Thomist” is indebted. In that work, he has shown that the Thomistic
understanding of the natural desire to see God in de Lubac has been mediated through the tradition of
the Augustinian Order, particularly via Giles of Rome (“Aegidius Romanus”), Thomas’s student: 2022. Giles insisted that in human “nature itself [there is] a desire for the vision of God, and who
therefore saw Christ and the Church as indispensable mediators of human happiness.” Wood notes
that this tradition was never condemned by the Church, even if other Thomists “confused [it]…with
heterodox Augustinianism of one form or another”: Restless Heart, 19-20. He argues the publication
of de Lubac written most closely to 1950, the essay “Le mystère du surnaturel” (1949) (evident also in
Augustinisme et théologie (1965) and Le mystère du surnaturel (1965)), aligns with Fulgence Lafosse
OESA (c. 1640 – post-1684) and thus, strictly speaking, does not offend against Pope Pius XII’s
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insistence on the gratuity of grace in Humani Generis (1950): 417-418. Lafosse argued that the call to
the beatific vision is contingent but, having been made “in the present, historical state” (emphasis in
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vision”: 403. This contrasts with the view of Michelangelo Marcelli OESA (d. 1804), who argued that
God was “‘bound’ (tenebatur)” to grant the possibility of the beatific vision to rational creatures: 404.
In de Lubac’s early work, it is suggested that present is the influence of Giovanni Berti OESA (16961766), who argued that the gifts of “grace and glory lay outside our natural faculties” and thus cannot
be claimed as of right. Berti acknowledges the possibility that God could create humanity in a state
that desires the vision of God but is “not ordered by grace to do so”. However, this is not the
providential arrangement by which all is ordered to the good: 402, 416 (quotations on 402).
Wood suggests that de Lubac’s view of the supernatural “bears an important relationship to
the Augustinianism of Joseph Ratzinger” (including in the latter’s magisterial interventions as Prefect
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and Pope), the Communio school more generally, as
well as Lumen Gentium: Restless Heart, 24; see also his “Henri de Lubac, Humani Generis, and the
Natural Desire for a Supernatural End,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 15(4) (2017): 1209. He notes
that in the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which was published under the
auspices of Benedict XVI, is described a human “desire to see God” (nn2, 533, emphasis added).
Unlike St John Paul II’s Catechism, which speaks of a “desire for God” (CCC, 27), Ratzinger – Wood
implies – is intervening in the debates between the schools concerning the natural desire for God on
the side of those who posit a natural desire for the beatific vision in the human person: 24n87. Wood’s
assessment is, it is argued, correct with respect to Ratzinger and also Pieper, to whom Ratzinger is
generally aligned. As this Chapter will endeavour to show, Ratzinger argues that the human person
has a natural desire, greater than an intellectual curiosity and in fact a longing, to be in communion
with God. Arguably, there are Lafossian and Bertian strains in Pieper and Ratzinger because each
emphasises that humanity’s end is beyond its powers but that that human person has a natural desire to
see God as he has been created in the concrete, historical order. Ratzinger of course came to
theological prominence in the latter half of the century. Neither he nor Pieper intervene directly at
length in the Surnaturel controversy. The issue with which this Chapter is concerned is the extent to
which Pieper and Ratzinger may be characterised as taking on the thrust of the Lubacian position in an
architectonic way in their conception of the human spirit, even if in the case of Pieper, it could be said
that he anticipated the Lubacian position. To be clear, the thesis is not concerned with suggesting that
Pieper and Ratzinger would necessarily have agreed with the entirety of the Lubacian position
(although they may indeed have done so), only that their understanding of the human person takes on
or parallels key aspects of de Lubac’s reading of human nature, with important consequences for
conceiving the hope-history relationship. It is not a study as such on the relationship between de
Lubac and Ratzinger on nature and grace, important though that relationship is.
Despite the acrimony in the debates over nature and grace in the mid-twentieth century, there
has been through much of the period after the Council broad acceptance of de Lubac’s position:
Wood, Restless Heart, 24; Edward T Oakes SJ, “The Surnaturel Controversy: A Survey and a
Response,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 9(3) (2011): 626; Kerr, After Aquinas, 134f; Rowland,
Faith, 20 quoting Kerr’s After Aquinas, 134. According to Schindler, the central point of de Lubac’s
Surnaturel was “to secure theologically the truth of creation as understood in the Gospel, which
requires a non-divine subject that is nonetheless always-already, in the order of history, invited to
participate in the divine Trinitarian communio revealed in Jesus Christ”: David L Schindler,
“Introduction,” to Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New
York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), xxv-xxvi (quotation on xxvi). In Schindler’s view, the
basic underlying thrust of de Lubac’s theology has been vindicated, especially in light of in the
conciliar text, Gaudium et Spes, 22, which itself has parallels with a formulation of de Lubac’s in his
earlier Catholicisme. Schindler, “Introduction”, xi, xxvii: de Lubac had stated that “By revealing the
Father and by being revealed by him, Christ completes the revelation of man to himself” in
Catholicisme (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1938), 264 and the English translation Catholicism, 339. See
also Schindler, Heart of the World, 51. Gaudium et Spes, 22 makes the oft-cited Christo-centric claims
that “only in the Word made flesh [does] the mystery of man truly [become] clear” and that “Christ
the Lord, Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love,
fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling”. Second Vatican Council,
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et Spes, 7 December 1965, 22 (in
Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, new revised edition, ed. Austin
Flannery OP (Northport, NY/Dublin: Costello Publishing Company/Dominican Publications, 1975).
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relationship falls therefore within the general framework of a Communio
fundamental theology and is thus distinguished from a Concilium account, which
tends to depend on a theology of grace that immanentizes or ‘naturalises’ grace’s
operation (1.4). True it is that both the Communio and Concilium thrusts in theology
reject an extrinsic reading of the relationship. Their accounts of the relationship,
however, turn on different appreciations of the imperative of human nature to look
‘beyond itself’ for fulfilment, with vastly different implications for an inner or extrahistorical conception of hope.
Ratzinger’s conceptions of hope and eschatology (2 and 3), as directed to a suprahistorical end in Christ, are thus not fully intelligible without reference to de Lubac
and Balthasar’s Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist reading of the nature-grace
relationship.2 Fundamental hope is oriented to the fulfilment of an innate orientation
Serge-Thomas Bonino OP in a balanced introduction to the Surnatural controversy, suggests that de
Lubac’s exegesis of Thomas is at times only “partial”, to which some Lubacians might respond by
questioning why Aquinas’s writings are cast as dispositive: “Foreword” in Surnaturel: A Controversy
at the Heart of Twentieth Century Thomistic Thought, ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino OP, trans. Robert
Williams, trans. revised by Matthew Levering (Ave Maria: Sapienta Press, 2009), viii. C.f. Milbank,
Suspended Middle, 28, who argues that Lawrence Feingold’s methodology in his The Natural Desire
to See God according to St Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters is flawed because it sees Aquinas as
an initiator of a commentarial theological tradition rather than as a participant in an already living
theological tradition.
Nevertheless, Bonino notes that one of the “irreversible acquisitions” for traditional
Thomism in light of de Lubac’s work was the recognition of “the congenital openness of the mind to
the supernatural”: “Foreword”, viii (emphasis added). Thomas Joseph White OP, writing today from
an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective, which differs from de Lubac and Milbank by rejecting an
innate and natural inclination or proportionality between nature and grace, accepts that “there exists a
natural point of contact in us such that grace is not alien to human nature and can lead human nature
without violence through the ascent upward into the supernatural life of God”: White, “Paradigm of
Nature-Grace Orthodoxy”, The Thomist 78 (2014): 288.
Despite the apparent concordance of views on de Lubac in the post-conciliar period, his
position has been challenged in the twenty-first century. Wood notes two directions of critique: one,
coming from a Neo-Thomist origin, arguing that de Lubac “went too far” in positing a natural desire
for the supernatural, which threatens the integrity of the natural order and imposes a “debitum
naturae” on God. Two of the chief proponents of this strand that Wood cites are Lawrence Feingold,
Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters, 2nd ed. (Ave Maria:
Sapienta Press, 2010) and Steven Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of
Grace (New York: Fordham, 2010). The other direction of critique comes from the Radical
Orthodoxy direction, chiefly John Milbank’s Suspended Middle, which argued that de Lubac did not
go far enough because bound by circumstances: Restless Heart, 25-26. Milbank, Suspended Middle
engages some of the criticisms from the Neo-Thomist direction as well as draws out what he considers
are the full and radical implications for theology of de Lubac’s views. See especially Chapter 9 of that
work. See also Guerrerio, Benedict XVI, 77.
2
Notwithstanding any difference that might exist between de Lubac and Balthasar, a topic worthy of
further investigation – c.f. Milbank, Suspended Middle, 72-73. Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 267n1
remarks that de Lubac’s Surnaturel “discussed this issue [of the single, supernatural end of the created
spirit] … [such] that we no longer need to recapitulate the main lines of his argument”.
In this Chapter, the expression ‘Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist’ is preferred to describe
Ratzinger’s view because Pieper’s understanding of the innate capacity and desire for God in the
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of the human person to eternity, which surpasses his natural capacities and any
potential of politics and history. Ratzinger’s insistence that hope belongs to the realm
of gift and not human ingenuity relates to an appreciation of the supernatural, in
which human nature is said to possess a desire for a supernatural end unobtainable by
human power. The fundamental hope that surpasses all other hopes, and transcends
all possibilities and expectations (2.3), has as its object a supernatural reality, which
the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of the nature-grace relationship and a
consequent soteriology (5) helps explain is beyond the control of the hoping person.
Salvation or eternal life exists in the order of the supernatural and is made accessible
to the human person only through the supernatural life offered via the gifts of the
theological virtues in baptism, which mediates the fruits of the Paschal Mystery to
humanity.

The Chapter first summarises the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of natural
desire, as exemplified by twentieth century Communio scholars, and differentiates it
from a Rahnerian theology of grace.3 Secondly, it will explore how Pieper and
Ratzinger conceive the human spirit as constitutively oriented ‘beyond itself’,
possessing a natural desire for a supernatural end. Thirdly, the Chapter will explore
the connection between the theological anthropology thus described and Pieper and
Ratzinger’s conceptions of hope and the hope-history relationship.

4.2

The Communio Reading of the Supernatural in Theological Context

This section summarises one of the principal reactions against an extrinsic reading of
the nature-grace relationship: the Lubacian critique of the concept of pure nature and
his presentation of natural desire as indicative of the human person’s ordination to
God. Although not the place to delve deeply into the nuances of the debate generated
human person relates to his reading of Thomas, whereas Ratzinger’s could be described as
Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist as mediated by de Lubac, with an important amount of Bonaventure.
The point is to read Augustine and Thomas in continuity with each other and as representative of the
Christian tradition: c.f. De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 112-113; see also 113n64. Wood,
Restless Heart, also reads Thomas in continuity with Augustine: 35. As seen in the Introduction,
Pieper and Ratzinger also prefer to read Thomas through a Patristic and not scholastic lens, which is
consistent with a Communio approach.
3
The phrase ‘natural desire’ will be used at times herein as shorthand for the notion of the natural
desire for a supernatural end. The appellation Communio is given even if many of these arguments
were formulated before the founding of the journal, because the orientations are often found in
Communio circles.
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by de Lubac, a brief explication of his Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist position of
(along with figures such as Balthasar and Romano Guardini) is necessary to
contextualise Ratzinger’s view of the human person.4 It is also necessary briefly to
contrast the Lubacian perspective with the alternative response to an extrinsic
reading of nature and grace offered by Rahner, both in order to respond to the claim
of some liberation theologians that these authors belong together and to highlight the
implications of the differences in fundamental theology that they represent.

4.2.1

Summary of the Twentieth Century Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist
Account of the Nature-Grace Relationship

The Communio Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of the nature-grace
relationship rejects the notion of natura pura and the “[t]heological dualism”, which
had hitherto prevailed.5 It is distinguished from a Suarezian presentation of the
human creature as theoretically possessing a ‘pure nature’ (natura pura) closed in,
and complete of, itself. It sought to supersede the idea that there is a ‘twofold human
beatitude’ (duplex hominis beatitudo), namely, that human beings can possess a state
of natural beatitude apart from supernatural beatitude, achieved by its own powers.
Although grace on this view might “[assist] nature to realize its own finality”, natural
and supernatural ends stand separately in their own realm and only come into contact
adventitiously, as it were.6 On a neo-scholastic view, nature and the beatitude offered

4

The purpose of this Chapter is not to determine the correctness of de Lubac’s interpretation of
Thomas. The central point, as Balthasar puts it, is the adoption by Ratzinger that the human person
only has a single end, a supernatural fulfilment that responds to an intrinsic orientation of his nature,
which is nevertheless only gratuitously given. De Lubac insisted on the gratuity of grace and that
supernatural fulfilment is unmerited, which makes him consistent with Humani Generis, at least by
intention (4.2.2): Rowland, Catholic Theology, 33; c.f. de Gaál, Christocentric Shift, 38, Wood,
“Natural Desire for a Supernatural End,” 1229-1237; at 1236: de Lubac “agrees with Lafosse that the
calling of human nature to the beatific vision is contingent and that this calling creates in man a
natural desire for the vision of God”. Riches, “Christology and duplex hominis beatitude,”44- 45n1
collects some of the recent contributions to the debate surrounding de Lubac’s Surnaturel.
5
C.f. Dupré, Passage to Modernity, 171. De Lubac “Duplex hominis beatitudo,” Communio 35(4)
(Winter 2008): 599-612, eg 600-601. De Lubac argues that, for Thomas, “only ‘eternal beatitude’ is
true beatitude”: 609 quoting De Veritate, 24,8, co.
6
Schindler, Heart of the World, 79. Rowland, Catholic Theology, 46-49, 97, Oakes, “Surnaturel
Controversy,” 627, de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 102n7, quoting Schillebeeckx, Christ the
Sacrament (London, 1963), 1. O’Shea, “Nature and Grace, Revelation and Catholic Education,” 144.
A view of some sort of natural beatitude is not entirely superseded, even among scholars of a
Communio bent. Riches argues for its relevance along Christological lines and Wood argues that the
debates surrounding de Lubac initially did not concern whether the human person has a natural end
but in what that end consists, to the extent it can be separated from the supernatural end. He suggests
that Milbank, a “radical [figure] of post-modernity”, departs from de Lubac in this regard: Jacob
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by grace are extrinsically related, with grace being possible merely because of the
obediential potency of the creature.7

Contrastingly, the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account argues that human nature
has an innate orientation to a supernatural end, and must be understood in light of the
intrinsic unity of nature and grace in an undivided cosmic order. Balthasar argues
that there is “one, indivisible world order”.8 Guardini suggests that human life’s
“movement, its growth, are directed from man to God and back from God to man”
and “[t]he whole realm of created being …come[s] from God’s grace”.9 Nature is in
a sense “always already” graced because the whole of creation is a gratuitous gift. 10
A close correlation and an organic connection is therefore observed between the
rational, spiritual nature and the graced end to which it is directed. There exists a
unitary (but not monist), “symbiotic and intrinsic” relationship between nature and
grace, in which “nature exists for the sake of grace and is ordered to it, having its

Wood, “Rebuilding the City of God: Locating the Politics of Virtue within the Politics of Sin and
Grace,” Nova et Vetera, English edition, 16(4) (2018), 1375n18 citing Milbank, Suspended Middle, 1st
ed., 104-108. C.f. Wood, Restless Heart, 35 on his proposed via media between de Lubac and his
critics, and his distinction between our first, active nature, which correlates with natural reason and
our second passive nature of which our first nature implicitly seeks fulfilment, but which cannot be
fulfilled without reference to Christ. This relates to the Augustinian analysis of natural desire (see 115, esp at 10), which suggests that we have a “natural desire for happiness and implicitly a natural
desire for the vision of God”: 33. Although the movement towards God can only be a grace, the
restlessness of the human heart shows the human desire for happiness that can only ultimately be
fulfilled by that grace, even as happiness is sought in the possession of created goods, which generates
a lack of fulfilment that seeks ever more fulfilment: 9-10. Arguably, parallels can be found between
this and Ratzinger and Pieper’s thought, although it is perhaps unlikely Ratzinger would accept the
notion of a purely natural beatitude. The distinction between ratio and intellectus suggests a human
discursive rationality, proper to human rational nature as such (ratio), which can nevertheless be
elevated through the intellectus into ‘superhuman’ perception and remain properly human: 4.3.8. The
unity in differentiation that Ratzinger maintains between the orders of nature and grace, faith and
politics (5), might be said to correspond to the capacity of “first nature” to elaborate philosophical
ethics, even as our “second nature” needs Christ for fulfilment: Wood, Restless Heart, 35. Against
this, it must be observed however that Ratzinger is sceptical of claims of a purely “philosophical
ethics” and “philosophical anthropology” based on pure reason arising from the “first nature”, instead
presenting a Christological and theological ethics: c.f. Wood, Restless Heart, 35, see e.g. Joseph
Cardinal Ratzinger, “The Renewal of Moral Theology: Perspectives of Vatican II and Veritatis
Splendor,” Communio 32(2) (Summer 2005): 357-368, eg. 361, 364, 367.
7
Oakes, “Surnaturel Controversy,” 628 citing Rahner, “Nature and Grace,” in Theological
Investigations IV, trans. Kevin Smyth (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1965): 165.
8
Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 267 (emphasis in original).
9
De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 115n80 quoting Guardini, The Last Things (London, 1954),
20. Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 345 quoting Guardini, Welt und Person, 186-187.
10
C.f. Milbank, Suspended Middle, 45, 71 and Schindler, “Introduction”, xvi.
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ultimate finality in it.”11 Nature, whatever can be said of it abstractly, in reality
belongs in a unitary cosmic order in which it is directed to a graced telos.
Balthasar argues that the order of creation is intrinsically Christocentric. While the
“order of creation” (nature/ontology) remains prior to the “order of redemption”
(grace/soteriology), there is a “deeper [,]…true and lasting priority” grounded on
Christ, who “is the presupposition of creation”.12 Even if the “first Adam” was
created first, he derives his being from Christ, and was in fact “created …for the sake
of the second Adam”.13 While the natural realm is distinct from the sacred, it
nevertheless “everywhere and always retains an ordering that is first from within,
toward the end which is God in Jesus Christ”.14 The significance of human nature
and its relationship to grace can only be grasped by reference to an undivided world
order, in which creation is itself grounded in and ordered to the supernatural in
Christ.
The Communio position is thus an ‘intrinsicist’ expression of the nature-grace
relationship. The relationship between nature and grace is summarised as “organicparadoxical” and not extrinsic.15 It holds “the concept and the reality of a
supernatural vocation to be intrinsic to a full description of the human person”.16 The
human person, simply, is “designed and intended to encounter God” and is created

11

C.f. Tracey Rowland, “Faith, Reason and Love”. Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 268. Balthasar’s
formulation, which is the second quotation of the sentence, matches de Lubac, who wrote that it “is
from within that grace seizes nature… [raising] it up, in order to make it serve its (grace’s) own ends”:
“Le Puvoir de l’eglise en matiere temporelle,” Revue de Sciences Religieuses 12 (1932): 329-354, at
343-344 quoted in Schindler, Heart of the World, 78. C.f. Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on
Nature and Grace, trans. Br Richard Arnandez FSC (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 13.
12
Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 353. Related are Ratzinger’s reading of humanity’s eschatological
destiny being the ‘eschatological Adam’ (3) and his Christological reading of human nature (5).
13
Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 353. He also quotes Przywara to the effect that between God and
creature exist “only one, single, concrete existing order between God and creature” and that “the grace
of redemption in Christ” is the “final form” of being (nature) and history (which is also a creature):
256 quoting Erich Przywara, “Philosophy,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch (1949), 1-9. C.f. Ratzinger’s
discussion of the absolute priority of Christ: 5.4.5.
14
Schindler, Heart of the World, 78 (emphasis in original). According to Schindler, de Lubac
relatedly holds that nature, including “all of its penultimate ends”, is “ordered internally and from its
creation toward the God revealed in Jesus Christ”.
15
Schindler, Heart of the World, 82; see also Schindler, “Introduction,” xxvii. C.f. de Lubac,
Catechesis, 13.
16
Nichols, Hermes to Benedict XVI, 147. Nichols refers to this test in the course of discussing
Maurice Blondel’s philosophy of action. Blondel was an influence on de Lubac. Nichols describes the
debate as occurring in the first half of the twentieth century; he would have had in mind de Lubac’s
Surnaturel and the responses of neo-scholastic scholars such as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.
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“out of” grace for that intended end.17 Theological disputes over the true meaning of
Aquinas’ views are “secondary” to his insight that “as a created being of nature, man
has no other goal than the supernatural vision of God… Thomas never entertains,
even hypothetically, a final goal that could be unmoored from [that vision]”.18 Nature
and grace are to be understood as forming a unity because the concrete subject of the
nature-grace relationship is:

the real man [who] is the man himself, a profound unity, not dissociable into
juxtaposed elements as fragments of a mosaic would be, [but] a unity in which
nature and grace, reason and faith cannot function each one on its own…19
This human person has therefore “only one end, a supernatural one”.20 The human
person possesses an intrinsic supernatural vocation.
In short, the human person has a natural desire for a supernatural end. In Kerr’s
words, the human person possesses a “natural desire for the vision of God”.21 Proper
to the nature of created spirits is the longing for God on the level of consciousness,
cognition and the will. By virtue of their own natures, human persons “are innately
called to the beatific vision” as integrated persons in which will, intellect and feeling
operate together.22 For de Lubac, the “desire to see God” is not accidental to the
human person or dependent upon individual or historical variables. The call is
constitutive of human nature; the desire for our destined end in God is “inscribed
upon [our] very being”.23 He quotes Aquinas that “[e]very intellect [spiritual in
nature] naturally desires the vision of the divine substance” and that the human
17

Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 345 summarising Guardini’s conception of the nature-grace
relationship in Guardini, Freiheit, Gnade, Schicksal (Munich, 1948), 163-166; see also the quotations
extracted 345-346 from that work. Balthasar provides an extensive overview of Catholic thinkers who
generally agreed with this position: Theology of Barth, 343ff. See his summation of their view, at 353,
as being grounded on the “historical, nay Christian experience – from man as he has been created in
the actual world as an answer to God’s creative and redemptive Word of grace, a word that by
definition is a dialogic word.”
18
Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 269 (emphasis in original). Balthasar is aware of the interpretive
disputes over the intended significance of Aquinas’s position on this issue: n1.
19
Etienne Gilson quoted in GB Sadler, Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian
Philosophy Debates in France (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 125, in
turn quoted in Rowland, “Faith, Reason and Love.” See also Sadler’s “Introduction” to Reason
Fulfilled by Revelation, 54-55.
20
Balthasar, Theology of Barth, 267 (emphasis in original).
21
Kerr, After Aquinas, 137. See also Gutiérrez, Theology of Liberation, 45.
22
Milbank, Suspended Middle, 33.
23
De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 54-55.
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person’s desire to behold God is “the desire of his nature”.24 The desire for God
inheres in human nature.
The human spirit is uniquely situated in the order of creation as immediately ordered
to God (and who, in contrast to the angels, have a body). Against Cajetan’s
Aristotelian view of nature as being a “closed whole” and necessarily “an essence
which rests content in the good that is proportionate to it”, the rational spirit is
viewed as “different, and structured differently” from other (non-angelic) created
natures.25 According to Aquinas, the rational creature is “superior to every creature
in its capacity for the highest good through the divine vision and enjoyment”. 26 The
created spirit “has a direct relationship with God” and “a certain capacity for the
infinite”.27 The rational human creature is unique in creation because ‘capable’ of
encounter with God.

The Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist position strives to avoid collapsing the orders of
nature and grace, and the extremes of an intrinsicist position. The human person has
a strong and innate but paradoxical desire beyond itself for the vision of God,
attainment of which exceeds its powers. The spiritual ‘capacity’ for the infinite is by
definition not proportionate to the human person’s faculties. Such a capacity
“surpasses the powers of his nature” and divine grace is needed to bring the
supernatural end of the spirit to fruition.28 For de Lubac, the rational spirit can only
“be fulfilled by getting beyond itself” and “[m]an is only man when he surpasses
24

De Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 56 citing Summa contra Gentiles, bk 3, c. 57 (emphasis
in de Lubac), and 58 citing Summa Theologiae I, 12, 1, Summa contra Gentiles, bk 3, c 48. For
commentary on article 1 of question 12 of the Prima Pars see Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae, 60. While not touching on the nature-grace debate, Davies points out that it would have
been reasonable to expect Aquinas not to conclude that it was possible for the human creature to see
God given his “claim that we cannot know what God is”. However, appealing to the claims of faith,
Aquinas concludes that it possible to possess the beatific vision by God’s power. This would correlate
to the idea that the human spirit receives a gift that exceeds its own natural capacity.
25
De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 114-115, (115 quoting, “Nature pure et surnaturel”
Gregorianum vol 2, 1947, 391-392), 140 quoting Cajetan, In Primam, q. 12, a.1, n. 10: “reasonable
nature is a closed whole within which the active capacities and tendencies are in strict
correspondence” and “Natural desire does not extend itself beyond the faculty of nature”. See further
examples on 189. See also O’Shea, “Nature and Grace, Revelation and Catholic Education,” 144,
Rowland, Guide, 85.
26
De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 117 quoting De Malo, q. 5, a. 1. See also 116 citing Scotus
Ordinatio, prol.
27
De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 110, 111. He also quotes Bonaventure to similar effect: the
“soul [is] the image of God, and is born to be carried into God immediately and to be beatified in
him…”: 113n67 citing In 2 Sent., dist. 18, a. 2, q. 3.
28
De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 111, 117 citing De Malo, q. 5, a. 1. See also 116 citing
Scotus, Ordinatio, prol. (quotation on 11). See also Riches’s Christological reading of the paradoxical
character of the natural desire: Riches, “Christology and duplex hominis beatitude,” e.g. 64-65.
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himself”.29 Balthasar likewise summarises Aquinas’ view that “the nature of the
created spirit is directed beyond itself” and that “it is [thereby] a nature that cannot
be fulfilled through its natural possibilities alone”.30 Every nature reaches its
perfection according to an interior and superior reality, such that there can be “a
fundamental end beyond ourselves”.31 Fulfilment occurs as a consequence of “actual
grace”, which fulfils the human person’s “truest essence” but does not flow from
“any natural necessity”.32 In short, the human person is oriented beyond himself to
the beatific vision, a call to which belongs to him by nature but which is beyond the
human person’s power of fulfilment. As a consequence, God’s grace is necessary for
the human spirit to reach its destined end ‘beyond itself’.

In summary, de Lubac, Balthasar and Guardini offered a reappraisal of the naturegrace relationship. Against an extrinsic reading of the relationship, they reject the
concept of pure nature and purely natural beatitude. They advocate the unity
(understood not in a monist way) of the orders of nature and grace, in which the
single cosmic order is given a Christocentric reading. The human person has a single,
supernatural vocation or calling to a life of grace in Christ. He possesses a natural
desire for a supernatural beatitude, beyond human capacity to realise. The human
person is called ‘beyond itself’.

29

De Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, 102 quoting Bulletin thomiste 4 (1934-36): 587, 109
quoting Maurice Blondel, Dialogues sur la Pensée, dialogie 8 (Paléonéos), in Etudes blondéliennes 3
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4.2.2

Who Claims the Legacy of the Nouvelle Théologie in Fundamental
Theology?

Gutiérrez and Müller argue that liberation theology inherits both de Lubac’s view of
the supernatural and Rahner’s theology of grace (1.5.4). They view de Lubac’s
nouvelle théologie and Rahner’s theology of grace as similar if distinct expressions
of a rejection of neo-scholastic extrinsicism. Against the view of their fundamental
similarity is the recognition that de Lubac, along with Balthasar, and Rahner offer
important and contrasting views of the nature-grace configuration, with subsequently
different implications for conceiving the hope and history relationship. As Rowland
points out, Müller “says nothing about the significance of the difference” between de
Lubac and Rahner.33 It is not the purpose of the sub-section necessarily to adjudicate
between de Lubac and Rahner, an open question with which theology continues to
grapple. Rather, its purpose is to underscore that de Lubac and Rahner offer different
perspectives in fundamental theology, especially concerning the nature-grace
relationship. In so doing, they provide contrasting starting off-points for theologians,
the adoption of which has implications for the hope-history debate (1.4, 1.5, 4.4).

The participants in the debate themselves understand their contributions to that
debate to differ in important if subtle respects. Responding to Surnaturel, Rahner’s
theology of grace offers a critique of de Lubac, a different solution to the problem of
nature and grace, and a contrasting understanding of human existence.34 He argues
that “grace and beatific vision can no longer be said to be unexacted” (i.e. not due or
to be ‘exacted’ or demanded from someone) if it is suggested that in nature the
person has an essential ordination to grace such that God in his “wisdom and
goodness” will unconditionally fulfil it.35 According to Rahner’s reading of the
Lubacian position, once an unexacted grace of creation is seen to be given to the
creature, God must fulfil the natural desire for the supernatural end. To posit a desire
33
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for grace necessitates a debitum that the desire be met by grace, which thereby
renders it unfree. The Lubacian refusal to acknowledge a hypothetical pure nature
supposedly vitiates the gratuity and conditionality of grace and revelation. 36
For Rahner, the Lubacian position naturalises grace’s operation. Grace “perhaps”
becomes no more than an auxiliary means by which the “reality already desired and
called for in the constitutive depths of the self” is realised. 37 Grace is the ‘exacted’
fulfilment of the potentiality of human nature and, “if too literally interpreted,
becomes shackled by the very naturalism it wants badly to be free of”.38 Rahner fears
therefore that de Lubac’s position can “[level] the two orders” of nature and grace,
by failing to posit a pure nature.39 Grace becomes less the free intervention of God
than the simple realisation of the possibilities inherent to human nature.40
To protect the gratuity and unconditional character of grace as a “free gift” of God,
Rahner first insists on the continuing utility of a hypothetical pure (human) nature,
without any reference to humanity’s supernatural destiny. 41 Pure nature is “a
remainder concept (Restbegriff)”, which denotes “what he [the human being] always
is” when “the supernatural existential as unexacted is subtracted”.42 The call to
eternal life must remain an unexacted, conditional feature of human existence. To
posit a “natural existential immediately ordered to grace itself”, as Rahner says the
Lubacian position does, would be to demand a “supernatural existential”. 43 The
concept of ‘pure nature’ enables a human nature to be postulated without an intrinsic
ordination to grace and so does not require grace to be ‘exacted’.
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Secondly, Rahner also insists on the utility of the potentia oboedientialis, which he
says is “scorned by de Lubac”.44 He says:

Man should be able to receive this Love which is God himself; he must have
congeniality for it. He must be able to accept (and hence grace, the beatific vision)
as one who has room and scope, understanding and desire for it. Thus, he must have
a real ‘potency’ for it. He must have it always. He is indeed someone always
addressed and claimed by this Love. For, as he is now in fact, he is created for it; he
is thought and called into being so that Love might bestow itself. To this extent, this
‘potency’ is what is inmost and most authentic in him, the centre and root of what he
is absolutely.45

The potency is more than “non repugnance” to God’s intervention but a positive,
“inner ordination” to the supernatural existential, while at the same time being
“unconditional”.46 As Garver points out, the “potentia” is “an active longing for God
that is present in the human pre-apprehension (Vorgriff) of everything”.47 The
longing is present in each act of knowing, which makes the person self-transcendent
and open to God’s “self-communication and summons”.48 In contrast with the neoscholastic view of obediential potency as being no more than a velleity for God,
Rahner considers it to be a strong ordination to God. However, unlike de Lubac, this
potency is ordered to the supernatural existential and not directly to God.

Thirdly, Rahner argues that the human person possesses a supernatural existential
distinct from his potency (1.4).49 The “natural self-transcendence [in which the
potency consists] and the supernatural existential are to be held as formally
distinct”.50 The ordination of the supernatural existential to the Trinity contrasts with
the potency’s ordination to the supernatural existential. The former is “unexacted”
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and therefore “‘supernatural’”.51 An insistence on the supernatural existential’s
unexacted character ensures that grace is unexacted. Grace ‘responds’ as it were to
the supernatural existential and not natural desire or potency. The gratuity of the
supernatural existential ensures the gratuity of grace itself. 52 What is natural to the
human person is a potency for God, but not the supernatural existential itself. Only
the latter is ordered to grace.

Although respectful of Rahner as theologian, thinker and friend, de Lubac detects
differences between himself and Rahner. Against Rahner’s accusation that he
naturalises grace’s operation, de Lubac maintains the gratuity of grace. His intention
at least is to distinguish between the given natural desire and its supernatural
fulfilment of it. He argues that “the supernatural end can in no case be the object of
any requirement or debt”.53 It is possible to insist upon the gratuity of grace without
the need to posit a pure nature “that could get along without grace”. 54 Instead, the
human spirit is in the position of paradox, “made for God” without being able to
obtain vision of him using “[its] natural powers alone”.55 De Lubac advocates a
twofold gratuity and a “double movement of grace” in creation and its elevation.56
De Lubac argues for the paradoxical contingency of the initial call but also its
intrinsic and determinative quality to the human spirit as it has been created.57

Importantly, de Lubac questions also the utility of interposing a supernatural
existential between the natural openness to God (whether natural desire or
obediential potency) and the potential fulfilment of that desire. He expresses
51
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impatience with the concept of the supernatural existential.58 According to de Lubac,
Rahner reformulates the problem of nature and grace, without answering the paradox
of the necessarily gratuitous character of grace and the “constitutive” nature of God’s
call as a predicate of human nature or existence as it has in fact been created.59
Balthasar also critiques Rahner’s formulation of the nature-grace relationship. For
Balthasar, Rahner cannot conceive God as giving an “unconditional dynamism” to
the spirit without effectively tying his own hands and fulfilling it as the payment of a
debt.60 Instead “we must try out a difficult experiment in conceptual distinctions” by
envisaging a hypothetical pure nature.61 Although “the supernatural existential
openness to grace…is man’s most intimate and unique feature”, because
supernatural, it “must [be] disregarded” when considering the hypothetical pure
nature.62 Implicitly, such mental gymnastics is of dubious utility. Most importantly, it
distracts attention from the most important feature of the human person, namely that
he has been created for God. Positing a pure nature insufficiently notices that the
natural desire’s signal feature is precisely to point beyond itself for fulfilment in
God. Minimising the fact of the natural desire downplays the centrality of Christ in
human flourishing. Instead the supernatural existential, unlike the natural desire, is
an anticipation of that fulfilment, which might unduly limit the interplay of divine
and human freedom.63 Although acknowledging the need to recognise a theological
concept of ‘nature’, Balthasar implicitly aligns therefore himself with de Lubac’s
criticism of Rahner. Adding the element of the supernatural existential to a
description of the human person fails adequately to describe the relationship between
nature and grace and also attempts to prescind from God’s all-determinative and
constitutive call.64
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Balthasar raises an even more fundamental objection. Rahner’s attempt to posit a
pure nature actually runs the risk of “equating the invisible residual product with
man’s spirit-nature”.65 There might be very little difference between the rational preapprehension of the infinite (obediential potency) and the ordination and longing for
God of which the supernatural existential consists.66 Proposing the supernatural
existential as an existential of the concrete person unintentionally risks conflating the
orders of nature and grace and immanentizing the latter’s operation. Implicitly, de
Lubac’s paradox of the natural desire better protects the gratuity of grace. The orders
of nature and grace are kept distinct, even as their intrinsic relationship is recognised.
Balthasar’s fear of conflating the natural with the supernatural is indebted to
Przywara’s analogical mode of thinking, which emphasised the difference between
Creator and creature (4.3.3). Rhetorically, Balthasar asks with respect to Rahner,
“Are we not really trying to unite the incompatible?”67 Ouellet notes the different
metaphysical starting points of Balthasar and Rahner. The former believes the
transcendentalism of the latter to thematise “esse” too much.68 Implicitly, the
transcendental philosophy of Rahner understands Being in too univocal a manner,
and fails to attend to the difference in being as between Creator and creature. Unlike
de Lubac, who begins from a theological a priori, Rahner’s insistence on the concept
of pure nature is a creaturely theology, beginning from below. Balthasar’s analogical
mode of thinking contends, in contrast, that “finite freedom is called beyond itself”.69
Inadequately noticing the analogical difference between finite and infinite being
results in “transform[ing] this offer [the supernatural existential] into a constitutive
part of [the created spirit’s] finitude”.70 Thus, according to Ouellet, it is Balthasar’s
reliance on Lateran IV’s insistence on the greater difference (in-similarity) between
Creator and creature that forms his understanding of the creature’s orientation
‘beyond itself’ and grounds his critique of a “formal-material anticipation of grace in
transcendental subjectivity”.71 On this view, Rahner ends up insufficiently
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recognising the radically different characters of nature and grace, and the reality that
the order of grace can only ever be known analogically.

Underlying fundamental differences between a Rahnerian theology of grace, and de
Lubac and Balthasar’s nouvelle théologie exist. Arguably there is a failure of
analogical thinking in a Rahnerian theology of grace.72 His criticism that de Lubac
conceives grace to be exacted by a natural desire appears to overlook the analogical
difference between God and creature, and would have greater bite if de Lubac
understood God and creature to belong to the same “ontic realm”. 73 A kind of
contractual analysis, which assumes parties on an equal footing, might then have
force (see also 4.3.3). A univocal metaphysic remains however alien to the
Communio mode of analogical thinking.74 To suggest that grace’s operation is
‘naturalised’ in de Lubac, because fulfilment is mere realisation of the latent
potential inherent to nature, is to underappreciate the paradoxical character of the
supernatural in de Lubac’s understanding. To argue that the fact of a natural
ordination to God necessarily leads to grace’s exaction is a failure to acknowledge
the paradox in which grace can be desired but not demanded as a debitum. Rahner
perhaps does not therefore pay sufficient regard to the need for the human spirit, in
the created order, to be extended beyond itself to receive a fulfilment of which he is
not the author.
Rahner’s presentation of the human person as being existentially in a state of
supernatural elevation contrasts with the Lubacian view of a natural desire for an end
beyond the creature’s power. Although the desiderium naturale is in a sense grace
(although, like Rahner’s supernatural existential not sanctifying grace), the natural
desire reveals the human person to be in need of elevation. The Lubacian position
argues that transformative, elevating grace is mediated through Christ. Revelation is
instead confirmatory in Rahner of an ‘already elevated transcendentality’ (1.4). Thus,
salvation for de Lubac is “situate[d] …historically in relation to human events” and
72
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“the historical event of Christ”.75 For Rahner, it is the “‘anonymous’ free response to
grace”, which can occur “apart from membership in the church or any religious
organization”. Even if Christianity is “necessary”, it is an “addition …to what is true
of us most fundamentally apart from them”.76 Different appreciations of the relative
necessity of the Church in mediating grace are thus evident between de Lubac and
Rahner.
Moreover, Rahner’s solution is arguably guilty of the naturalism of which he accuses
the Lubacian position. The presuppositions underlying his view that a natural desire
necessarily exacts grace might imply that the ordination of the supernatural
existential to grace itself demands an exaction of grace. On this view, grace’s
extraction, based on an existential of the human person would be to ‘naturalise’
grace. Grace is exacted for the human person not because of acceptance of God’s
specific revelation of himself in Christ but because of his acceptance of himself (1.4).
Arguably, grace is anticipated in the supernatural existential. Human nature is seen
as not needing to be extended ‘beyond itself’ on a Rahnerian view, in contrast with
the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist perspective. In de Lubac, the natural desire for
grace remains unfulfilled without the novel irruption of God in Christ into the natural
order. The Rahnerian view can diminish the necessity of revelation and the Church
for human personal and social fulfilment, a necessity promoted in the Lubacian view
of the supernatural.77
Thus, the argument that de Lubac’s nouvelle théologie is connected in fundamental
theology to Rahner’s ‘theology of grace’ – and by extension Schillebeeckx, Metz,
and Gutiérrez’s – is contestable. A common opposition to extrinsicism does not mean
that their readings of human existence or ‘nature’ are the same. Treating de Lubac
and Rahner’s views of the supernatural as belonging to the same fundamental
theology, misses the important differences between them and the implications
flowing from their adoption. Rowland observes that that the difference between them
actually goes to the heart of the cleavages in fundamental theology after the Council.
The immanentist framework adopted in liberation theology resulted from going
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down the “Rahner-Schillebeeckx bus” and not a de Lubac-Balthasarian one.78 As
Milbank points out, Balthasar uses de Lubac’s account of supernatural and combines
it with a Przywarian analogical metaphysics to refute liberal theology’s choice to
begin ‘below’ from a humanist foundation (i.e. Rahnerianism).79 Arguing that the
supernatural existential is an existent reality given as part of human existence itself
can tend, at least as adopted in the Concilium perspective, to the “baptism” of human
nature, history and “secular society” as such, independent of any reference to
Christ.80 Sin, in its social dimension, is dealt with by reference to a dialectical
philosophy rather than primarily by reference to the Paschal Mystery of Christ.81
Rahner’s ‘supernatural existential’ should then not be understood as a necessary
development of de Lubac but arguably a rupture, a rupture rooted in differing
conceptions of how grace relates to nature and differing philosophical frameworks.

Ratzinger, who as we will see below broadly inherits the Lubacian position, thus
operates according to a different fundamental theology from Rahner and his
Concilium inheritors (1). Contrasting views of the hope-history debate, grounded in
different views of the supernatural, consequently emerge (4.4). Adoption of a
Lubacian perspective leads to a view of hope in Ratzinger, which locates fulfilment
in a reality exterior to history, whereas the Rahnerian option, as adopted by his
followers, can include in eschatological hope’s prospect, the fulfilment of political,
earthly goals (1.4 and 1.5).

4.3

The Human Spirit’s Orientation ‘Beyond Itself’ in Pieper and Ratzinger

The Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist reading of the supernatural forms a key part of
the background to Ratzinger’s conception of the human person. Pieper’s
anthropology also constitutes an essential contextual component. Pieper and
Ratzinger share with de Lubac the view that there is a “fundamental orientation of
the soul to the beatific vision”.82 Intrinsic to the human spirit is an ineluctable calling
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to supernatural beatitude. The human spirit has a paradoxical desire ‘beyond itself’
for an end it cannot effect, which must then be received as gift. The natural desire is
grounded in nature and an analogical metaphysics, giving the human creature the
capax Dei. The person possesses a soul, the capacity for dialogical immortality,
which shows the human spirit to exist in the order of freedom, with an ecstatic
orientation ‘beyond itself’, all in the context of a view of creation as gift.

This section will first present summary evidence in Pieper and Ratzinger for the
claim that the human person to possesses the natural desire. It will then explore the
theology of creation and analogical metaphysics employed by Pieper and Ratzinger,
which support the predication of the natural desire. Thereafter, it will focus on the
different characteristics of the spirit, which they consider constitute it as oriented
beyond itself to the receipt of a gift that it cannot manufacture itself. The human
spirit, grounded in God and possessing a nature by virtue of being a creature, has an
analogical, erotic and reflexive desire for dialogue and communion with God.
Bearing the influence of Przywara, de Lubac and Balthasar, Pieper and Ratzinger
present a picture of the human mind as spirit and inherently directed to the vision of
God, a vision that is not alien to human capacity but nevertheless a stretching beyond
any natural power.
4.3.1

The Natural Desire for Supernatural Beatitude

Ratzinger presents a view of the human person as possessing a natural desire for
supernatural beatitude, even if not necessarily formulated in those terms. He would
agree with the claim that God has created the human person to enjoy happiness with
him.83 The innate vocation for eternal beatitude rests on the immortality of the
human soul. Ratzinger observes that “[t]he only thing that lasts forever is the human
soul, the human person created by God for eternity”.84 He argues that “man by his
nature is created for immortality”.85 The human person is intended to enjoy eternal
life with God. His existence raises a question, the “deepest” of human life, which
keeps the human person alert “for God, for a gratification that is limitless, for the
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infinite”.86 In “the heart of every man and every woman” is therefore an “innate
desire for happiness”, which relates to the human person’s telos in infinity.87
Significantly, this last comment was given in one of Benedict’s General Audiences
on St Thomas Aquinas, implying a general agreement with the LubacianBalthasarian reading of Thomas on the desiderium naturale. The human person longs
for the infinite, for supernatural beatitude.

Pieper likewise reads Thomas as presenting the human person with a natural desire
for beatitude, which extends beyond the satisfaction of a general, natural curiosity for
knowledge of the First Cause. According to Pieper, Aquinas understood beatitude as
the “ultimate goal of human life”.88 The desire for beatitude is the telos of human
existence. As a rational creature, “[m]an craves by nature happiness and bliss…we
want happiness by nature”.89 There is a “nature-dictated desire for happiness”.90
Moreover, a person’s “directing of the will” to his happiness “has the quality of a
natural process”.91 The desire for, and movement of the will towards, happiness is
natural to the human person. That it concerns the ‘ultimate goal’ of human life, and
refers to the human person’s natural desire for ‘bliss’ (c.f. 2.3) suggests a constitutive
desire greater than curiosity for knowledge of God as First Cause.

Because the desire of the rational spirit for happiness is natural, it contains a
givenness that cannot be erased. The desire for beatitude arises “naturally and by
necessity”.92 To desire happiness is to obey a “gravitational impulse” within the
human heart, an impulse over which “we have no power”. 93 In fact, we “[are] this
gravitational impulse”.94 Because we are our very yearning, so strong is the natural
desire for happiness that, in Pieper’s words, “the entire energy of human nature is
86
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considered a hunger which demands satiation, a thirst that requires quenching”.95
Desire for happiness is not mere velleity or a vague curiosity for knowledge of God
naturally obtainable, but a strong orientation which embraces the whole of the human
person, intellect, will and passion. All striving flowing from the character of the
human person as created spirit, impels the spirit to reach beyond itself and desire to
attain happiness.96

The completion of human nature is the beatific vision, the vision of God, which is a
fulfilment of and not alien or extrinsic to human nature. Rather, such vision is “the
fulfilment objectively appropriate to our nature”.97 The “visio beatifica” is “the
fulfilment of [the human person’s] being” and “human life”. 98 The human being “by
nature craves the appeasement of his yearnings through seeing.”99 Each creature
possesses a “natural orientation toward fulfilment”.100 Resting on a theological
anthropology given in “the tradition of humanity’s wisdom” is thus the view that
there is a close concordance between seeing God as the transcendent ground of all
being in the beatific vision and human nature.101 To see God is to satiate the desire
for happiness, appropriate to our nature.
Pieper and Ratzinger’s view that the human creature has a dynamic orientation to an
end in God aligns with an Augustinian view that the human person has been created
‘towards’ God for happiness in him. Commenting upon Augustine’s statement,
Wood notes that “we are made to praise God and long to do so”.102 As translated by
Robert McMahon, Augustine at the beginning of his Confessions famously
comments, “You have made us toward yourself and our heart is restless until in rests
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in you”.103 McMahon admits his use of ‘toward’ to be awkward English.
Nevertheless, its use captures more accurately the natural orientation of the rational
spirit towards God: “Augustine’s ‘toward yourself’ implies an innate inclination in
human nature. Human beings are innately, by our very nature, drawn toward
God.”104 The human being has been created ‘facing’ God and looking towards him as
part of his very nature. He can attempt to look away from God but of necessity is
oriented to him in a dynamic, non-static way.105 As Ratzinger says, the human
person, “being towards others”, is “a traveller on the way of knowing and loving”. 106
We are moving towards him in a manner natural to the human being.

Pieper and Ratzinger argue, therefore, along Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist lines
that constitutive of our essence is an inescapable orientation to a supernatural end.
Pieper argues “that in the act of being created we are – without being asked and
without even the possibility of being asked – shot toward our destination like an
arrow.”107 His use of the metaphor ‘arrow’ is suggestive of the ineluctable
directedness the human person has towards God as his final end. It is a metaphor
picked up also in Ratzinger, who argues that the spirit “bear[s] within itself the arrow
pointing beyond itself.108 Human existence is “like an arrow in flight”.109 In virtue of
its nature, the spirit is drawn and directed back to the Creator.
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4.3.2

The Theology of Creation and the Possession of a Nature as Supporting the
Natural Capacity for Relationship with God

Pieper and Ratzinger’s view of the natural desire is grounded in their theology of
creation, and the link they detect between creation and the human person’s
possession of a nature. The natural desire for God depends upon the fact that the
human person is a creature. Ratzinger relies on Pieper’s elaboration of Aquinas’s
theology of creation and the nexus between having a nature and being created to
argue that as a creature, the human has a natural capacity to be open to “Another”,
namely God (the capax Dei: 4.3.4 and 4.3.5).110 For Pieper, the consequence of being
a creature is to possess a nature. As Ratzinger points out in respect of this argument,
the corollary of this is that without a Creator, there can be no nature. To have a
nature simply means to have been created by God and implies an anterior,
ontological relationship with the Creator. The Western tradition equated ‘nature’
with the idea of “by virtue of the created state”.111 What “happens ‘by nature’
happens ‘by virtue of creation’”.112 To have a nature is to be created; what occurs
‘naturally’ (and what flows from a natural capacity) arises because of creation.113
The concept of nature is thus necessarily linked to creation in Pieper and Ratzinger,
and natural capacity is grounded in the fact of being a creature.

The possession of an anterior nature constitutes the person as what he is and can be.
Pieper argues that the “datum prior to all others, which most decisively affects our
existence, is we ourselves, i.e., that which we are by virtue of our created state.”114
Human nature is “the irrevocable origin and precondition” of what we can achieve
naturally, as well as the “newness of life” offered in the gift of grace that God in
Christ offers us.115 Nature is prior to the operation of grace and what makes it
possible.
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A theology of creation argues that the human person is the product of a
communication of God’s Being to him. Pieper understands creation as involving God
“truly” giving and sharing Being such that the creature has its own existence and
essence as belonging to it.116 Consistent with Pieper, Ratzinger argues that such a
communication is what makes the possession of a nature possible. Paradoxically,
while entirely dependent on God’s creative act, creation gives the human creature a
nature, which is simultaneously existence “in its own right” and participation in
God’s Being.117 In the case of the human person, what is natural involves
immortality. For Ratzinger, this “immortality belongs to man by nature”, which is a
reality that flows from being a creature.118 Likewise, Pieper contends that the
“imperishability” of the human soul “is given to us as really our own…a permanent
part of our beings” because the human person has been created.119 What the human
person has “by virtue of Creation”, he has “by nature”. 120 By nature, human beings
have an immortal or imperishable soul.
A theology of creation has also implications for conceiving the human person’s
natural capacity for God, the supernatural and grace, and therefore the nature-grace
relationship (see further 4.3.4). The human person has been given a natural capacity,
as his own ‘possession’, to be open to God. He ‘owns’, by nature, immortality, which
in Ratzinger’s personalist language entails the capacity for dialogue with God. For
Ratzinger, the human person’s “essential immortality” rests on the love of God and
the reality of his being called to a “dialogic relationship with” God, on whom he
depends as creature.121 A human being’s immortality arises from “his relatedness, or
capacity for relatedness, to God” (4.3.5).122 An individual and “inviolable [soul
that]… can persist and be preserved in being beyond death” belongs to him
intimately (4.3.3).123 A capacity for God belongs to the human creature as his own
possession by nature.
116
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4.3.3

Nature, Natural Desire and Analogy

Intimately tied to the nexus between nature and creation is an analogical
metaphysics, which recognises God as the ground of all being, in whose existence all
creatures’ own being is but a participation, and to whom the human person is called
to enter into the fullness of existence. The orientation to the fullness of being
overlaps thus with and helps make philosophically intelligible the natural desire. In
contrast arguably to Rahner’s supernatural existential (4.2.2), an analogical
metaphysics supports the notion that the natural desire is oriented ‘beyond itself’ for
fulfilment. Such an analogical metaphysics is present in Ratzinger and Pieper.

The analogy of being, on which an analogical metaphysics rests, expresses Lateran
IV’s claim in 1215 that “No similarity can be observed between Creator and creature,
however great, that would not require one to observe greater dissimilarity between
them”.124 That there is ‘greater dissimilarity’ between God and creature rests on the
recognition that “Deus semper maius – God is always greater” than the creature,
which, according to Ratzinger, belongs to the “Platonic-Augustinian tradition” and is
found also in Aquinas.125 God’s ever-greater reality is most evident in his “wholly
other mode” of existence as compared to that of the creature.126 God possesses a
‘wholly other mode’ of existence because, in Aquinas’s analogical terms, God is “the
sheer act of to-be itself (ipsum esse subsistens)”, a mode of reality that remains
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“inescapably mysterious to the human intellect”.127 The human mind can only know
the ever-greater God’s existence by analogy.
God’s ever-greater mode of being is articulated in the claim that God’s essence is his
existence. Pieper and Ratzinger would generally agree that the divine name revealed
in Exodus 3:14 shows God to be “He [who] just is, without qualification”.128 God’s
nature is the act of sheer existence. What he is, is to exist. In Pieper’s words, only
God, “who is absolute being”, possesses an identity of “essence and existence”.129
Consequently, God possesses the perfection and fullness of existence, a mode of
existence that the finite mind can only analogically grasp.

Arguably, Ratzinger develops the analogy of being theologically by positing what
could be described as a ‘metaphysical personalism’.130 Acknowledging that the
human person’s relationship to God cannot be reductively described as “I-Thou”, he
nevertheless synthesises profoundly the metaphysical and the personalist.131 He
alludes to the convergence of God as the ground of all that is – “the ground of being
per se” – and God as the “ground of my [personal] being”.132 The ground of all being
is “a relationship”, revealed as Father, but at the same time is the “absolute”.133 The
127
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human person has “personal knowledge” of the “objective” ground of reality, and in
this way can “entrust [himself] absolutely” to it.134 The human person does not relate
to God as an ontological equal. He trustingly abandons himself to the God who
reveals himself as “Person”, but who is simultaneously ever-greater Being as such,
and subsequently the source itself of the human person.135
The interiority of God to the human person, implicit in Ratzinger’s metaphysical
personalism, forms an important integer in his conception of human nature and its
orientation to supernatural fulfilment. He employs the Augustinian motif that God is
“interior intimo meo et superior summon meo”, simultaneously transcendent of
creation but also immanent to it in a profound way.136 Contrary to a univocal
conception of being’s “competitive” understanding of the relationship between God
and creation, Ratzinger argues that when the human person grows in love of God, his
will becomes not an alien, external imposition, but converges with the person’s own
will. A union of wills is possible because “God is in fact more deeply present to me
than I am to myself”.137 God is not a separate ens ‘outside’ the human person but the
esse who is ‘within’ (and simultaneously without) the human person as its ground.138
The Thomistic metaphysics of Pieper complements Ratzinger’s Augustinian
understanding of the relationship between God and the person. Against the
Enlightenment notion of God as Deus extramundanus (God exclusively external to or
‘outside’ the world) Pieper argues that all creatures are in God as archetypes and that
God “is necessarily in all things, in the most intrinsic manner”. 139 According to
134
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Pieper, therefore, there is an “indwelling of creation in God and of God in
creation”.140 The creature exists in God as God’s idea, according to which he
communicates existence to the creature as its ground, creating an intimate nexus
between God and creature.141 God’s interiority to the creature derives from the
identity of essence and existence in him, with the consequence that any existent
subsists as “a producing peculiar to His essence”.142 God is the most interior reality
of creature because existence as such – “the act-of-being” – “is the innermost thing
for every being”.143 What is ‘closest’ to the creature is the fact of its own existence.
Because its existence derives from the One whose nature is simply ‘to-be’, God is
what is ‘closest’ to the creature.144 God is ‘within’ as the creature’s source of
existence.
God is the human person’s inmost reality but also his transcendent source and
destiny. Even more than being grounded in nothing, “[t]o be a creature…means
being grounded in absolute being and having an existential orientation toward being,
toward one’s own being and, at the same time, toward the Divine Being”.145
Consistent with Ratzinger’s metaphysical personalism, Pieper argues that personal
existential fulfilment consists in participation in God’s plenitude. That there is a deep
convergence between existential fulfilment and participation in the life of God flows
from understanding the creature as participating in God’s esse, per a Thomistic
“participation metaphysics”.146 The orientation to the fulfilment of one’s own being
necessarily involves the orientation to God, who is the ‘sheer act of to-be’ as such,
the plenitude and source of being.
That the human person possesses an ‘existential orientation toward being’ can be
said to equate with an innate but paradoxical orientation to supernatural beatitude.
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The existential orientation depends upon God’s will for the human creature to enjoy
life with him. Following Aquinas, Pieper argues that God “created all things that they
might be” (Wis 1:14).147 According to Pieper, creatures have a natural tendency
“toward a good”.148 Adopting the scholastic notion of the convertibility of good and
existence, he argues thus that the “proper orientation of the ‘way’ is toward
being”.149 Existence itself is good. The human creature has been created for
supernatural fulfilment consisting of the enjoyment of the fullness of being in God.
Creaturely desire for being derives from the creature’s participation in the Essence
that is Existence. God, whose nature is ‘to be’, imparts a strong inclination in the
creature likewise ‘to be’. Possessing existence analogically, the creature is in the
paradoxical position of always desiring a greater share in existence. Embedded in the
notion of creatureliness is that the creature comes:

from the being-creating power of the Creator, who holds the creatura above
nothingness with such an absolute strength of realization that this urge, to be,
becomes simply identical with the inmost nature of the created entity.150

In an analogical sense, we “are life” (vita sunt) by nature because we are made in the
Word and “[dwell] in God as creative essence”.151 An impetus to exist and to have
the fullness of being is given the creature, such that this impetus is synonymous with
the nature of the creature itself.

An analogical conception of being present in Pieper and Ratzinger intersects
therefore with an Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist understanding of the supernatural,
with which they are generally aligned. The general orientation of the creature is ‘to
be’, to the good that is existence. Even more so, the human person’s natural
orientation to supernatural fulfilment – that is, ‘the fullness of happiness – or rather,
147
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bliss’ in Pieper’s words (2.3.4) – corresponds with definitive participation the
fullness of being, that is, eternal life. The desire for definitive existence equates to
the desire for supernatural happiness, and is implanted in the creature’s ‘inmost
nature’. God gives the human person not only existence but a natural orientation to
the fullness of existence as such.

4.3.4

Capax Dei

Also bound up with the connection between creation and the possession of a nature is
the human person’s capax Dei, a capacity to be acted upon by God in virtue of being
a creature. In Pieper, like de Lubac, the capax Dei is understood to extend beyond a
mere non-repugnance to God’s action. It is one of the key characteristics of the
human spirit as oriented beyond itself.

The neo-scholastic account of Cajetan suggested that the obediential faculty in man
referred to a “passive non-repugnance to miraculous change”.152 For the human
person, “supernatural elevation” is merely “not repugnant to human nature”, in
contrast to the view that the human has a natural desire for the supernatural.153
Consistent with a neo-scholastic account of obediential potency, Pieper affirms that
the human creature can be subject to God’s intervention. The power to receive God’s
action in the soul belongs to the human person by nature as creature. As creature, the
human being constantly receives its “being and essence from the divine Source and
Creator” and is “never to be finally completed”. 154 Dependent on God, the creature is
ever open to a “new intervention by God”, either in the form of grace or revelation
for the human being.155 For Pieper, the term potentia oboedientialis of the creature
refers therefore to a natural, ontological state of openness to divine intervention.
Arguably, Pieper’s understanding of obediential potency extends beyond Cajetan. He
uses language redolent of natural desire (4.3.1). The human spirit’s orientation to the
152
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supernatural depends first of all on a natural capacity to receive the supernatural
(capax Dei) and the spirit’s immediate relationship to the Creator. In his treatment of
the theological virtue of faith, Pieper argues that “the soul is by nature capable of
receiving the ‘supernatural’ new life of grace (‘naturaliter anima est gratiae
capax’)”.156 The capacity to be able to believe or exercise charity is ‘natural’ to the
human person even if the actual possession of faith or charity arises as a result of
grace.157 Moreover, he recognises the unique nature of the mind as being
immediately related to God and, in this way, ‘naturally’ oriented to him. For Pieper it
is in the mind that the capacity of divine intervention is especially situated. Pieper
observes that ‘mind’ in itself can be understood as “receptivity to Being”.158
Although belonging to it by virtue of being a creature rather than as a consequence of
its spirituality (which might suggest that Pieper confines the capacity for the
supernatural to an obediential potency), the human being possesses a power
“inherent to the human mind by nature” to comprehend God’s revelation and the
supernatural, which extends beyond an “openness to… ‘natural’ revelation of God in
the created order”.159 Pieper argues that this inherent power is natural to the human
person, and stems from mentality being immediatum ordinem ad Deum, in an
unmediated “ontological openness” to God.160 Rational creatures possess an innate
receptivity to God’s supernatural action.

4.3.5

Dialogical Immortality as Natural Desire

Ratzinger develops the idea of the capax Dei and refers, in a more personalist and
less conceptualist manner, to the immediate relationship between the human person
and God. He develops a dialogical conception of immortality, in which the human
person is called in his nature to have a relationship with God. A unitary and not
156
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extrinsic reading of the nature-grace relationship, a picture of the human spirit as
oriented beyond itself, follows.

For Ratzinger, the possessor of a spiritual nature is proximately related to the
Creator. He links the capability to know and reply to God to the possession of “a
spiritual, immortal soul”.161 Preferring to use “historical, actual language” over such
“substantialist language”, the early Ratzinger nevertheless sees no opposition
between what it connotes and seeks to elaborate its “concrete meaning”.162 The
human possession of a soul simply signifies that God has “willed, known and loved”
the human person in a “special way”.163 The human person has a “special
dependence of being” on God and has been created by him “in a more specific, more
direct way”.164 The human creature does not exist in the same mode as other
creatures, a natural mode “that ‘is there’” subsisting in a determined way and which
does not relate directly in consciousness or cognitive capacity to God. 165 Rather, the
human creature “has the ability to be immediately in relation to God”.166 As a
spiritual creature, he can think of God and respond to him by addressing him as Thou
in eternity. He is thereby “opened onto transcendence”. 167 Unique to the human
person is therefore that God calls him “to an eternal dialogue” and has been given the
capacity to be “God’s partner in a dialogue”. 168 The capax Dei relates thus to human
persons’ “capacity for truth and their call to freedom”.169 Using biblical language,
Ratzinger presents a dialogical personalism in which the human person, by nature,
has a supernatural vocation to relationship with God, a relationship predicated on call
and response. The call in a sense supersedes the order of created nature, and extends
beyond the mere non-repugnance to God’s action of the obediential potency shared
by all creatures.
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Ratzinger relates his dialogic personalism to a Thomistic hylomorphism. He
interprets the Thomistic account of the soul in light of the human person’s unique
and natural dialogic capacity to know and enter into communion with God. Ratzinger
connects Thomas’s concept of the soul to the latter’s “account of the dynamic
movement of all creation towards God”.170 The soul belongs completely “to the
material world, yet also goes beyond this world in going beyond itself”. 171 He argues
thus that when the human person is conceived as anima forma corporis, his
“relationship to God” is seen not simply as “some optional pleasurable diversion for
the intellect” but “express[es] the core of his very essence”.172 In other words, the
human person’s orientation to relationship with God is more than a simple
intellectual curiosity to know the First Cause. The human person is instead the
“creature…for whom the vision of God is part and parcel of his very being”.173 As
the human person can grasp the “truth in its most comprehensive meaning, it also
belongs intrinsically to his being to participate in life”.174 The human person’s
relationality to God for Ratzinger is not accidental to the human person such that he
can exist independently of God, but “is deepest in man’s being”. 175 Significantly,
Ratzinger identifies this capacity as consisting of “what we call ‘soul’”. 176 To possess
an immortal soul means the human person is open to relationship to God. The ability
for relationship with God and a supernatural vocation for knowledge of truth in its
ultimate significance (the beatific vision) constitute the soul and are innate to a
description of the human person.

The immortality that belongs to the human person by nature is, by being constituted
as relatedness to God, closely related to the order of grace. The capacity to ‘awaken’
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(after death) into dialogical relationship with God is possessed by “every” person.177
The immortality of the human person is therefore “not some secondary ‘supernatural’
addition” but belongs to “man as man”.178 Immortality and an eternal dialogue of
love with God is not the “special destiny for the pious” but inheres in every human
qua human.179 Moreover, because the capacity for dialogue with God is natural to
every man, it is impossible to “make a neat distinction between ‘natural’ and
‘supernatural’”.180 Ratzinger argues that there is a “smooth transition” between the
“basic dialogue” to which the human being is called in being created and “the
dialogue of grace known as Jesus Christ”.181 Christ is, after all, the “second Adam”
which fulfils the “infinite longing” of the first Adam, who possessed a created human
nature.182 Ratzinger places therefore human nature within a supernatural context
ordered to grace in Jesus Christ.183 That human nature is created for dialogue with
God and that there is a ‘smooth transition’ between ‘natural’ dialogue with God, as
effected in the grace of Christ, evidences a unitary relationship between nature and
grace, in which human nature is ordered intrinsically to the supernatural.

4.3.6

Human Spiritual Nature as Surpassing the Natural Order

The human person possesses a ‘nature’ ordered to dialogue with God, which
constitutes the human as spirit having a vocation ‘beyond itself’. As such, he is
situated uniquely in the order of creation. As constitutively immortal and called into
dialogue with God, the human spirit subsists in an order between mere ‘nature’ and
God. In an early essay, Ratzinger describes thus the human rational spirit as existing
in the order of freedom, in the space ‘between’ God and nature. According to
Bonaventure’s voluntaristic concept of the nature-grace relationship, which
Ratzinger affirmatively explores in an early essay, the human will exists “as a
separate middle order between mere nature and God’s own freedom”. 184 In Ratzinger
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also present is the idea of the human person as bridge-maker, existing – to use a
phrase of Balthasar – “on the border between the [natural and supernatural]
orders”.185 The character of personhood is such that it occupies a “separate order”
between nature and “God’s revelatory actions”, that is, grace. 186 As spirit, the human
person exists on the plane of freedom between the merely natural and God.

Ratzinger shares with de Lubac a suspicion of the concept of pure nature. Intrinsic to
the human soul is that it “surpasses pure nature”.187 Ratzinger argues that a “merely
natural soul is inconceivable”.188 According to Ratzinger’s interpretation of
Bonaventure, “the human soul is entirely beyond the realm of mere nature” and,
importantly, “cannot subsist in itself alone”.189 Unlike a nature that by Aristotelian
definition operates according to its own principles or powers, a soul is preserved by
the “supernatural” in “a freely given grace”, a reality greater than and above itself.190
Ratzinger argues, moreover, that such preservation does not deny the gratuity of
grace because, contrary to “naturalism”, the “category of the spirit is precisely
freedom”.191 Rather, the soul is in a sense ‘always-already’ graced as belonging to
the spiritual order of freedom.
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The spiritual as related to God in the order of freedom is intrinsic to the mode of the
existence of the human person. Unless “preserved immediately by God” in “every
moment”, the person could not “exist properly”.192 The human soul “can exist only in
the manner of dialogue and freedom”.193 God has freely created the human person
and has given him, as a call to human freedom, the vocation “to surpass himself”.194
A vocation for the spirit to go ‘beyond itself’ allows it to be truly authentic and
relates to Ratzinger’s idea that the soul is immortal by virtue of being called to
dialogue with the Thou of God.195 Possessing a spiritual nature, the human person is
fundamentally upheld by, and turned as it were toward God.
According to Ratzinger’s theological anthropology, human spiritual ‘nature’ has an
intrinsic ordination to grace. He argues that “from God’s perspective…in the end all
nature is ‘grace’”.196 In reference to the axiom ‘gratia praesupponit naturam’
Ratzinger suggests that ‘naturam’ refers to a particular human person “in his
humanness”, that is, in what constitutes his humanity.197 Importantly, the naturam is
the reference point “for the grace event”.198 As its own entity, nature refers to a
subject, which is “the formal capacity to become the bearer of qualities and the goal
of actions”.199 Human nature is conceived as being congenitally open to the action of
the supernatural and the subject of divine activity. Relativity to the divine is
constitutive of the spirit and to be human is to be the possible subject of grace.
Nowhere, seemingly, is there room for a residual concept of pure nature.
Ratzinger does not use the term ‘person’ in his early essay on nature and grace.
Relevant however to the conception of the human spirit as the possible recipient of
grace is his idea that what constitutes ‘personhood’ is a particular receptivity and
relationality to divine activity. For Ratzinger, a human being is a personal subject
192
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capable of dialogue and relationship with the Creator.200 Analogous to the Divine
Persons, each of whom is “not a substance” closed in on itself, but are “complete
relativity”, the human person is intrinsically open to relationship.201 For Ratzinger,
the human person only becomes a ‘self’ to the extent he is “open to all being, in its
wholeness and in its Ground”.202 Essential to the nature of spirit is a reflexive
“openness, [and] relatedness to the whole”, to all that is. 203 Personality, for
Ratzinger, is constituted by relationship to the Divine as the ground of being.
Relationality enables the human person to be oriented ‘beyond itself’. The purpose of
our existence is to say, in Ratzinger’s words, “Thou to God in eternity”. 204 The
human person is created as a subject, an ‘I’, who can address the subject, ‘Thou’,
person to person. The capacity to address God on personal terms stems from our
nature as spirit. The spirit, by nature, “is to put itself in relation…to see itself and the
other”.205 The spirit has the natural capacity to take cognisance of another as
conscious subject. Human nature is the personal capacity to receive and, in receiving,
relate back ‘beyond itself’.

A key component of personhood and the spiritual nature of the human person is
therefore possession of the fundamental capacity and inclination to reach ‘beyonditself’, ultimately to a knowledge of and participation in a higher principle of being.
The essential nature of the spirit is to reach fulfilment only by “going away from
itself”.206 The human spirit does not subsist in itself. It not simply “is” (as a selfenclosed nature) but “reaches beyond itself” and in so doing, comes “to itself”.207
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Self-possession comes from communion with the other. The human spirit is not
meant to be left alone (c.f. Gen 2:18). It is to depart from itself, by knowing itself and
existence generally, and “the wholly other, the transcendent God”. 208 What
constitutes spirit qua spirit is that it exists as “being related beyond oneself”.209
Intrinsic to human existence is a call to go beyond itself.

4.3.7

Eros and the Supernatural

Another key element of the human spirit as directed ‘beyond itself’ and linked to its
unique situation in the realm of freedom is its ecstatic constitution. The natural desire
for God involves the whole person’s movement towards God and carries an ‘erotic’
dimension. According to Milbank the natural desire for knowledge of God as the
source of all things is part of the “general ontological and erotic drawing back of all
creatures towards God”.210 The term ‘eros’ in this context carries overtones of
sexuality but refers more deeply to the longing for happiness that arises when the
human person is touched by the divine and drawn out of himself.

Erotic love involves the human person coming out from himself, transcending
contingency and ascending to God. Ratzinger describes ecstasy as the “fundamental”
or “truly basic law of human existence”.211 Love is an ecstatic “journey”, which
involves an “ongoing exodus out of the closed inward-looking self towards its
liberation through self-giving”, leading to genuine discovery of self and God.212 An
‘exodus’ patterned on Christ involves the human person going “out from himself”,
losing himself and in that way finding himself (Mt 10:39).213 In a passage directly
indebted to Pieper, Ratzinger argues that the experience of encountering beauty is a
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“salutary emotional shock” that draws the person out of himself. 214 Purified, eros
involves thus “an ascent in ‘ecstasy’ towards the Divine” and provides “a certain
foretaste of the pinnacle of our existence, of that beatitude for which our whole being
yearns”.215 Erotic experience of this sort is directly related to the supernatural
happiness that is the human person’s end. For Ratzinger, erotic “love promises
infinity, eternity”.216 It “awakens man to his ultimate destiny”.217 In love’s ascent,
erotic love promises and points to its “definitive goal”, namely an eternal,
indestructible love.218 In Pieper’s words, love’s goal is the “great banquet” at which
the soul contemplates “true Being”.219 Grounded in the natural experience of the
human person’s encounter with beauty, eros points to a fulfilment in the eternal
vision of God.
Reference to Pieper’s work on eros provides philosophical support to Ratzinger’s
view of the spirit as having as ‘erotic’ longing for the divine grounded in its nature.
According to Pieper’s interpretation of Plato’s Phaedrus, the soul’s erotic ascent to
God depends upon its natural capacity to do so and the unique immortal and rational
character of the soul. Pieper argues that in the “overpowering emotion” experienced
in eros, the human person is taken out of the present and “becomes unborn and
imperishable”, with a desire that can only be satiated with “the Whole, the Totality of
being, truth, goodness, beauty”.220 He argues that “the soul has the power to ascend
to the place of the gods”.221 Nevertheless this capacity in turn depends upon the
strength offered by “the nearness of the divine” to the soul.222 The human soul shares
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with God, a spiritual character and a non-corporeal “breath of life”.223 The soul is
immortal and it is “immediately ‘created’” by God and, in a sense, “unborn”.224 It
does not have a genetic origin and come into existence as the product of natural
growth, but springs directly into existence at the hands of God. In a sense, the soul is
“both ‘divine and human’”.225 It is this immediate relationship to God that gives the
human creature its unique character and erotic capacity for the divine. Thus, Pieper’s
conception of eros echoes Ratzinger’s notion of the spirit as immediately related to
God and in an order surpassing mere nature.

The spirit desires and longs for fulfilment. The vocation given to the human person
‘to surpass himself’ is entailed in the desire for beatitude, quickened and heightened
in ecstasy. In the experience of eros, the human person has “a longing so great that it
surpasses human nature”, giving an impetus to achieve insight “beyond human
thought”.226 The human spirit’s orientation ‘beyond itself’ is the ecstatic constitution
of the human person and is itself the desire for beatitude.

4.3.8

The Significance of the Ratio-Intellectus Distinction

Pieper’s analysis of the distinction between ratio and intellectus provides further
insight into Ratzinger’s conception of the human spirit as oriented ‘beyond itself’. It
also highlights the importance of the notion of ‘gift’ to understanding human
supernatural fulfilment. It underscores the unitary character of the nature-grace
relationship, in which the spirit is elevated beyond itself in a manner proper to its
nature.
An understanding of the spirit as being oriented ‘beyond itself’ animates Pieper’s
conception of the human mind, which is evident in his discussion of ratio and
intellectus. In elaborating how the human mind, can be elevated beyond its natural
power to engage in discursive thought, Pieper sought to resurrect the medieval
223
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distinction drawn between these intellective faculties. He considers that human
knowing engages two faculties, which give the human mind two corresponding
layers of knowledge. The first (ratio) follows from human intellectual effort and the
second (intellectus) comes in the form of a gift. The two layers of knowledge can be
said generally to correspond to the orders of nature and grace. Pieper’s understanding
of their interplay reflects an important dynamic in the nature-grace relationship,
namely that it is properly human for the mind or spirit to be elevated ‘beyond itself’,
even as that elevation remains an extension beyond what is merely natural.227

According to Pieper, modernity and especially Kant lost sight of the important
distinction between ratio and intellectus in their reduction of thought to ratio,
discursive reasoning. Necessarily, the mind’s capacity to know the whole was
overlooked. In the context of defending the primacy of leisure to the formation of
culture, Pieper mentions Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which claims that “[b]y nature, all
men long to know”.228 What is desired to be known is however not just technical
knowledge the result of discursive reasoning. Rather, knowledge of the whole and
that which transcends creation is desired, precisely the knowledge that Ratzinger
considers the spirit’s unique object (4.3.5).

Intellectus makes possible vision of the whole. It gives to the human mind the power
of simplex intuitus, “simply looking” at the reality confronting it.229 To that capacity,
“truth presents itself as a landscape presents itself to the eye”. 230 Intellectus gives
“direct intuition”, and is the contemplative perception of the mind’s object, such that
the mind “rests in it”.231 Intuition is thus “the perfect form of knowledge” because it
227
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gives knowledge of what is present.232 The capacity of intellectus is therefore distinct
from ratio, the discursive nature of which concerns “knowledge of what is
absent”.233 Ratio refers to the human intellectual development of thought from
premises, based on observation and logic, whereas intellectus is concerned simply
with the perception of reality as such. For Pieper, human knowing consists of not
merely the intellectual ‘work’ of abstract thinking, but also the receptive capacity to
receive an overall vision of truth and reality.
Pieper’s treatment of the distinction between ratio and intellectus supplements
treatment of Ratzinger’s view of the human spirit as oriented ‘beyond itself’ to a
grasp of ‘truth in its most comprehensive meaning’ (4.3.5). It suggests a picture of
the nature-grace relationship in which what is humanly natural is extended and
elevated into a supernatural realm. Following the “ancients”, Pieper suggests that
ratio is “the essentially human element of knowing”.234 Strictly human or ‘natural’
cognition, significant though it is, is confined to discursive reasoning. Intellectus, in
contrast, relates to “what surpasses human limits”.235 Tellingly, even if intellectus is
a “super-human” power, this capacity “nevertheless does belong to man”.236
Paradoxically the “knowing power of human nature” is not exhausted by the
discursive thinking proper to human rationality. Instead “it is essential to the human
person to reach beyond the province of the human and into the order of angels, the
truly intellectual beings”.237 In the intellectus, the human person partakes in the
angels’ vision of spiritual reality. Nevertheless, such participation remains “truly
human” because it is “the highest fulfilment of what it is to be human”, even if it
involves “receptive seeing”, which transcends what is human as such.238 The vision
involved in the intellectus is “non proprie humana, sed superhumana”.239 What is
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‘super-human’ transcends what is solely and “essentially human”.240 It remains
essentially human for the mind to be elevated beyond what it can reason for itself,
even if capacity for that elevation is proper to humanity. Rationality as such does not
necessarily lead to knowledge of the whole but human nature nevertheless has been
created to extend ‘beyond itself’ to such knowledge.241
The intellective process in which the human person’s mind is taken out of itself into
a vision of spiritual reality relates to the natural desire. The human person possesses
a capax universi, a capacity “to comprehend the sum total of existing things”, which
extends beyond “normal” technical knowledge and proficiency.242 The human spirit
is capable of receiving vision of the entirety of being, including its ground. Common
with other spiritual beings, the human mind “is by its very nature a receptacle for the
whole of reality”.243 Pieper does not simply refer to created reality, but the
“undiminished totality of being”, which necessarily includes God. 244 The end of
human existence entails a “seeing awareness of the divine ground of the universe”.245
The vision of God, the source of all being, is that for which the human mind is made
and to which it is open.
Pieper’s analysis of the ratio-intellectus distinction serves therefore as a distinct
expression of the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist view of the supernatural, and
supplements Ratzinger’s view of the human spirit as oriented to fulfilment ‘beyond
itself’. It reveals an important feature of the human spirit. Elevation into the ‘seeing’
of the angelic orders is paradoxically above human nature but entirely in accordance
with it. Analogous to the organic connection Ratzinger detects between the spirit’s
240
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natural capacity to enter into dialogue with God and the ‘dialogue of grace’ made
possible in Christ (4.3.5.), there is in Pieper a ‘smooth transition’ between the natural
inclination of the mind to a vision of the whole and its reception as gift (4.3.9). The
intellectus is connected to the ‘openness, relatedness to the whole’ that Ratzinger
considers to be intrinsic to the nature of spirit (4.3.6). Ratzinger’s understanding of
this openness to the whole accords thus with Pieper’s conception of the human
mind’s orientation beyond itself, which is grounded in a simultaneous capacity to
comprehend the whole and dependence on a superhuman elevation to achieve such
vision.

4.3.9

Nature and Fulfilment in the Context of Gift

A significant feature of Ratzinger’s view of the human person is revealed in
discussion of the distinction between ratio and intellectus which has implications for
conceiving the nature-grace relationship. Underlying Pieper and Ratzinger’s notions
of the human mind’s capacity to reach ‘beyond itself’ is the notion that gift is
required for the mind (and the human person) to reach its full knowing capacity.
Pieper and Ratzinger’s view of human nature and the achievement of its end are
therefore distinct from various strains of modernity’s view that the human end and
eschatological fulfilment can be achieved according to human rationality (c.f. 1.2.1).
Instead, human fulfilment ultimately comes as the result of gift.

Knowing in the fullest sense, that is, as the result of the operation of intellectus, does
not arise from effort. It intrinsically belongs to the realm of gift. Pieper argues that
knowledge does not consist “in the effort of thought as such” but in the grasping and
discovering of reality.246 Even if intellectual effort might be a pre-condition for
obtaining insight, the “lightening-like insight, true insight” itself is not the product of
thought but “comes to one like a gift”.247 Contemplation is intrinsically connected to
play (leisure), which are juxtaposed against a Kantian conception of “intellectual
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work”.248 Ratzinger likewise, but from a more specifically Augustinian perspective,
considers cognition ultimately to operate in the realm of gift:

In every cognitive process, truth is not something we produce, it is always found, or
better, received. Truth, like love, ‘is neither planned nor willed, but somehow
imposes itself upon human beings’.249

Authentic insight comes from contemplative receptivity and is not itself the product
of human rational activity.
Pieper connects his claims regarding the intellectus’s capacity to receive vision of the
truth to a view of creation as subsisting in the context of gift. The fundament of
Christian existence is that “life is based on the reality of ‘Grace’”, that the Holy
Spirit is “Gift” and that God’s Justice is grounded in “Love”. 250 All that is achieved
or claimed by the human mind rests on the prior reality “that what is first is always
something received”, a reality exceeding any claims of justice and which is entirely
gratuitous.251 Akin to hope and charity, which “[transcend] every law of justice”,
truth is a “gift” and “greater than we are”.252 As Ratzinger argues, “every good thing
is a gift on loan from [God]” and that “Everything is grace”. 253 Knowledge of the
truth in its fullness is received from outside ourselves and as transcending natural
capacity in the manner of a gift.

An understanding of creation as itself a grace reveals an important element of the
Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist, and therefore Ratzinger’s, view of the supernatural.
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That the whole of truth itself is imparted to the mind via gift supports the claim that
the object of the innate desire for beatitude is beyond the control of the person
desiring it. That a “creature’s power is not as great as its desire”, dictates that the end
desired is beyond our natural power to obtain.254 A creature qua creature cannot
make itself God, and is only ‘made so’ through participation in the divine nature
received as a gift (5). For Ratzinger, the human person’s “powers are insufficient to
lift him up to God”.255 Earlier, Pieper’s quotation of Aquinas’s comment that the
very desire for happiness is not subject to human control was noted. Even more
beyond human capacity is the fulfilment of that desire. He argues thus that happiness
comes as a gift and that “we are not the forgers of our own felicity”.256 Even if the
human person can “establish, by his own effort, a ‘claim’ to the happy outcome of
his pilgrimage” with “meritorious action”, the claim rests on the “pre-existence” of
something unmerited.257 Any ‘claim’ and ‘merit’ to fulfilment are not absolute and
depend upon a prior unmerited conferral of a nature which is oriented to a fulfilment
that humans “cannot bring about themselves”.258 Human fulfilment is received as a
gift and is not the product of human effort.

The human person thus finds his happiness outside himself. For Pieper, following
Aquinas, an agent outside of the soul produces its happiness and the soul must
therefore look “elsewhere” for fulfilment.259 Ratzinger likewise contends that the
human person’s “center of gravity” is outside himself, in the God who calls him in
his nature “to go out of itself in order to find itself”.260 Human nature being related
beyond itself to an external source of fulfilment necessitates that what is sought is
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beyond its capacity and cannot be earned. In the context of an anterior graced
creation, beatitude results from grace.

4.3.10 Conclusion

That the supernatural vocation of the human person is intrinsic to a description of
him means that his nature is oriented ‘beyond itself’. The notion of ‘beyond itself’ is
fundamental to Ratzinger’s conception of the rational spirit and connects him closely
to an Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of nature and grace. His language
aligns with both de Lubac and Balthasar, who use the phrase ‘beyond itself’ to
describe the rational spirit’s directedness to a reality that surpasses its own powers
(4.2). Ratzinger considers that it is constitutive of the human spirit to reach to a
reality beyond its own nature. He conceives the human spirit as possessing an innate,
‘natural’ capacity for dialogue with God, on which immortality rests. The natural
desire for God extends beyond a mere velleity and obediential potency for God but
goes to the essence of the human spirit as constitutively, reflexively and erotically
oriented to union with God. The human mind is paradoxically made for knowledge
of God, even if such knowledge is beyond purely natural human intellectual
capabilities. The superhuman knowledge that is the object of the intellectus is
received as gift. Beatitude comes from a source outside the human person, even as a
creaturely metaphysics shows the creature to have an intrinsic desire to be.

4.4

The Supernatural, Metaphysics and Hope

The natural desire at the heart of every human person is for eternal life, for
immortality, for indestructible happiness and love. It is therefore intrinsically
connected to Pieper’s and Ratzinger’s idea of eternal life as the object of human
hope. Fundamental hope, as oriented to eternal life, bliss or happiness in God and not
merely to the attainment of inner-worldly goods, is grounded in the human person’s
innate capacity and desire for eternity. The human person’s constitutive orientation
to participation in the infinite matches the orientation of authentic hope, fulfilment of
which is its object (2.3).
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The appreciation that hope’s object is beyond human control is linked to the call
inscribed in the human spirit for a supernatural end paradoxically elevated above
human capacity. Pieper and Ratzinger’s accounts of hope as directed ultimately to an
extra-historical object of eternal life given by God, thus depend upon the theological
anthropology, outlined in 4.3, which recognises that the human person “can come to
salvation and to himself only through the gift of love – through grace”.261 Hope as
oriented to salvation consisting of the participation in eternal love and joy rests upon
a view of rational, spiritual nature as oriented reflexively ‘beyond itself’ to the
reception of an unmerited and uncontrollable gift. Ratzinger’s understanding of the
hope-history relationship is thus underpinned by the positions he takes in
fundamental theology concerning the nature-grace relationship.
Ratzinger’s conception of the hope-history relationship can also be supplemented by
reference to an analogical metaphysics and its reference to an existential fulfilment in
the plenitude of being, which relates to the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist view of
natural desire. An analogical view of creation and the human person also
distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger from the theology of hope’s emphasis on futurity
and the realisation of inner-historical goals. Grounded in an analogical dissonance in
the mode of creaturely being vis-à-vis God’s being, the historical human creature is
only ‘on the way’ to an eternal supra-historical participation in infinite being. Such
participation can only be effected through the violent transposition of history outside
of itself. Claims of inner-historical fulfilment are therefore relativised.

The

theologies of futurity arguably pay insufficient attention to the metaphysical
dimension of hope by inordinately historicising it and exclusively focusing upon the
‘future’. The revelation that is communicated in sacred tradition, and the created
nature that conditions and provides the content of the object of hope are paid scant
heed.

4.4.1

Natural Desire and Hope

Pieper and Ratzinger’s understanding of hope is connected to the natural desire. The
Augustinian conception of the restless human heart, an important component of the
261
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Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist tradition (4.3.1), is important to Ratzinger’s analysis
of hope. Ratzinger argues that the anticipated happiness of the human person resists
(or ought to resist) settling on any created good (Goethe) but yearns for an unknown
happiness. Hope is grounded in this Augustinian restlessness for a happiness that
only God can fulfil. The lack “at the heart of the human condition” means the human
heart ultimately finds unsatisfying any experience the moment can give. 262 It strives
and hopes instead for a permanent happiness, which can only ever be anticipated on
earth.263 The restless Augustinian heart finds unsatisfying any created good and
hopes instead to rest in God.264

The restlessness of the human heart recalls the ecstatic constitution of the human
spirit (4.3.7) and is related to hope. Rowland observes that traditionally “hope [is
especially related] to the memory and its experience of beauty”. 265 Connecting the
experience of eros to hope, Ratzinger suggests that “memory and longing” sets the
person searching for fulfilment and that in the experience and memory of beauty, an
“arrow of longing pierces… and wounds” the human person.266 Ratzinger cites
Nicholas Cabasilas’s comment that the arrow of beauty originates in the beauty of
the “Bridegroom himself”, which wounds the recipient, who thereby longs for the
Bridegroom.267 Such longing constitutes an ‘erotic’ desire for God in Christ and
quickens hope in the “fullness of satisfied desire”.268 Hope in fulfilment is nourished
by the memory of beauty, which promises a fulfilment in eternal beauty.

The restless desire of the human heart is for an object surpassing human capability.
Pieper and Ratzinger’s view of hope’s object as beyond human control aligns with de
Lubac against a neo-scholastic reading of the supernatural. De Lubac argued that
Suarez and the tradition following him “unduly restricted humanity’s innate, non-free
desire to a naturally achievable end” (4.3.1).269 The natural non-free desire for
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happiness, which Pieper considers the human person to possess, matches the hope for
unmerited beatitude, which Pieper and Ratzinger consider to be the object of
fundamental hope (2.3; 4.3.1). Hope involves an object hoped for from “the very
depths of our soul, with a much more vital, a truly unconquerable, intensity”. 270
Moreover, it is a hope possessed by the human person “by nature” for a “fulfilment
of just the kind they cannot bring about themselves”.271 The reception of happiness to
which hope is oriented is “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable”.272 It comes to the
human person as a surprise and is something unexpected. Consequently, like the
reception of truth (4.3.9), “[h]appiness is essentially a gift”.273 A view of the human
spirit as oriented ‘beyond itself’ thus accords with Pieper’s claim that “we cannot
make ourselves happy”.274 Happiness is not under our control and involves gratitude,
something by definition that “we do not owe…to ourselves”. 275 Implicitly, gratitude
is offered to the gift giver outside ourselves. Hope is grounded in the necessary
desire for happiness inscribed in the human spirit for an end not ‘naturally
achievable’. Hope’s object is the happiness that fulfils the innate desire for a
supernatural beatitude, given at the hands of God.

By positing as intrinsic to the human person an inordinate and necessary desire for
supernatural happiness beyond its control, Pieper and Ratzinger distinguish
themselves from an immanentist epistemology, which undergirds inner-historical
conceptions of hope (1.2.1). So too does an epistemology, which sees the reception
of the fullness of truth as a gift, contrast with a Hegelian-Blochian conception of
hope, in which what is hoped for is produced and manufactured. The object of the
human desire and hope for fulfilment cannot be so manufactured due to an
epistemological want. As a consequence of happiness being an uncontrolled gift, the
production of happiness cannot be made “subject to planning and intention”.276
Although the possibility of perfect happiness is understood, the nature of that
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perfection remains “hidden” to the human mind.277 It is therefore impossible for the
human mind to construct an object it cannot understand.
Pieper’s use of the language of ‘planning and intention’ with respect to the
production of happiness, replicates his and Ratzinger’s critiques of immanentist
understandings of hope. Against the view that the objects of hope can be
manufactured according to rational planning, they argue that hope of its nature
cannot be produced according to the dictates of human rationality (2). Tied into an
epistemology that sees reason as “finite and feeble” and a view of hope’s objects as
being beyond the control of the hoping person, are thus Pieper and Ratzinger’s views
of the supernatural.278 They serve as a basis of the critique of the ‘strategies of hope’
in a Blochian conception of hope, which purports to subject the production of human
hope to a laboratory. The human person cannot fabricate the object of his hope,
because the beatitude for which he hopes is satiated by God alone.

Any claims to the definitive inner-historical attainment of the object of fundamental
hope are rendered nugatory in light of an Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist view of
nature’s inner-ordination to the supernatural. De Lubac states that “the destiny of
man being eternal, he is not meant to find ultimate repose here below”. 279 Christian
faith, rather, points to an “ever-present and ever-demanding transcendence… [of] a
world that perpetually tends to close in upon itself”.280 The harmony that God
promises will only be achieved through “cleavages and struggles”, which remain
constant throughout time.281 The eschaton will not follow as a matter of course
according to a dialectical logic of history. While the Christian Gospel compels
attempts at the solution of earthly problems, the world remains “the magnificent and
painful field where our eternal being is worked out”.282 The world is the site for
decisions about eternity to be made, not for that eternity to be manufactured.
Consequently, in the words of Ratzinger made in commenting on de Lubac’s
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Surnaturel, rational attempts to construct “a self-contained, adequate ordo naturalis”
are limited.283 The natural order needs something, Someone, outside itself to perfect
it.

Fundamental hope concerns the transcendence of what can be naturally attained. Its
object is existential fulfilment in eternity, the longing for which matches the
orientation to beatitude that de Lubac’s conception of the supernatural argues
belongs to the human person by nature. The paradoxical desire to be stretched
beyond oneself in the search for happiness matches an account of hope presenting
eternal fulfilment and bliss as its object. An inner-historical account of hope as
dependent on human activity is shown to be flawed in reference to a desire for the
gift of supernatural, eternal life. The human person naturally desires and hopes for a
fulfilment outside of himself and of history. Such fulfilment must come in the form
of a gift from the divine to whom the person is constitutively related. A Lubacian
account thus supports a view of hope as expressed in prayer and patiently reliant on
God’s providence (2.3.8). An object of this type, non-specifiable and not capable of
being conceptualised and manufactured, can only ever be asked for and awaited as
the joyfully expected but non-contingent gift.

4.4.2

Metaphysics and Hope

An analogical conception of the human creature and history complements analysis of
the role of a Lubacian fundamental theology in Ratzinger’s views on hope and
history. Pieper’s analogical analysis of the creature forms an important basis for his
philosophy of hope, which in turn influences Ratzinger’s theological reflections on
hope. It helps the latter to view the human person as being ‘on the way’ to a suprahistorical, existential fulfilment, in light of which the inner-historical will only ever
be transitory or temporal. Analogical metaphysics also preclude a theology of
futurity, by revealing the rootedness of the human creature in the Creator. The ‘on
283
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the way’ of the person is grounded in the reality that he is a creature, a created,
analogical participant in the eternity of God. History is simultaneously from and
oriented to the eternity of God. The ‘on the way’ character of creation to fulfilment
relativises history and parallels the natural desire for beatitude as an innate,
irresistible urge that can only be satisfied in eternity, not history.

The human person is, within history, embedded in a historico-temporal framework
‘on the way’ to supra-historical fulfilment. A key notion in Ratzinger’s conception of
hope (as in Pieper) is that the human person is thus not bound for an earthly
destination. For Ratzinger, contemporary experience demonstrates the insufficiency
of the historico-temporal framework for fulfilment, generating the view “that we are
not where we actually belong”.284 Instead, we are ‘wayfarers’ and “homeless” on
earth, a universal experience that Israel’s religion underscored.285 The feast of the
Passover reminded humanity that “we are never really at home, as men we are
always on the way”.286 Ratzinger considers therefore that creation and human nature
remain in the state of “being on the way” until culminating in Christ.287 The human
person, within the travail of history, is a pilgrim, an ‘alien’ sojourner not truly at
home.288
A “dynamic” anthropology, in which the human person’s historicity is seen as
transitory and relative to eternity, is thus evident in Ratzinger’s work. He views the
historical human person as a “[being] en route” and “characterized by transition”.289
The human person is in a state of becoming: according to Ratzinger, human persons
284
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“are not yet themselves; they must ultimately become themselves”.290 They will only
become so in the Body of Christ, the Head of which “is the directional arrow that
indicates what being human tends toward”.291 Importantly, Ratzinger emphasises that
humanity’s goal in Christ (5.4.2) “is never fully reached” so long as “history is still
on the way”.292 The human person’s historicity is revealed as being ‘on the way’ to
eternity. As creature analogically grounded in God, he is constituted by “relativity
toward the eternal”.293 According to Ratzinger, such “relativity implies ‘being on the
way’ in the manner of human history”.294 Oriented to eternity, historical human
nature is provisional until it rests in fulfilment in Christ.

The notion that the human person while on earth is in a state of pilgrimage, key to
Ratzinger, is foundational to Pieper’s anthropology and his philosophy of hope.
Ratzinger replicates Pieper’s phrase, “being on the way”, which the latter uses to
describe the human person’s temporal existence as homo viator.295 The concept
status viatoris captures the human person’s state of temporality, which Pieper
employs to denote the existential situation of the human person as pilgrim and
‘wayfarer’, as ‘not yet’ possessing the status comprehensoris of beatitude (2.3.3).
The human person in a temporal framework is constitutively oriented to the future,
because ‘not yet’ does he possess that for which he longs, supernatural fulfilment and
the “fullness of existence”.296 He is ‘on the way’ to the fulfilment for which he
hopes.
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An ontology of “not-yet-existing-being” underlies Pieper and Ratzinger’s
anthropology.297 According to such ontology, the human person is ‘on the way’ to
possessing the ‘fullness of existence’ and experiences temporality as a kind of
homelessness. For Ratzinger, hope for future happiness is based on the human
person’s “experience of temporality[,] according to which man never totally
possesses his own being”.298 He continually experiences in the present “tension
between the past and the future”, what he has been and will be, and temporality as a
‘prison’.299 Consequently, the human person exists, in Przywara’s terms, in a
“suspended middle”, “between the shores of being and nothingness”, between the
plenitude of God’s being and the nothingness from which he has been created.300 The
‘suspended middle’ of creaturely existence contains “an end-directedness”.301 What
the human person will become belongs to the future. The human person is driven or
oriented toward a fullness of being of which he is not yet in possession.
Pieper’s analogical analysis mode of creaturely being, itself indebted to Przywara,
underpins the view of the human person as being ‘on the way’ to the fulfilment of
being. According to Pieper, the “deep differentiation of being [the human creature
has] with regard to God” follows from the dissonance in the creature between its
essence and existence.302 The human person’s “essential creatureliness”, means he
“is not ipso facto his own essence”.303 His nature is not to possess existence as such
or necessarily but ‘only’ as a participation in the Ground of Being. For Pieper, and it
may be implied Ratzinger, the status viatoris is constitutively temporal, grounded in
the analogical distinction between essence and existence in the human person vis-àvis God. As Barth says, “the creaturely mode of existence…bears only an analogical
resemblance to the divine mode of being”.304 In Betz’s words, the full possession of
essence “is never fully given… but is always on the horizon of its existence as
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something to be attained”.305 God has given the creature the urge ‘to be’ (4.3.3), but
by nature the creature is not God, and therefore does not possess the fullness of
existence as its essence. He is ‘on the way’ to that fullness of being in which he can
only participate.

The fullness of being to which the human person is directed and for which he hopes
can solely be experienced beyond history and death. The “dynamic state of not-yetbeing”, in which being is “unfulfilled and incomplete”, subsists until death. Even a
person on the “threshold of death” cannot say that fulfilment “does not lie in the
future for me”.306 Prior to death, the state of self-possession still awaits the definitive
participation in eternal life, which cannot occur in free and peccable historicaltemporal existence (2.2.3). The choice for (or against) God, for “fulfilment” (or
“nonfulfillment”, in which damnation consists), is the human person’s “last decision”
and occurs only in death, “the uttermost step on the road to self-realization”.307 Death
itself is not the end of existence but terminates the state of “being-on-the-way” by
opening up the prospect of eternal life made possible by the immortal nature of the
soul.308 In Ratzinger’s words, in death, “we step beyond history”. 309 Death does not
dissolve existence but contains within it the “new beginning” which consists in the
“arrival” at the goal “towards which we have been on the way”. 310 In short, the ‘on
the way’ of earthly existence finds its terminus “beyond death”, which the person
“can gain …only in dying”.311 The choice for life with Christ becomes definitive on
death and not before.
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While ‘imprisoned’ in temporality, the creature, including the human person and
human history, can only ever provisionally experience the fullness of being. God’s
utter transcendence of all created reality necessitates that human experience of
creation can only ever point to God. Creation is sacramental and the human
encounter with God occurs through “words and signs”, which point to the greater
reality.312 Consequently, it is only when earthly experience is regarded “as a
road…to set out upon”, that God can be approached.313 Journeying along the status
viatoris and never standing still is constitutive of creaturely existence. Such a journey
is predicated on the greater dissimilarity between God’s mode of being and the
creature’s, and includes the metaphysical proposition that nature and history can
never be more than transitory.

4.4.3

Analogy Precludes a Theology of Futurity

Reliance on an analogical metaphysics distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger’s
conceptions of hope from the focus of a Moltmann-inspired theology of futurity and
political theology on the inner-historical future and their adoption of a dialectical
view of history. Pieper and Ratzinger insist upon the transitoriness of the temporal,
historical state, while simultaneously grounding the human person in sacred tradition
and ultimately the Creator. Although insisting upon the historical nature of the
human person, they reject an exclusive focus upon the future and the tendency to
collapse the immanent and the eschatological together. They point to sacred tradition
as providing the content of hope, with its promise of the eschatological future in
Christ, to whom the tradition connects past, present and future. They insist upon the
possession of a nature as delimiting what can be hoped for, and orienting it
ultimately to the future possession of eternity. Eternal life, that towards which the
natural desire for a supernatural end is oriented is underscored as the object and
source of hope, even as analogical metaphysics shows that entry into eternity
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depends upon the violent, cataclysmic passage at the hands of God into the eternity
revealed in revelation.

Reliance on metaphysics does not result in a static understanding of the human
person, contrary to Moltmann’s critique of Pieper’s supposedly too-metaphysical
philosophy of hope. A Moltmannian concern “about the future, about hope and
eschatology”, tends to label caution about the reduction of Christianity and theology
to its future implications as a “traditional, archaic position”.314 However, German
theological interest in Romanticism and its concept of Bildung, which denotes
personal, cultural and inevitably historical development for the human person was
the context of Ratzinger’s theological work.315 For his part, Pieper defends likewise
Aquinas against the charge of elaborating a “‘purely static concept of being’ and an
extra-historical view of the world and existence”. Metaphysical accounts impressed
with “the rationalistic stamp of the Enlightenment” (such as Christian Wolff’s) are
guilty of being “undynamic”, and not Aquinas.316 Instead, Aquinas considers as
characteristic of “created existence”, that creatures are “always ‘on the way’ toward
something”, with the consequence that “existence [possesses] the structure of a
journey, a dynamic orientation toward the future”.317 Thomas turns out to be the
basis for Pieper and, in turn, Ratzinger’s adoption of a dynamic view of the human
person as being ‘on the way’.318 The nature of human existence as being ‘on the way’
necessarily involves historical processes of change and orientation to future
development. Its recognition demonstrates that Pieper and Ratzinger are not
archaically traditional in the manner described in a theology of futurity.
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Nevertheless, dependence on metaphysics means that Pieper and Ratzinger do not
consider the human person’s nature to be historically relative or solely oriented to the
future. Contrary to what Fukuyama suggests is the relativist position of Hegel,
according to which human nature is relative to historical circumstances (1.2.1), they
argue that the human person has a necessary link to the past, which grounds his
orientation to the future.319 What the future can and will be depends upon the past
and the created nature of the person, which points to the Creator who precedes and
not just follows our hope. They oppose the theologies of futurity’s exclusive
orientation to the future and dialectical rejection of the past.320 That the past contains
salvific significance and is not to be rejected in the name of a dialectical reading of
history is instead affirmed.
A signal feature of Pieper and Ratzinger’s respective thought is the constitutive
importance they give sacred tradition to the human person as such. Against the
“emancipated rationality” characteristic of modernity, which rejects the authority of
tradition, Pieper and Ratzinger defend the concept of tradition as a unique and
fundamental to human nature and existence.321 Tradition, as what distinguishes
human beings from animals, is the act of the intellect via the medium of memoria,
which perpetuates the past for the sake of the future and constitutes him as a
historical being. The historicity of the human person does not mean he is entirely
future-oriented, but rooted in a past that is grounded in and points to transcendence.
Moreover, sacred tradition grounds the human person as the receiver of divine
revelation, connecting the promise of future realisation contained therein to the past
revelation of Christ. Christianity does not simply concern “openness toward the
future” but also an “acceptance, as true and real, of something which has already
happened in the past” (even if not confined to the past).322
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An exclusive orientation to the future misunderstands, therefore, human nature.
According to Ratzinger, standing at the heart of the “humanum” as such is to be
“rooted in tradition”, which means “the ability to hear the Other (whom we call
God)”.323 The dialogue to which the human person has capacity to enter is mediated
through tradition. For Pieper “not before us but behind us”, is “a horizon of the past
whence all things are derived”, reaching to the origins of history and “beyond that”
to timeless eternity.324 Human nature qua nature is ‘traditional’, by being embedded
within a history connected to the past and present through tradition, which facilitates
the encounter with the eternal God. The mediatory function of tradition thus
distinguishes Pieper and Ratzinger from a Moltmann-inspired theology of hope, in
which connection with God tends to be seen as entirely futuristic and severed from
reference to sacred tradition.
The theology of futurity’s over-emphasis on the future at the expense of sacred
tradition misunderstands also the theological task as the transmitter of revelation via
the medium of tradition. For Pieper, theology should not take its cues from changing,
historical human experience. Its task is, rather, to perpetuate a sacred tradition which
is essentially rooted to the past, that is:
…to recall, proclaim, preserve from oblivion, maintain the identity of, and keep alive
in the present moment, something pre-existent: namely the revelation, the word of
God, which was spoken at some time in the past.325

Sacred tradition communicates the ‘pre-existent’ revelation, which conditions
humanity’s connection to God. For Pieper against Moltmann, “revelation stands at
the beginning of tradition”, first in the form of an original revelation to the “ancients”
– what Ratzinger refers to as “primordial revelation”.326 Secondly, Christian
323
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revelation involves the novel revelation of Christ communicated directly to the
Apostles, as the starting points (the ‘ancients’) of Christian sacred tradition.
Theology is intrinsically bound to tradition, even if oriented to the future, because its
role is to interpret the revelation mediated by tradition.327 It assists therefore in the
dialogic encounter between humanity and God.
Because tradition and revelation are constitutive of humanity’s dialogue with God,
they are centrally important to any understanding of the nature of hope. For Pieper
and Ratzinger, the revelation heard by the tradition-constituted human being, as
mediated through sacred tradition, forms the content of Christian hope. Sacred
tradition gives hope its “content and meaning”.328 Moltmann criticises Ratzinger’s
Spe Salvi on the basis that it conflates hope with the faith of the Church and points
out that those without faith in God are without hope.329 In linking hope closely with
faith and the eternal life it promises, and praising the humility of Mary, Ratzinger
allegedly overlooks the “revolutionary God of the prophets” and begins not with the
world but the Church.330 For Ratzinger, however, the revelation to which sacred
tradition bears witness and which the Church mediates, is the ground of true hope.331
The “Gospel message” responds “to the restless yearnings of the human heart”.332
The Church’s responsibility is “to show that Christian faith is the true answer to the
human quest for meaning” and the genuine source of “a hope that saves from
despair”.333 Hope is made “concrete through faith in Christ”, access to whom is not
given through historical reason, “but through the plenary authority of the
communitarian history of faith, that is, in the Church”.334 The sacred tradition of the
Church alone mediates the genuine source of hope, Christ. Moltmann is right to point
out the connection Ratzinger makes between faith and hope. However, the genuine
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source of hope for the historical, tradition-bound creature is not revolution but the
revelation mediated through the Church’s sacred tradition.

The hope to which Christian revelation bears witness is eternal life in Christ. An
analogical metaphysics highlights further the centrality of eternity to Pieper and
Ratzinger’s conceptions of hope, compared to the theology of hope’s emphasis on
the inner-historical future. Contrary to a traditional metaphysic, Moltmann argues
along Blochian lines that God is “only ever before us” (1.2.2).335 God “‘is’ not
eternal presence” and hope is not focused on “the reality which exists”.336 Metz’s
political theology echoes Moltmann. It is true that Metz acknowledges that God is
Deus semper major and “uniquely absolute”.337 Marsden notes that Metz, in his later
Theology of the World, distinguishes himself from Moltmann’s “severing of the
future from the past”.338 Moreover, Metz does not fully adopt Moltmann’s
metaphysical idea that the “‘future’ [is] ‘the mode of God’s being”. 339 Arguably,
however, Metz’s avoidance of “allowing his eschatology to get too tied up with
metaphysics” amounts to a problematic failure to engage fully the metaphysical issue
and results in an over-emphasis on inner-historical praxis at the expense of logos.340
Milbank notes that as a consequence of the early Metz’s approval of the
secularisation process, “physics has gradually replaced metaphysics, and ethical and
political norms can be deduced etsi Deus non daretur”.341 Traditional metaphysics is
either overturned or downplayed in significance with the theologies of futurity,
which relate to the minimisation of the importance of eternity to hope.

An analogical metaphysics refers instead back to the eternal God as the ground of all
being and ‘physics’. Pieper qualifies thus the Blochian metaphysics underpinning
Moltmann-inspired theologies of hope.342 God is not simply “the absolute future” but
is “at the same time the absolute origin of man and all created things”.343 Theology
that misses a metaphysical appreciation of God “as a central Now… [encompassing]
335
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all the dimensions of temporal duration” is, taken to its radical, logical extremes, in
danger of overlooking the importance of human nature.344 It “might reveal” also a
tendency to conceive theology not as the safeguarding of sacred tradition and
revelation of eternity but as needing to take its cues from contemporary “religious”
or “utopian” impulses.345 God is rather the eternal “nunc stans” an eternity which is
“the perfect and complete simultaneous possession of unlimited life” (Boethius) or
“whose being is simultaneously the whole” (Aquinas), from which theological and
philosophical conceptions of hope need to take their bearing.346 Everything created,
including our natures, has been “ordained” from all eternity from him whose essence
is the fullness of existence, and unfolds not sequentially but from eternity in God’s
‘eternal present’.347 God stands at the origin as well as the end of all things. In Christ,
he is the Alpha and the Omega and dwells already with us in Word and sacrament. 348
Pieper (and Ratzinger) would argue that it is thus mistaken for theology to conceive
God as ahead of us and focus on what is “still to come”, when the reality of nature
and grace exists now and in the past, even as they point to future fulfilment.349
Eternal logos always ontologically precedes ethos, praxis follows from metaphysical
reality, and God simultaneously grounds our existence and constitutes the promise of
its fulfilment.350
Eternity at the same time is the basis for creation’s existence and its destined end.
Creation is placed up against, as it were, the eternal God who dwells within creation.
Analogical metaphysics show:

that temporal-historical reality in toto, by virtue of it character of being creature, is
situated in an absolutely immediate operational relationship to a non-temporal being
and operating, in an uninterrupted and most intimate permeation, without which
creature cannot be conceived.351
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As a result, “the temporal is inwardly sustained, saturated, pervaded by the
untemporal”.352 For Ratzinger, creation “never ceases to touch” God.353 All of
creation is thus characterised by relationship to eternity (4.4.2). Applying the notions
of eternity’s permeation of temporality and God’s creative will that creatures ‘might
be’ (4.3.3) to the concept of the status viatoris, means that creation, including human
history and the human person, is ‘on the way’ to eternity. The status viatoris is
oriented “toward fulfilment beyond time”.354 Reference to the transcendent source of
the human person, who gives him an “a priori” nature that orients him to
supernatural fulfilment of being, shows the pilgrim character of historical existence
as it has been created to have an end in the eternity in which he participates as a
creature.355
Despite creation ‘touching upon’ God, the analogical dissonance between the eternity
of the Creator and the temporality of the historical creature implies a need for
transformation from a historical to eternal state for humanity’s desire for eternity to
be fulfilled. Humanity cannot undertake such transformation from its own resources.
Creation, as analogically participating in God’s plenitude of Being, does not possess
its own eternal perfection. For Pieper, the phrase ‘New Heaven and New Earth’, the
biblical representation of personal and cosmic hope, is theological shorthand for the
“… ‘transposition’ of the temporal being of the historical world into the state of
direct participation in the untemporal mode of being of the Creator.”356 The
Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist claim that fulfilment is beyond human control is thus
matched by Pieper’s analogical argument that no “historical, temporal power” can
effect the transposition from temporality into eternity.357 Only the “direct
intervention of the Creator” can enable creation to participate in eternity.358
Moreover, the “dichotomy” between the directional orientation of history towards its
end outside itself and the reality that nothing within history can bring about the
‘transposition’ into eternity, means that an “utterly catastrophic”, “extreme crisis”
352
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will characterise the End.359 Analogically speaking, this crisis will not be exterior to
creation but come from its “innermost ground of being”.360 Creation from within will
be stretched beyond its own natural capacities at the hand of the Creator God and
elevated into eternity as an inherent fulfilment but simultaneous transposition of its
nature.361
An analogical metaphysics supports therefore Ratzinger’s understanding of the hopehistory relationship and critiques the metaphysically thin account of Moltmann,
which is oriented to the historical future and relates to the Concilium view of the
hope-history relationship. Any claims of definitive inner-historical, temporal
fulfilment are excluded by reference to temporality’s grounding in and orientation
towards eternity. The necessary violence of its transposition into eternity matches
moreover Ratzinger’s claim that history’s perfection comes from outside it. An
analogical metaphysical understanding also underpins Ratzinger’s eschatological
claim, discussed in Chapter 3, that “the End is ever present” and his idea that
salvation is ‘already’, ‘not yet’.362 It thus shows the possibility of salvation already to
have irrupted into temporality, while pointing to that temporality’s future fulfilment.
It rules out, it is suggested, Moltmann’s exclusive focus on the future as hope’s
significance, as well as a dialectical exclusion of the past.

4.5

Conclusion

This Chapter has argued that Ratzinger’s conception of the supernatural is grounded
in the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist tradition and is connected to Pieper’s
analogical metaphysics and anthropology. The human person, as creature of the evergreater God, is seen to possess an innate and not merely non-repugnant desire for a
beatitude and fulfilment of being that it cannot manufacture for itself. The spirit is
thus naturally ‘erotically’ oriented ‘beyond itself’. Ratzinger presents a view of the
human spirit as uniquely capable, in its possession of an immortal soul, to enter into
dialogue with God. The human being, as spirit, is open to relationship with God as
such, and immortal for that reason, grounded in the mind’s capacity to comprehend
359
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the whole. The ratio-intellectus distinction demonstrates moreover that the vision of
the whole is proper to the human mind, while nevertheless constituting a
‘superhuman’ extension of human capacity ‘beyond itself’. There is thus a ‘smooth
transition’ from nature to grace (even if that needs to be qualified somewhat: 5).

Ultimately, human beatitude as an elevation of the mind into comprehension of the
whole is a gift, not manipulable by human ingenuity but received by God.
Ratzinger’s vision of the human spirit as existing in the order of freedom between
mere ‘nature’ and God, receives its context from a view that all of creation is graced.
Nature comes from the creative freedom of God and all its possibilities are
determined in the context of that gift. Ratzinger’s view of the supernatural is thus
distinct from a Rahnerian theology of grace and represents the Communio caution
regarding the conflation of the order of nature and grace, an argument to be
developed further in Chapter 5. The call and fulfilment depend upon the freedom of
God, and can be said to be non-contingent and not exacted. Grace is not ‘owed’ to
the human spirit, nor can it be considered to be naturalised, arguably the albeit
unintended result of Rahner’s work. Ratzinger’s view of the spirit is that fulfilment
occurs outside human control and what is latent to human existence and history.
Allied to an analogical metaphysics, it shows the human spirit, and correspondingly
creation and human history, to require transformation for the temporality of the
creature to ‘passover’ to eternity.363 The creature, whose participation in being is
only ever analogical, is ‘on the way’ to fulfilment in eternal life beyond time. The
call to communion of God is precisely for the spirit to go ‘beyond itself’.
A view of the human spirit as oriented ‘beyond itself’ provides the foundation stone
for the Communio view of hope and distinguishes it from a Rahnerian theology of
grace and Concilium view of the hope-history relationship. The personal hope for
eternal life in Christ, which is the object of Christian hope described in Chapters 2
and 3, is based in the natural desire for a supernatural end. As restlessly oriented to a
happiness that no creature can provide, the rational spirit desires and hopes beyond
itself for eternal fulfilment. Happiness is beyond natural capacity and control. It can

363
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only be received as a gift. Anything that human ingenuity can accomplish is not the
object of fundamental hope. The natural desire for a gift surpassing any attempt at
conceptualisation supports the view that the human person desires God as such, and
will not be content to hope for anything less than him.
Another building block of Ratzinger’s fundamental theology which contributes to his
view of hope is an analogical metaphysics. It affirms nature and created being while
recognising that nature can be nothing of itself and in fact needs something outside
of itself (which is also inmost to it) for fulfilment. It supports the view that the
human person is oriented ‘beyond itself’ to a supra-historical happiness. Intersecting
with an Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist view of the supernatural is the conviction that
the creature has been implanted by the ‘ever greater’ God the urge ‘to be’, to share in
the plenitude of being that God Who Is possesses. At the same time, an analogical
metaphysics highlights the dissonance in the mode of being that the creature
possesses as compared to God, demonstrating the insufficiency of the temporal mode
of being to satisfy. The creature is only ever ‘on the way’ to a fulfilment that must be
wrought through the violent, catastrophic transposition from temporality to eternity.

The adoption of an Augustinian-Thomist view of the supernatural, in combination
with an analogical metaphysics, relativises therefore any inner-historical claims for
hope which can be evident in political theology and liberation theology. It guards
against any Concilium tendency to secularise the eschaton or naturalise grace’s
operation. The analogical experience of being, in which the human person is ‘on the
way’ to a fulfilment not yet given, corresponds to a view of the supernatural in which
the human person is oriented to union with God in the beatific vision. Moreover,
theologies of futurity arguably do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that human
beings possess a nature and more broadly to the metaphysical question.
Underestimating the importance of metaphysics elides the significance of eternity to
hope. Fundamental hope is oriented to eternal life and not the realisation of earthly
projects. Nature is in a state of transition and relative to eternity, which precludes an
absolutist view of the immanent possibilities of human nature and history or the
tendency to conflate the orders of nature and grace. Hope is the longing of the spirit
for the transformative grace of eternal life.
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CHAPTER 5 SOTERIOLOGY AND CHRISTOLOGY – A COMMUNIO REJECTION OF
AN IMMANENTIST SOTERIOLOGY

5.1

Introduction

Consideration of spiritual nature’s orientation ‘beyond itself’ raises questions
concerning how grace fulfils or perfects nature. In short, it asks how the human
person is saved (the concern of soteriology). An Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist
account of the natural desire as oriented ‘beyond itself’ is matched by a soteriology,
which projects salvation and eschatological realisation beyond history at the hands of
the eternal God in Christ. Beatitude, which entails the gift of supernatural elevation,
necessarily relates and depends upon the grace offered by Jesus Christ. The
conceptually ‘smooth transition’, which Ratzinger posits between the spirit and the
grace of Jesus Christ (4.3.5), is nevertheless cruciform in shape. Human redemption
involves transformation of human nature and its elevation above itself through
beatification in the Cross of Christ.

The Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account of nature and grace insists therefore on
the transformative particularity and novelty of Christ.1 Radical transformation of
human nature comes at the hands of the unique Jesus Christ, who is seen as a
“disturber”.2 He is not a Kantian exemplar of pure reason or a Rahnerian “realization
of transcendental anthropology”, but the unique and indispensable saviour of
humanity, who is “somehow else”.3 Ratzinger – who describes himself as “a sort of
Barthian, if also critical” and focuses therefore on the particularity of Christ – poses
the question of what it was that Christ brought that was new, given that the human
soul is “created immortal” and thus apparently contains within itself the grounds of

1

As pointed out in the Introduction, this is what Healy considers to be the test that differentiates
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2
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its own imperishability.4 He argues that it is “[o]nly the Risen Christ [who] can bring
us to complete union with God, to the place where our own powers are unable to
bring us”.5 Christ stands as the novel fulfilment of the human spirit’s yearning for
beatitude. The Divine Word made flesh entered history from above to heal wounded
humanity and elevate creation and history beyond themselves. He alone is
humanity’s saviour.
Ratzinger’s work contrasts thus with the arguably implicit if not necessarily intended
immanentism in Rahner’s theology of grace (1.4). Even if there is an intrinsic
continuity between creation’s possibilities and the fulfilment offered in grace,
Ratzinger considers that human nature is in need of radical transformation. As Wood
notes, there is an “infinite distance” between the capax Dei, and the sanctifying grace
that orders the human person to his supernatural end.6 The natural desire does not
equate to salvation. Contained in the Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist view of the
supernatural is that the supernatural, desired end nevertheless remains contingent (4).
It depends upon the free, historical action of God in Christ.7

The Chapter attempts thus to describe the Communio response to the Concilium
authors’ insufficiently differentiated account of nature and grace, and integrated view
of redemption. Present in the latter is a view of history as immanently containing and
establishing somewhat eschatological salvation. Ratzinger insists, on the contrary,
that redemption is not the acceptance of what is already contained within human
existence or implicitly contained within a universal history. What saves, instead, is
the entry of God into history and the eschatology he has inaugurated in Christ.
Necessary to human salvation is the Church, which receives the Revelation of Christ
4

Ratzinger, Last Testament, 152: Benedict, “Homily at Easter Vigil” (2007). Ratzinger attributes his
‘Barthianism’ to his encounter with his teacher Gottleib Söhngen. The phrase ‘if also critical’
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and communicates it through history. Divine Revelation bears witness to Christ, the
unexpected fulfilment of the natural desire for beatitude.8
The Communio school’s insistence on the necessity of Christ and the Church to
human salvation and the novelty of Revelation arguably most distinguishes it from
the Concilium perspective.9 Salvation is not a product of human ingenuity or the
logic of history but given in the Person of Jesus Christ. Inner-historical conceptions
of hope, which rest on the potentialities inherent to nature, reason and history,
instead of drawing attention to God in Christ mistake those potentialities.
Fundamental hope, rather, cannot be directed to inner-historical improvement.
Human activity has salvific meaning insofar as it is oriented beyond itself to the
divine. The worldly realm, to be saved, needs its own inherent possibilities to be
transcended by a super-abundant divine gift of grace. That is the Christian hope.
This Chapter sets out how Ratzinger conceives Christ’s relationship to nature and the
character of his saving work as the key to understanding the nature-grace relationship
and the hope-history relationship. First it will describe in what Pieper and Ratzinger
consider salvation to consist, namely the healing and elevation of wounded
humanity. Secondly, it will differentiate what can be identified as Ratzinger’s
‘soteriology of deification’ from immanentist notions of redemption, such as found
in Marxism, which are unable to account for humanity’s need to be redeemed from
death. Thirdly, it will outline the relationship between Christology and soteriology in
Ratzinger. Redemption is communicated through Christ, understood in Chalcedonian
terms (3). It involves divine filiation as a rejection of the purely natural, in favour of
the need of the human person to go beyond himself by embracing Christ’s Cross.
Finally, it explores some ramifications of Ratzinger’s soteriology for the hope-

8

C.f. Garver, “Rahner and de Lubac”, de Lubac, Catholicisme. Compare also Oakes, Infinity
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history debate, particularly how he conceives the relationship between faith and
politics and his critique of Rahner’s conception of salvation history, which is present
in the Concilium perspective on hope and history.

5.2

Redemption as Requiring Healing and Elevation

Present in Ratzinger is what could be called a ‘soteriology of deification’, which
involves transformative transcendence of human nature and history beyond
themselves, and the view that human fulfilment is necessarily supernatural. The
following quotation encapsulates Ratzinger’s view of nature’s ordination to grace
and how redemption involves that nature moving ‘beyond itself’:

The disciple who walks with Jesus is thus caught up with him into communion with
God. And that is what redemption means: this stepping beyond the limits of human
nature, which had been there as a possibility and an expectation in man, God’s
image and likeness, since the moment of creation.10
Human nature, while intrinsically ordered to the grace of supernatural communion
with God, is in need of an external and divine principle, which elevates it into a
higher order of being. Redemption is allowing that elevation to occur, such that one
is in communion with God.
Salvation is simultaneously healing and elevation.11 Human nature is in itself
incomplete and lacking wholeness. As noted in Chapter 2, the German word for
‘salvation’ is ‘heil’, which relates to the verb heilen, to heal. For Pieper, what is
sought in Christian virtue and in knowledge generally is “a higher bliss, a healing,
and the fullness of existence, and thereby the fullness of happiness”.12 The bliss of
fullness of existence, of which salvation consists, involves healing and elevation. An
example in Ratzinger of salvation considered as healing and elevation is the
experience of eros. The ascent of the human person in ecstatic love is salvation
because it consists in healing. Ratzinger refers to the human person’s experience of
beauty as causing a “salutary emotional shock”, which draws the person out of

10
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himself.13 Beauty wounds the person but this very wound is what draws “him
upward”.14 Experience of beauty is healing, a salus or salve.15 The ecstatic
constitution of the human spirit is enlivened, as it were, through the experience of
beauty, which takes the spirit out of itself and in that way ‘heals’ it.
Just as human nature needs ‘healing’ in the form of being drawn out of itself, there is
a second element of human existence that requires curing, namely sin and its effects.
According to Pieper, sin consists in the absence of the state of “‘salvation’ [Heil] and
‘being whole’”.16 Ratzinger importantly states:
By birth according to one’s natural origins alone, no one is saved [im Heil], but,
rather, everything is in ruins [im Unheil]. This means that concrete nature, as it is in
fact bestowed on man in his birth, is not a salvific order.17
Sin leaves the person in a state of woundedness, lacking salvation, a lack into which
the human person is born and which reveals nature’s salvific inadequacy.
The reality of sin is something that Pieper and Ratzinger acknowledge as ‘part’ of
human nature. Sin is not proper to human nature as such but has become a constant
in human existence. Ratzinger argues that, although the “truly human” orientation of
the spirit to the divine cannot be eliminated, it is not present “without warping or
falsification”.18 He refers to Pascal’s notion that the human person has obtained a
“second nature” as a result of sin, a concupiscent “susceptibility to egoism”.19 The
concept of ‘second nature’ makes intelligible the simultaneously “noble and base”
characteristics commonly attributed to human nature, in which the phrase “that’s
only human” is used to excuse bad behaviour.20 Thus, in the human experience is a
“mysterious polarity … between ‘granduer’ and ‘misère’”, such that the human
person simultaneously contains “greatness and baseness”, the “highest aspiration”
13
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and the capacity for descent into an “abyss that may be one of despair”. 21 Sin has
become such an integral part of human experience that it is understood as an
inevitable accident of human nature, even while the underlying orientation to eternity
remains uneffaced. It is a bar, however, to that salvation being obtained, unless that
barrier is removed.

The effects of sin include two realities that need healing and overcoming, namely
death and guilt. An account of redemption must answer the problem of death to be
convincing. Death and guilt stand as obstacles to the experience of infinite, assured
love. For redemption to be genuine, it needs to fulfil this “yearning for love” and take
away the uncertainty inherent to it.22 The human person needs “to be able to know
inviolably that he is accepted, that someone says Yes to him” and that he is not a
“random product of evolution”, but is willed and, in some sense, needed.23 As such,
he wants a “determined freedom”, in which there exists a certain love, offering the
possibility of communion and matching his “yearning for fulfilment”. 24 In short, the
human person desires to possess a love that transcends and conquers death and guilt.
Salvation transcends death and temporality. It responds to the human person’s innate
thirst for imperishability. As creatures that are immortal, the question of redemption
involving transcendence of death and history is thus vital to the human person. For
Ratzinger, “real life” truly begins in the “awakening” that occurs in death and
therefore “beyond the historical existence of man”.25 Material and inner-worldly
success, unavoidably conditioned by temporality, are insufficient to provide genuine
happiness. Significantly, Ratzinger argues that “[r]ighteousness”, which is the “godly
21
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living” that amounts to the deification or justification central to Christianity’s
understanding of itself, “by its very nature points beyond” material and temporal
earthly existence.26 Redemption, on Ratzinger’s view, necessarily entails a
transcendence of death and temporality, and healing and elevation beyond historical,
sinful existence.

5.3

Distinguishing Ratzinger’s Account of Redemption from Marxist Variants

Ratzinger’s view of redemption as involving healing and elevation opposes an
expectation of a historically immanent eschatological state. His notion of salvation
contrasts with the Marxist tendency to promote and expect inner-historical liberation.
To the extent that such ideas are present in the Concilium authors, especially
Gutiérrez (1.5). Ratzinger can be distinguished from their account. Instead, for him,
redemption involves deification as true liberation. He contends that immanentist
conceptions of redemption overlook the incapacity of humanity to redeem itself.

A historically immanent collective does not contain within itself the power to
absolve or heal the guilt arising from the exercise of human freedom. Merely human
acts of reparation and forgiveness cannot atone for the “outstanding debt of guilt”
that has accrued through history.27 Similarly, human nature is incapable of
overcoming the “insecurity of our existence that is grasping for love”. 28 For these
reasons, attempts to construct a “new world” in which the concepts of “God, love,
guilt, and death” are eliminated, such as materialist atheism purports to do, are
misconceived.29 Authentic redemption requires “an authority of transformation that
goes beyond human ability”.30 Transformative redemption heals the evils beyond
human power to eliminate, and elevates human nature into God’s love.
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A Marxist-inspired understanding of redemption contradicts a theological
anthropology and creaturely metaphysics of gift.31 Pieper and Ratzinger’s view that
happiness cannot be manufactured but must be awaited as redemptive gift is
juxtaposed against a view of redemption in which praxis is primary. Opposing a tooneat dichotomy between seeing redemption as simply “otherworldly or this worldly”,
Ratzinger considers that the genuine question concerning the meaning of redemption
is whether it entails liberation from dependence (the Marxist view, which has some
resonance in political and liberation theology) or whether “its sole path [is] the
complete dependence of love”, which is what provides “true freedom”.32 He clearly
adopts the latter in arguing that liberating happiness, in which redemption ultimately
consists, is given in a context of dependence. Liberation for Ratzinger means
dependence on God.

The connection that Ratzinger detects between freedom and truth also distinguishes
his view of redemption from a Marxist one. As dependence on God, liberation entails
living in the truth that is God, a truth that is greater than and prior to the human
person. For Ratzinger, “truth and freedom are inseparable”.33 The truth about the
human person is that he is a creature, dependent upon God for existence but also on
his gift for the elevation of his spirit into the beatific vision. To find “liberating
fulfilment”, the human person must then be open to “true love” and ultimately to
grace, the gratuitous imparting of the divine life in the soul. 34 Ratzinger argues thus
that the human person “can come to salvation and to himself only through the gift of
love – through grace”.35 Becoming “like God” does not consist in “anarchic”
attempts to overthrow the Creator but participating in his life.36 Human effort at
removal of the conditions of dependence does not produce redemption.

Redemption is communion in the divine nature as a result of grace. For Ratzinger,
authentic liberation entails deifying “transformation in God”.37 Against Hans Küng’s
reluctance to claim that Christianity offers deification, Ratzinger strongly affirms that
31
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it answers the person’s “deepest longing” for divinization.38 The Council of Trent,
the Second Vatican Council, Baptism, the Eucharist and the professions of faith all
concern the central Christian idea of justification or salvation, which involves the
human person “Eritis sicut Deus”.39 Fulfilment is the satisfaction of the thirst for the
infinite, through participation in the life of God, that is “life in the bosom of the
Blessed Trinity”.40 While claiming to offer a freedom eliminating human limitations
and dependence, Marxist claims of deification within an immanent framework
deceive, to the contrary, the human person and frustrate his genuine “desire [for] the
infinite”.41 Although Marxism is right to suggest that the human person needs to
become as God to find satisfaction, it is only Christianity that provides the means for
the human person to obtain “the status of divinity”.42 Liberation comes from genuine
deification, salvific communion in God.

Ratzinger suggests therefore that the true path of freedom is not in the direct
transformation of history and society by human means. Rather, liberation is the
transformation of the person through grace. Genuine liberation involves the
supernatural transcendence of the sinful state of the human person, history and
society and the overcoming of the limitations inherent to human nature. Redemption
is essentially deification, which amounts to participation in the life of God, here and
now in the sacraments and the liturgy of the Church, but ultimately in the definitive
gift of eternal life after death.

5.4

Christology and Soteriology

There is an intrinsic connection between soteriology and Christology. To understand
Ratzinger’s claim that redemption is the discipleship of Jesus, which entails
communion with him and the consequent surpassing of oneself (5.2), who and what
Jesus is must be understood. This in turn depends upon Chalcedonian dogma, which
show Christ to be perfectus Deis, perfectus homo united in the Word. Salvation is
38
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participation in the divinity of Christ, mediated by his humanity. He is the end to
which the natural desire for supernatural fulfilment is directed. Christ is the
perfection of humanity and participation with him as the second Adam confers divine
Sonship upon the participant. Adoption as a ‘son’ of God gives the child of God
genuine subject-hood, which is not political. Instead, redemption involves in some
way the renunciation of nature and its limits. By entering history, Christ’s
redemption was not static but led to the Cross, the means by which natural
deficiency, and sin and death are overcome. The Cross is central to the redemption
and to be redeemed means participation in it.

5.4.1

Chalcedonian Christology and Soteriology

The Christology presupposed in Ratzinger’s soteriology is the Chalcedonian
Christology elaborated in Chapter 3. To step beyond one’s natural limit in
communion with Christ is to participate in his divinity via the medium of his
humanity. It is to be joined to the service of Christ, which follows from his nature as
Son of God, incarnated in his life, death, resurrection and ascension.

The connection between soteriology and Christology is evident in the unity of the
theologies of the Incarnation and the Cross (3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Salvation depends on
what Christ is and what he does (in the paschal mystery). The theology of the
incarnation focuses on Christ’s nature as Son, whereas that of the Cross on his
action. For Ratzinger, there is an intrinsic unity to what these reveal concerning the
Redemption. According to Ratzinger, Christ’s being as Son is to serve in an
“actualitas of pure service”, which in the Incarnation culminates in being the
“sacrificed man”.43 As Word, Jesus is moreover a communication deriving from
another and is to be heard by others. The Son, is a thus “totality of ‘from’ and ‘for’”,
which becomes manifested in his death on the Cross.44 Christ is Proexistenz and the
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“completely loving one whose being is both existence for others and existence for
life itself”.45 To be Son is to be oriented to service, incarnated in the Cross.

The unity between the theologies of the Incarnation and the Cross invokes a
Trinitarian theocentrism, which makes explicable the Christological foundation of
soteriology. Ratzinger argues “that the radical Christship of Jesus presupposes the
Sonship and that the Sonship includes the Godship”.46 Jesus is Son and Christ. He is
Son, who derives everything from the Father. He is the Incarnate Saviour, who
sacrifices himself for humanity as the manifestation in the ‘flesh’ of the Son’s
mission of being ‘from’ and ‘for’. Understanding Jesus as Messiah depends upon
him being conceived as Son of the Eternal Father.

Chalcedonian dogma is thus centrally relevant to understanding the nature of the
redemption. If salvation consists in participating in the divine nature, humanity’s
participation in it is through being joined to Christ, whose existence as Son made
flesh culminated in the Cross. We ‘become ‘God’ by participating in Christ’s
sacrifice on the Cross. Soteriology, Christology and Trinitarian theology are all
interrelated. If Jesus’ being is characterised as pure service, then he is also love,
which is uniquely God’s life. Consequently, he is to be seen as the Son of God,
consubstantial with the Father in the Holy Spirit.

5.4.2

Human Nature is Perfected in Christ

Christ, as perfect God, is the perfection of humanity. He is the end to which human
nature is directed. He is the site of the redemption of humanity. Communion with
God is participation in the Christ, who is the glorification and full realisation of
humanity. Human nature, which is congenitally open to God, is directed to and
fulfilled in Christ.

Ratzinger sees the human person as fully intelligible only in the light of Christ. As
Rowland points out in respect of Ratzinger’s reading of Gaudium et Spes, 22,
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“Christology is deemed necessary for any adequate anthropology”.47 True insight
into the nature of the human person, his supernatural end and the means by which
that is brought about only arises in the light of Christ. Ratzinger rejects – and thus
distances himself from an anthropocentrism which focuses on the historical Jesus to
the exclusion of his divinity – the suggestion that Christology should be sundered
apart from theology in the name of “humanism and anthropology”. 48 For him, the
human person becomes fully such to the extent that he is united to God.
Consequently, “radical humanism and faith in the God who reveals himself” should
not be contrasted but “meet and even merge” in consideration of Christ. Genuine
anthropology is Christological. Christ, understood in Chalcedonian terms, is the
mediator of salvation and the means by which human nature is transformed,
simultaneously healed and elevated.

Human nature is incomplete without reference to Christ. Against a neo-scholastic
view positing a human nature complete in itself, Ratzinger rejects the idea of natura
pura. He suggests that the Genesian idea of the human person as in the image of God
“only receives its full meaning” in the New Testament’s presentation of “Christ as
the definitive Adam”.49 Christ is recognised as the “the definitive human being”.50
The “two-Adams doctrine” underlying Ratzinger’s anthropology understands the
first Adam to be oriented to fulfilment in the Second Adam, the “Body of Christ” and
the state in which God will be ‘all in all’.51 The consequence of the ‘two Adams
doctrine’ is that “creation is, as it were, a preliminary sketch that points to him”.52
Human nature is oriented to Christ as the perfection of humanity. The innate
orientation to beatitude is fulfilled in the concrete form in the figure of Christ the
eschatological Adam (3.3.1).

Human nature is thus given an eschatological, Christo-centric reading. It is only
made “intelligible in eschatology” and humanity’s future is only fully realised in the
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final Adam.53 Christ alone is “the complete answer to the question about what the
human being is”.54 Christ is the means by which “the human race may come into its
future”, which it cannot do “unaided”.55 In him does the “deepest meaning” of the
“rough draft” that is created humanity appear.56 Therefore, Christ as the Second
Adam is the “true fulfilment of the idea of the human person”, the “exemplary man”
and the “fulfillment of the whole concept of humanity”. 57 Human life, made for
communion with God, “comes to its highest possibility” when joined to God, who in
the Person of Jesus Christ is joined to humanity.58 In Christ so perfecting nature, the
‘smooth transition’ between the immortality that belongs to the human person by
nature and communion in Christ, is realised in grace through Christ.

A Christological, and necessarily Trinitarian, conception of personhood reveals how
the human person is perfected in Christ. Ratzinger argues the human being only
“truly” becomes a “person” or a “self” when open to the fullness of being and “its
Ground”, in its “relatedness …to God”.59 The means for this natural, spiritual
relatedness to become dialogue with the Father is Christ.60 Christ is the Word who
receives his entire “being from someone and [is communicated] toward someone”.61
As such, his existence is characterised by “the absolute openness of existence”.62 The
Person par excellence, who is open to the ground of all being, is the very ground of
all being. In his Person, he is characterised by “complete relativity of existence
toward the one who sent him” and is open to the reception of divine Being from the
Father and its communication in the Holy Spirit back to the Father. 63 The human
person made in the image of God possesses a constitutive openness towards God
which is perfected by grace. Through Christ the human person is given a “grace-
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filled participation in the divine nature”.64 Grace enables the person to participate in
Christ the Son’s personhood, who is ‘toward’ God the Father by nature, and in that
way find salvation (c.f. 4.3.1).
The grace of baptism enables the human to become a ‘person’ in a Christological and
Trinitarian sense. Tracey Rowland and Conor Sweeney write from a Communio
perspective on human personhood. While recognising that the human being by nature
is already a person made for God, they suggest with only an element of hyperbole
that it is in baptism that the human being first becomes a “real person…a theological
person because now a Christological person”.65 They argue that the spousal union of
Christ with his Church bears fruit in the begetting of children of the Father through
baptism. In such begetting they become “who [they] are meant to be”.66 What can be
described as a natural desire for ‘personhood’ is fulfilled in baptism. As de Gaál
points out in respect of Ratzinger’s eschatology, human beings have a heavenly
destiny, becoming “fully what they are” in the heaven that baptism foreshadows.67 In
baptism, the human being is “I, but no longer I”: the human individual remains but is
“transformed” in Christ.68 The person is “re-birthed”, becoming a new creation.69 He
becomes another Christ, another ‘son’ of the Father.

Ratzinger adopts therefore the basic Christian claim that Christian life involves
divine filiation and incorporation, by adoption, into Christ and his relationship with
the Father, and his Body. A Christian possesses the concomitant ‘right’ to claim what
is proper to Christ by nature, namely to receive the divine life from the Father.
Genuine deification and therefore redemption occurs, not by ourselves claiming
divinity through a Promethean violence and our rationality, work and supposed
independence, but through a “praxis of receiving” (as opposed to a praxis of
activism), in which we allow ourselves to be claimed as ‘sons’ in a dialogical
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relationship with the Father.70 Only by such divine adoption as heirs of God can the
human person claim equality with God, because in the Son, God became man,
allowing humanity to claim sonship in God. If immortal life consists in dialogue with
God, the manner by which such dialogue occurs is through participation in the
eternal dialogue of the Son with the Father, in the Holy Spirit. This occurs in the
communal “We” of the ‘body of Christ’, in which each person is united by
“becoming a son with the Son”, the filii in Filio of a soteriology of transformative
deification.71 Authentic deification occurs in the reception of divine life via
incorporation into the sonship of the Divine Son.

5.4.3

Genuine Subject-hood is Christological and not Political

Casting redemption as participation in the divinity of the Son leads Ratzinger to
conceive personal subject-hood in Christological terms, revealing a cleavage
between himself and political and liberation theologies. Those theologies emphasised
becoming a subject, implicitly understood as a political intra-historical notion, as the
object of hope.72 Ratzinger acknowledges that the human person is “a true subject in
his own right”.73 Contrary to a political notion of the subject, however, the basis for
“genuine subjecthood” is divine filiation, the process of grace whereby the person
“has become a son”.74 One is a subject to the extent that one is incorporated into
Christ’s filial relationship with the Father.

Being a subject is cast by Ratzinger in personalist terms and not within a political or
inner-historical framework. Directly contrary to the Concilium animus directed
against personalism (1.2.4), for Ratzinger the ‘rights’ attaching to the human being as
a child of God derives “from the ‘Thou’ of God”.75 The grace of divine adoption is
what entails authentic “[d]ivinization”, an “emancipation” involving participation in
70
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the Kingdom, itself understood in Christo-centric terms.76 Ratzinger’s use of
‘emancipation’ is deliberate and sets him apart from immanentist understandings of
that term (1). Consistent with a view of nature and grace in which the notion of gift is
given conceptual priority, Ratzinger argues that such participation in the Kingdom is
the result of a gift and not the product of human politics. ‘Emancipation’ is not to be
seen as a consequence of historical, social and political liberation. Rather it is a grace
incorporating people into the life of God and hence his sovereign reign, in which the
Kingdom consists (3.3.2).

Being a subject is soteriological, which reveals the non-political and gracious
character of the Kingdom. Although the human person is a genuine subject of the
Kingdom, he does not “produce the Kingdom of God from his own resources”. 77
Instead, the human person “inhabits time” as “an acting subject”, where acting is
understood in terms of the acceptance or rejection of grace.78 The primary
significance of our historical existence is to accept or reject grace. Consequently, the
principal categories of the Kingdom’s proclamation are the urgency of the call to
repentance and response to the offer of grace, centred on Christ and not political
action. So understood, the Kingdom “does not consist in a modification of our
earthly circumstances” but is, rather, found in those who have been touched by the
“finger of God” and have “allowed themselves to be made God’s sons and
daughters”.79 The Kingdom cannot be conceptualised in political terms and be
realised, therefore, in a “political process”, such as a political reading of the
Kingdom might suggest.80 The Christian ‘subject’ is a member of the Kingdom of
Christ, the major concern of which is to call the sinner to repentance. It is not to
establish definitively the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.
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5.4.4

Death and the Cross in the Redemption

Consistent with a Christological notion of the subject and a view that the Kingdom
cannot be brought about through human effort, Ratzinger presents a cruciform and
not a political soteriology. At the centre of Ratzinger’s soteriology is the Cross,
understood as the instrument by which the grace of repentance and divine adoption
finds its fullness. It is also the means by which death and limitations of history are
overcome, a reality that relativises the possibilities of inner-historical improvement.

Ratzinger considers there to be an intrinsic connection between authentic redemption
and the passage from life to death through the Cross. The “transformation” involved
in becoming a child of God, according to Ratzinger, “can only take place through
death”.81 Consequently, the realisation of “salvation in its fullness” in the Kingdom
of God is inextricably linked with the question of dying and the Cross, in which the
Son’s “gesture of gratitude and self-offering”, as constitutive of his very nature as
Son, is radically actualised.82 Liberation and divinisation for humanity is achieved
through Christ’s “obedience on the Cross”.83 Ratzinger quotes the Christological
hymn of Philippians, which relays Christ’s renunciation of the prerogatives of his
divinity in the act of loving obedience to the Father (2:5-11). Authentic equality with
the Godhead for humanity comes through the Death that conquers death through
love.84
Nature’s perfection in grace occurs thus via the medium of Christ’s Cross. The
‘smooth transition’ that Ratzinger detects between the natural spiritual orientation to
beatitude and fulfilment in divine adoption ought not, as a result, be understood as an
immanentist rendering of the nature-grace relationship. The genuine “salvation of the
world”, being focused on the crucified Christ, does not derive “from a transformation
of the world or a political system that sets itself up as absolute and divine”,
irrespective of how necessary sober political and economic improvements are. 85 The
novelty of Christ in relation to nature lies instead in the Cross as the means by which
81
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liberation is wrought. The natural desire remains unfulfilled without the
transformation of death and the Cross.

The importance of the Cross for genuine human fulfilment is connected to the reality
of original sin, which needs to be overcome. A precondition for the human person’s
natural desire for the supernatural to find fulfilment in a postlapsarian world is the
Cross. According to Ratzinger, Christ’s Cross, as “the humanly effected death of
God”, is “the shocking revelation of the sinister destructive power of human
wickedness”.86 The human person’s ‘second nature’ (5.2) is a concupiscent
“vainglory”, which masks the “divine glory” within the human person.87 The
pointless counter-‘glory’ constructed by human pride constitutes a barrier between
the spirit’s innate proximity and orientation to God, and the divine life offered to the
human person. The ‘smooth transition’ between nature and grace is the barrier of
sinful ‘nature’. For grace to elevate the human person above his natural capacity to
the divine life, it must travel through and crack the “hard shell” of this ‘second
nature’.88 Ratzinger argues thus that there can be “no grace without the Cross”.89 For
the human person to come into his destiny, “the endless promise that lies within
him”, he must undergo the Cross.90 The Cross defeats the sin that mars but does not
destroy the spirit’s orientation to God.

The perfection of human nature in Christ occurs through the Cross. Christ, via the
Paschal Mystery, is the means by which humanity ‘passes over’ from death to eternal
life. The human person must participate in Christ’s Passover in order for his ‘second
nature’ to be overcome and victory to be won, which provides the “victorious
gladness” that is the fruit of Christian hope.91 Only in the “humanity of the Second
Adam”, which underwent the Cross, can “true humanity” be uncovered.92 The “true
humanity of man” is the “humanity of God”, taken on in the Incarnation. 93 However,
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the mystery of Christ, as de Lubac points out, involves not just the Resurrection but
his death.94 Resurrection comes solely after the death of Christ.

The claim that human nature finds its perfection through the Paschal Mystery reveals
that redemption comes via a kind of turning away from ‘nature’ through death to self.
It rests on what Ratzinger describes as the “fundamental law of the spirit”, in which
the human person can only come to himself by going forth (the Latin exi) from
himself in an ‘exodus’.95 This ‘fundamental law’, given inchoate shape in the erotic
experience of ecstasy (4.3.7), crystallises in the Paschal Mystery of Christ, who tells
his followers that salvation depends upon losing oneself (Mt 10:39; c.f. Mt 16:25).
Thus, the ‘basic law of human existence’ is paralleled in “the definitive fundamental
law of revelation”, which concerns the exodus of humanity out of its sinful state into
the divine life.96
The Cross of Christ and his Resurrection give meaning to “the age-old wisdom of
humans” concerning the need to die to oneself with a hope that true life will thereby
be realised.97 For human beings “to be themselves” and find fulfilment, they “must
die with Christ like a grain of wheat” (Jn 12:24).98 Participation in the Paschal
Mystery entails the denial of oneself and the picking up of one’s Cross in following
Jesus.99 The ‘meaning of one’s own dying’ is thus found in the death of Christ, who
is “the grain of wheat which fell into the ground” and bears fruit in the life of the
Church.100 The fulfilled human person is the one who participates in Christ’s Cross
and thereby the Resurrection.

The notion that the human spirit must undergo the Cross to reach its supernatural end
‘beyond itself’ is contrary to a naturalistic ethic, which rejects the Cross as the
instrument of salvation (c.f. 1 Cor 1:23). Ratzinger contends with Nietzsche’s notion
that the Cross represents the “crucifixion of man”, because it denies humanity and
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smothers its longing for fulfilment, including in the realm of eros.101 For Ratzinger,
the Cross amounts instead to the “true healing” of humanity because it is the
“genuine fulfillment of the yearning cry that arises out of [the spirit’s] nature”.102
Human nature finds satiation in the Cross because it constitutes the movement of
exodus by which the human person’s “self-sufficiency” is destroyed.103 Significantly
this entails “the breaking down of all earthly assurances and their false
satisfactions”.104 Human fulfilment is not found in the earthly realisation of human
power but the surpassing of self.

5.4.5

A ‘Renunciation’ of Nature?

Implicit in the claim that salvation depends upon incorporation into Christ’s passover
from earthly existence and death to eternal life, is what could be described as an
Augustinian suspicion of the possibilities of fallen nature. What is claimed as
belonging to Ratzinger’s thought is not a debased Augustinianism but the recognition
of the imperative that nature must come out from itself in order to come to itself.105
Moreover, as wounded by sin, it is in need of the novel intervention of Christ to be
healed and elevated in order to reach its potential. Ratzinger observes that the
humanity of the first Adam “had no finality to it” and “was wholly marked by its
failed beginning”. Humanity had fallen into a state that “needed to be
overcome…through death and downfall” in the “Crucified and Risen One”, who
“[begins] humanity’s second and final phase”.106 Thus, the “former merely natural
human condition” must be surpassed through the embrace of the elevated and
perfected “‘second’ humanness of the incarnate God”.107 Human nature, as such and
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as characterised by sin, needs to be surpassed, in order to overcome the fall and to
enter into the divine-human life of Christ, who transposes the ‘merely natural’ into
its state of fulfilment.

Ratzinger is indebted to de Lubac for the idea that human nature follows a pattern of
exodus and requires conversion in order to come to fulfilment. He quotes de Lubac’s
comment that there “is no smooth transition from a natural to a supernatural love”.108
De Lubac’s use of ‘smooth transition’ contrasts with Ratzinger’s employment of the
very same phrase in suggesting that there is an organic connection between nature
and grace (4.3.5). Ratzinger shares however with de Lubac the “spiritual dialectic”,
which suggests that supernatural love is only possible through a process of “Exodus
and ecstasy”.109 The spiritual dialectic claims that for the human person “[t]o find
himself, man must lose himself”, consisting in the letting go of ‘self-sufficiency’.110
Despite recognising an intrinsic openness to grace in the human person, Ratzinger
evidently considers human nature to be in need of radical conversion beyond itself.

Intrinsic to a spiritual exodus pattern is an almost violent renunciation of nature.
According to de Lubac, entailed in the “passing over” of Christ’s Pasch:
is a transmutation of the whole being, a complete separation from oneself…[and] a
denial of all natural values in their natural existence and a renunciation even of all
that had previously raised the individual above himself.111
Ratzinger shares the ecstatic view of the exodus which Christ undergoes on the
Cross, and the transmutation and separation it involves. The passion of Christ’s love
involves the “pain of being torn apart”, and contains “the ec-stasy of man outside
himself, in which he is stretched out infinitely beyond himself, torn apart, as is it
were, far beyond his capacity for being stretched”.112 The Cross is the instrument
which effects the spirit’s movement ‘beyond itself’. It is the means by which human
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nature is turned ‘inside out’, as it were, and opened to the fulfilment of the spirit’s
innate orientation ‘beyond itself’.113

Entailed in the doctrine of the Cross is the claim therefore that nature in some way
must be renounced, not to the point of denying its integrity, but so as to perfect it by
radically surpassing its limits. The arguable tension between Ratzinger’s defence of
the continuing integrity of nature and his apparent adoption of a Lubacian
renunciation and surpassing of nature, which might superficially have Barthian
overtones, is overcome in the realisation that grace perfects and does not destroy it.
Grace perfects the nature of the spirit because, according to the AugustinianAegidian Thomist view, the spirit’s own latent orientation is to surpass itself and find
supernatural fulfilment in participation in the life of God. The first Adam necessarily
points to the Second Adam, the ‘last man’. Human nature in itself reaches its
ultimate perfection only in Christ, which implies an imperfection on the part of the
first Adam. His preternatural gifts were not supernatural, in the sense of the
possession of definitive eternal, divine life (he was free to sin and suffer its
consequences). In this regard, Ratzinger leaves open the question of whether the
Incarnation would have occurred without sin (Scotus’s idea of the praedestinatio
absoluta Christi). Nevertheless, he quotes the comment of Aquinas that, prior to the
Fall, “man believed, explicitly in Christ’s Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for
the consummation of glory”.114 As Ratzinger avers, perfected humanity is God’s
humanity, the joining of human nature to the divine in Christ as expressed at
Chalcedon. The grace of the Incarnation is thus what perfects humanity.115 Only in
union with the divinity does human nature surpass and perfect itself.

Ratzinger does not however merely adopt a theology of the Incarnation. The
renunciation of nature entails especially a rejection of sinful nature. In Aquinas, who
according to Ratzinger “[sees] a strong relationship between the Incarnation of Christ
and man’s fall into sin”, is the notion that Christ’s Passion and Resurrection were
113
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necessary to deliver humanity from sin.116 Although what is purely natural to the
human person needs elevation and completion, and is perfected in Christ the Second
Adam, what needs destruction is the ‘second nature’ of sin, which occurs in the
Cross.117 Ratzinger may not think that the ‘tearing apart’ involved in the Cross would
have been necessary for natural spirit without sin to find its perfection, although the
logic of his position is that the spirit constitutively needs to surpass itself in some sort
of ecstatic exodus. In the concrete historical order, in which sin is part of reality,
such a ‘transmutation of being’ is, however, necessary. Human nature and human
existence as it is cannot be left in itself to find fulfilment. It is perfected in Christ and
his Cross, which involves a violent letting-go of merely natural values and an
acceptance of death as the means of passing from life to death.

5.5

Soteriology and the Hope-History Relationship

Pieper and Ratzinger’s accounts of hope present it as oriented to redemption (2.3.5).
In positing deification as the transformative redemption of the human person,
Ratzinger offers a soteriology, which matches his account of hope. Thus redemption
for Pieper and Ratzinger involves salvation and deification, the object of genuine
human hoping. It responds to the human person’s natural desire, and corresponding
hope, for immortality (2). A soteriology of this sort is necessarily eschatological.
Seeking God’s face, the vision of which is the fullness of immortality and therefore
beatitude, is an “eschatological orientation” that contains the “transcendence of time
and eschatological hope”.118 Eschatological hope is thus directed towards transhistorical, eternal deification grounded in a soteriology, which ‘renounces’ the
merely natural.
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What Pieper and Ratzinger consider is the content of fundamental hope as oriented to
an extra-worldly object, is matched in a view of the supernatural in which human
fulfilment involves the overcoming of worldly promises of happiness through the
Cross. Economy and politics are therefore not the basis for hope. Instead, hope is
connected to the Cross, which necessarily limits the claims that politics can make
regarding the liberation of the human person and points, rather, to a path of liberation
as flowing from renunciation of self. Christian hope “points less and less to an
earthly and political power”.119 Rather “the passion [is] an essential element of
hope”.120 The hope for undying love, which conquers death, is quenched on the
Cross, in which an “act of love” given divine power and communicated to humanity,
“prevailed and death fled vanquished”.121 Genuine hope and eschatological
expectation is therefore centred on the crucified Christ, foolishness to the Greeks and
scandal to the Jews (1 Cor 1:23).

Immanentist understandings of salvation history underappreciate the necessity of the
Cross for genuine salvation. For Ratzinger, “an exodus without the cross” does not
lead “to the resurrection but to an earthly utopia”.122 Christ’s liberating work in his
Passover “neither refers to a geographical nor to a political way”. 123 Contrary to a
view of liberation seen as purely political, which understands the Old Testament
Exodus in political terms, Christ universalises the Exodus undertaken by Moses. He
is not a political parallel of him.124 The means by which the object of hope is
achieved is the Cross, not economy or politics. This section explores, therefore,
Ratzinger’s theology of politics as bounded by eschatology, and his critique of a
Rahnerian view of salvation history, which informs the Concilium view of the hopehistory relationship and its tendency to conflate politics with eschatology.
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5.5.1

Politics as Bounded by Eschatology

Ratzinger’s theology of politics is informed by his understanding of the nature and
grace relationship, in which the limits of human nature as such and as marked by sin,
and the consequent necessity of the Cross to redemption, are recognised. Ratzinger
elaborates a theology of politics, which although not extrinsicist respects the relative
autonomy of faith and politics, and delimits their respective spheres. He opposes a
collapsing of the orders of nature and grace, and a conception of the Kingdom of
God as realisable by political means. As seen, he detects in political theology a
mingling of faith and politics, which runs the risk of turning the eschaton into
utopia.125 He presents instead a view of politics as relativised by eschatology. He
does not see politics as effecting eschatological reality.

To be clear, Ratzinger does not promote an entirely extrinsic reading of the
relationship between faith and politics. He presents a reading of the relationship
between eschatology and utopia, which acknowledges an underlying unity in
differentiation between faith and politics. Politics, like nature (and reason),
ultimately must transcend and ‘renounce’ itself for fulfilment.126 For Ratzinger,
eschatology bounds any human, earthly activity including politics, and reminds
humanity of its transcendent destiny. Eschatology is a “statement of faith”, involving
theological reason.127 Eschatology is therefore not itself a “political goal” but assures
history of its meaning, by pointing to the prospect of its perfection outside itself.128
Eschatology, as theological and Christological (and therefore ontological), is allied to
“the tradition of Platonic thought”.129 For Ratzinger, an apocalyptic theology of
history – and it could be added, eschatologically driven theologies of hope – recedes
in importance when it is understood that eschatology, in proclaiming Christ’s
Resurrection and the promised sharing of creation in that Resurrection, is primarily
125
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concerned with belief in Christ.130

Eschatology concerns not any particular

philosophy of history, but, as seen above, is theocentric and Christological (3).

Politics is informed by faith, even if politics is not itself eschatological. Eschatology
points to “values as realities” by encouraging reason to extend beyond the merely
empirical and to search for the ontological reality that transcends it.131 In this way,
faith reminds the political realm of an underlying “core of humanity” and “the
genuine common good” – that is, the mores essential to a healthy polity – and the
supra-historical destiny of nature.132 Faith does not however address politics in the
manner of dictating specific outcomes. It avoids thus the “irrationality” of chiliasm,
by insisting that the eschaton is a trans-historical reality.133 In reminding politics that
it does not contain immanently the seeds of its own perfection, eschatology ensures
that politics remains within its own bounds and does not seek to arrogate
eschatological claims for itself. Thus, in contrast to political theology, Ratzinger
argues that politics is not part of eschatology but a subset rather of moral theology. It
is concerned with the moral life and development of persons and communities, and is
not an attempt to instantiate eschatological reality.134
In the light of eschatology, a genuine understanding of ‘utopia’ emerges. For
Ratzinger, ‘utopia’ involves an ongoing search for justice, a search not ever fully
achieved but only “asymptotically” touched.135 Contrary to Bloch’s and popular
notions of utopia, Ratzinger argues that ‘utopia’, strictly considered, is not futuredirected or revolutionary. Rather, it is the philosophical attempt in the present to
direct “practical reason within the framework of ontological thought”. 136 Utopia
relates to ontology and seeks God’s justice, revealing the ultimate origin of all things
in him. Ratzinger is, however, careful to limit the claims of utopia because the norms
it seeks can never be perfectly realised on earth. Utopia is not an attempt to realise
the supra-historical ‘future’ promised in Christian eschatology but the never-ending
search for justice.
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Present in Ratzinger is also an Augustinian dialectic between the City of Man and the
City of God, which denies that eschatological fulfilment can be found within the
merely natural or historical. For Ratzinger, the City of God is an incipient, historical
reality, pointing to a “heavenly Jerusalem” (Heb 12:22), which is the eschatological
realisation of human, corporate unity.137 That unity cannot be found in history. From
the time of Christ, within history, are “two poleis”.138 Against the ancient, Orphic,
pantheist notion that Zeus’s body included the universe and a Roman identification
of the cosmos with the polis (and it can be suggested a Hegelian pantheistic
understanding of history), Christianity suggested that the Church was “the new
cosmopolis”.139 The Church is, however, a reality transcendent of history.
Incorporation into the Church involves participation in the “death-destiny of the
Crucified One” and thus entails the “overcoming [of] the former merely natural
human condition” and embrace of “the new ‘second’ humanness of the incarnate
God”.140 In short, the “two-poleis” doctrine relates to the ‘two Adams’ doctrine, in
which nature is understood as pointing to Christ. The fulfilment of natural desire in
Christ can only be realised in the surpassing and ‘renunciation’ of nature through the
Paschal Mystery and the definitive establishment of the heavenly Jerusalem. The
‘new cosmopolis’ is announced in the Church and begun on earth eventually to
replace the old earth.141 It promises, however, a fulfilment not to be found on earth.

Matching a theology of hope, which posits the status viatoris and a supra-historical
object of human hope and is grounded in an Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist account
of the supernatural, is the insight that Christians are citizens of the heavenly
Jerusalem and while on earth, are pilgrims (4.4.2). Acknowledgment of the pilgrim
state of Christian existence shows Christians to be in exile on earth. Simultaneously
they are, however, members of the “new society which is the goal of their common
pilgrimage and which is anticipated in the course of that pilgrimage”.142 As a pilgrim,
the Christian “is not therefore bound for an earthly city, but for the new City of God
137
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that develops in the midst of this world”.143 Christians are “still en route” towards a
heavenly commonwealth, “which is to come” (Heb 13:14; c.f. Phil 3:20).144
Consequently, Christians have taken on the mantle of Israel’s patriarchs in being
“foreigners and resident aliens” whose orientation is “toward[s] their future
fatherland”.145 Due to its exilic character, for Ratzinger, the Christian’s pilgrimage
involves participation in the Cross as a necessary element of the “ascent to the
heights of God” and “the realization of one’s own humanity”. 146 Paralleling
Ratzinger’s soteriology and consequential to the doctrine of the heavenly Jerusalem,
in which the Cross takes a central place in the surpassing of nature, is the view that
the Christian’s place in history is one of exile.

Being a citizen of a City whose consummation remains an eschatological promise
relativises the possibility of historical fulfilment for Christians and to a degree sets
the Christian in opposition to the City of Man. Entailed in the recognition that the
Christian is in exile on earth is an “‘eschatological’ attitude”, which limits the claims
of the state as well as the possibilities of history. To this extent, Ratzinger can be
described as an “Eschatologist”, understood as one who reminds the Church that her
ultimate destiny is eschatological and not historical, and warns against the totalising
tendencies of an inner-historical focus. He sets himself against the reticence on the
part of Christians to cite texts regarding the destination of humanity in a heavenly
Jerusalem, in the face of Nietzschean and Marxist arguments “that time devoted to
heaven is time wasted”.147 A hesitation to proclaim a heavenly destiny is grounded in
a fear that to do so would be to distract humanity from fulfilling its “political”,
“innerworldly task” and “alienate [him] from the earth”. 148 For Ratzinger, this
misconceives however the pilgrim character of the Church’s existence.149
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Exclusive focus on the inner-historical can tend to a dangerous humanism. Ratzinger
rejects a mere affirmation of humanism, even of what is highest in ‘natural’
humanity and rejects a humanism denuded of specific reference to Christ.150 He
shares thus with de Lubac a suspicion of a humanism that avoids reference to the
Christian mystery. De Lubac argues that “Christian humanism must be a converted
humanism”.151 Following de Lubac, Ratzinger argues that humanism cannot simply
be grounded on “what is noble about man”.152 Without conversion through Christ’s
Cross, affirmation of the merely natural “eventually leads to man’s self-assertion and
self-idolization and the refusal of God’s new reality”.153 Failure to recognise the
‘new reality’ of God’s action in Christ, can lead to humanity arrogating to itself or to
history divine status. Instead, it is necessary to accept the new humanity found in
Christ in order to “[unmask] as false the humanness that merely divinizes itself”.154
In short, any earthly political instantiation cannot claim divinity but remains always
relative to the genuinely heavenly city. To hold otherwise creates a dangerous polity
concerned with enforcing eschatological “purity”.155 A belief that human nature or
human existence as such is perfectible can lead to an idolatrous elevation of human
nature and eschatological view of politics. Politics instead is a task of moral
theology, limited by the eschatological destiny of humanity.
5.5.2

Ratzinger’s Critique of a Rahnerian View of Salvation History in the
Concilium Perspective on Hope and History

Ratzinger’s account of politics, informed by a view of natural desire as oriented
beyond itself to a fulfilment in the Cross, contrasts with the failure of the theologies
of futurity adequately to differentiate faith and politics. Arguably, this failure
conceptually rests on the Rahnerian tendency to correlate the universal with the
particularity of Christianity. Detecting dangers inherent to an unconverted humanism
distinguishes Ratzinger’s soteriology from a Rahnerian-inflected one, which informs
the Concilium position on hope and history. The privileged place given to the unique
Christ by Ratzinger contrasts with the immanentist tendency of Rahner’s theology of
150
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grace to conflate Christianity with the universal claims of philosophical reason. This
section sets out Ratzinger’s critique of the Rahnerian theology of grace from
soteriological and Christological perspectives. It will then suggest some
ramifications of this criticism for the Concilium tendency to integrate world history
and salvation history, and what can be achieved by politics.
Ratzinger’s soteriology is grounded in his view of the supernatural and is predicated
on the recognition that humanity is in need of radical transformation to attain
salvation. Ratzinger specifically critiques Rahner for acknowledging but failing in
Foundations of Christian Faith to explore fully the implications of the principle of
“Ek-stase”.156 According to Ratzinger, a Rahnerian theology of grace argues that
redemption consists in the human person accepting “his [own] existence” (1.4).157
Against this view and the “Marxist-inspired theologies” that followed on from
Rahner, Ratzinger argues that “reality as such – man as he is – cannot be the object
of unconditional acceptance but rather bears within itself the seeds of a profound
nonacceptance”.158 Accepting humanity “as it is in itself … is not redemption; it is
damnation”.159 Instead, an ecstatic “spirituality of conversion” expresses the essence
of soteriology.160 He argues that the “world’s salvation rests on the transcending of
the world in its worldly aspect”, an argument that contrasts with Metz’s affirmation
of the world in its worldliness (1.4.3).161 The insufficiency characteristic of human
nature, and sin and death need to be overcome. Ratzinger possesses a view of
redemption that accepts the radical novelty and transformative character of grace
mediated through Christ, in contrast to a soteriology and Christology resting on the
immanent capabilities of human nature and reason.

The tendency to equate salvation with the acceptance of the human person as he is,
follows from Rahner’s use of transcendental philosophy, which relates to a Hegelian
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philosophy of history. Ratzinger critiques Rahner and Gutiérrez on the grounds that
they equate the universal with salvation and thus deify history in Hegelian terms.
Ratzinger detects in Rahner an “intermingling of the universal and particular, of
history and being”.162 The supernatural existential is thus a form of what Ratzinger
describes as the totalising “claim of gnosis”.163 Ratzinger critiques Rahner for
attempting to explain all of salvation history, God’s dealings with humanity, by
reference to an all-encompassing philosophical system. Ratzinger argues that the
transcendental lens through which Rahner understands human existence leads to an
identification between Christianity and natural reason. He suspects that Rahner’s
application of the “transcendental deduction” to a spiritual context, such that the
human person comes into contact with Christ simply by “accept[ing] his [own]
existence”, consists in “a resolution of the particular into the universal that is at
variance with the newness of Christianity”.164 He points out that Rahner constructs a
“world formula” based on “necessary causes”.165 To do so, however, is to commit
“Hegel’s basic error” by suggesting that there is a “spiritual world formula”. 166 In
Gutiérrez’s liberation theology, this Hegelian thrust is seen in the perception that
Marxism is the expression of human reason. Its philosophy of history thus becomes
determinative of the meaning of history, and its references to praxis become
incorporated into liberation theology (1.4.2). It is paralleled also in Schillebeeckx’s
understanding of the Church-world relationship and Metz’s political theology, in
which world history and salvation history are seen in unitary terms. In contrast to the
Augustinian-Aegidian Thomist view of the supernatural and analogical metaphysics,
there is insufficient differentiation of nature and grace, history and being.
Ratzinger’s view of the nature-grace relationship, soteriology and Christology stands
therefore opposed to a Rahnerian theology of grace. A Rahnerian account of grace
misunderstands human freedom, at least as used by the Concilium perspective,
because it “reduces Christian liberation to pseudoliberation” and downplays the
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novelty of Christ.167 It is tempted to view redemption as the confirmation of the
dynamic of offer and acceptance inherent to human existence as such, grounded in
the supernatural existential. Consequently, a popularised Rahnerianism sees Christ’s
Paschal Mystery as “exemplary rather than efficacious”. 168 The particular is seen
merely as a confirmation of the universal and not the cause of redemption. Salvation
is not the ‘renunciation’ of what is there in human existence as it is but rather its
affirmation.

The result is the minimisation of the peculiarly Christian. As Balthasar avers, while
Rahner remains affectively committed to the particularity of the Church, his
transcendental, philosophical orientation “demands the relativisation of everything
ecclesiastical in the name of an all-pervading grace”.169 Justifying grace is present
anonymously in the human person without any consciously explicit connection to
Christ and his Church.170 In contrast, for Ratzinger Christ is “the Event of the new
and unexpected”.171 The human person “does not find salvation in a reflective
finding of himself” but in undergoing the exodus of the Cross.172 Ratzinger would
argue thus that grace is not an anonymous aspect of our being but is uniquely present
in the Church, based on the singular mediation of Christ.
The Concilium account of hope does not pay sufficient regard to the spirit’s
orientation beyond itself and the particularity of Christianity. The Rahnerian
tendency to identify the universal with Christianity is arguably reflected in its
approach to hope and history, especially in liberation theology. An integrated view of
liberation, in which the achievement of earthly goods is seen as part of salvation
(1.5.3), contrasts with Ratzinger’s Christological soteriology, as well as his view of
salvation as ‘already, not yet’. It also contrasts with Pieper’s notion that true hope
might only emerge precisely when little hopes, directed to the attainment of earthly
goods, are disappointed (2.3.1).
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Despite their insistence on the distinction between history and eschatological reality,
the Concilium perspective on hope and history conflates eschatology and history. In
Metz’s political theology and Gutiérrez’s liberation theology, there is a risk
eschatological reality is secularised, which relates to the “intermingling of history
and being” in Rahner.173 Metz and Gutiérrez clearly adopt the Rahnerian tendency to
conflate world history and salvation history (1.5), in which it can be said that the
historical and ontological impermissibly converge. For example, Müller and
Gutiérrez’s understanding of the relationship between the historical and
eschatological conceives soteriology by reference to an immanent framework.
Instead of being oriented to Christ and his Parousia in the liturgy and at the end of
time, Müller and Gutiérrez consider that eschatological reality is manifested in the
achievement of openly described ‘earthly goods’ (1.5.3). It is true that the
achievement of earthly goods can be signs of God’s reign (c.f. Lk 4:16-21). Placing
freedom, human dignity and so on as goals to be realised on earth runs however the
risk of ‘immanentizing the eschaton’ and politicising Christianity in the name of
utopia. It is but a short step from arguing that salvation is to be understood in integral
terms, to the inappropriate politicisation of faith. Müller, for example, suggests that
those involved “in groups that work for liberation [stand] on the side of the divine
liberator”.174 Respectfully, this is too large a claim to be made in the realm of
politics. It may not leave space for prudential disagreement over the merits of
particular efforts to achieve ‘liberation’ understood in integrated terms. Moreover,
concepts such as freedom, human dignity and justice are concepts whose content are
not and cannot be definitively or exhaustively understood this side of eschaton.
Accordingly, they can be filled by contestable secular idioms.175 In this regard, the
interest of liberation theology, as well as Metz and Schillebeeckx, in political
communities and praxis reveals a conflation of faith and politics, eschatology and
history.

Despite this, Fiorenza defends political and liberation theology from the charge of
immanentising soteriology based on the ‘eschatological proviso’ said to be utilised
by these theologies (1.3.3, 1.5.2). In seeking to defend Gutiérrez against the charge
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of “politico-religious messianism”, he actually ends up however revealing the
immanentist tendencies of liberation theology.176 According to Fiorenza, Gutiérrez
argues that faith can only be a norm solely based on “a rational analysis of reality
and through the mediation of a utopian ideal of what man should be”.177 Faith is
conflated with immanent rationality and measured against a utopian ideal. The
implicit reliance on Enlightenment ideals of rationality and appeals to utopia and the
‘new man’, lack any specific or necessary reference to a Christological reading of
reason or the perfection of the human person. Instead, redolent of Rahner’s
transcendental deduction of the particularity of Christianity into universal reason,
utopia, understood as an ideal future state for society, is the rationalist guiding
principle.

5.5.3

Conclusion

In summary, Ratzinger rejects a conflation of nature and grace, faith and politics.
Although faith has something to say to politics, it does so by pointing out the
limitations of the political and merely ‘natural’ realm. An Augustinian-Aegidian
Thomist view of the nature-grace relationship and soteriology, in which the
particularity of Christ and the need for nature’s transcendence is emphasised,
contrast with the Rahnerian-inflected Concilium view of the hope-history
relationship, which overlays politics with specifically eschatological significance.

5.6

Conclusion

Ratzinger’s soteriology argues that it is Christ alone, in his novelty and particularity,
who can draw human nature and history outside of themselves to fulfilment.
Although asserting that human nature is directed to supernatural fulfilment, he
maintains the distinction between the two orders of nature and grace, and between
world history and salvation history. Necessary for their fulfilment is a salvific gift
that can only be given at the hands of the divine, which heals wounded nature, and
draws up and elevates the potentialities inherent to nature into participation in a new,
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higher order of being. Ratzinger’s soteriology recognises that human nature as
wounded by sin needs renunciation in a spirituality of the Cross to find fulfilment.
Being Christological in shape, Ratzinger’s soteriology is allied to a Johannine
incarnational (not Incarnationalist) theology, according to which human nature is
consummated only in the joining of the human with the divine in the Incarnation of
the Word. In itself, and not just as a result of sin, human nature needs surpassing in
an Exodus pattern to come to its fullness. Christ is the embodiment of the distinctly
novel action of the divine that perfects human nature’s orientation to supernatural
fulfilment, an orientation that nevertheless depends upon something outside of itself
for beatitude. In the real world of nature and grace, the passage to fulfilment is
cruciform. For Ratzinger, the notion of the Passover, as involving death, entails a
kind of denial of nature and the possibilities of profane history and politics. His view
of nature and grace leads to a suspicion of any soteriological claims emphasising
human capacity and immanentist means to achieve liberation. He rejects Marxist
understandings of redemption and presents soteriology in a-political personalist
terms, in which salvation consists in being adopted into the filiation of Christ.
Politics is bounded by eschatology, which points history to its transcendent
fulfilment outside itself.

Ratzinger thus avoids the problematic Concilium tendency to collapse the orders of
nature and grace, downplay the need for Christ, elide the problem of death and give
to human existence (and history, politics and reason) a capacity (the power to
redeem) that it does not possess. Unlike the tendency of those who utilise Rahner’s
theology of grace, in which the supernatural existential is a component, Ratzinger
recognises that the natural inclination for supernatural fulfilment requires grace to be
mediated through the Church. The revelation of God in Christ is not the confirmation
of a dynamic operating within human existence already but the non-contingent, free
and surpassingly unexpected act of God.
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CONCLUSION

Tracey Rowland points out that the principal cleavage in post-conciliar theology
turns on whether one prefers Balthasar or Rahner and the fundamental theologies
they embody.1 Although not the principal foci of the current thesis, these authors can
be taken generally to represent the competing ‘schools’ of theology dominant in the
post-conciliar period, the Communio and Concilium perspectives. The thesis has not
been specifically engaged in resolving the debate between the two, but has sought to
offer from the Communio perspective an examination of the implications that flow
from an adoption of one or the other starting point in fundamental theology
represented in these schools and particular authors from them. Chief of those authors
has been Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI, whose work in important respects is
indebted to Josef Pieper. They represent the Communio perspective. Arrayed against
them are Edward Schillebeeckx, Johann-Baptist Metz and Gustavo Gutiérrez, as
representative of an alternative Concilium fundamental theology. Behind each set are
often the luminaries Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Karl Rahner
respectively.

An examination of the ramifications flowing from the particular starting points in
fundamental theology reveals the significance of which starting point is chosen. The
thesis has examined such implications in reference to the hope-history debate, which
has animated contemporary philosophy and theology, and has broader ramifications
1

Tracey Rowland, “A Catholic Appropriation of Romantic Themes,” in How Balthasar Changed My
Mind: Fifteen Scholars Reflect on the Meaning of Balthasar for Their Own Work, eds. Rodney A
Howsare and Larry S Chapp (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2008), 195: “When I
arrived in Cambridge [to commence doctoral studies], I had a meeting with my supervisor, who asked
me what type of Catholic I was, and before I had time to answer the general question, he asked
specifically whether I preferred Rahner or Balthasar. This was the first time anyone had suggested to
me that this really is the key question of post-conciliar Catholicism”. Ratzinger describes Balthasar’s
Cordula, in which the Rahnerian tendency in theology is critiqued, as “…a classic of impartial
polemics. This work worthily joins the great polemical works of the Fathers, which taught us to
differentiate gnosis from Christianity.” See Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, “Communio: A program,”
Communio 19(3) (Fall, 1992): 437, Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Moment of Christian Witness, trans.
Richard Beckley (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), e.g. 100-113 and Kerr, Twentieth Century
Catholic Theologians, 92.
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in a culture intent in destroying the past for the sake of a utopian future. The hopehistory debate concerns: how to conceive eschatological hope, its object and the
extent of its possible realisation within history; human agency in bringing it about;
the importance of metaphysics vis-à-vis praxis in understanding the nature of hope;
the limitations of a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical view of history in theology; and the
role of revelation and Christ, viewed in light of Chalcedonian dogma, in conceiving
the content of eschatological hope as ‘already’ but ‘not yet’ fully realised. The
Communio and Concilium perspectives offer vastly different answers to these
questions. The former, rooted in a Communio fundamental theology, offers a vision
of hope as oriented to extra-historical eternity and grounded in Christ, in which
human nature is joined to the divine in the Person of the Word. The latter, founded
on a marriage of Hegelian-Marxist emphasis on praxis, a low Christology and
immanentist Rahnerian theology of grace, does not eschew the eschatological
character of hope but view history and the secular as an important site for the
realisation of eschatological goals, which become necessarily political and
materialist.

Principal among the issues in fundamental theology touched upon herein has been
the relationship between nature and grace, and the capacity for and manner in which
the human being can receive revelation and the grace it promises. Present in the
competing understandings of the hope-history debate are implicit appeals to a
Lubacian view of the Surnaturel and a Rahnerian theology of grace. The author takes
the view that these represent conflicting and importantly different reactions to the
extrinsic reading of the relationship between nature and grace offered in the
dominant pre-conciliar theology. Although both are ‘intrinsicist’ in recognising an
intrinsic ordination to God in the human person (as he has been created in the natural
desire or supernatural existential), they contribute ultimately different pictures of the
human person, the nature of his capacity for God and how his orientation to
fulfilment is realised. Positing a natural desire, combined with an analogical
metaphysics, reveals the human person to be oriented ‘beyond himself’ to the evergreater God. The supernatural existential, allied to a transcendental philosophy, tends
to reveal the person to be fulfilled in simply accepting himself as God’s primary or
ontologically prior ‘revelation’. Taking either as the starting point filters through to a
view of whether hope is grounded in a restless desire for eschatological, eternal
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fulfilment realised only in and through Christ, against the view that hope is mingled
with the realisation of human, earthly goals.
The implications of the hope and history debate – and its connection to contemporary
calls for ‘paradigm shifts’ and the application of a Hegelian dialectic in the
ecclesiastical environment – call for a renewed discussion of the importance of
fundamental theology and its importance for theology and the Church. The thesis
should not be treated as an exhaustive treatment of the nature-grace relationship and
the continuing debates swirling around de Lubac’s Surnaturel. Nor even should it be
understood as a comprehensive resolution of the hope-history debate – although the
preferred perspective of the author is apparent. Rather it should be taken as an
illustration of the importance to all areas of theology of the positions taken in
metaphysics, Christology and the nature-grace debate, with its necessarily corollary
question of the role of Christ vis-à-vis nature. The foundational question in all
theology ultimately concerns whether to begin with Christ in the particularity and
singularity of the revelation of him or to begin with the human person in himself as
he is and the universal philosophy (be it Kantian, Hegelian or Marxist) that such a
starting point supposedly brings. It is hoped that the thesis has indicated the
importance of the question and suggested the necessity of beginning with Christ, the
Alpha and the Omega, the measure of all human nature and fulfilment. +AMDG
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